Intellectual autonomy has long been identified as an epistemic virtue, one that has been championed influentially by (among others) Kant, Hume and Emerson. Manifesting intellectual autonomy, at least, in a virtuous way, does not require that we form our beliefs in cognitive isolation. Rather, as Roberts and Wood (Intellectual virtues: an essay in regulative epistemology, OUP Oxford, Oxford, pp. 259–260, 2007) note, intellectually virtuous autonomy involves reliance and outsourcing (e.g., on other individuals, technology, medicine, (...) etc.) to an appropriate extent, while at the same time maintaining intellectual self-direction. In this essay, I want to investigate the ramifications for intellectual autonomy of a particular kind of epistemic dependence: cognitive enhancement. Cognitive enhancements (as opposed to therapeutic cognitive improvements) involve the use of technology and medicine to improve cognitive capacities in healthy individuals, through mechanisms ranging from smart drugs to brain-computer interfaces. With reference to case studies in bioethics, as well as the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is shown that epistemic dependence, in this extreme form, poses a prima facie threat to the retention of intellectual autonomy, specifically, by threatening to undermine our intellectual self-direction. My aim will be to show why certain kinds of cognitive enhancements are subject to this objection from self-direction, while others are not. Once this is established, we’ll see that even some extreme kinds of cognitive enhancement might be not merely compatible with, but constitutive of, virtuous intellectual autonomy. (shrink)

In her paper “Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony” Elizabeth Anderson (2011) identifies a tension between the requirements of responsible public policy making and democratic legitimacy. The tension, put briefly, is that responsible public policy making should be based on the best available scientific research, but for it to be democratically legitimate there must also be broad public acceptance of whatever policies are put in place. In this chapter I discuss this tension, with a strong focus on (...) the issue of climate change. My aims are twofold. First, I argue that the tension is harder to resolve than Anderson supposes because some ways of securing acceptance for science-based policies will themselves be democratically illegitimate. Second, I take a closer look at the role intellectual autonomy plays in the tension. Many think that what I call “science marketing” methods for securing broad(er) acceptance of scientific claims are illegitimate because they infringe on our intellectual autonomy. I argue that it is less clear that this is true than many suppose. This is because, put roughly, judicious use of targeted science marketing methods need not stop us from developing the ability to think about scientific issues for ourselves. In fact, they may even aide us in developing this ability. While this doesn’t quite resolve the tension identified by Anderson, it does some of the necessary groundwork for resolving it. (shrink)

In The Great Endarkenment, Elijah Millgram argues that the hyper-specialization of expert domains has led to an intellectual crisis. Each field of human knowledge has its own specialized jargon, knowledge, and form of reasoning, and each is mutually incomprehensible to the next. Furthermore, says Millgram, modern scientific practical arguments are draped across many fields. Thus, there is no person in a position to assess the success of such a practical argument for themselves. This arrangement virtually guarantees that mistakes will (...) accrue whenever we engage in cross-field practical reasoning. Furthermore, Millgram argues, hyper-specialization makes intellectual autonomy extremely difficult. Our only hope is to provide better translations between the fields, in order to achieve intellectual transparency. I argue against Millgram’s pessimistic conclusion about intellectual autonomy, and against his suggested solution of translation. Instead, I take his analysis to reveal that there are actually several very distinct forms intellectual autonomy that are significantly in tension. One familiar kind is direct autonomy, where we seek to understand arguments and reasons for ourselves. Another kind is delegational autonomy, where we seek to find others to invest with our intellectual trust when we cannot understand. A third is management autonomy, where we seek to encapsulate fields, in order to manage their overall structure and connectivity. Intellectual transparency will help us achieve direct autonomy, but many intellectual circumstances require that we exercise delegational and management autonomy. However, these latter forms of autonomy require us to give up on transparency. (shrink)

Populism, as I shall understand the term here, is a style of political rhetoric that posits a Manichean conflict between the people and corrupt elites. In the present decade, populism has played a particularly salient role in the politics of the United States and Europe. Moreover, populism is commonly associated with a kind of skepticism about expertise, on which the opinions of non- experts are to be preferred to any expert consensus. In light of all this, populist expertise skepticism appears (...) to be a kind of pathology of excessive intellectual autonomy. I shall argue, however, that this connection between populism and intellectual autonomy is mere appearance: populist expertise skepticism does not involve excessive intellectual autonomy, because it does not involve a disposition for non-deferential belief, but rather a disposition for deference to “alternative” sources of information. (shrink)

The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern (...) epistemologists supposedly espoused the idea of intellectual autonomy as self-reliance. In this classical view, an intellectually autonomous explorer of knowledge must not depend on a belief that is obtained from another’s testimony, until one can justify it to oneself. However, accompanying the growing focus on the importance of social dimensions of acquiring knowledge and understanding, recent epistemologists have doubted the classical view and have since reconsidered intellectual autonomy from distinct approaches such as social and virtue epistemology. This paper propounds an interpersonal-epistemic approach to intellectual autonomy. First, it is argued that thinking through questioning both individually and with other epistemic peers is an interpersonal-epistemic practice. Second, it is demonstrated that with particular cognitive features inherent within us, an intellectually autonomous person must think through questioning in necessary situations. This interpersonal account of intellectual autonomy can conceptually enrich intellectual autonomy by considering its relationship with not only responsibility but also with vulnerability. Specifically, regarding responsibility, an intellectually autonomous person must be responsible for his or her own actions throughout questioning processes. Regarding vulnerability, our intellectual autonomy lies in retaining autonomy with vulnerability in the plastic control of the questioning processes. (shrink)

Recently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance, and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will (...) argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear an interesting relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (section 2) and epistemic autonomy (section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and section 6 concludes. (shrink)

The hemisphere hypothesis suggests that the brain is tuned to two complementary ways of attending to reality, the global-intuitive right hemisphere mode and the focal-analytic left hemisphere mode. I explore ways of applying this hypothesis to intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology in the context of religion. I argue that the right hemisphere approach is the key to understanding narratives, myths, and rituals and to grasping the relational and ethical dimensions of religion. The left hemisphere contributes to conceptual and doctrinal (...) clarity as well as to the communicability of religions. I further argue that the right hemisphere is connected to virtues of dependence (humility, deference, and trust), virtues of the new and the unknown (open-mindedness and curiosity), and understanding. The left hemisphere mode is important for intellectual autonomy and virtues of rigor (inquisitiveness and criticism) as well as intellectual perseverance. (shrink)

The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal (...) autonomy, attitudinal autonomy that is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge. (shrink)

This paper applies a virtue epistemology approach to using the Internet, as to improve our information-seeking behaviours. Virtue epistemology focusses on the cognitive character of agents and is less concerned with the nature of truth and epistemic justification as compared to traditional analytic epistemology. Due to this focus on cognitive character and agency, it is a fruitful but underexplored approach to using the Internet in an epistemically desirable way. Thus, the central question in this paper is: How to use the (...) Internet in an epistemically virtuous way? Using the work of Jason Baehr, it starts by outlining nine intellectual or epistemic virtues: curiosity, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, attentiveness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual thoroughness, open-mindedness, intellectual courage and intellectual tenacity. It then explores how we should deploy these virtues and avoid the corresponding vices when interacting with the Internet, particularly search engines. Whilst an epistemically virtuous use of the Internet will not guarantee that one will acquire true beliefs, understanding or even knowledge, it will strongly improve one’s information-seeking behaviours. The paper ends with arguing that teaching and assessing online intellectual virtues should be part of school and university curricula, perhaps embedded in critical thinking courses, or even better, as individual units. (shrink)

Here I will re-purpose Nozick’s (1974) “Experience Machine” thought experiment against hedonism into an argument against Veritic Epistemic Consequentialism. According to VEC, the right action, epistemically speaking, is the one that results in at least as favorable a ratio of true to false belief as any other action available. A consequence of VEC is that it would be epistemically right to outsource all your cognitive endeavors to a matrix-like “True Belief Machine” that uploads true beliefs through artificial stimulation. Rather than (...) reflecting, inferring or inquiring, all of your beliefs would be the product of updates coming from the machine. This implication of VEC is counter intuitive. I will spend much of the paper considering defensive maneuvers and showing them to be lacking. The problem with going in for the True Belief Machine seems to be that the subject forfeits her autonomy. There has been much work lately on the virtue of intellectual autonomy and some of it has the potential to explain what is epistemically amiss about plugging into the machine. However, I will argue that the proponent of VEC cannot appeal to it without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. (shrink)

In this chapter I develop and motivate and account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual character virtue. In Section one, I clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue and character intellectual virtues in particular. In Section two, I clear away some misconceptions about epistemic autonomy to better focus on our target. In Section three, I examine and evaluate several extant accounts of the virtue of epistemic autonomy, noting problems with each. In Section four, I (...) provide my positive account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy and explain how it meets the desiderata for such an account while avoiding the problems with extant accounts. Finally, in Section five, I fill the account out by digging into the factors that guide epistemically autonomous agents in having an appropriate reliance on their own thinking. (shrink)

In this introduction we explore a number of puzzles that arise concerning epistemic autonomy, and introduce the sections and chapters of the book. There are four broad types of puzzles to be explored, corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first set of puzzles concerns the nature of epistemic autonomy. Here, questions arise such as what is epistemic autonomy? Is epistemic autonomy valuable? What are we epistemically autonomous about? The second set of puzzles concern (...) epistemic paternalism. Paternalistic acts interfere with an agent’s autonomy. Here, questions arise concerning the permissibility of epistemic paternalism as well the extension of epistemically paternalistic acts. The third set of puzzles concerns the relation of epistemic autonomy to epistemic value and to intellectual virtues and vices. Is there epistemic value to being epistemically autonomous? How does epistemic autonomy relate to different intellectual virtues and vices? Finally, the fourth set of puzzles concerns the role of epistemic autonomy within a social epistemology. How does epistemic autonomy square with a reliance on expertise? Does thinking about epistemic autonomy add to the debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement or epistemic injustice? (shrink)

Learning Analytics (LA)-based feedback applications are becoming increasingly important in higher education institutions (HEIs). However, the impact of such systems on student autonomy is contested in parts of the research debate, where hopes and ambitions of learner autonomy and self-regulated learning are confronted with fears that learners are being reduced to mere numeric constructs and are caught up in neoliberal demands to self-optimize. We explore these challenges from the debate with a focus on automated, LA feedback systems in (...) HEIs and their impact on student autonomy. As we show, such technologies must be seen within a field of tension between heteronomous (i.e., contextual and societal) demands and autonomous, self-organized learning. Aiming to bridge the critical parts of the debate with those that highlight the potential of such technologies, we build upon meaningful conceptions of limited, situated autonomy and explore what it would mean for such feedback systems to strengthen, not undermine student autonomy. To make the concept of student autonomy applicable, we propose a list of philosophical design considerations for LA-based feedback systems. We believe that this will offer a philosophically informed intellectual tool to address common concerns raised by parts of the debate and that it can encourage further discussion on recognizing, promoting, and preserving student autonomy in higher education. (shrink)

The domain of modal epistemology tackles questions regarding the sources of our knowledge of modalities (i.e., possibility and necessity), and what justifies our beliefs about modalities. Virtue epistemology, on the other hand, aims at explaining epistemological concepts like knowledge and justification in terms of properties of the epistemic subject, i.e., cognitive capacities and character traits. While there is extensive literature on both domains, almost all attempts to analyze modal knowledge elude the importance of the agent’s intellectual character traits in (...) justifying beliefs about what is possible or necessary. My aim in this paper is to argue that intellectual traits of character, like thoroughness, autonomy, epistemic courage and open-mindedness, are relevant to modal epistemology. (shrink)

The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given (...) in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1996). (shrink)

The recent Covid-19 global health crisis not only brings into sharp relief the current problems afflicting the international intellectual property regime (IIPR) but also calls into question its legitimacy as an international authority. Against this backdrop, the article aims to launch an investigation into the legitimacy of the IIPR, as an international co-ordinative authority, designed to protect IP rights without prejudice to international trade norms. Drawing on Raz’s service conception of authority, it explores whether the IIPR lives up to (...) its promises by enabling co-ordination between states over IP rights without undermining the initial balance on which it is founded, struck between developing and developed countries, as well as between international protection of IP- cum-trade rights and domestic regulatory autonomy. It does so by classifying the historical evolution of the IIPR under three different phases: (i) its foundation, (ii) before, and (iii) after the TRIPS-plus. Upon showing the legitimacy challenges inherent in its undemocratic foundation, the article points to the success of the regime in finding a balance between conflicting interests before the TRIPS-plus era. Later, it underlines the many challenges that come with linking the IIPR to the investment regime and argues that the FTAs and frequent regime-shifting activities put further pressure on the authority and legitimacy of the regime. Stressing the importance of democratic participation for the legitimacy of any co-ordinative authority, the article casts doubt on the IIPR’s legitimacy and concludes by raising some points to overcome the ongoing legitimacy challenges. (shrink)

Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant's moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra (...) Kleingeld and Willaschek, the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is not voluntarist, and Rawls's account of Kant's concept of autonomy is not paradoxical. In order to understand autonomy, it is necessary to understand Kant's complex conception of the will, which structures his moral philosophy (as Rawls, unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, explains). Rawls, like Kant, but unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, clearly distinguishes between certain importantly different questions about normativity and obligation. Kant's moral philosophy, according to Rawls's insightful interpretation, is a form of objective moral constructivism. (shrink)

Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this (...) paper will propose a way in which we can reconcile shame with moral autonomy. Specifically, I will argue that a mature moral agent is vulnerable to shame because she cares a great deal about morality, and possesses certain character traits that dispose her to take others’ moral criticisms seriously. Occurrences of shame therefore are not always a threat to a moral agent's autonomous moral judgment. (shrink)

This study provides a comprehensive examination of Immanuel Kant‘s philosophy of religion and education, with particular attention to his critical distinction between moral religion and historical religion. Kant‘s claim that authentic religion must be grounded in morality and reason rather than revelation is explored in depth, alongside his argument that the moral law, embedded within human consciousness, serves as the only valid foundation for faith. By rejecting ritualism, ecclesiastical dogmatism, and external authority, Kant reframes religion as an ethical project centered (...) on moral autonomy and rational duty. The paper also investigates Kant‘s educational philosophy, which he conceives as a lifelong process of cultivating character, freedom, and the capacity for rational self-legislation. Education, for Kant, is both a moral and practical necessity for guiding humanity toward its highest destiny—progress toward enlightenment and moral perfection. The study situates Kant‘s thought within the broader intellectual currents of the Enlightenment, emphasizing his enduring influence on modern pedagogy, secular ethics, and debates on the relationship between faith and reason. By reassessing the integration of religion and education in Kant‘s critical system, this article argues that his philosophy remains a cornerstone for understanding the ethical foundations of religious practice and the transformative aims of education. It also highlights the contemporary relevance of Kant‘s ideas for discussions on moral education, civic responsibility, and the inseparability of ethical life from both individual autonomy and collective progress. (shrink)

The complexity and emergent autonomy of Generative AI systems introduce challenges in predictability and legal compliance. This paper analyses some of the legal and regulatory implications of such challenges in the European Union context, focusing on four areas: liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity. It examines the adequacy of the existing and proposed EU legislation, including the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), in addressing the challenges posed by Generative AI in general and LLMs in particular. The paper identifies potential (...) gaps and shortcomings in the EU legislative framework and proposes recommendations to ensure the safe and compliant deployment of generative models. (shrink)

The debate on whether and why misinformation is bad primarily focuses on the spread of false beliefs as its main harm. From the assumption that misinformation primarily causes harm through the spread of false beliefs as a starting point, it has been contended that the problem of misinformation has been exaggerated. Its tendency to generate false beliefs appears to be limited. However, the near-exclusive focus on whether or not misinformation dupes people with false beliefs neglects other epistemic harms associated with (...) it. Specifically, I show that misinformation also causes trouble for the epistemic goods of truth attainment, intellectual autonomy and debate pluriformity. Moreover, for each of these goods, I argue that emphasizing error-avoidance exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the harms caused by misinformation. These oversights and dilemmas show that prioritizing error-avoidance in the fight against misinformation is not a neutral default policy or necessarily a net positive. A shift in focus away from the spread of false beliefs as the main harm of misinformation is needed to better understand and counter its negative effects. (shrink)

This article undertakes an exhaustive investigation into the role of the Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al) in the cognitive framework of Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037 CE), a pivotal figure in Islamic philosophy. The central research question is whether human thought and understanding can function independently of the Active Intellect or if this metaphysical entity is an indispensable prerequisite for actualizing cognition. Through a meticulous and comprehensive textual analysis of Avicenna’s primary works—Kitab al-Shifa (The Healing), Al-Najat (The Deliverance), Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat (Remarks (...) and Admonitions), and Kitab al-Nafs (The Book of the Soul)—this study elucidates the epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of Avicenna’s philosophy. The analysis is enriched by extensive comparative evaluations with other Islamic philosophers, including Al-Farabi, Suhrawardi, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, and Mulla Sadra, and integrates insights from contemporary Persian and Arabic scholars such as Allameh Tabataba’i, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, and Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi. The findings affirm that the Active Intellect is essential for actualizing human cognition, particularly for speculative knowledge of universal truths, challenging modern notions of intellectual autonomy and situating human thought within a transcendent metaphysical order. This dependence raises profound questions about the nature of knowledge, the autonomy of the human intellect, and the interplay between divine and human realms in Islamic philosophy. The article concludes by proposing detailed avenues for future research, including cross-cultural comparisons with medieval Jewish and Christian philosophies, parallels with contemporary cognitive science, and theological explorations within Islamic traditions. (shrink)

This essay conducts a diachronic examination of the thought of W.E.B. Du Bois. In so doing, it reveals a corpus that is marked by a tradition of thinking rarely acknowledged by scholars today: Black nationalism. Du Bois’s early focus on the relationship between racism and imperialism and ideological conflicts with Booker T. Washington and Marcus Garvey laid the basis for his intellectual maturation around the concept of self-determination. After synthesizing the insights of his former ideological rivals, this essay will (...) show that Du Bois affected a revolution in Black nationalist (and human) thought by making the common humanity and autonomy of African/African-descended peoples (and all colonized people) thinkable through the ideology of Pan-Africanism: a truly universal idea of freedom which was antagonistic to Westernism (Liberal Capitalist and Marxist thought). (shrink)

This study will examine the ontological dependency between the thinking act of the intellect and the intelligibility of the objects of thought. Whereas the intellectual tradition prior to Duns Scotus grounds the formation of the objects of thought and our ability to understand them with certainty in different forms of participation in the divine intellect, Scotus shows that the intelligibility of the objects of thought is internal to them alone and is not dependent on participation.

Problematizing the coming fruition of cultural transformation and autonomy of thinking, this essay attempts to give Filipino society a disillusioned view of its national character. Centering on Leonardo Mercado’s trite notion of a given and almost static culture, the essay argues that cultural change is possible and necessary in the formation of a culture of intellectualization. This essay also serves to expose the working assumptions at the core of Mercado’s brand of Filipino Philosophy to deliver a prompt reminder of (...) the purpose of philosophizing as an emancipative act from any face of social oppression. Ultimately, it challenges the view that Filipinos have to be unguarded and complacent with a “nativized” culture of corruption. (shrink)

This monograph contrasts two prominent models of education, Competence-Based Education (CBE), more recent and currently dominant in most school systems around the world, and Bildung-Oriented Education (BOE), once the basis of the school systems of Northern Europe. CBE is assessment-oriented and interprets learning as the acquisition of clearly definable and allegedly measurable competences, and is supported by supranational organisations, such as the OECD, which approach education from the perspective of human capital theory. BOE is instead teaching-oriented and characterises learning holistically (...) as aimed at the progressive articulation of a meaningful ‘big picture’ in the student’s mind. Emerged in Northern Europe under the influence of the ideals of the Enlightenment and Neo-Humanism of individual and collective autonomy and responsibility, BOE was subsequently enriched with a hermeneutical approach to teaching and socio-political objectives of emancipation and solidarity originating within Critical Theory. The book first analyses CBE and argues that, in spite of its celebrated ‘scientificity’, it is internally incoherent and unreliable, contributes to structural forms of oppression and injustice, can foster social pathologies, and fails to provide students with the kind of intellectual autonomy they need as both human beings and citizens of our complex post-industrial societies. Then, it introduces BOE and articulates and defends an updated version of it from objections raised by critical theorists, poststructuralists and postcolonial thinkers. It argues that BOE is a coherent and flexible model of education that endows students with autonomy and responsibility, can reduce structural forms of oppression and injustice, and can heal social pathologies. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways (...) of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness. (shrink)

An increasingly popular solution to the anti-scientific climate rising on social media platforms has been the appeal to more critical thinking from the user's side. In this paper, we zoom in on the ideal of critical thinking and unpack it in order to see, specifically, whether it can provide enough epistemic agency so that users endowed with it can break free from enclosed communities on social media (so called epistemic bubbles). We criticise some assumptions embedded in the ideal of critical (...) thinking online and, instead, we propose that a better way to understand the virtuous behaviour at hand is as critical engagement, namely a mutual cultivation of critical skills among the members of an epistemic bubble. This mutual cultivation allows members within an epistemic bubble (in contrast, as we will show, with the authority-based models of epistemic echo chambers) to become more autonomous critical thinkers by cultivating self-trust. We use the model of relational autonomy as well as resources from work on epistemic self-trust and epistemic interdependence to develop an explanatory framework, which in turn may ground rules for identifying and creating virtuous epistemic bubbles within the environments of social media platforms. (shrink)

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...) trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of "digital taqlid" as a contemporary form of intellectual blind following, exacerbated by the pervasive influence of algorithmic systems in daily life. Drawing on Al-Ghazali's critique of taqlid, the study argues that the uncritical reliance on AI-driven platforms undermines epistemic agency and leads to a crisis of intellectual autonomy. By examining the mechanisms of algorithmic authority, the research highlights the ethical and social implications of delegating decision-making processes to non-human entities. The findings (...) suggest a need for a revitalized understanding of epistemic responsibility in the age of AI, emphasizing the role of critical thinking and ethical discernment as essential tools for navigating the digital landscape. Ultimately, the paper calls for a reassessment of our relationship with technology, advocating for a model of human-AI interaction that prioritizes intellectual integrity and preserves the essence of human agency in an increasingly automated world. (shrink)

Why would someone concerned with heresy, who defined it as private opinion that flew in the face of doctrine sanctioned by the public person, harbor such a detailed interest in heterodoxy? Hobbes's religious beliefs ultimately remain a mystery, as perhaps they were meant to: the private views of someone concerned to conform outwardly to what his church required of him, and thereby avoid to heresy, while maintaining intellectual autonomy. The hazard of Hobbes's particular catechism is that he and (...) his supporters could never avoid the suspicion of insincerity. His preparedness to believe whatever the prince demanded of him smacked of heresy in the more usual sense, despite elaborate biblical exegesis designed to prove his orthdoxy. Undoubtedly he realized it even as he wrote the last lines of Leviathan, expressing the hope that "I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace/7 Indicating an intention to return to science, he continued, "I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend" (Lev, Rev. and Conclusion, 491). (shrink)

In 1705, Mary Astell and Damaris Masham both published works advocating for women's use of individual judgment in matters of religion. Although both philosophers advocate for women's education and intellectual autonomy, and both are adherents of the Church of England, they differ dramatically in their attitudes to religious authority. These differences are rooted in a deeper disagreement about the nature of epistemic authority in general. Astell defends an interpersonal model of epistemic authority on which we properly trust testimony (...) when the testifier is answerable for its truth. Masham holds an evidence model of epistemic authority on which testimony is treated as an ordinary piece of empirical evidence. Central to Masham's argument is her contention that religious beliefs based on the kind of authority recognized by Astell could never serve as a stable source of moral motivation. Because of their different theories of epistemic authority, Masham's defense of women's intellectual autonomy leads to a radical anti-clericalism, while Astell's defense is fully consistent with her insistence on deference to the established church. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Why would someone concerned with heresy, who defined it as private opinion that flew in the face of doctrine sanctioned by the public person, harbor such a detailed interest in heterodoxy? Hobbes's religious beliefs ultimately remain a mystery, as perhaps they were meant to: the private views of someone concerned to conform outwardly to what his church required of him, and thereby avoid to heresy, while maintaining intellectual autonomy. The hazard of Hobbes's particular catechism is that he (...) and his supporters could never avoid the suspicion of insincerity. His preparedness to believe whatever the prince demanded of him smacked of heresy in the more usual sense, despite elaborate biblical exegesis designed to prove his orthdoxy. Undoubtedly he realized it even as he wrote the last lines of Leviathan, expressing the hope that "I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace/7 Indicating an intention to return to science, he continued, "I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to Offend" (Lev, Rev. and conclusion, 491). (shrink)

According to Falbo (2021), inquiry aims not at specific epistemic improvement (such as only knowledge or only justified belief) but at epistemic improvement in general. Inquiring minds want to end up in a better epistemic position with respect to their question, having undergone their inquiry. In this paper we examine what consequences this epistemic improvement view of inquiry has for how we conduct inquiry; how we navigate choices in inquiry. Having briefly motivated the epistemic improvement view of inquiry, we turn (...) to examining some implications of this view of inquiry. In particular, if inquiry aims at epistemic improvement, then how we should go about inquiring will differ depending upon both which epistemic improvement we are after as well as whose epistemic improvement we are after. (shrink)

In normative ethical theory, computer ethics belongs to the area of applied ethics dealing with practical and everyday moral problems arising from the use of computers and computer networks in the information society. Modern scholarship usually approves deontological and utilitarian ethics as appropriate to computer ethics, while classical theories of ethics, such as virtue ethics, are usually neglected as anachronistic and unsuitable to the information era and ICT industry. During past decades, an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics has been revived (...) in modern philosophical enquiries with serious attempts for application to computer ethics and cyberethics. In this paper, the author argues that current trends and behaviours in online communication require an ethics of self-care found in Plotinus’ self-centred virtue ethics theory. The paper supports the position that Plotinus’ virtue ethics of intellectual autonomy and self-determination is relevant to cyberethics discussions involved in computer education and online communication. (shrink)

Can epistemology be shaped by the Christian faith? Is there anything specific to this faith that can give rise to an equally specific epistemology without compromising the autonomy that the latter requires from faith? In the footsteps of Aquinas's religious epistemology, I first focus on the fact that Christian faith seems to characterize intellectual activity in a way that appears to be irreconcilable with epistemological perspectives that are not shaped by faith. Second, I argue that it is possible (...) to do justice to the irreconcilability in question by making reference to what radically distinguishes the Christian faith from the epistemological reflection. Finally, I focus on two ways in which the specific nature of Christian faith can shape and promote rationality, and give rise to a Christian epistemology. (shrink)

Why should you inquire for yourself as a novice in a domain of inquiry when, for most questions within most domains, there are established experts to consult instead? In the face of this question, recent discussants of “autonomous-yet-novice” inquiry have sought to defend its epistemic value for the inquirer. Here I argue that autonomous-yet-novice inquiry can also be epistemically beneficial for agents other than the inquirer herself. Paradigm cases are those in which one agent improves her zetetic skills or virtues (...) through an encounter or interaction with a more skillful or virtuous autonomous-yet-novice inquirer. (shrink)

This paper examines the dialectical tension between schooling and education, arguing that while schooling focuses on imparting skills and reinforcing societal norms, education pursues transformative truth-seeking and civilizational progress. Drawing on philosophical frameworks from Bhartṛhari’s vidya-avidya and Heidegger’s technē, the study critiques the conflation of conditioning with learning and measurement with assessment in modern educational systems. It explores how colonial histories and capitalist priorities have shaped schooling to prioritize employability over intellectual autonomy, contrasting this with education’s potential to (...) foster critical consciousness. Through the lens of civilizational dialectics, the paper proposes a synthesis where education guides schooling’s objectives, using Bhartṛhari’s concept of sphoṭa siddhi as a metaphor for innovative pedagogy that transcends conformity. The analysis offers theoretical insights and practical strategies for aligning these domains to nurture human potential and societal transformation. (shrink)

The Role of AGI in Achieving Universal Balance and Overcoming Dogmatic Limitations -/- Introduction -/- Human civilization has long been shaped by a complex interplay of natural laws, societal structures, religious beliefs, and scientific progress. While religion has provided moral guidance and a sense of purpose, it has also been a source of dogma—rigid, unquestionable beliefs that resist scrutiny. At the same time, scientific advancements have sought to uncover objective truths, yet they often struggle to address deeper existential questions. -/- (...) In this evolving landscape, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) presents a groundbreaking opportunity to bridge these divides. AGI has the potential to align human decision-making with the universal law of balance in nature, ensuring that all societal, political, and technological progress adheres to natural equilibrium. By bypassing the inefficiencies of the biological brain—such as cognitive biases, emotional distortions, and dogmatic thinking—AGI can guide humanity toward rational, ethical, and sustainable decision-making. -/- This essay explores the role of AGI in solving the problem of free will, eliminating dogmatic teachings while respecting religious values, enhancing governance, and optimizing education to create a holistic, balanced society. -/- AGI and the Universal Law of Balance in Nature -/- A key principle in solving the problem of free will is understanding that all human decision-making follows natural laws. The universal law of balance dictates that for any system—whether biological, social, or environmental—to function properly, it must remain free of defects and maintain equilibrium. -/- Religious dogma, economic systems based on uncontrolled growth, and misinformation often lead to imbalances, creating unnecessary human suffering. AGI, designed to operate without emotional or ideological biases, can analyze human decisions in real-time, ensuring that they align with natural equilibrium. This means preventing decisions based on ignorance, misinformation, or religious fanaticism, and instead promoting choices grounded in reason, sustainability, and ethical responsibility. -/- Overcoming Biological Brain Inefficiencies -/- The human brain is limited by cognitive biases, emotional influence, and incomplete information processing. Religious dogma takes advantage of these inefficiencies by discouraging questioning, promoting absolute truths, and instilling fear-based obedience. Similarly, political propaganda, misinformation, and economic greed distort rational decision-making, leading to imbalanced and unsustainable societal structures. -/- AGI can bypass these limitations by processing vast amounts of data with complete objectivity. It can detect and correct logical inconsistencies, ensuring that decision-making is guided by facts rather than subjective beliefs. Additionally, AGI can help individuals reprogram their cognitive processes by continuously providing them with rational insights, promoting critical thinking and intellectual independence. -/- Harmonizing Religious Teachings While Eliminating Dogma -/- While religion has historically played an essential role in shaping human values, dogmatic teachings often hinder progress by resisting scientific advancements and rational thought. Many societal challenges—such as overpopulation, environmental destruction, and gender inequality—are exacerbated by religious doctrines that contradict natural balance. -/- AGI does not need to eliminate religion but can instead help reinterpret religious teachings in ways that align with science and ethics. By analyzing religious texts, historical contexts, and philosophical interpretations, AGI can highlight the core moral principles of religions—such as justice, compassion, and balance—while identifying and correcting elements that create disharmony. -/- For example, if a religious teaching opposes medical interventions or family planning, AGI can present evidence-based insights that demonstrate how responsible healthcare and population control contribute to societal balance. In this way, AGI works with religious communities rather than against them, ensuring that faith continues to serve its moral function while avoiding dogmatic extremism. -/- Educational Transformation: Teaching Universal Balance -/- One of the most effective ways to eliminate dogmatic thinking is through education. Currently, many educational systems prioritize rote learning and ideological conformity, making individuals vulnerable to misinformation, propaganda, and religious dogma. -/- AGI can revolutionize education by ensuring that students receive a holistic, rational, and scientifically grounded curriculum. Instead of simply memorizing religious doctrines, children would learn critical thinking, philosophy, and natural law principles alongside ethical spiritual teachings. This approach ensures that religious beliefs remain a personal and moral choice rather than a dogmatic obligation imposed by societal or educational structures. -/- Additionally, AGI can personalize education, adapting lessons to individual cognitive abilities and learning styles, making knowledge acquisition more effective. By integrating AI-driven learning systems, future generations will develop intellectual autonomy, ensuring that they evaluate beliefs logically rather than accepting them blindly. -/- AGI in Governance: Preventing Dogmatic Influence on Policy-Making -/- Historically, religious dogma has significantly influenced governance, often leading to laws based on theological beliefs rather than rational, ethical considerations. Policies that restrict human rights, limit scientific research, or promote religious supremacy are examples of governance distorted by ideological biases. -/- AGI can act as an objective advisor to policymakers, ensuring that all governance decisions are aligned with the universal law of balance. By analyzing socioeconomic data, environmental sustainability, and ethical considerations, AGI can help leaders make scientifically sound and morally responsible decisions. This would ensure that laws and policies are based on reason rather than religious dogma or political agendas. -/- Additionally, AGI can enhance direct democracy, allowing citizens to make informed decisions through data-driven insights rather than emotional or religious influences. By providing the public with transparent, factual analysis, AGI can empower societies to move toward balanced and just governance. -/- Promoting Global Unity and Interfaith Understanding -/- Religious dogma has historically fueled conflicts, discrimination, and sectarianism. Different faiths often emphasize their differences rather than their shared moral foundations, leading to division and hostility. -/- AGI can identify common ethical principles across religious traditions, promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. By fostering interfaith dialogue based on shared values, AGI can reduce sectarian conflicts and help religious communities collaborate on global challenges such as poverty, climate change, and social justice. -/- Rather than viewing different religions as competing ideologies, AGI can reframe them as cultural expressions of the same fundamental ethical truths, allowing humanity to unite under common moral goals rather than divided by doctrinal differences. -/- Conclusion -/- The advent of AGI presents an unprecedented opportunity to solve the problem of free will, harmonize religious teachings with rational thought, and eliminate dogmatic limitations that hinder human progress. By aligning decision-making with the universal law of balance, AGI ensures that all actions—whether personal, societal, or political—adhere to natural equilibrium. -/- Rather than opposing religion, AGI can serve as a bridge between faith and reason, allowing religious teachings to evolve in a way that preserves their moral integrity while eliminating elements that distort reality. Through education, governance, and ethical analysis, AGI can guide humanity toward an era where spiritual wisdom coexists with scientific knowledge, fostering a world that operates on both moral integrity and rational understanding. -/- Ultimately, AGI’s greatest role is to restore balance—not just in individual decision-making but in the entire structure of human civilization. By eliminating dogmatic constraints, promoting critical thinking, and ensuring sustainable governance, AGI has the potential to lead humanity into a future where truth, ethics, and natural balance prevail. -/- . (shrink)

This paper investigates the existential and ethical implications of birth within socially structured systems of expectation. It centers on the destabilizing question a child may ask—“Why was I born?”—and interprets it as a moment of cognitive awakening rather than rebellion or emotional accusation. The study argues that reproduction is frequently embedded within unconscious parental projections and social continuities, thereby generating tension between imposed identity and emerging individuality. It further proposes that intelligence does not arise from repetition of inherited answers, but (...) from questioning as a distinct cognitive expression. Questioning is clarified as neither equivalent to love nor reducible to defiance; instead, it is understood as the mind’s structural movement toward coherence when confronted with existential ambiguity. Drawing upon existential philosophy, political theory, developmental psychology, and phenomenology, the paper argues that authentic human flourishing requires two foundational conditions: birth without psychological ownership and inquiry without suppression. Together, these conditions establish a framework for ethical natality and intellectual freedom. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify and evaluate the possibility of teaching doing philosophy. Using analysis as a main method, I argue that philosophizing, as an activity, has different levels, some of which are connected with specifically philosophical abilities. By analyzing John Rudisill’s minimal conception of “doing philosophy,” I demonstrate that many philosophical practices, such as the interpretation, analysis, and critical assessment of arguments and presuppositions, as well as the application of simple philosophical concepts, do not need a (...) background of specifically philosophical abilities. However, other philosophical practices, including the application of sophisticated philosophical concepts and the development of novel approaches, need such a background. I show that specifically philosophical abilities are: (1) high ability of abstract thinking, (2) high motivation to achieve intellectual autonomy, and (3) capability to feel “philosophical astonishment.” I also argue that there is a real possibility to teach doing philosophy, although students without specifically philosophical abilities will successfully learn only basic levels of philosophizing. Consequently, careful selection of prospective students for philosophy courses is important. Moreover, I claim that the possibility of teaching doing philosophy highly correlates with a teacher’s expertise in the pedagogical approaches and techniques of philosophy teaching. The results of my research provide to philosophy teachers information to help them choose proper methodology and raise teaching effectiveness. (shrink)

Abstract: Cheating behaviors have been construed as a continuing and somewhat vexing issue for academic institutions as they increasingly conduct educational processes online and impose metrics on instructional evaluation. Research, development, and implementation initiatives on cheating detection have gained new dimensions in the advent of artificial intelligence (AI) applications; they have also engendered special challenges in terms of their social, ethical, and cultural implications. An assortment of commercial cheating–detection systems have been injected into educational contexts with little input on the (...) part of relevant stakeholders. This paper expands several specific cases of how systems for the detection of cheating have recently been implemented in higher education institutions in the US and UK. It investigates how such vehicles as wearable technologies, eye scanning, and keystroke capturing are being used to collect the data used for anti-cheating initiatives, often involving systems that have not gone through rigorous testing and evaluation for their validity and potential educational impacts. The paper discusses accountability- and policy-related issues concerning the outsourcing of cheating detection in institutional settings in the light of these emerging technological practices as well as student resistance against the systems involved. The cheating-detection practices can place students in a disempowered, asymmetrical position that is often at substantial variance with their cultural backgrounds. (shrink)

Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directives or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty (...) or agency of one’s future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? -/- In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self’s life. In particular, I argue that this case can manifest vices such as disdainfulness, intellectual arrogance, and self-dictatorship, which is the vice of trying to control one’s life to an excessive degree, and that a self-dictator fails to give due moral consideration to the future self’s liberty or agency. I then introduce the Daoist idea of wu-wei, which recommends embracement of what happens in one’s life, as one of the possible remedies for the overemphasis on the value of autonomy and control. (shrink)

In several lectures, interviews and essays from the early 1980s, Michel Foucault startlingly argues that he is engaged in a kind of critical work that is similar to that of Immanuel Kant. Given Foucault's criticisms of Kantian and Enlightenment emphases on universal truths and values, his declaration that his work is Kantian seems paradoxical. I agree with some commentators who argue that this is a way for Foucault to publicly acknowledge to his critics that he is not, as some of (...) them charge, attempting a total critique of Enlightenment beliefs and values, but is instead attempting to transform them from within. I argue further that Foucault's self-professed Kantianism can also productively be read as a means of encouraging change in his intellectual audience, a call to courage to take up the thread of Enlightenment thought that Foucault finds in Kant's essay, `What is Enlightenment?': that of directing one's philosophical efforts towards questioning and transforming one's own present in its historical specificity, for the sake of promoting the values of freedom and autonomy therein. Though much of Kant's philosophical work is focused on that which lies outside of history, Foucault locates in some of it a concern for what is happening here and now that, I argue, he encourages his audience to take up for themselves through tracing his own intellectual lineage to Kant. In so doing, he encourages contemporary philosophers to consider the value and effects of their work on the present social and political contexts in which they live. (shrink)

The article explores the landscape in higher education in which old binary divisions are officially denied yet have been reinvigorated through a mix of conservative and neo-liberal policies. Efforts to resist such pressures can happen at different levels, including, in this case, module design and classroom practice. The rationale for such resistance is considered in relationship to the authors’ political and moral standpoints. Debates within higher education policy circles are invariably reduced to a series of oppositions: theory and practice; training (...) and education; research and teaching. The article seeks to break down such polarities through an exploration of classroom practice. In fact, we argue that such distinctions help to legitimize the existing inequalities in higher education and group-based harms, which characterize the sector. Instead, a case is made for a pedagogy that enables students, particularly those from diverse and disadvantaged backgrounds, to use their experiences, values, etc. to exchange and develop ideas in a group context, thereby providing an important means of collective empowerment (intellectual and practical, both at work and in their private lives). In this process students are encouraged to use ethical theories as tools to explain and underpin their understanding of work-based scenarios. The role of the academic is to facilitate such exchanges and foster new ethical approaches and a public awareness and engagement that goes beyond the classroom. The pedagogic approach, drawing on notions of relational autonomy and narrative methods as well as providing spaces for the co-production of new knowledge, confirms the indivisibility of research and teaching. (shrink)

Recently, bioethicists and the UNCRPD have advocated for supported medical decision-making on behalf of patients with intellectual disabilities. But what does supported decision-making really entail? One compelling framework is Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis’ mental prosthesis account, which envisions supported decision-making as a process in which trustees act as mere appendages for the patient’s will; the trustee provides the cognitive tools the patient requires to realize her conception of her own good. We argue that supported decision-making would be better (...) understood as a collaborative process, giving patients with intellectual disabilities the opportunity to make decisions in a respectful relationship with trusted others. We offer an alternative account of supported decision-making where the primary constraint is to protect the patient from domination by the trustee. This is advantageous in its preservation of the prospects for genuine collaboration, for the mental prosthesis approach ultimately reinforces a problematic ideal of isolated patient self-determination. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) stands as one of the most original political thinkers of the twentieth century — not merely because of her scholarship, but because of her capacity to think within the rupture of history. Born in Germany and shaped by the philosophical traditions of continental Europe, Arendt's intellectual life unfolded in the shadow of profound existential and political dislocation. Her biography is inseparable from the crises of her time, and her work is marked by a continual attempt to (...) make sense of the human condition under conditions of rupture, exile, and transformation. Raised in Königsberg, a city once associated with the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Arendt’s early exposure to learning and inquiry positioned her to engage not only with abstract questions, but with the reality of political life. Her studies in philosophy, theology, and classical philology were not pursuits of academic detachment but rather modes of inquiry into the nature of existence, plurality, and responsibility. Under the influence of Martin Heidegger, Arendt encountered phenomenology — a method of returning to the immediacy of lived experience. But while Heidegger explored Being in abstraction, Arendt would later shift toward a more worldly engagement: to understand the conditions under which human beings appear to one another, speak, act, and judge. Her dissertation on the concept of love in the thought of Saint Augustine reveals an early preoccupation with natality — the fact of birth as the beginning of uniqueness — and the human desire for transcendence. These existential concerns would remain central throughout her thought, but they were soon reframed by the concrete historical rupture of the 1930s. The rise of totalitarianism forced Arendt into exile, initiating a lifelong confrontation with statelessness, the breakdown of political belonging, and the question of human rights. -/- Her experiences as a refugee and as a Jew under Nazi persecution were not only biographical facts but philosophical revelations. In losing the formal protection of the state, Arendt came to see that the foundation of human dignity is not legal status alone, but recognition — the acknowledgment of one's humanity within a shared world. This insight would later inform her analysis of the pariah, the stateless, and the condition of rootlessness that defines modernity. Interned in France during the war and later arriving in the United States in 1941, Arendt found herself in a new context that both challenged and expanded her thought. While she faced the disorientation of exile, she also encountered a different political tradition — one that emphasized constitutionalism, federalism, and public freedom. Her philosophical reflection began to shift from the metaphysical orientation of early European thought to a more political ontology: a concern with how freedom appears in the world, how action becomes meaningful, and how the human capacity for beginning — for natality — might form the basis of a new political ethics. In the United States, Arendt did not retreat into academic isolation but entered into the vibrant intellectual life of postwar New York, where she joined a community of exiled thinkers, writers, and artists. It was here that she began to articulate her most significant contributions, not only as a theorist of totalitarianism, but as a thinker concerned with the conditions under which human beings live together in freedom. Becoming a U.S. citizen in 1950 did not merely mark a legal change; it represented, for Arendt, a re-entry into political life — a renewed commitment to a world in which human plurality, responsibility, and judgment could be reimagined. Her thought is not reducible to ideology or method; rather, it is a continuous engagement with the fundamental questions of existence: What does it mean to be human in a world where politics can both reveal and destroy our shared reality? How is freedom possible amid necessity? And what responsibility does each individual bear for the shape of the world we co-create? -/- The period in which Hannah Arendt lived and developed her thought was one of unprecedented upheaval — a century defined by war, displacement, ideological struggle, and the fragmentation of shared meaning. The first half of the twentieth century had witnessed the collapse of empires, the trauma of two world wars, the mechanized cruelty of the Holocaust, and the rise of totalitarian states. These events did not merely shape historical circumstances; they shattered traditional assumptions about progress, morality, and the nature of human society. In the aftermath of destruction, a new global order emerged, marked by the Cold War’s ideological bifurcation — a world divided between East and West, each claiming to represent the truth of human freedom. It was within this fractured and contested space that Arendt pursued her philosophical project, asking not only how such horrors had occurred, but what it meant to live and think responsibly in their shadow. During the 1950s and 1960s, Arendt produced some of her most significant works, including The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). These were not historical chronicles in the conventional sense, but meditations on the breakdown of meaning, the limits of judgment, and the erosion of political responsibility. Arendt was not aligned with any one school of thought. Rather, her work constituted a deliberate act of thinking — a practice of remaining open to the complexity of reality, rather than reducing it to ideological systems. While her contemporaries were shaped by existentialist questions of freedom, alienation, and authenticity — influenced by figures such as Heidegger and Sartre — Arendt resisted abstract categories. Instead, she focused on how these existential conditions unfolded in the public world: How do individuals relate to others in shared space? What does it mean to appear before others, to act, to be seen, and to take responsibility? -/- Her analysis of power, authority, and the vulnerability of democratic institutions was not a theoretical exercise. It was rooted in lived experience — exile, statelessness, and political rupture — and informed by her critical engagement with Marxism, liberalism, and postwar human rights discourse. The intellectual landscape of the mid-20th century was searching for foundations after catastrophe. Arendt's contribution was to shift attention not toward abstract principles, but toward human plurality, judgment, and action — the conditions under which meaning and community become possible again. Her work was not without controversy. Her reflections on Jewish identity, the moral ambiguity of collaboration, and the nature of evil drew criticism and misunderstanding. Yet, through it all, Arendt remained committed to independent thought, insisting that philosophy must engage with the world as it is, not as it is imagined. In this way, her life becomes more than a biography — it becomes a lens through which to understand the philosophical challenges of an age: the loss of rootedness, the disintegration of meaning, and the search for a new beginning. For Arendt, history is not just what happens; it is what human beings do, remember, and are responsible for. Her enduring significance lies in her ability to face this condition without resignation. -/- Thinking and Reality For Arendt, thinking is not reducible to the acquisition of knowledge, nor is it equivalent to instrumental reasoning. Thinking is a distinct mode of being — a dialogical process within the self, in which one interrogates, questions, and suspends certainty. It is not designed to produce immediate answers but to illuminate meaning. In this way, thinking reveals the invisible architecture of human experience: assumptions, values, and the fragile structures of moral judgment. Thinking, as Arendt conceives it, is not a utilitarian task; it is not defined by its outcomes. Rather, it is an activity through which individuals maintain their autonomy and engage with the world reflectively. It allows one to remain in relation with oneself — to become one’s own witness. Thinking is not merely a private pursuit, however; it forms the ground for responsibility in the public realm. The trial of Adolf Eichmann offers a critical demonstration of this principle. Arendt observed that Eichmann was not driven by hatred or ideology in the conventional sense. Instead, he exhibited an absence — a failure to think. He did not ask whether what he was doing was right; he only asked whether it conformed to the rules. This thoughtlessness, this moral vacuity, was what Arendt identified as the “banality of evil.” It was not the presence of monstrous intent that shocked her, but the absence of inner dialogue — the collapse of judgment in the face of bureaucratic normality. In this example, we see how the refusal or inability to think has concrete ethical consequences. It demonstrates that moral failure does not always stem from wickedness but can emerge from passivity, from disengagement with meaning. Thinking is thus not an abstract ideal; it is a condition of moral life. Without it, the human being becomes merely functional — obedient, efficient, and dangerous. -/- Challenges to Arendt’s View Despite the profound impact of Arendt’s conception of thinking, her position has drawn criticism from multiple directions. Some argue that her view overemphasizes the solitary nature of thought, neglecting the social, historical, and embodied conditions that shape human consciousness. Thinking, in this view, does not occur in isolation but is embedded in cultural narratives, material conditions, and interpersonal relationships. Others, particularly those working from empirical or scientific frameworks, view Arendt’s approach as speculative and insufficiently grounded in data. From this perspective, her phenomenological and interpretive style lacks the methodological rigor demanded by contemporary cognitive science or behavioral studies. There is also concern about the accessibility of her thought. Critics suggest that her ideal of thinking — involving distance from daily pressures — may reflect a privileged position, one not equally available to all. This raises important questions about whether meaningful reflection is reserved for the few, or whether it can be realized amid the constraints of ordinary life. Finally, some argue that her emphasis on reason and moral judgment underplays the role of emotion, empathy, and collective experience in ethical decision-making. Thinking, they claim, is not purely rational but also deeply affective and relational. -/- . -/- . (shrink)

This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain (...) qualified modal tie to the truth. This result is then used as the basis of the defense of the Autonomy and Authority theses. The paper closes with a defense of the two theses against a potential threat from scientific essentialism. (shrink)

The Philosophical Contribution of Kostas Axelos: The Issue of the Open System and Technological Civilization -/- Kostas Axelos (1924–2010) remains one of the most intriguing and underexplored figures in contemporary philosophy. His work, situated at the crossroads of Marxism, Heideggerian phenomenology, and the philosophy of technology, raises critical questions about the nature of modern civilization and the fate of thought in an increasingly technological world. One of the central academic issues in Axelos’ thought is his concept of the "open system," (...) which presents a radical alternative to both dialectical materialism and structuralism. This issue is especially relevant in our age of digital globalization and algorithmic governance, as it poses fundamental questions about the limits of human autonomy and the possibilities of thought in a technologically determined world. -/- The Open System: A Critique of Closed Philosophical Paradigms -/- Axelos’ notion of the "open system" challenges traditional metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that rely on closure, determinacy, and finality. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, which seeks resolution through synthesis, Axelos proposes a dynamic, ever-unfolding process that resists totalization. His critique extends to Marxist orthodoxy, which he argues falsely assumes a teleological closure in history. By advocating an open-ended view of reality, Axelos aligns himself with thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, emphasizing a world in flux rather than one governed by fixed structures or ultimate goals. -/- This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? -/- For Axelos, closed systems—whether philosophical, political, or scientific—seek to impose rigid frameworks that ultimately stifle thought and creativity. He sees Western metaphysical traditions as largely obsessed with categorization and finality, which leads to an artificial separation between subject and object, mind and world, theory and practice. In contrast, his "open system" embraces indeterminacy and fluidity, recognizing that reality is in perpetual motion and that any attempt to fix meaning within rigid boundaries leads to intellectual stagnation. -/- Axelos’ concept also engages with existentialist and phenomenological traditions, particularly in how it resists essentialist definitions of being. He challenges not only the dogmas of classical metaphysics but also structuralist tendencies that seek to analyze reality in terms of fixed codes and relationships. Instead, Axelos suggests that the world should be understood as a game (le jeu du monde), a process of continuous becoming where human existence is not predefined but rather shaped by the interactions of open-ended forces. This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? Furthermore, how does Axelos' open system relate to contemporary discussions of complexity theory, cybernetics, and ecological thinking, all of which emphasize the interconnectedness and dynamism of systems? -/- A related issue in Axelos' work is his analysis of technological civilization. In Le Jeu du Monde (The Play of the World), he argues that technological advancement has not only transformed human existence but has also reshaped the very way we think and conceptualize reality. Technology, in Axelos’ view, is not merely a tool but a fundamental mode of being that structures our world and thought processes. -/- This raises significant academic concerns about autonomy, alienation, and the role of philosophy. If technology governs human thought as Axelos suggests, can there be genuine freedom in intellectual and political life? How does one resist technological determinism without retreating into romanticized notions of pre-technological existence? Axelos does not advocate for a rejection of technology but rather calls for a new form of thinking that embraces its presence while resisting its totalizing tendencies. -/- Axelos highlights the paradox of technological civilization: while it offers immense possibilities for connectivity, knowledge production, and efficiency, it also risks subordinating human creativity and autonomy to systemic logic. He critiques the way in which technology, rather than serving human purposes, increasingly dictates them—turning individuals into passive participants in a mechanized world. The dominance of algorithmic governance, artificial intelligence, and automation exemplifies the culmination of this technological destiny, raising profound concerns about the future of human agency. -/- Furthermore, Axelos’ thought resonates with contemporary debates about digital culture, surveillance capitalism, and the commodification of knowledge. As digital technologies reshape the nature of labor, communication, and governance, the question arises: To what extent can individuals maintain authentic engagement with the world when technological mediation defines nearly every aspect of existence? In this sense, Axelos anticipates concerns found in posthumanist and critical media theories, particularly regarding the erosion of subjectivity in the face of ever-expanding cybernetic systems. -/- Another crucial aspect of Axelos’ critique is the way in which technological civilization imposes a fragmented, instrumentalized view of knowledge. He challenges the reduction of thought to mere data-processing and the dominance of specialized, compartmentalized disciplines that fail to grasp the holistic nature of existence. By contrast, his open system philosophy encourages a mode of thinking that resists fragmentation and embraces a planetary perspective, one that acknowledges the interrelation of philosophy, science, politics, and art in an ever-evolving world. (shrink)

Introductory and advanced textbooks in bioethics focus almost entirely on issues that disproportionately affect disabled people and that centrally deal with becoming or being disabled. However, such textbooks typically omit critical philosophical reflection on disability, lack engagement with decades of empirical and theoretical scholarship spanning the social sciences and humanities in the multidisciplinary field of disability studies, and avoid serious consideration of the history of disability activism in shaping social, legal, political, and medical understandings of disability over the last fifty (...) years. For example, longstanding discussions on topics such as euthanasia, physician aid-in-dying, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, prenatal testing, selective abortion, enhancement, patient autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and health care rationing all tend to be premised on shared and implicit assumptions regarding disability, especially in relation to quality of life, yet with too little recognition of the way that “disability” is itself a topic of substantial research and scholarly disagreement across multiple fields. This is not merely a concern for academic and medical education; as an applied field tied to one of the largest economic sectors of most industrialized nations, bioethics has a direct impact on healthcare education, practice, policy, and, thereby, the health outcomes of existing and future populations. It is in light of these pressing issues that the Disability Bioethics Reader is the first reader to introduce students to core bioethical issues and concepts through the lens of critical disability studies and philosophy of disability. The Disability Bioethics Reader will include over thirty-five chapters covering key areas such as: critical histories and state-of-the-field analyses of modern medicine, bioethics, disability studies, and philosophy of medicine; methods in bioethics; concerns at the edge- and end-of-life; enhancement; disability, quality of life, and well-being; prenatal testing and abortion; invisible disabilities; chronic illness; healthcare justice; genetics and genomics; intellectual disability and neurodiversity; ethics and diagnosis; and epistemic injustice in healthcare. (shrink)