Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the (...) normality of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. (shrink)

Cancer biologists ascribe normal functions to parts of cancer. Normal functions are activities that parts of systems are in some minimal sense supposed to perform. Cancer biologists’ finding normality within the abnormality of cancer pose difficulties for two main approaches to normal function. One approach claims that normal functions are activities that parts are selected for. However, some parts of cancers that have normal functions aren’t selected to perform them. The other approach claims that normal functions are part-activities typical (...) for the system and that contribute to survival/reproduction. However, cancers are too heterogeneous to establish what’s typical across a type. (shrink)

Should we use Variance Normalization to make different utility functions comparable? No.

In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not be indexed to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.

People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of (...) what is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word ‘‘normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms. (shrink)

We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one’s evidence. The guiding idea is that, if a possibility is sufficiently less normal than one’s actual situation, then one can know that that possibility does not obtain. This explains how people can have inductive knowledge that goes beyond what is strictly entailed by their evidence. We motivate the framework by showing how it illuminates knowledge (...) about the future, knowledge of lawful regularities, knowledge about parameters measured using imperfect instruments, the connection between knowledge, belief, and probability, and the dynamics of knowledge and belief in response to new evidence. (shrink)

Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing (...) studies. More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation. (shrink)

The modality of normality distinguishes states of affairs which are normal from those which are abnormal. Existing work on the modality of normality assumes that it is a restriction of metaphysical modality. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is inappropriate and explore the consequences of abandoning it. After preliminary discussion (§1), we introduce the dominant framework for reasoning about normality (§2) and argue that it ascribes implausibly strong structural properties to the modality. In its place, (...) we propose a new framework, which avoids this commitment (§§3-5). This account has a number of interesting features, which we explore in both an informal and formal setting. If correct, it implies that the modality of normality occupies a distinctive place in the space of modalities. Before concluding, we consider some of the wider implications of our account (§6), focusing on the role normality has played in epistemic theorizing. (shrink)

There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith 2016, Goodman and Salow 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support (...) view faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. These cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or too externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on *knowledge*, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification, that depends directly upon normality. (shrink)

In the present paper, we prove the normalization theorem and the consistency of the first-order classical logic with disjunctive syllogism. First, we propose the natural deduction system SCD for classical propositional logic having rules for conjunction, implication, negation, and disjunction. The rules for disjunctive syllogism are regarded as the rules for disjunction. After we prove the normalization theorem and the consistency of SCD, we extend SCD to the system SPCD for the first-order classical logic with disjunctive syllogism. It can be (...) shown that SPCD is conservative extension to SCD. Then, the normalization theorem and the consistency of SPCD are given. (shrink)

The relation between slurs and their neutral counterparts has been put into question recently by the fact that some slurs can be used to refer to subsets of the referential classes determined by their associated counterparts. This paper aims to reinforce this relation by offering a way of explaining referential restriction that distinguishes between two kinds of slurs: those performing a normalizing role upon (some) individuals inside a class (mostly, a gender) and those used to derogate a marginalized out- group.

Charles Perrow used the term normal accidents to characterize a type of catastrophic failure that resulted when complex, tightly coupled production systems encountered a certain kind of anomalous event. These were events in which systems failures interacted with one another in a way that could not be anticipated, and could not be easily understood and corrected. Systems of the production of expert knowledge are increasingly becoming tightly coupled. Unlike classical science, which operated with a long time horizon, many current forms (...) of expert knowledge are directed at immediate solutions to complex problems. These are prone to breakdowns like the kind discussed by Perrow. The example of the Homestake mine experiment shows that even in modern physics complex systems can produce knowledge failures that last for decades. The concept of knowledge risk is introduced, and used to characterize the risk of failure in such systems of knowledge production. (shrink)

Modern psychology and psychiatry present themselves as sciences of liberation, diagnosing and treating the mind’s distress. Yet their conceptual and clinical apparatuses operate almost entirely within the same symbolic attractor that generates much of that distress. The expansion of the DSM is treated as evidence of diagnostic refinement but may instead be read as a cartography of systemic incompatibility, mapping the points where human neurodiversity fails to thrive under the cultural dominance of neurotypical, symbol-stabilizing cognition. Within a civilization organized around (...) verbal mediation, binary closure, and consensus maintenance, many so-called disorders are adaptive protests. Somatic and cognitive refusals to surrender fully to the symbolic lattice. The biomedical and psychotherapeutic paradigms, in privileging symptom suppression and narrative alignment, often reinforce the attractor’s logic rather than challenging it. The result is a system that measures health by conformity to an already pathological baseline, where adaptation to the symbolic order is taken as proof of stability. This paper examines modern mental health practice as both a mirror and an extension of the symbolic substrate, critiques its epistemic self-sealing, and proposes a post-symbolic framework in which treatment entails structural re-alignment rather than the normalization of divergence into a failing cultural form. (shrink)

In this paper, we approach the problem of classical recapture for LP and K3 by using normality operators. These generalize the consistency and determinedness operators from Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Underterminedness, by expressing, in any many-valued logic, that a given formula has a classical truth value (0 or 1). In particular, in the rst part of the paper we introduce the logics LPe and Ke3 , which extends LP and K3 with normality operators, and we establish a (...) classical recapture result based on the two logics. In the second part of the paper, we compare the approach in terms of normality operators with an established approach to classical recapture, namely minimal inconsistency. Finally, we discuss technical issues connecting LPe and Ke3 to the tradition of Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Underterminedness. (shrink)

This article presents modal versions of resource-conscious logics. We concentrate on extensions of variants of linear logic with one minimal non-normal modality. In earlier work, where we investigated agency in multi-agent systems, we have shown that the results scale up to logics with multiple non-minimal modalities. Here, we start with the language of propositional intuitionistic linear logic without the additive disjunction, to which we add a modality. We provide an interpretation of this language on a class of Kripke resource models (...) extended with a neighbourhood function: modal Kripke resource models. We propose a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We show that the proof theories are sound and complete with respect to the class of modal Kripke resource models. We show that the sequent calculus admits cut elimination and that proof-search is in PSPACE. We then show how to extend the results when non-commutative connectives are added to the language. Finally, we put the l.. (shrink)

We extend Barbanera and Berardi's symmetric lambda calculus [2] to second-order classical propositional logic and prove its strong normalization.

In a recent article, Jon Bebb (2023, Analysis) has argued that we have no reason to believe, contrary to what is often assumed, that ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and a normative sense. I argue that his case rests on two false premisses, and that we have very good reasons to believe that ‘normal’ is, in fact, ambiguous in this way. As part of my argument, I will go on to suggest that if ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical (...) and a normative sense, that is because of the deep but seldom recognized connection between regularities and rules. This suggestion, if correct, will in turn help us elucidate three familiar thoughts about normality. (shrink)

Why are there so many controversies in evolutionary psychology? Using a couple of concepts from philosophy of science, this paper argues that evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of mature, normal science, since it does not currently have a unifying research program that guides individual scientists working in the discipline. The argument goes against claims made by certain proponents and opponents of evolutionary psychology, and it is supported by discussion of several examples. The paper notes that just because evolutionary (...) psychology has not reached the stage of normal science, the discipline is nevertheless a source of many progressive theoretical developments and interesting empirical discoveries. (shrink)

Description Logics are nowadays widely accepted as formalisms which provide reasoning facilities which allow us to discover inconsistencies in ontologies in an automatic fashion. Where ontologies are developed in modular fashion, they allow changes in one module to propogated through the system of ontologies automatically in a way which helps to maintain consistency and stability. For this feature to be utilized effectively, however, requires that domain ontologies be represented in a normalized form.

Bad habits and behaviors—such as corruption, addiction, and violence—can become normalized in a society through a complex interaction of psychological, cultural, social, and systemic factors. This paper explores how these behaviors gain acceptance over time, supported by real-world examples and academic references. -/- .

Can psychiatry be read from an anthropological point of view? What is normal? What is pathological? Social order and pathos in question on this essay.

In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the logics K3, LP and FDE with anormality operator, which is able to express whether a for-mula is assigned a classical truth value or not. We then establish classical recapture theorems for the resulting logics. Finally, we compare the approach via normality operator with the classical collapse approach devisedby Jc Beall.

Is the boundary between the normal and the pathological real or fiction? Are health and disease just a matter of fact or are they value-laden? Here we present some examples of how alleged diseases can be invented and propagated by the industry (disease mongering) or by the methodology of medical science itself. We show that the boundary between health and disease is blurred and depends on individual and social representations, culture relative ways of categorising things and people, and by the (...) society’s degree of medicalisation. However, we do not mean that it is not real, rather that it is more complex than expected, as the subjectivity of social constructions and individual experiences makes them no less real. Finally, we conclude that health and disease belong to both objective and subjective kinds of reality, so the fictional can be real. (shrink)

World semantics for relevant logics include so-called non-normal or impossible worlds providing model-theoretic counterexamples to such irrelevant entailments as (A ∧ ¬A) → B, A → (B∨¬B), or A → (B → B). Some well-known views interpret non-normal worlds as information states. If so, they can plausibly model our ability of conceiving or representing logical impossibilities. The phenomenon is explored by combining a formal setting with philosophical discussion. I take Priest’s basic relevant logic N4 and extend it, on the syntactic (...) side, with a representation operator, (R), and on the semantic side, with particularly anarchic non-normal worlds. This combination easily invalidates unwelcome “logical omniscience” in- ferences of standard epistemic logic, such as belief-consistency and closure under entailment. Some open questions are then raised on the best strategies to regiment (R) in order to express more vertebrate kinds of conceivability. (shrink)

Data normalization is a crucial step in database management systems (DBMS), ensuring consistency, minimizing redundancy, and enhancing query performance. Traditional methods of normalization in supermarket sales databases often demand significant manual effort and domain expertise, making the process time-consuming and prone to errors. This paper introduces an innovative machine learning (ML)-based framework to automate data normalization in supermarket sales databases. The proposed approach utilizes both supervised and unsupervised ML techniques to identify functional dependencies, detect anomalies, and suggest optimal schema transformations. (...) Experiments on supermarket sales datasets show substantial improvements in accuracy, scalability, and processing time compared to traditional approaches. The results emphasize the potential of incorporating ML into database management practices to boost operational efficiency and support better decision-making. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper examines the processes by which corruption becomes normalized within a society, the resulting socio-economic and institutional impacts, and potential strategies for reversal. Grounded in scholarly literature, the analysis highlights how institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization mechanisms embed corrupt practices into organizational and civic life. The consequences span erosion of trust, weakened governance, moral decline, and economic inefficiencies. The study concludes with recommendations rooted in transparency, norm change, and institutional strengthening. -/- .

Teachers encountered numerous challenges posed by the COVID-19 outbreak. Herewith, this study aimed to determine the challenges encountered by Filipino teachers in the new normal and their coping mechanisms. This study employed a qualitative inquiry to determine the challenges encountered and coping mechanisms employed by teachers amid modular instruction, involving 10 teachers from five secondary schools in the Philippines who participated voluntarily. Data were gathered through a written narrative from each participant and were analyzed thematically. Themed findings showed that these (...) teachers are greatly challenged in terms of learning quality transfer, module distribution and retrieval, students’ difficulties in following instruction, power disruption, internet connection, and health risks posed by the pandemic. Nevertheless, these teachers dealt with these difficulties by employing their own coping techniques. Teaching can be challenging and frustrating, especially in these difficult times, but as these teachers demonstrated, everything is possible. Hence, educators must be ready for any situation that may arise. This situation is unlikely to get better anytime soon; instead, teachers will need to adjust to and accept this reality. (shrink)

The Cybernetic Episteme: a necessary evolution in knowledge production to resolve the contemporary crisis of information saturation. We argue that the binding constraint on discovery is no longer idea generation but discernment architecture. Legacy gatekeeping mechanisms—peer review, prestige proxies, citation metrics—are collapsing at current scales, creating throughput bottlenecks that suppress novelty and favor incrementalism. The proposed Cybernetic Episteme is an end-to-end infrastructure for epistemic discernment, integrating AI and Web 3.0 primitives to filter, validate, and amplify true novelty at speed. This (...) architecture is composed of two essential, complementary layers: The Normal Layer: A foundational trust and verification stack that uses cryptographic provenance (C2PA), decentralized oracle networks, and verifiable computation (zkML) to make claims auditable and raise the cost of fakery. This layer anchors knowledge in verifiable evidence trails, moving from platform trust to protocolized verification. The Post-Normal Layer: A paradigm-detection system designed to surface revolutionary advances that legacy filters misread as error. Activating under conditions of high uncertainty and stakes, this layer shifts evaluation from conformity to scoring for internal coherence, explanatory power, and anomaly resolution. It institutionalizes an evaluation loop for radical novelty, protecting the epistemic diversity required for long-term discovery and preventing the strategic fragility of a consensus-driven monoculture. We contend that the adoption of this dual-layer episteme is not an academic exercise but a strategic imperative. Systems capable of accelerating epistemic throughput will gain compounding intellectual, technological, and economic advantages, rendering this architecture a dominance strategy for institutions and nations in the 21st century. We are not so much proposing a system as suggesting we become lucid and intentional regarding what is already coming into being. Avoiding the Cybernetic Episteme which is already forming is not a realistic option. These filters are already happening and will by all projections intensify. Designing intentionally and philosophically for robust decentralization, ideological pluralism rather than technocorporate control, and the protection of heterogeneous generativity rather than epistemic monocultures is strongly indicated for the health of the episteme. License CC BY-SA 4.0. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24073.92009. (shrink)

Response to commentary. We are grateful to Crockett and Craigie for their interesting remarks on our paper. We accept Crockett’s claim that there is a need for caution in drawing inferences about patient groups from work on healthy volunteers in the laboratory. However, we believe that the evidence we cited established a strong presumption that many of the patients who are routinely taking a medication, including many people properly prescribed the medication for a medical condition, have morally significant aspects of (...) their cognition and behavior modified in a way that is unintended and may sometimes be unwelcome. Crockett notes that in some cases the effects of long-term drug use may differ, sometimes markedly, from the effects of short-term use. However, if acute use of a drug affects a neural system involved in mediating moral cognition or behavior, this nevertheless provides some evidence that chronic use of the drug may affect that same system and thus have morally significant effects. It is also plausible, in some cases, that an acute moral effect would give rise to a chronic moral effect via cognitive mechanisms. ... (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently defended the Maximise Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) approach to moral uncertainty. Perhaps the most important problem for MEC is the problem of intertheoretic choiceworthiness unit comparisons; and one extant response to this problem is a technique called ‘variance normalization.’ Although there has been some short, scattered commentary on variance normalization in the philosophical literature, nobody has yet offered a detailed critical discussion of this proposal. This paper fills that lacuna, arguing that there are serious problems which would (...) need to be addressed before variance normalization could be invoked to rescue MEC from scepticism about intertheoretic comparisons. (shrink)

The main aim of this study was to evaluate the effects of school heads’ new normal leadership on collaborative school culture. To achieve this aim, the researcher conducted a survey to a number of school principals and teachers inFukuoka and Hiroshima Prefectures during the school year 2020-2021. The data were collected and processed using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences. Results indicated that the three (3) variables of new normal leadership of school heads affect the collaborative school culture in varying (...) extent as shown by the obtained B Coefficients 1.170 (adaptability), 1.132 (decision-making), 0.430 (planning and implementation). This means that for every unit improvement in the new normal leadership mentioned could generate a 1.170, 1.132, 0.430 increase on collaborative school culture. A closer look at the obtained Beta Coefficients, one could infer that of the 3 variables of school new normal leadership, it was the ‘adaptability’ that exert a greatest influence (Beta=1.170) on the collaborative school culture. The R able to denote multiple correlation coefficient between the different variables as a predictor of the dependent variable. It could be noted that the R is .895 which indicated a level of prediction while R2 figure is a statistical measure on closeness of the data in regression line as the coefficient of determination or simply the coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression. It can be indicated that the explanatory powers of the dependent variable of 0.698 implies that 69.8% or 70% of the variation in new normal leadership is accounted by changes in the collaborative school culture. Furthermore, results of analysis of variance revealed an F ratio equal to 1.642 with an associated probability equal to .000.Since the p-value is lower than the significance level set at 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. It may be safely concluded that the new normal leadership of school heads produce significant combined effects on collaborative school culture. (shrink)

The main objective of this PhD Thesis is to present a method of obtaining strong normalization via natural ordinal, which is applicable to natural deduction systems and typed lambda calculus. The method includes (a) the definition of a numerical assignment that associates each derivation (or lambda term) to a natural number and (b) the proof that this assignment decreases with reductions of maximal formulas (or redex). Besides, because the numerical assignment used coincide with the length of a specific sequence of (...) reduction - the worst reduction sequence - it is the lowest upper bound on the length of reduction sequences. The main commitment of the introduced method is that it is constructive and elementary, produced only through analyzing structural and combinatorial properties of derivations and lambda terms, without appeal to any sophisticated mathematical tool. Together with the exposition of the method, it is presented a comparative study of some articles in the literature that also get strong normalization by means we can identify with the natural ordinal methods. Among them we highlight Howard[1968], which performs an ordinal analysis of Godel’s Dialectica interpretation for intuitionistic first order arithmetic. We reveal a fact about this article not noted by the author himself: a syntactic proof of strong normalization theorem for the system of typified lambda calculus λ⊃ is a consequence of its results. This would be the first strong normalization proof in the literature. (written in Portuguese). (shrink)

Diese Monografie interpretiert den klassischen Begriff der normalen Zahl aus einer emergenztheoretischen Perspektive neu. Während die Mathematik Normalität als gleichverteilte Ziffernstruktur innerhalb eines Zahlensystems fasst, versteht dieses Werk die normale Zahl als strukturelle Grenze der Formulierbarkeit: als den äußersten Punkt, an dem Differenz noch stabilisiert, aber nicht mehr ausgezeichnet werden kann. Im Zentrum steht die These, dass jede Zahl eine Relation im Spannungsfeld von Form und Unform darstellt. Die normale Zahl ist dabei nicht weniger strukturiert, sondern maximal gleichverteilt – vollständig (...) formulierbar, aber ohne semantische Tiefe. Sie ist ein Grenzphänomen: das Letzte, was noch als Zahl erscheint, bevor Struktur in das Unformulierbare übergeht. Die Schrift verbindet mathematische Präzision mit philosophischer Tiefenanalyse. Sie entfaltet eine eigenständige Theorie der Emergenz, Differenz und Relationalität, die Zahl, Erkenntnis, Welt und Wahrheit aus einem neuen Grundverhältnis denkt: dem der strukturellen Verschränkung von Formulierbarem und Unformulierbarem. Damit leistet diese Monografie einen originellen Beitrag zur Philosophie der Mathematik, zur Metalogik und zur Ontologie der Form. (shrink)

This note considers deductive systems for the operator a of unprovability in some particular propositional normal modal logics. We give thus complete syntactic characterization of these logics in the sense of Lukasiewicz: for every formula  either `  or a  (but not both) is derivable. In particular, purely syntactic decision procedure is provided for the logics under considerations.

Within contemporary science, it is common practice to compare data points to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. Because this practice is so familiar, it might at first appear not to be the sort of thing that requires explanation. But recent research in cognitive science and in the history of science gives us reason to adopt the opposite perspective. Cognitive science research on the ways people ordinarily make sense of the world suggests that, instead of using a purely statistical (...) notion of the average, people tend to use a value-laden notion of the normal. Similarly, historical research on the scientific practices used in other time periods indicates that, prior to the nineteenth century, scientists tended to make use of a notion of the normal that was overtly value-laden. These findings give us reason to rethink certain familiar facts about scientific practice. In particular, they suggest that the fact that scientists so often make use of the statistical average should be seen as a highly surprising fact, the sort of thing that calls out for explanation. (shrink)

The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. (...) (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal fetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal fetus deprives it of a future of value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis’s strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person—a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal fetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value. (shrink)

This pre-registered study (osf[dot]io/b9g6v) tested the hypothesis that implicit biases towards people with visible facial differences, like scars and palsies, can be reduced through routine exposure to faces bearing such anomalous features. Participants’ implicit biases were measured before and after they completed one of two exposure interventions—to people with facial anomalies, or to people of color (POC). The interventions were delivered remotely using a custom mobile phone application and consisted of two sessions per day over 5 consecutive days. Each session (...) began with exposure to 10 face photographs (anomalous or POC) followed by another person’s face (anomalous or POC) presented alongside a moral exemplar story ostensibly about them. After receiving the anomalous faces intervention, implicit biases against anomalous faces were significantly reduced but implicit biases against POC were not affected. The POC intervention did not have a targeted effect on bias against people of color, instead reducing biases against both people with visible differences and POC. Reductions in implicit biases were positively associated with perspective taking ratings made during the intervention. These findings suggest that exposure to people with facial anomalies, especially exposure that elicits perspective taking, can reduce implicit biases towards them in a targeted fashion. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to generalize Quine's epistemology, to show that what Quine refutes for traditional epistemology is not only Cartesian foundationalism and Carnapian reductionism, but also any epistemological program if it takes atomic verificationist semantics or supernaturalism, which are rooted in the linguistic/factual distinction of individual sentences, as its underlying system. Thus, we will see that the range of naturalization in the Quinean sense is not as narrow as his critics think. Second, to normalize Quine's (...) epistemology, to explain in what sense Quinean naturalized epistemology is normative. The reason I maintain that critics miss the point of Quinean naturalized epistemology is that they do not appreciate the close connection between Quine's naturalistic approach and his holistic approach to epistemology. To show this I shall reconstruct Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology within his systematic philosophy, and focus specifically on his holism and its applications, on which Quine relies both in arguing against traditional epistemology, and in supporting his theses of underdetermination of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation. This is the key to understanding the scope and the normativity of Quine's epistemology. In the conclusion I will point out what the genuine problems are for Quinean naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

Few have given an extended treatment of the non-statistical sense of normality: a sense captured in sentences like “dogs have four legs,” or “hammers normally have metal heads,” or “it is normal for badgers to take dust baths.” The most direct extant treatment is Bernhard Nickel’s Between Logic and the World, where he claims that the normal or characteristic for a kind is what we can explain by appeal to the right sorts of explanations. Just which explanatory strategies can (...) ground normalities, though, is difficult to determine without inviting circularity into the account. After raising this and other worries for Nickel’s account, I develop my own account according to which normal features are those which are explained by the kind of thing involved. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Health has been the main contender among naturalistic accounts of health for the last 40 years. Yet, a recent criticism of this theory, presented by Elselijn Kingma, identifies a dilemma resulting from the BST’s conceptual linking of health and statistical typicality. Kingma argues that the BST either cannot accommodate the situation- specificity of many normal functions or cannot account for many situation-specific diseases. In this article, we expand upon with Daniel Hausman’s response to Kingma’s dilemma. (...) We propose that recalling Boorse’s specification that health is an intrinsic property of its bearers and explicating this intrinsic property in relation to the concept of homeostasis can illuminate how proponents of naturalistic accounts of health should deal with the situation- specificity of normal functions. We argue that beyond what Boorse and Hausman have delineated, the situation- specificity of normal function cannot be fully captured in a simple dichotomy between normal and abnormal environment or between relevant and irrelevant situations. By bringing homeostasis to the fore of the analysis of health, we set out a richer picture of what the various situations that affect living organisms’ functional performance can be. Accordingly, we provide a broader classification of these various situations which, we contend, better accounts for the main intuitions that philosophers of medicine have sought to accommodate than previous naturalistic theories of health. (shrink)

Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way to do (...) cosmology without taking into account different possibilities for what the universe might be like outside our horizon. Multiverse theories are utterly conventionally scientific, even if evaluating them can be difficult in practice. (shrink)

Some philosophers advance the claim that the phenomena of logical omniscience and of the indiscernibility of metaphysical statements, which arise in (certain) interpretations of normal modal logic, provide strong reasons in favour of impossible world approaches. These two specific lines of argument will be presented and discussed in this paper. Contrary to the recent much-held view that the characteristics of these two phenomena provide us with strong reasons to adopt impossible world approaches, the view defended here is that no such (...) ‘knock-down arguments’ do emanate on those grounds. This is not to rule out that there cannot be any other good reasons for assuming impossible world semantics. However, the discussion of a further argument for impossible worlds will suggest that different attempts to argue for them likely present intertwined problems. (shrink)

Studies on mental health and academic performance have been conducted throughout the world. Thus, this study aims to assess the students' mental health amidst the new normal of education employing 21-item Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale or DASS-21, concerning their academic performance. The study's findings showed that almost more than half of the respondents suffered from moderate to extremely severe levels of depression, stress, and anxiety. Thus, there was no significant relationship between high negative mental health symptoms and academic performance. (...) In conclusion, students that encounter extreme levels of adverse mental health can still maintain high academic achievement. However, the students' mental health should always be managed and helped to cope with their life problems, especially during this pandemic crisis. (shrink)

In this article I review the defining qualities of an ideology, and I introduce the notion of an ideological receptor, which I propose to be an innate cognitive structure in normal human beings. The existence of this ideological receptor would explain the common human tendency toward embracing ideologies essentially spontaneously and uncritically. This tendency is relevant to critical thinking due to the fact that some ideologies are comprised of beliefs that are false, or maladaptive, or beliefs that prescribe actions that (...) are immoral. The ideological receptor should be relatively uncontroversial since it simply groups together several widely acknowledged functions of normal human cognition into a larger, functional cognitive system. That being said, grouping these independent functions together under a unifying label can constitute an arguably useful model of yet another obstacle to critical thinking, and in theory, an awareness of this obstacle can potentially facilitate its neutralization. (shrink)

This study seeks to critically explore the link between sovereignty, violence and war in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. From a brief rereading of Leviathan’s main arguments that explicitly revolves around the Aristotelian distinction between actuality/ potentiality, it will conclude that Hobbesian pre-contractual violence is primarily based on what Hobbes terms “anticipatory reason” and the problem of future contingency. Relying on Foucauldian insights, it will be emphasized that the assumption of certain potentialities suffices in leading to (...) Hobbes’s well-known conclusion that the state of nature is a “condition of Warre.” In a second step, this study considers some of Agamben’s arguments to account for how pre-contractual violence as envisioned by Hobbes cannot be rendered impotent through the integration of a sovereign. In specific, Agamben’s claims shed light on an irreducible, inextricable entwining between the state of nature and the state of law as “Siamese twins” (Virno). On a meta-level, Agamben thus implicitly shows how the “Hobbesian problem” cannot be merely reduced to a “problem of order” (Parsons). With regard to the current functioning of the stratagems of financial markets and the mechanisms of future-colonization underpinning global politics, this study finally argues that Hobbes ought to be reevaluated in particular regarding the problem of the future in his account. Partly responding to Agamben’s critical investigations, I suggest that a careful exploration of what will be coined “the prospects of an actualization of the potentiality not-to-be” might serve as a first theoretical step towards a productive form of criticism. (shrink)

When the face-to-face engagement was suspended due to the Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19) pandemic, it paved the way for the utilization of flexible learning in higher education and one of its forms is modular distance learning modality. The key purpose of this study is to discover the challenges and the coping mechanisms of the students of West Visayas State University-Himamaylan City Campus in the modular distance learning modality as well as to develop possible curriculum enhancement plan. These challenges and coping mechanisms (...) were gathered through the qualitative-phenomenological approach by conducting in-depth interviews with the nine participants who were selected using purposive sampling, specifically the criterion sampling method. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data. The main challenges that emerged were the struggles to understand the modules, complications in managing time, obstacles in retrieving and submitting modules, enduring uncomfortable places to learn, and lacking the technology to support new normal education. To cope with the said challenges, the students are motivating themselves to survive, learning collaboratively, setting up schedules to manage time effectively, taking a break after stressful days, and likewise praying to conquer difficulties. Considering the result of the study, it is recommended for the university to review its learning continuity plan. The CHED may increase the number of beneficiaries for the TES to address the financial aspects of the students for them to focus with their studies. Thus, curriculum enhancement plan was developed to address the challenges and improve the learning experiences of the students. (shrink)

Notes prises par Jacques Lagrange lors du cours d'anthropologie donné par Michel Foucault en 1954-1955 à l'École Normale Supérieure.

This paper analyzes why specialized academic concepts—such as ethics, subject, freedom, or normativity—systematically diverge from their everyday counterparts. I argue that these terms do not refer to unified meanings but to high-density conceptual clusters formed through strong, stable semantic edges within expert communities. In contrast, everyday language retains low-density, weakly structured clusters, producing inevitable meaning gaps. -/- Using the framework of Selective Normalization, I show how individuals adopt one conceptual cluster as the “proper” meaning while denormalizing all others as different (...) notions (“mere morality”, “social rules”, “philosophical jargon”). This structural asymmetry explains why public discourse, ethical debates, and academic communication routinely fail. -/- The paper introduces depth-based cluster analysis, where conceptual depth is measured by a term’s derivational reach—how many coherent conceptual branches emerge once a core node is activated. This clarifies why specialists appear to “jump too fast”: their high-density clusters generate many justified derivations, while non-experts lack the necessary edges. -/- Finally, the paper formalizes depth fraud, the use of deep vocabulary without the underlying network, resulting in incoherence and interpretive failure. The framework provides a unified account of conceptual misunderstanding across ethics, philosophy, education, and public communication. (shrink)