This essay explores Friedrich Nietzsche’s concepts of Eternal Recurrence and Amor Fati from a personal philosophical perspective, examining how these ideas illuminate the meaning of human existence, ethical self-realization, and the creative affirmation of life. The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence presupposes that every human experience—whether positive or negative—repeats infinitely, while Amor Fati transforms this repetition into an active ethical practice of loving and affirming one’s destiny. By connecting these concepts with my own reflections and lived experiences, I attempt (...) to understand life as an integrated totality that includes both suffering and joy, failure and success, loss and creation. The essay further discusses how ethical choice and self-realization can be achieved within this cyclical view of existence and how Nietzsche’s thought can be applied to the moral and existential challenges of modern life. Keywords Eternal Recurrence; Amor Fati; Will to Power; Nietzsche; Ethical Self-Realization; Existential Responsibility; Affirmation of Life; Personal Philosophy; Non-Dualism; Value Creation. (shrink)

This essay presents a personal reflection on Nietzsche’s concept of the Will to Power, integrating insights from his doctrine of eternal recurrence and Buddhist non-dual philosophy. Moving beyond common misinterpretations that reduce the Will to Power to political ambition or domination, the essay interprets it as an existential and ethical force enabling individuals to embrace life fully, confront inevitable repetitions, and generate authentic values. By cultivating metanoia, a transformative awareness that dissolves dualistic judgments of good and bad, one can (...) exercise Amor Fati, the unconditional love of fate, and respond creatively and joyfully to the unfolding of life. Drawing parallels with Buddhist teachings on the abandonment of conceptual distinctions, the essay highlights how non-dual awareness and eternal recurrence together provide a framework for radical affirmation, ethical creativity, and profound engagement with existence. (shrink)

The Twelvefold Chain of Dependent Arising (Paṭicca-samuppāda) has long been interpreted in multiple ways: doctrinally as the structure of samsara, psychologically as the unfolding of mental processes, or philosophically as an illustration of emptiness (śūnyatā). In this essay, I propose a personal perspective: the core insight of the Buddha’s awakening lies in the momentary origination of all phenomena—the direct, experiential awareness that each event, sensation, and impulse arises and passes away in an instant. Drawing upon my own reflections (...) and recurrent dream experiences, I explore how the twelve links can be seen not merely as an abstract schema but as a living, immediate insight into the flux of existence. (shrink)

LSTM has the advantage of handling inconsistent gradients, which was a typical problem found in conventional RNN by its cyclic rescan of the sequence to minimize the gradient errors. This is especially significant, that cryptocurrency has a highly volatile fluctuation of its market trend.

The task of Philosophy in Science (PinS) is to use philosophical tools to help solve scientific problems. This article describes how I stumbled into this line of work and then addressed several topics in philosophy of biology—units of selection, cladistic parsimony, robustness and trade-offs in model building, adaptationism, and evidence for common ancestry—often in collaboration with scientists. I conclude by offering advice for would-be PinS practitioners.

This paper presents a theoretical and computational framework for exploring the dynamics of first-person reflective cognition versus analytical detachment. We model the interactions of key neural networks—Default Mode Network (DMN), Central Executive Network (CEN), and Salience Network (SN)—as a stochastic dynamical system, from which emergent cognitive modes E(t), representing reflective engagement, and A(t), representing analytical processing, arise. Hybrid states, identified conceptually as x_d approximately equal to x_e, capture moments of co-activation between these modes, suggesting a dynamic interplay between introspection and (...) detachment. Sensitivity and phase-plane analyses reveal regions of heightened responsiveness and potential hybrid cognition, offering insights into how parameter variations influence cognitive stability. Importantly, all results are derived theoretically, based on the analytical structure of the governing equations; no empirical simulations were performed. This framework bridges computational neuroscience and philosophical inquiry, providing a formalized model to interpret the oscillatory tension between subjective reflection and objective analysis, and highlighting the potential for theoretical models to illuminate the architecture of human cognition. (shrink)

This essay presents a personal philosophical reflection on reincarnation (saṃsāra), emphasizing the Buddha’s teaching on dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda), momentary causality (kṣaṇika-pratītyasamutpāda), and non-self (anattā). Drawing on early Buddhist canon and Mahāyāna sutras, I argue that reincarnation is a continuous, causally emergent process rather than a linear passage of a fixed self. The essay integrates canonical quotations, detailed exegesis, and personal reflection to provide a comprehensive understanding of the process of rebirth from a Buddhist philosophical perspective.

Prior research found correlations between reflection test performance and philosophical tendencies among laypeople. In two large studies (total N = 1299)—one pre-registered—many of these correlations were replicated in a sample that included both laypeople and philosophers. For example, reflection test performance predicted preferring atheism over theism and instrumental harm over harm avoidance on the trolley problem. However, most reflection-philosophy correlations were undetected when controlling for other factors such as numeracy, preferences for open-minded thinking, personality, philosophical training, age, and gender. Nonetheless, (...) some correlations between reflection and philosophical views survived this multivariate analysis and were only partially confounded with either education or self-reported reasoning preferences. Unreflective thinking still predicted believing in God whereas reflective thinking still predicted believing that (a) proper names like ‘Santa’ do not necessarily refer to entities that actually exist and (b) science does reveal the fundamental nature of the world. So some robust relationships between reflection and philosophical tendencies were detected even among philosophers, and yet there was clearly more to the link between reflection and philosophy. To this end, demographic and metaphilosophical hypotheses are considered. (shrink)

Reflective Field Pedagogy (RFP) is a learner-centered approach that positions curiosity and questioning at the heart of education. Emerging from personal explorations in quantum physics and classroom practice, RFP emphasizes the teacher’s role in setting a structured yet flexible “field” where inquiry can thrive. Rather than transmitting facts, educators scaffold context, encourage reflection, and empower students to take ownership of discovery. This pedagogy bridges cognitive and emotional dimensions of learning, fostering agency, engagement, and the thrill of exploration. Distinct from (...) traditional inquiry-based or project-based models, RFP highlights the importance of context-setting and reflective ownership, ensuring that complex phenomena become meaningful rather than overwhelming. Applicable across both advanced and primary STEM education, RFP cultivates critical thinking, creativity, and confidence in navigating uncertainty. By integrating human intuition with emerging technologies such as AI facilitators, RFP offers a pathway to personalized, participatory learning that awakens natural curiosity and plants seeds for lifelong discovery. (shrink)

A brief critical notice of _What Is a Person?_ by Nancy Jecker and Caesar Atuire focusing on their relational account of what gives human beings a dignity.

The intent of this article is to discredit the much used concept (often unstated) of virtuous violence. To begin with, it is a paradox hence in need of not easily achieved justification. Here author's critique focuses on the political myth of prophetic righteousness, the ethical myth of a common good, and the myth of the infinite, which is utilized all too often to bypass finite systems. (Article sharply criticized when first presented to a faculty group.).

NOTE: This is an early preprint version. The definitive, citable "Version of Record" of this paper has been archived on Zenodo and can be found under the DOI 10.5281/zenodo.16269768. Please use the Zenodo version exclusively for all citations. -/- This paper presents Reflective Epistemology, a metatheoretical model that offers a fundamental reorientation for knowledge acquisition. Based on an analysis of fundamental mental structures and their semantic dimensions, a formal framework for integrating subjective and objective aspects of cognition is developed. The (...) model identifies fundamental epistemological categories—such as entity relations and modal qualities—as elements of a ``Proto-Grammar of the Mind.'' Through the introduction of multidimensional epistemic assessment criteria (consistency, truth of premises, belief, degree of recognition), a typology of epistemic biases is derived. The core thesis states that robust knowledge results from the conscious reflection and integration of subjective factors, whereby ``True Objectivity'' is redefined as an intersubjectively validated, coherent, and bias-reflected subjective understanding. The paper concludes with implications for scientific methodology, education, and personal epistemic practice. (shrink)

In December of 2013, my Dad died of advanced Alzheimer's and a condition called Myasthenia Gravis. This is a selection of journal entries I made over the course of the two years leading up to my Dad's death. It is not a philosophical essay, but a personal reflection, in "real time" so to speak, on the nature of the dying process in relation to questions of faith, hope, despair, and the meaning of a man's life. I offer it here (...) for any who might find it worthwhile. (shrink)

In our article (Zawadzki and Adamczyk 2021), we analyzed threats that novel memory modifying interventions may pose in the future. More specifically, we discussed how optogenetics’ potential for reversible erasure/deactivation of memory “may impact authenticity by producing changes at different levels of personality.” Our article has received many thoughtful open peer commentaries for which we would like to express our great appreciation. We have identified two main threads of objections. They are related to the potential applicability of optogenetics as a (...) therapeutic memory modification technology (MMT) in humans—applicability thread, and the normative value of authenticity, that is, the assumption that preserving authenticity is valuable (either in general or in the particular approach we adopted)—normative thread. Both of these threads concern fundamental issues: The former deals with the scientific credibility of the case vignette on which our discussion is based, and the latter deals with the normative weight of our considerations. We think that addressing both of them can be instructive in a broader context as they reflect a more general disagreement among neuroethicists about the very purpose and method of our discipline. (shrink)

Humans have distinctive powers of reflection: no other animal seems to have anything like our capacity for self-examination. Many philosophers hold that this capacity has a uniquely important guiding role in our cognition; others, notably Hilary Kornblith, draw attention to its weaknesses. Kornblith chiefly aims to dispel the sense that there is anything ‘magical’ about second-order mental states, situating them in the same causal net as ordinary first-order mental states. But elsewhere he goes further, suggesting that there is something deeply (...) misleading about reflection’s first-person view of cognition. This chapter takes a closer look at the conditions under which reflection is misleading. Even if humans are the only reflective animals, we are no longer the only creatures that can be questioned about their claims. Chatbots can also be asked to explain themselves, and by studying the conditions under which they produce clarification as opposed to confabulation, we can develop a non-skeptical account of the epistemic value of reflection. I argue that this capacity naturally supports the distribution of complex problem solving among multiple agents. (shrink)

Here I will develop a naturalistic account of epistemic reflection and its significance for epistemology. I will first argue that thought, as opposed to mere information processing, requires a capacity for cognitive self-regulation. After discussing the basic capacities necessary for cognitive self-regulation of any kind, I will consider qualitatively different kinds of thought that can emerge when the basic capacities enable the creature to interiorize a form of social cooperation. First, I will discuss second-personal cooperation and the kind of (...) thought that emerges from its interiorization. Then, I will discuss third-personal cooperation and the kind of thought that emerges from its interiorization. We will see that epistemic reflection is the interiorized version of interpersonal argumentation, which is the epistemic component of third-personal cooperation. In developing this account, I will draw heavily on the work of Michael Tomasello and other cognitive scientists advocating the “social intentionality hypothesis”. However, I will show how work done in the defeasible reasoning tradition can provide us with a deeper explanation of some claims made by advocates of the social intentionality hypothesis. Additionally, we will see that work done on social intentionality can help us better understand the significance of knowledge and justification as understood by the defeasible reasoning tradition. We will see that the social intentionality hypothesis and the defeasible reasoning tradition are mutually illuminating. By drawing equally on both, I will provide a novel account of the foundations of knowledge. (shrink)

There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centred on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over her own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant’s conception of moral virtue as it is (...) developed in his later work, chiefly the Metaphysics of Morals. Melissa Merritt’s book is a distinctive contribution to this recent turn to virtue in Kant scholarship. Merritt argues that we need a clearer, and textually more comprehensive, account of what reflection is, in order not only to understand Kant’s account of virtue, but also to appreciate how it effectively rebuts long-standing objections to the Kantian reflective ideal. (shrink)

The development of AI tools, such as large language models and speech emotion and facial expression recognition systems, has raised new ethical concerns about AI’s impact on human relationships. While much of the debate has focused on human-AI relationships, less attention has been devoted to another class of ethical issues, which arise when AI mediates human-to-human relationships. This paper opens the debate on these issues by analyzing the case of romantic relationships, particularly those in which one partner uses AI tools, (...) such as ChatGPT, to resolve a conflict and apologize. After reviewing some possible, non-exhaustive, explanations for the moral wrongness of using AI tools in such cases, I introduce the notion of second-person authenticity: a form of authenticity that is assessed by the other person in the relationship (e.g., a partner). I then argue that at least some actions within romantic relationships should respect a standard of authentic conduct since the value of such actions depends on who actually performs them and not only on the quality of the outcome produced. Therefore, using AI tools in such circumstances may prevent agents from meeting this standard. I conclude by suggesting that the proposed theoretical framework could also apply to other human-to-human relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship, when these are mediated by AI; I offer some preliminary reflections on such applications. (shrink)

Human beings are inherently symbol-making, and this symbolic capacity is central to African philosophical and religious thought. In African traditions, symbolism is not a mere aesthetic element but a foundational ontological structure through which identity, personhood, and communal belonging are understood. Symbols— manifested in names, rituals, proverbs, totems, and cosmologies—do not merely reflect reality but actively construct it. Personality, in this context, transcends individual psychology; it is a culturally embedded phenomenon shaped by spiritual, communal, and metaphysical dimensions. While much has (...) been written on African symbolism and identity, the symbolic constitution of personality remains underexplored. This paper examines how symbols function in articulating personality within African thought, serving as mediums for ethical expression, metaphysical insight, and communal norms. Drawing on textual and oral traditions, it explores how symbolic forms mediate divine-human relations, encode moral expectations, and sustain social cohesion. The study argues that the African notion of the person is that of homo symbolism-a being whose existence is inseparable from symbolic representation. Amid globalization and cultural homogenization, the resilience of African symbolic systems underscores their importance. The paper concludes by calling for the revitalization of indigenous epistemologies through culturally responsive education, intergenerational knowledge transmission, and contextual theologies. (shrink)

There has been a call for a potentially revolutionary change to our existing understanding of the psychological concept of personal identity. Apparently, people can psychologically represent people, including themselves, as multiple individuals at the same time. Here we ask whether the intransitive judgments found in these studies truly reflect the operation of an intransitive concept of personal identity. We manipulate several factors that arbitrate between transitivity and intransitivity and find most support for transitivity: in contrast to prior work, (...) most participants do not make intransitive judgments when there is any reason to favor one individual over another. People change which single individual they personally identify with, depending on which individual competes more strongly or weakly for identity, rather than identifying with both individuals. Even when two individuals are identical and therefore both entitled to be the same person, we find that people make more transitive judgments once they understand the practical commitments of their responses (Experiment 4), and report not being able to actually imagine two perspectives simultaneously when reasoning about the scenario (Experiment 5). In short, we suggest that while people may make intransitive judgments, these do not reflect that they psychologically represent identity in an intransitive manner. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the challenges of implementing reflective thinking in engineering ethics education (EEE). It examines existing methods for teaching ethical reflection in EEE and argues that pedagogical activities aiming to foster ethical reflection need to be infused with dialogical interactions and, at a deeper level, informed by dialogism. Dialogism is understood as a relational approach to inquiry in which interactions between moral agents enable them to develop their own understandings through the process of finding shared meanings with the others (...) in activities such as sharing reasons and deliberation. Drawing on pragmatism and phenomenology, the authors conceptualize reflection as a mode of thinking that enables us to monitor and question our assumptions and values – and to synthesize experiences and situations continuously and iteratively. Classroom reflection is a nuanced practice that can be captured through experiential, first-person accounts. Given the centrality of the dialogical experiences in reflection, the assessment methods should focus on evaluating the process rather than the learning outcomes, by emphasizing self-awareness, transformation, and spontaneity in class interactions. In creating opportunities for reflection, instructors need to purposefully consider their choice of specific cases and scenarios used in instruction. Students should be guided to recognize and engage in ethical situations by considering their full, diverse, and complex contextual reality, their own assumptions, values, and experiences, and by promoting dialogical practices in the classroom. (shrink)

Epistemic trespassing, science denial, refusal to guard against bias, mishandling higher-order evidence, and the development of vice are troubling intellectual behaviors. In this paper, I advance work done by psychologists on moral self-licensing to show how all of these behaviors can be explained in terms of a parallel phenomenon of epistemic self-licensing. The paper situates this discussion at the intersection of three major epistemological projects: epistemic explanation and intervention (the project of explaining troubling intellectual phenomena in the hopes of deriving (...) ameliorative strategies), hostile epistemology (the study of how intellectual vulnerabilities might be exploited), and the promise of higher- order evidence (the hope that higher-order evidence leads to epistemic improvement). Analyzing epistemic licensing allows us to explain and offer modest interventions aimed at mitigating these behaviors, while illuminating exploitable vulnerabilities and tempering optimism about the promise of higher-order evidence. (shrink)

The distinction between personal-level and subpersonal-level attributions of cognition raises interesting questions. What is the relationship between personal-level and subpersonal-level attributions of cognition, for example? Does the personal/subpersonal distinction pick out two different kinds of cognitive processes, or does it merely reflect two different kinds of explanatory projects we might have? This piece gives an overview of the personal/subpersonal distinction and explores how the distinction is used to guide research in cognitive science and beyond.

Reflection Theory holds that our sensations reflect physical properties, whereas Empiricism believes that sense (data), presentations, and phenomena are the ultimate existence. Lenin adhered to Reflection Theory and criticized Helmholtz’s sensory symbolism for affirming the similarity between a sensation and a physical property. By using information and color vision theories, analyzing the ostensive definition with inverted qualia, and extending the relativity principle, this paper affirms the external world’s existence independent of personal sensations. Still, it denies the similarity between a (...) sense and a physical property. Then, it improves symbolism to analog symbolism and Reflection Theory to Information Reflection Theory. (shrink)

This paper proposes a Rawlsian conception of moral justification as a social activity. Through a close reading, Rawls’ view of ethical justification is shown to be significantly more dialogical and deliberative than is commonly appreciated. The result is a view that emphasizes the social nature of ethical justification and identifies information sharing between persons as the crux of justification in metaethics, in contrast to normative ethics. I call it Rawlsian reflective equilibrium to distinguish it from other varieties.

Dependent Arising (paṭicca-samuppāda) is often interpreted either as a doctrine of rebirth or as a general theory of causality. This paper proposes a different reading: Dependent Arising as a phenomenological description of how suffering is constructed and ceased within lived experience. Drawing on a personal reflection grounded in early Buddhist teachings, the paper focuses on sati (awareness) as the decisive turning point in this process. Rather than treating suffering as an inevitable result of conditioned existence, this study argues that (...) suffering arises at a specific moment—when feeling gives rise to craving through habitual patterns of judgment and fixation. At this critical juncture, sati functions as an immediate recognition of the mind’s movement toward grasping. When such awareness is present, ignorance loses its operative force, and the chain of Dependent Arising does not proceed further. By examining the transition from momentary awareness to sustained mindfulness, the paper shows how Dependent Arising shifts from a closed cycle of suffering to an open and observable process. In this light, conditioned phenomena (saṅkhata-dhamma) are no longer experienced as fixed or absolute, but as fluid and contingent. The paper further suggests that the Four Noble Truths and the Twelvefold Chain express a single insight in complementary forms: the structure of suffering and the practical means of its cessation. Ultimately, this essay presents Dependent Arising not as a metaphysical claim, but as a path of seeing—one that reveals freedom not beyond experience, but within the clear awareness of experience as it unfolds. (shrink)

Upon entering Harlem for the first time, Simone de Beauvoir recounts how “a force pulls me back … fear. Not mine but that of others – the fear of all those whites who never take the risk of going to Harlem”. But of what are they fearful? The risk, Beauvoir describes, is not that of an external danger but themselves. These passages detail the phenomenon of having one’s collective being, one’s unity to certain others, revealed to oneself through a third-person (...) encounter. In this paper, (1) I make sense of Beauvoir’s reflections through Gerda Walther’s social ontology, (2) to show how we consistently undergo pre-reflective we-experiences qua social identities. (3) I then demonstrate how this pre-reflective ‘we’ is made reflective by the external Third; and (4) how we may reflectively disavow ourselves of this ‘we’ when we find it uncomfortable, alienating, and inappropriate. These novel inroads into the phenomenology of collective intentionality leads me (5) to argue that while members of dominant groups enjoy the privilege of having their collective being remain in the unremarkable background, members who inhabit social identities that are stigmatised and oppressed are systematically forced back upon themselves through third-person encounters. (shrink)

If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Arguably not. For this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational duty to maximize one's utility. Further, why cause a want's target if one will not then want it? And people "are" their wants. So if these change, people will not survive to enjoy their wants' targets. I reply that one rationally need not (...) advance one's future wants, only current ones. Furthermore, rational choice seeks not utility (the co-obtaining of a want and its target), but satisfaction (the eventual obtaining of what is now wanted) -- otherwise, it would be irrational to care now about what happens after one dies. Finally, persons survive "rational" changes of values. Thus reflection on the rational revision of values illuminates the conditions on personal identity and the bases and aims of rational choice. (shrink)

A few reflections, somewhat random, on ephemeral experiences and the value we live with in the course of them. As entities that we know will cease to exist, but that we maintain a life that we give a personal meaning, an object. Somewhere between philosophy and literature.

This paper presents a novel framework for understanding consciousness, termed Reflective Consciousness. It proposes that consciousness is the universe’s self-reflective process, emerging naturally when matter and energy reach a certain level of complex organization. Individual experiences, or the sense of “I,” are illusions of perspective, differentiating personal awareness, but fundamentally there exists only one universal consciousness. Consciousness is not a goal or teleological endpoint, but a natural, inevitable outcome of physical organization, allowing the universe to perceive itself through the (...) multiplicity of lived experiences. This framework emphasizes that the experience of individuality is shaped by the differentiation of personal perspectives, yet all consciousness is a single, unified process. The emergence of consciousness is a natural, spontaneous consequence of matter and energy reaching high levels of organization, rather than the result of intentional design or purpose. -/- Author’s Note: All ideas, logical structure, and conceptual development presented here are entirely the author’s own. Minor editorial assistance, including linguistic refinement in English, was employed solely to ensure clarity and precision; the arguments and original thinking remain fully the author’s intellectual property. (shrink)

Except in extraordinary circumstances, patients' clinical care should reflect their preferences. Incapacitated patients cannot report their preferences. This is a problem. Extant solutions to the problem are inadequate: surrogates are unreliable, and advance directives are uncommon. In response, some authors have suggested developing algorithmic "patient preference predictors" (PPPs) to inform care for incapacitated patients. In a recent paper, Earp et al. propose a new twist on PPPs. Earp et al. suggest we personalize PPPs using modern machine learning (ML) techniques. In (...) this paper, I argue that, contrary to Earp et al.'s claim, personalized patient preference predictors are neither technically feasible nor ethically desirable. (shrink)

Enlightenment values are built around the presumption of an independent rational self, citizen, consumer and pursuer of self-interest. Even the authoritarian and communitarian variants of the Enlightenment presumed the existence of autonomous individuals, simply arguing for greater weight to be given to their collective interests. Since Hume, however, radical Enlightenment empiricists have called into question the existence of a discrete, persistent self. Today neuroscientific reductionism has contributed to the rejection of an essentialist model of personal identity. Contemporary transhumanism has (...) yet to grapple with the radical consequences of the erosion of liberal individualism on their projects of individually chosen enhancement and longevity. Most transhumanists still reflect an essentialist idea of personal identity, even as they embrace projects of radical cognitive enhancement that would change every constituent element of consciousness. Transhumanists need to grapple with how their projects and ethics would change if personal identity is an arbitrary, malleable fiction. (shrink)

1. EXPLICATING THE CONCEPT OF REFLECTION (under review) To understand how ‘reflection’ is used, I consider ordinary, philosophical, and scientific discourse. I find that ‘reflection’ seems to refer to reasoning that is deliberate and conscious, but not necessarily self-conscious. Then I offer an empirical explication of reflection’s conscious and deliberate features. These explications not only help explain how reflection can be detected; they also distinguish reflection from nearby concepts such as ruminative and reformative reasoning. After this, I find that reflection (...) is not obviously limited to only practical or only theoretical reasoning. The chapter ends with reasons to prefer ‘unreflective’ and ‘reflective’ to dual process theorists’ labels about systems or types. 2. BOUNDED REFLECTIVISM & EPISTEMIC IDENTITY (in Metaphilosophy) Reflection features centrally in philosophy (e.g., Korsgaard, 1996; Rawls, 1971; Sosa, 1991) and psychology (e.g., Pennycook, 2018). Bounded reflectivism is an empirically adequate model of reflection that explains reflection’s capacity to either help or hinder reasoning—e.g., reflective equilibrium vs. reflective polarization (e.g., Kahan et al., 2017). One innovation of the model is epistemic identity: an identity that involves particular beliefs—e.g., religious and political identities. When we feel that our epistemic identity is threatened, we can reflectively defend its beliefs rather than update our beliefs according to the best arguments and evidence. The solution, I argue, is not to suppress epistemic identity but embrace it by appealing to shared, superordinate epistemic identities. 3. ALL MEASURES ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL (under review) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? “10 cents” comes to most people’s minds immediately. However, upon reflection, we can realize that “5 cents” is the correct answer. There are many reflection tests. Each has its limitations. Some reflection tests are mathematical—like the bat-and-ball problem (e.g., Frederick, 2005) and others are logical (e.g., Janis & Frick, 1943). So there are concerns that reflection tests track logical and mathematical competence rather than reflection per se. Also, some psychologists assume a priori that correct answers are reflective and lured answers are unreflective. New evidence raises additional concerns about the plausibility of these assumptions. I argue that think aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1998) and process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) can assuage some of these concerns. 4. GREAT MINDS DO NOT THINK ALIKE (in Review of Philosophy and Psychology) Two large studies (N = 1299), one pre-registered, found that many correlations between reflection and philosophical beliefs among non-philosophers replicated among philosophers. For example, less reflective philosophers preferred theism to atheism and utilitarian rather than deontological responses to the trolley problem (Hannikainen & Cova, in prep.; Pennycook et al., 2016; Reynolds, Byrd, & Conway, forthcoming). However, philosophical judgments were sometimes better predicted by factors like education, gender, and personality than by reflection test performance. So although some relationships between reflection and philosophy were robust, there is more to the link between reflection and philosophy. Normative implications are also discussed—e.g., how we can infer the quality of philosophical views from their correlations with reflective or unreflective reasoning. 5. WHAT WE CAN (AND CAN’T) INFER ABOUT IMPLICIT BIAS (in Synthese) Contrary to some philosophers and psychologists, I argue that implicit bias is probably associative. However, I also argue that debiasing is not thereby entirely unconscious and involuntary. Indeed, strong evidence suggests that reflection can change implicitly biased behavior—e.g., conscious and deliberate counterconditioning. This has implications for the science and morality of implicit bias—e.g., evidence suggests that we can reform biases; so. intuitively, we can be responsible for biases. (shrink)

Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.

The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences, has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to its subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological (...) view’, according to which the subject, in being pre-reflectively self-conscious, is just aware of their own occurrent mental state. In this paper, I argue in favour of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured ‘fact-like’ entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one’s own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. (shrink)

This essay offers a personal philosophical reflection on Sigmund Freud’s concept of the unconscious through the lens of Yogācāra Buddhism and phenomenology. While acknowledging Freud’s decisive contribution in revealing the limits of rational self-governance, the essay raises a further question: where does unconscious conflict ultimately arise? Rather than locating its source in repressed mental contents, this reflection proposes that conflict emerges from the structural activity by which experience is continuously organized around a sense of self. Drawing on the Yogācāra (...) notions of ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) and manas (self-grasping consciousness), the Freudian unconscious is reconsidered as a phenomenological manifestation of latent structural tendencies rather than a hidden repository of desires. In this view, Ego and Superego are understood not as independent inner agencies, but as functional expressions of a deeper self-maintaining structure that precedes reflective awareness. By bringing phenomenology into dialogue with psychoanalysis and Yogācāra thought, this essay argues that the persistence of psychic conflict points to a fundamental limit of reason. Insight alone cannot dissolve suffering as long as the pre-reflective activity of self-identification remains intact. The essay does not claim a doctrinal synthesis, but suggests that Yogācāra may serve as a structural supplement to psychoanalysis by clarifying why unconscious patterns endure despite understanding. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...) of the core expressions in a different way. I will illustrate this claim by focusing on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s accounts and argue that these authors use the notions of knowing and of understanding other minds differently than traditionally assumed. As a consequence, second person accounts thus conceived do not directly address the questions that gave rise to the theory of mind debate. They invite us, however, to critically reflect upon the way the debate has been set up. (shrink)

Since the millennium, first person accounts of experience have been accepted as philosophically valid, potentially useful sources of information about the nature of mind and self. Several Vedic sciences rely on such first person accounts to discuss experience and consciousness. This paper shows that their insights define the information structure of experience in agreement with a scientific theory of mind fulfilling all presently known philosophical and scientific conditions. Experience has two separate components, its information content, and a separate ‘witness aspect’, (...) which can reflect on all forms of experience, and with training be strengthened until its power of reflection identifies it as the innermost aspect of ‘self’. The Vedic sciences, Sankhya, Yoga and Vedanta develop these themes. Sankhya identifies the different aspects of experience, outer and inner; Yoga practices lead the mind to inner states without information content (samadhi) in which the experience of the witness (sakshi) is strengthened and deepened. Vedanta states the nature of the ‘self’ is to know itself directly without intermediary. All this requires the witness to have a singular loop structure. The information structure of experience therefore has two aspects, information content plus a singular loop endowing it with a subjective sense of ‘Self’. (shrink)

Idiosyncratic responses as more strictly personal responses to fiction film that vary across individual spectators. In philosophy of film, idiosyncratic responses are often deemed inappropriate, unwarranted and unintended by the film. One type of idiosyncratic response is when empathy with a character triggers the spectator to reflect on his own real life issues. Self-reflection can be triggered by egoistic drift, where the spectator starts imagining himself in the character’s shoes, by re-experiencing memories, or by unfamiliar experiences that draw the (...) spectator’s attention. Film may facilitate self-reflection by slowing down narrative development and making the narrative indeterminate. Such scenes make idiosyncratic responses, such as self-reflection, appropriate and intended. Fiction film is a safe context for the spectator to reflect on personal issues, as it also affords him with distancing techniques if the reflection becomes too painful or unwanted. The fictional context further encourages self-reflection in response to empathy, as the spectator is relieved from real life moral obligations to help the other. (shrink)

Balancing Ritual and Personal Growth: The Key to Spiritual and Societal Harmony -/- Throughout history, humans have sought meaning, guidance, and connection through both structured rituals and personal spiritual growth. Religious ceremonies, such as Mass or collective worship, provide a sense of tradition, belonging, and ethical reinforcement. At the same time, true spiritual transformation often requires individual reflection, self-awareness, and a deep understanding of moral principles beyond external practices. This balance between ritual and personal growth is not (...) only vital in spirituality but also in other areas of life, such as education, leadership, and societal development. -/- The role of Religious Rituals in Creating Harmony -/- Religious rituals serve as a foundation for unity, stability, and peace within communities. The structured nature of worship—through prayer, music, sermons, and symbolic acts—offers individuals a sense of belonging and a connection to a higher purpose. Rituals can provide psychological comfort, especially during difficult times, reinforcing faith and resilience. Furthermore, religious ceremonies often promote moral and ethical values, encouraging kindness, forgiveness, and compassion among followers. -/- However, for religious rituals to truly create harmony, they must be practiced with an inclusive and open spirit. If rituals become rigid, mechanical, or exclusionary, they can lose their transformative power and, in some cases, lead to division rather than unity. When people engage in religious practices without understanding their deeper meaning, the rituals become mere formalities rather than tools for personal and collective growth. -/- The Importance of Personal Spiritual Growth -/- While religious rituals provide structure, personal spiritual growth ensures that individuals internalize and embody their faith’s core teachings. True spirituality is not just about attending services or following traditions but about cultivating wisdom, self-awareness, and moral integrity. Through personal reflection, meditation, and conscious decision-making, individuals deepen their understanding of their beliefs and apply them meaningfully in their daily lives. -/- Spiritual growth allows people to adapt to changing realities, fostering an open-minded and compassionate approach to life. Instead of blindly following rituals, a person with deep spiritual awareness understands the purpose behind them and integrates them into their moral and ethical framework. This balance between external practice and internal wisdom leads to genuine peace and harmony, both within the self and within society. -/- The Same Principle in Education and Leadership -/- The balance between structure and personal growth is not limited to spirituality—it applies to education, leadership, and other aspects of life. In education, structured learning systems provide knowledge, but true understanding comes when students actively engage with ideas, think critically, and apply what they learn. Memorizing facts alone is not enough; education must encourage independent thought, creativity, and lifelong learning. -/- Similarly, in leadership, rules, policies, and traditions offer stability and order, but effective leaders must also adapt, think critically, and connect with people on a deeper level. A leader who follows rigid traditions without personal insight may fail to address new challenges, while a leader who focuses solely on personal instincts without structure may create instability. The most effective leadership balances institutional wisdom with individual growth and adaptability. -/- Achieving a Harmonious Balance -/- To create a world of true harmony, both on a spiritual and societal level, we must integrate the benefits of structured rituals and personal growth. Rituals offer stability, shared values, and tradition, while personal growth ensures that these traditions remain meaningful, relevant, and adaptable. -/- When religious practices, education, and leadership embrace both structured learning and independent wisdom, individuals and societies can thrive. The challenge is not choosing between ritual and personal growth but finding the right balance where both reinforce each other. A world that understands and applies this principle will be more peaceful, resilient, and enlightened. -/- . (shrink)

This article reviews research on counterfactual, social, and temporal comparisons and proposes a Reflection and Evaluation Model (REM) as an organizing framework. At the heart of the model is the assertion that 2 psychologically distinct modes of mental simulation operate during comparative thinking: reflection, an experiential (“as if”) mode of thinking characterized by vividly simulating that information about the comparison standard is true of, or part of, the self; and evaluation, an evaluative mode of thinking characterized by the use of (...) information about the standard as a reference point against which to evaluate one’s present standing. Reflection occurs when information about the standard is included in one’s self-construal, and evaluation occurs when such information is excluded. The result of reflection is that standard–consistent cognitions about the self become highly accessible, thereby yielding affective assimilation; whereas the result of evaluation is that comparison information is used as a standard against which one’s present standing is evaluated, thereby yielding affective contrast. The resulting affect leads to either an increase or decrease in behavioral persistence as a function of the type of task with which one is engaged, and a combination of comparison-derived causal inferences and regulatory focus strategies direct one toward adopting specific future action plans. (shrink)

Louis Charland has argued that the Cluster B personality disorders, including borderline personality disorder, are primarily moral rather than clinical conditions. Part of his argument stems from reflections on effective treatment of borderline personality disorder. In the argument from treatment, he claims that successful treatment of all Cluster B personality disorders requires a positive change in a patient’s moral character. Based on this claim, he concludes (1) that these disorders are, at root, deficits in moral character, and (2) that (...) effective treatment of these disorders requires a sort of moral education rather than clinical intervention. In this paper, I evaluate the argument from treatment through a critical analysis of two psychotherapeutic interventions that have shown recent effectiveness against borderline personality disorder. I suggest that both Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and Mentalization-Based Treatment indicate that borderline personality disorder is, at root, a deficit in non-moral cognitive and emotional capacities. I suggest that these non-moral deficits obscure the expression of an otherwise intact moral character. In light of this, I conclude that effective treatment of borderline personality disorder requires primarily clinical intervention rather than moral edification. (shrink)

This reflective philosophical piece explores the temporal dissonance between human understanding and actionable wisdom, framing it as a fundamental structural tragedy of the human condition. Through a hybrid essay-poetic form, the work examines how moral and cognitive realizations often arrive only after irreversible harm has occurred—whether ecological, social, or personal. It critiques the reactive nature of human learning, the sluggish pace of societal change, and the ethical lag that permits historical atrocities to persist despite eventual condemnation. The text ultimately (...) calls for a radical, anticipatory form of empathy and ethical foresight, urging readers to grieve in advance and act preemptively to prevent future suffering. It is both a lament for what is lost too soon and a desperate plea for timely transformation. (shrink)

I want to examine the implications of a metaphysical thesis which is presupposed in various objections to Rawls' theory of justice.Although their criticisms differ in many respects, they concur in employing what I shall refer to as the continuity thesis. This consists of the following claims conjointly: (1) The parties in the original position (henceforth the OP) are, and know themselves to be, fully mature persons who will be among the members of the well-ordered society (henceforth the WOS) which is (...) generated by their choice of principles of justice. (2) The OP is a conscious event among others, integrated (compatibly with the constraints on knowledge and motivation imposed on the parties) into the regular continuity of experience that comprises each of their ongoing constitutes lives. (3) The parties in the OP thus are, and regard themselves as, psychologically continuing persons, partially determined in personality and interests by prior experiences, capable of recollection and regret concerning the past, anticipation and apprehensiveness regarding the future, and so on. Although the continuity thesis as stated above is not at odds with any of the conditions that define the OP, its exegetical validity is a matter for discussion. I shall be concerned to argue that if it is indeed contained in or a consequence of Rawls' theory, then it casts into doubt the capacity of the OP to generate or justify any principles of justice at all. On the other hand, if the continuity thesis is viewed as dispensable and unnecessary to the Rawlsian enterprise, then Rawls is correct in maintaining the irrelevance of the question of personal identity to the construction of his moral theory. In this case, the contract-theoretic, instrumentalist justification for the two principles of justice (henceforth the 2PJ) needs to be supplanted by a modified conception of wide reflective equilibrium. The considerations that form the bulk of this discussion then may be understood as providing a rationale for Rawls' recent revisions in the model of justification on which his theory of justice rests, and for his increasing emphasis on us as moral mediators between the OP and the WOS. Now I want to consider the question of whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls, and what problems for his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. -/- . (shrink)

Personal narratives can let us in on aspects of reality which we have not experienced for ourselves, and are thus important sources for philosophical reflection. Yet a venerable tradition in mainstream philosophy has little room for arguments which rely on personal narrative, on the grounds that narratives are particular and testimonial, whereas philosophical arguments should be systematic and transparent. I argue that narrative arguments are an important form of philosophical argument. Their testimonial aspects witness to novel facets of (...) reality, but their argumentative aspects help us to understand those facets for ourselves. My argument takes the form of a case study of the exemplary narrative argument penned by Rachel Moran, a former prostitute who uses her experiences to argue that prostitution amounts to sexual abuse. We’ll see that narrative arguments can enjoy expository Advantages over analytic ones. (shrink)

This chapter discusses a form of pedagogy of reflection suggested to be defined as the dialogical-reflective professional-development school (DRPDS)
a framework that develops and empowers students by engaging them in a process of continual improvement, responding to diverse situations, providing stimuli for learning, and giving anchors for mediation. The pedagogy of reflection relates to dialogue not only from a theoretical historical context but also by way of example
that is, it offers empowering dialogues within the traditional teacher-training framework. (...) This chapter outlines the importance of the pedagogy of reflection in the multicultural educational space of the preservice education field in Israel, analyzing the first university PDS model. The pedagogy of reflection in the context of the educational dialogue of educators is outlined as a tool for student empowerment, achieved through a community of learners who dedicate space to the development of their whole personality within the profession, taking a moral stance toward the educational discourse, minimizing judgmentalism and prejudice, creating national/gender equality with the goal of examining the fundamental question of educational performance, and reinforcing their sense of organizational belonging within the system. In these contexts, the chapter is based on the elements of dialogical philosophy exemplified in the thought of Burbules, Nelson, Isaacs, Bohm, and Heckmann and the reflective basis of educational and organizational performance exemplified in the writings of van Manen. The chapter also presents two examples from a project in which teaching units based on dialogue and reflection were developed within a dialogic community that represents in its very being collective empowerment, the possibility of coping with problems that are too large for an individual to solve on his/her own, and an alternative to sealed and alienated organizations. (shrink)

It is well known that Kant seeks to discredit rational psychology on the grounds that we cannot access the nature of the soul by reflecting upon the ‘I think’ of self-consciousness. What is far less understood, however, is why Kant still believes the theorems of rational psychology are analytically true insofar as they represent the ‘I’ through the categories of substance, reality, unity, and existence. Early post-Kantian thinkers like Fichte would abandon this restriction and approach the concept of the ‘I’ (...) instead through the category of community or reciprocal interaction. The result was nothing less than a radical shift in thinking about persons after Kant, yet in a way that would bear a striking affinity to the substance monism of Spinoza. The aim of this chapter is to trace the origin of this shift and its aftermath in Fichte’s effort to defend a new conception of the ‘I’. (shrink)

Evidence affirms that aesthetic engagement patterns our movements, often with us barely aware. This invites an examination of pre-reflective engagement within cities and also aesthetic experience as a form of the pre-reflective. The invitation is amplified because design has political implications. For instance, it can draw people in or exclude them by establishing implicitly recognized public-private boundaries. The Value Sensitive Design school, which holds that artifacts embody ethical and political values, stresses some of this. But while emphasizing that design embodies (...) implicit values, research in this field lacks sustained attention to largely unconscious background biases or values, rooted in cultural attitudes and personal interests, that lead theorists and planners—often too narrowly—to promote design organized around specific values such as defensibility. In examining these points, I draw on J. J. Gibson, a central figure for some writing on aesthetics and cities, and whom pragmatists and phenomenologists in turn influenced. Taking a cue from pragmatists in particular, I argue Gibson’s perceptual theory of affordances entails a theory of values, meaning our perception and therewith movements are inherently value-based. I advocate design that accounts for relatively constantly held values such as safety, while also handling the vast pluralism that exists and not crushing the aesthetic vibrancy of city life. (shrink)