Causal Decision Theory reckons the choice-worthiness of an option to be completely independent of its evidential bearing on its non-effects. But after one has made a choice this bearing is relevant to future decisions. Therefore it is possible to construct problems of sequential choice in which Causal Decision Theory makes a guaranteed loss. So Causal Decision Theory is wrong. The source of the problem is the idea that agents have a special perspective on their own contemplated (...) actions, from which evidential connections that observers can see are either irrelevant or invisible. (shrink)

This paper extends the temporal concept of Sequential Time Theory (STT) to the problem of metrology in the quantum domain. In STT, a time interval Δt is constructed by a counter n representing the number of realizations of a standard displacement ΔQ_unit, while time t serves as a coordinate label assigned to this sequence. STT explicitly posits that "time is a scaling of physical change" and that "time is constructed solely by clock phenomena subject to the same conditions within (...) a local system." Consequently, in regimes where ΔQ is indistinguishable, time does not "cease to exist" but becomes "unconstructible (undefined)." Based on these definitions and axioms, this paper (i) organizes criteria for distinguishing between science and metaphysics, (ii) identifies conceptual confusions arising from the implicit assumption of an external classical clock in quantum theory, and (iii) proposes a relativity principle regarding differences in observation scale (e.g., macroscopic observation of microscopic systems). We demonstrate that issues such as measurement, classicality, and tunneling time can be unifiedly organized as problems of "choice of clock (ΔQ)" and "recording (event-token) protocols." -/- [Version Note (Jan 2026)]: This version (latest Version) adds a mathematical derivation in Appendix A and clarifies the arrow of time in Appendix B. (shrink)

Prioritarianism is a variant of utilitarianism. It differs from utilitarianism in that benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are. On this view, there are two standard ways of handling risky prospects: Ex-Post Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off in final outcomes and then values prospects by the expectation of the sum total of those adjusted values, whereas Ex-Ante Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off on each individual's expectation and then values prospects by the sum total (...) of those adjusted expectations. A standard objection to Ex-Post Prioritarianism is that it violates Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. In this article, I argue that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism suffers from much the same problem: it violates a sequential version of Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes sequences of choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. (shrink)

The human being possesses mutually conflicting potentials that cannot be simultaneously actualized within a single world. On the one hand, existential justice requires that none of these potentials remain unfulfilled; on the other hand, free will demands that choice be genuine and conscious. A single world, due to linear time, the intrinsic conflict among potentials, the inherent inequality of existential situations, and the irreversibility of choices, fails to provide such a field. -/- Employing an analytic–deductive methodology and drawing upon (...) Transcendent Theosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyah), this study proposes the theory of “successive worlds” (ʿawālim nawbatī): independent and sequential ontological fields, each of which provides the pure conditions for the realization of one of the fundamental opposites (such as poverty/wealth, power/weakness). Within this model, “succession” (nawbah) denotes the order of experience; “existential intensity” signifies the situational pressure of each world; and “existential weight” refers to the qualitative impact of choices. -/- Acquired memory is suppressed so that free will remains untainted, while presential knowledge of acquired dispositions (malakāt) is preserved. Justice is thus redefined not as the distribution of outcomes, but as the opening of possibilities for the realization of potentials; and perfection is understood as the process of stabilizing dispositions through pure choices. This framework resolves the apparent tension between free will, justice, and the experiential encounter with opposites, and manifests the divine “best order” (niẓām al-aḥsan): the optimal mode for realizing the ultimate purpose of creation, namely, trial and the existential perfection of the soul (Qur’an, al-Mulk: 2). -/- The successive worlds do not occur prior to the creation of the worldly realm, nor after the intermediate state (barzakh) or the Resurrection, but rather within the very stage of this-worldly existence. The difference lies in the mode of temporality: instead of expanding horizontally as linear physical time, it unfolds vertically in a discrete, stepwise manner. Consequently, the entire series of successions still belongs to the same “worldly lifespan,” which the Qur’an designates as makthan (sojourn) (al-Anʿām: 29); yet from the external perspective of an earthly observer, each “succession” appears as an independent life. Hence, this model neither overlaps with barzakh and the Resurrection nor entails transmigration (tanāsukh), since all these stages are realized within a single unified existential–temporal world. -/- . (shrink)

Human beings possess mutually opposed capacities that cannot be simultaneously actualized within a single world. On the one hand, existential justice requires that none of these capacities remain unrealized; on the other, free will demands that choice be real and consciously made. A single world—due to linear time, the internal tension among capacities, the intrinsic inequality of positions, and the irreversibility of choices—fails to provide such a field of realization. -/- Using an analytical–deductive method and drawing on Transcendent Philosophy (...) (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya), this study proposes the theory of **“Successive Worlds”** (ʿawālim nawbatī): independent yet sequential existential contexts, each of which furnishes the pure conditions for the realization of one fundamental pair of opposites (such as poverty/wealth or power/weakness). In this model, *nawba* (succession) denotes the order of experience, *existential intensity* denotes the situational pressure, and *existential weight* denotes the qualitative impact of choices. Acquired (conceptual) memory is suppressed so that free will is not compromised, while presential knowledge of character traits (malakāt) is preserved. Justice is thus not the distribution of outcomes but the opening of genuine possibilities for the realization of capacities, and perfection is the process of stabilizing character traits through pure choices. This framework resolves the apparent tension between free will, justice, and the experience of opposites, and manifests the divine **Best Order (niẓām al-aḥsan)** as the optimal means for fulfilling the ultimate purpose of creation: trial and the existential perfection of the soul (Qurʾān 67:2). -/- The **“Successive Worlds”** occur neither prior to the creation of the world, nor after the intermediate realm (barzakh) or the Resurrection, but within the very phase of *this worldly life* itself. The difference lies in the structure of time: physical linear time does not extend horizontally, but is experienced vertically in a discontinuous, step-like manner. Accordingly, the entire series of successions still falls within the same *worldly lifespan* that the Qurʾān describes as *makthan* (abiding) (al-Anʿām 6:29), even though from the external perspective of an earthly observer, each succession appears as an independent life. Hence, this theory neither overlaps with barzakh (the realm of the grave) nor with the Resurrection (the realm of reckoning and recompense), and it is distinct from reincarnation, since all successions are realized within one and the same existential–temporal world. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and (...) possible reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be (...) borne out by the sharp model but not by any promising incarnation of its imprecise counterpart. After first pointing out that Elga has fallen short of establishing that his principle is indeed uniquely borne out by the sharp model, I cast aspersions on its plausibility. I show that a slight weakening of the principle is satisfied by at least one, but interestingly not all, varieties of the imprecise model and point out that Elga has failed to motivate his stronger commitment. (shrink)

The desirable gambles framework provides a rigorous foundation for imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility via its coherence axioms. In our related work, we introduced function-coherent gambles to accommodate non-linear utility. However, when repeated gambles are played over time---especially in intertemporal choice where rewards compound multiplicatively---the standard additive combination axiom fails to capture the appropriate long-run evaluation. In this paper we extend the framework by relaxing the additive combination axiom and introducing a nonlinear combination operator that (...) effectively aggregates repeated gambles in the log-domain. This operator preserves the time-average (geometric) growth rate and addresses the ergodicity problem. We prove the key algebraic properties of the operator, discuss its impact on coherence, risk assessment, and representation, and provide a series of illustrative examples. Our approach bridges the gap between expectation values and time averages and unifies normative theory with empirically observed non-stationary reward dynamics. (shrink)

review of McLennen's *Rationality and Dynamic Choice*. The topic is important and the discussion is powerful. Some connection with modelling and simulation would be valuable.

Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing that they face significant problems.

W. V. Quine wished to restrict the interests that matter to those of actual people. Actual-Population Utilitarianism is a version of utilitarianism where, following Quine, only the interests of actual people matter. It is well known that ethical theories of this kind, which depend on what is actual, typically lead to normative variance. In this paper, I put forward a new objection to Actual-Population Utilitarianism. I present a case in which Actual-Population Utilitarianism prescribes choices that are worse for everyone whose (...) interests matter than the opposite choices. Moreover, I put forward a case in which total and average versions of Actual-Population Utilitarianism prescribe choices that are worse than the opposite choice for everyone (full stop). This objection also applies if the Actual-Population Restriction is combined with non-utilitarian views, given some minimal assumptions. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My (...) Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

The evolution of the human mind through natural selection mandates that our conscious experiences are causally potent in order to leave a tangible impact upon the surrounding physical world. Any attempt to construct a functional theory of the conscious mind within the framework of classical physics, however, inevitably leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolution theory. Here, we derive several rigorous theorems that identify the origin of the latter impasse in the mathematical properties of ordinary differential (...) equations employed in combination with the alleged functional production of the mind by the brain. Then, we demonstrate that a mind--brain theory consistent with causally potent conscious experiences is provided by modern quantum physics, in which the unobservable conscious mind is reductively identified with the quantum state of the brain and the observable brain is constructed by the physical measurement of quantum brain observables. The resulting quantum stochastic dynamics obtained from sequential quantum measurements of the brain is governed by stochastic differential equations, which permit genuine free will exercised through sequential conscious choices of future courses of action. Thus, quantum reductionism provides a solid theoretical foundation for the causal potency of consciousness, free will and cultural transmission. (shrink)

This paper establishes the Law of Order—the principle that logic possesses inherent sequential and hierarchical structure—as the fifth fundamental law of logic, coordinate with identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason. We derive the law from the structure of primary distinction: the act by which anything determinate is differentiated from what it is not. The derivation shows that distinction necessarily exhibits sequence (from undifferentiated to differentiated) and hierarchy (the distinguished presupposes the act of distinguishing). We introduce the E/R/R Framework (...) (Elements/Roles/Rules) as the structural decomposition of any determinate system: Elements (what exists—grounded in L1), Roles (why signifficant—grounded in L4), and Rules (how structured—grounded in L5). This framework provides both a method for analyzing systems and a diagnostic tool for paradoxes. We derive the L5-Resolution Principle: when multiple elements qualify for the same role, L5 demands deterministic resolution through leftmost selection—not as arbitrary convention but as the unique order-respecting choice. This transforms a philosophical principle into a concrete computational rule. We provide a formal treatment in type theory, demonstrating that paradoxes are blocked structurally at the level of type-checking. The explanatory power of the Law of Order is shown through the E/R/R diagnosis of paradoxes: Russell's paradox, the Liar, and related constructions all involve confusing E/R/R categories—attempting to place an entity at two levels simultaneously. The framework provides a unified philosophical foundation for formal solutions including Russell's type theory, Tarski's hierarchy, and ZFC's axiom of regularity. (shrink)

A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect (...) if and only if two conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent,” which may be caused by violations of “deductive closure.” Our account is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance. (shrink)

I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. This decision should lead causalists to a better understanding of what it takes for a decision between some collection of options to count as a subdecision of a decision between a larger collection of options. And with (...) this better understanding of subdecisions in hand, causalists will not violate the IIA or the NEE. This decision will also teach causalists that, in sequential decisions, a rational agent may be led to make a series of choices which are causally dominated by some other sequence of choices they could have made instead. I will encourage causalists to recognise this as an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons. (shrink)

Technological advancement makes translation convenient due to the emergence of various translation tools. This Explanatory-Sequential study aims to determine the preference and the factors affecting the preference of Filipino and Foreign college students toward the Online Translation Tool. Likewise, it also aimed to identify if there is a significant difference between the respondents' choices. To acquire the data, the researchers used a survey conducted on 15 Filipino and foreign collegiate students enrolled in universities in Manila and a focus group (...) discussion among 3 Filipino students. The transcribed data were analyzed using Thematic Analysis. Moreover, the results of the quantitative data revealed that Google Translate was the preferred Online Translation Tool of Filipino and Foreign students for the reason of accessibility, user-friendliness, and the tendency of users to brand bias. The reasons presented in quantitative data are strengthened by the themes identified in the qualitative data. The three prevailing themes of Brand Bias, Accessibility, and Accuracy constituted the central theme of User Friendliness. It was identified through the Chi-Square Test that there is no significant difference among respondents' preferences (0.345 P-Value) toward online Translation software. (shrink)

This paper presents a two-stage critique of B-theory, the dominant view that temporal reality consists of a four-dimensional block universe with no objective becoming. Stage one establishes an undercutting defeater: B-theory lacks epistemic warrant for its central claim that the manifold possesses determinate relational ordering. I demonstrate that temporal becoming is the sole phenomenon through which precedence relations are detected, and that once becoming is denied, no warrant remains for asserting that slices stand in objective earlier-than/later-than relations. Every attempted rescue—through (...) coordinates, metrics, entropy, causation, quantum mechanics, or physics itself—presupposes the ordering it is invoked to establish. -/- Stage two establishes a rebutting defeater through a two-horn dilemma. Even granting charitably that temporal ordering exists, the manifold structure is compatible with infinitely many sequential arrangements (the Permutation Problem). With no mechanism to select among them, the probability that any specific ordering obtains is 1/∞ = 0 (the Selection Problem). B-theory faces an exhaustive choice: either no determinate ordering exists, or the probability that B-theory's described ordering is actual is measure-theoretically zero. Under both horns, B-theory fails. -/- Finally, I demonstrate that relativity—traditionally invoked to refute becoming—actually requires becoming to avoid this collapse. Relativity's formalism presupposes determinate temporal ordering, which only becoming can warrant. The century-long consensus is reversed: relativity does not vindicate the block universe; it depends on the temporal flow B-theory denies. (shrink)

This paper argues that many Indian philosophical and cosmological texts employ a causal architecture better described as recursive and co-constitutive rather than linear or sequential. Much of Western metaphysics models causation as a one-directional chain that presupposes temporal or ontological priority. Several Indian traditions, by contrast, depict ontological relationships in which entities co-define or co-generate each other. Examples include the reciprocal relationship between Rama and Shiva, the mutual emergence of Brahmā and the Vedas, the Nara and Narayana duality, the (...) interdependence of Puruṣa and Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya philosophy, and the reflexive structure of the self and the world in the Upaniṣads. These patterns are best analyzed using the conceptual vocabulary of recursion and fixed-point stabilization. The aim is not to claim that premodern authors anticipated these formal tools. Instead, recursion provides a precise lens for interpreting structures already visible in the texts. The paper situates these Indian models alongside linear Indian schools, particularly Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which serve as important counterpoints showing that recursive structures represent deliberate philosophical choices rather than default positions. A sustained case study involving the co-definition of Brahmā and the Vedas demonstrates that non-linear origination is not an occasional device but a central feature of Indian cosmology. The conclusion outlines implications for comparative metaphysics, narrative theory, and contemporary discussions of self-referential systems in artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Irreversibility as a Structural Requirement for Meaningful Conscious Experience Author: Tushar Chaand Abstract This work proposes that meaningful conscious experience requires irreversible temporal constraint as a necessary structural condition. While physical theories often treat time asymmetry as emergent or secondary, lived experience exhibits a strict one-way temporal ordering without which consequence, responsibility, and narrative coherence collapse. By analyzing reversibility, memory continuity, and choice, this framework demonstrates that backward temporal traversal with memory continuity would eliminate meaning by erasing irreversible consequence. (...) The theory is ontology-agnostic and remains compatible with physicalist, block-universe, multiverse, and simulation interpretations. Its contribution is to identify irreversibility not as a contingent feature of reality but as a functional requirement for any system capable of hosting meaningful experience. Core Claims 1. Conscious experience requires temporal ordering. 2. Meaning arises only when outcomes cannot be undone. 3. Memory continuity combined with reversibility collapses consequence. 4. Meaningful experience therefore requires irreversible temporal constraint. Axioms Axiom 1: Conscious experience requires sequential temporal structure. Axiom 2: Meaning requires irreversible outcomes within experience. Axiom 3: Memory continuity is necessary for learning, identity, and responsibility. Axiom 4: Backward temporal traversal with memory continuity eliminates meaning. Postulates Temporal asymmetry is experientially necessary. Irreversibility is local to conscious trajectories. Meaning is perspective-relative rather than globally defined. Ethical responsibility emerges from irreversible interaction. Falsifiability This framework would be weakened if meaningful conscious experience were demonstrated without temporal ordering, if backward time traversal preserved consequence, or if unlimited reversibility supported stable narrative identity. Conclusion Irreversibility is not a limitation imposed on experience but a structural requirement for meaning itself. Any reality capable of hosting meaningful conscious agents must enforce temporal asymmetry and excluded possibility, regardless of its underlying ontology. (shrink)

Network coding is all about combining a variety of packets and forwarding as much packets as possible in each transmission operation. The network coding technique improves the throughput efficiency of multi‐hop wireless networks by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. However, there are some scenarios where the coding cannot be exploited due to the stochastic nature of the packet arrival process in the network. In these cases, the coding node faces 2 critical choices: forwarding the packet towards (...) the destination without coding, thereby sacrificing the advantage of network coding, or waiting for a while until a coding opportunity arises for the packets. Current research works have addressed this challenge for the case of a simple and restricted scheme called reverse carpooling where it is assumed that 2 flows with opposite directions arrive at the coding node. In this paper, the issue is explored in a general sense based on the COPE architecture requiring no assumption about flows in multi‐ hop wireless networks. In particular, we address this sequential decision making problem by using the solid framework of optimal stopping theory and derive the optimal stopping rule for the coding node to choose the optimal action to take, ie, to wait for more coding opportunity or to stop immediately (and send packet). Our simulation results validate the effectiveness of the derived optimal stopping rule and show that the proposed scheme outperforms existing methods in terms of network throughput and energy consumption. (shrink)

A number of philosophers of science and statisticians have attempted to justify conclusions drawn from a finite sequence of evidence by appealing to results about what happens if the length of that sequence tends to infinity. If their justifications are to be successful, they need to rely on the finite sequence being either indefinitely increasing or of a large size. These assumptions are often not met in practice. This paper analyzes a simple model of collecting evidence and finds that the (...) practice of collecting only very small sets of evidence before taking a question to be settled is rationally justified. This shows that the appeal to long run results can be used neither to explain the success of actual scientific practice nor to give a rational reconstruction of that practice. (shrink)

Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...) more cost than it warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now? (shrink)

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes (...) and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way. (shrink)

Sequential Time Theory (STT) defines time as a metrological quantity realized by operational procedures (record, count, resolution), distinct from the coordinate time parameter in spacetime geometry. Starting from the primitive definition Δτ(n)=n k ΔQ_unit, STT internalizes time metrology (L2) and treats spacetime geometry (L1) as a representation of protocol constraints, rendering block-universe interpretations optional rather than required for physical derivations. Physics is reframed as STT-Core + Bridge axioms + Θ_sys, where Θ_sys is an explicit, auditable bundle of system-specific auxiliary (...) assumptions. Within this scheme, SR and GR kinematics arise as representation theorems for defect-free and defect-bearing clock networks; GR curvature is interpreted as a measurable holonomy defect density. Quantum interference is treated as U(1) phase holonomy in sequential update, and a Gaussian diffusion kernel is derived from minimal sequentiality assumptions. The framework is used to compare candidate quantum-gravity routes via Θ-auditing. (shrink)

The standard cosmological model (Lambda-CDM) postulates the existence of Dark Energy to explain the accelerating expansion of the universe. While statistically robust, the model lacks a fundamental physical origin for this energy and faces the persistent "Hubble Tension." -/- This paper applies Sequential Time Theory (STT) to cosmology, proposing a paradigm shift where the physical unit of time is not invariant but evolves due to the changing cosmic gravitational potential and quantum coherence scales. We construct a unified model integrating (...) General Relativistic time dilation with a Quantum Damping term derived from STT Vol.2. This model was tested against the full Pantheon+ Unbinned Supernovae dataset (N=1590), utilizing the full covariance matrix including systematic errors. -/- The results reveal that the STT model achieves a goodness-of-fit (chi-squared = 1402.71) that is statistically indistinguishable from the standard Lambda-CDM model (chi-squared = 1402.92) using SNe alone. Significantly, the derived quantum transition scale z_dec = 1.50 (+0.42 / -0.33) is consistent with the peak epoch of cosmic star formation. This suggests that "cosmic acceleration" could be reinterpreted as an illusion caused by the phase transition of time from a quantum-coherent regime to a gravity-dominated classical regime, potentially offering an alternative to the standard Dark Energy hypothesis. (shrink)

Sequential Time Theory (STT) provides a metrological foundation for physics, defining time through operational procedures rather than as a geometric coordinate. STT CR (Metrological Completion of Relativity) established a formal framework: Physics = (STT-Core -> Bridge -> L1) -> Θ_sys Physical Systems, where L1 is the formal language of dynamics, L2 (STT-Core) is the operational definition of time, and Θ_sys is the mapping rule to specific physical systems. This paper applies this framework to audit the Standard Model (Θ_SM), focusing (...) on the Higgs mechanism. -/- We propose that mass is not a primitive quantity but is defined through the time unit process: m = h * (c^2 * ΔQ_unit)^-1. From Bridge axiom B4 (local calibration consistency), we derive that mass must be determined by a spatially uniform Lorentz-scalar quantity. From metrological constraints on ΔQ_unit -- positivity (C1), finiteness (C2), and statistical reproducibility (C3) -- together with an explicit minimality assumption (Θ_minimal), we derive the form of the Higgs potential V(φ) = -μ^2 |φ|^2 + λ |φ|^4, where the derivation is conditional on the stated assumptions. -/- We show that, for UV-complete fundamental descriptions, renormalizability is a metrological necessity: otherwise the operational distribution of clock-ticks becomes resolution-dependent in a way that cannot be removed by finitely many calibrations (violating C3 and B4). Effective-field descriptions can still satisfy C3 within a finite resolution window. -/- Finally, we present a testable prediction distinguishing STT from standard quantum mechanics: intrinsic clock fluctuations scale as σ_Q ∝ m^-2, predicting the ratio σ_Q(e) : σ_Q(μ) ≈ m_μ : m_e ≈ 207 for electrons versus muons. (shrink)

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about (...) what it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

This monograph presents Sequential Time Theory (STT), an operational reconstruction of physical time based on the counting of discrete, distinguishable events. The framework resolves classical paradoxes surrounding the arrow of time, relativistic time dilation, and quantum measurement by treating time as a constructed variable rather than an ontological dimension. STT argues that irreversibility arises logically from event accumulation, that relativistic effects reflect delays in event generation, and that quantum collapse represents the registration of discrete physical changes. The theory offers (...) a parsimonious alternative to entropy-based, cosmological, and multiverse explanations of temporal asymmetry. (shrink)

There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace (...) certain kinds of responsibility gap. The argument is based on the idea that human morality is often tragic. We frequently confront situations in which competing moral considerations pull in different directions and it is impossible to perfectly balance these considerations. This heightens the burden of responsibility associated with our choices. We cope with the tragedy of moral choice in different ways. Sometimes we delude ourselves into thinking the choices we make were not tragic ; sometimes we delegate the tragic choice to others ; sometimes we make the choice ourselves and bear the psychological consequences. Each of these strategies has its benefits and costs. One potential advantage of autonomous machines is that they enable a reduced cost form of delegation. However, we only gain the advantage of this reduced cost if we accept that some techno-responsibility gaps are virtuous. (shrink)

The two most influential traditions of contemporary theorizing about democracy, social choice theory and deliberative democracy, are generally thought to be at loggerheads, in that the former demonstrates the impossibility, instability or meaninglessness of the rational collective outcomes sought by the latter. We argue that the two traditions can be reconciled. After expounding the central Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility results, we reassess their implications, identifying the conditions under which meaningful democratic decision making is possible. We argue that deliberation can (...) promote these conditions, and hence that social choice theory suggests not that democratic decision making is impossible, but rather that democracy must have a deliberative aspect. (shrink)

Psychological Sequentialism holds that no causal constraint is necessary for the preservation of what matters in survival; rather, it is sufficient for preservation if two groups of mental states are similar enough and temporally close enough. Suppose that one’s body is instantaneously dematerialized and subsequently, by an amazing coincidence, a collection of molecules is configured to form a qualitatively identical human body. According to Psychological Sequentialism, these events preserve what matters in survival. In this article, I examine some of the (...) main arguments for the view and argue that they fail to establish that no causal constraint is necessary. I also argue that Psychological Sequentialism yields implausible consequences that render it hard to accept the view. (shrink)

Welfarism is the view that individual welfare is the only thing that matters. One important contribution of social choice theory has been to provide a precise formulation and axiomatic characterization of welfarism using Amartya Sen's framework of social welfare functionals. This paper is motivated by the observation that the standard formalization of welfarism is too restrictive, since a welfarist social planner need not be committed to maximizing a preference ordering or any other binary relation over alternatives. We therefore provide (...) a characterization of welfarism in a more general choice-functional setting and show that welfarism, so understood, carries no commitment to rationalizability. This characterization is compatible with welfare values having any structure whatsoever. It also sheds light on different formulations of anonymity, revealing only some of these to be fundamental requirements of impartiality. (shrink)

This paper develops a semantic solution to the puzzle of Free Choice permission. The paper begins with a battery of impossibility results showing that Free Choice is in tension with a variety of classical principles, including Disjunction Introduction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Most interestingly, Free Choice appears incompatible with a principle concerning the behavior of Free Choice under negation, Double Prohibition, which says that Mary can’t have soup or salad implies Mary can’t have soup (...) and Mary can’t have salad. Alonso-Ovalle 2006 and others have appealed to Double Prohibition to motivate pragmatic accounts of Free Choice. Aher 2012, Aloni 2018, and others have developed semantic accounts of Free Choice that also explain Double Prohibition. -/- This paper offers a new semantic analysis of Free Choice designed to handle the full range of impossibility results involved in Free Choice. The paper develops the hypothesis that Free Choice is a homogeneity effect. The claim possibly A or B is defined only when A and B are homogenous with respect to their modal status, either both possible or both impossible. Paired with a notion of entailment that is sensitive to definedness conditions, this theory validates Free Choice while retaining a wide variety of classical principles except for the transitivity of entailment. The homogeneity hypothesis is implemented in two different ways, homogeneous alternative semantics and homogeneous dynamic semantics, with interestingly different consequences. (shrink)

A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for (...) theory choice by employing a strategy used by Sen in social choice, namely, to enhance the information made available to the choice algorithms. I argue here that, despite Okasha’s claims to the contrary, the information-enhancing strategy is not compelling in the domain of theory choice. (shrink)

In this article, we study difficult theory-choice situations, where division of cognitive labor is needed. Network epistemology models suggest that reducing connectivity is needed to prevent premature convergence on bad theories. We compare how network density, community size, strength of prior beliefs, adaptive learning methods, and weak ties influence epistemic outcomes, and show that reducing connectivity is only one possible way to improve collective epistemic accuracy. Our findings suggest that gains in accuracy often come at a high cost in (...) resources used, which should be considered when results from network epistemology models are used in applied settings. (shrink)

There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ, or that I φ? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice. I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish, has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the (...) thesis that the conclusion of the second is an action. (shrink)

Unlike existing paradigms that treat Pancasila’s five principles as simultaneously operative or organically unified, SPM conceptualizes their implementation as an evolutionary process through hierarchical stages where each principle serves as a necessary (though insufficient) condition for subsequent principles. Drawing on critical analysis of primary historical sources, philosophical reconstruction of founders’ intent, and engagement with comparative political theory, this study formulates six formal propositions explicating logical structure of sequential implementation. The model resolves longstanding debates about internal tensions in Pancasila by (...) demonstrating that apparent contradictions dissolve when implementation follows proper ordering. SPM contributes to both Indonesian political thought and comparative governance theory by bridging particularist philosophy with universal institutional sequencing frameworks. The paper concludes by outlining empirical research agendas for validating model and practical implications for constitutional interpretation, policy formulation, and civic education. (shrink)

Normative thinking about addiction has traditionally been divided between, on the one hand, a medical model which sees addiction as a disease characterized by compulsive and relapsing drug use over which the addict has little or no control and, on the other, a moral model which sees addiction as a choice characterized by voluntary behaviour under the control of the addict. Proponents of the former appeal to evidence showing that regular consumption of drugs causes persistent changes in the brain (...) structures and functions known to be involved in the motivation of behavior. On this evidence, it is often concluded that becoming addicted involves a transition from voluntary, chosen drug use to non-voluntary compulsive drug use. Against this view, proponents of the moral model provide ample evidence that addictive drug use involves voluntary chosen behaviour. In this paper we argue that although they are right about something, both views are mistaken. We present a third model that neither rules out the view of addictive drug use as compulsive, nor that it involves voluntary chosen behavior. -/- . (shrink)

Choice experiment (CE) is a questionnaire based method that the accuracy of research questionnaire determines the validity of the research outcomes. Attribute selection has a prime importance in every CE studies. If respondents do not understand or do not have preference for a certain attribute, the attribute non-attendance problem might happen that biases overall results of the research. Qualitative approaches such as literature review, focus group discussion, and in depth discussion commonly applied in CE researches. However, especially in the (...) developing countries context where ethnical and cultural diversity is a challenge in conducting survey based questionnaires, qualitative methods are not sufficient in selecting attributes. Present study investigates the application of relative importance index (RII) in respondents¡¯ preference for attributes in a modal shift study in Klang Valley, Malaysia. The 5 point Likert scale questions were employed to enhance respondents¡¯ preferences for initial 24 selected attributes. The results of this study showed that from 24 pre-selected attributes, only 18 of them had RII>0.5 and could be included in the final CE design. The results of this study could help researchers to control for unobserved problems in selecting the attributes which could not be discovered through qualitative approaches. (shrink)

Taken collectively, consumer food choices have a major impact on animal lives, human lives, and the environment. But it is far from clear how to move from facts about the power of collective consumer demand to conclusions about what one ought to do as an individual consumer. In particular, even if a large-scale shift in demand away from a certain product (e.g., factory-farmed meat) would prevent grave harms or injustices, it typically does not seem that it will make a difference (...) whether one refrains from purchasing that product oneself. Most present-day food companies operate at too large a scale for a single purchase to make a difference to production decisions. If that is true, then it is not clear what point there is in refraining. This is “the problem of collective impact.” This chapter explores a range of proposals for how to solve this problem. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...) of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13). (shrink)

While the free will debate tends to focus primarily on the implications of determinism for freedom, a long line of philosophers have also argued that free will would not be compatible with indeterminism either. These arguments typically take the form of a so-called Luck Objection: a family of related arguments which all seek to show, roughly, that if an action is not causally pre-determined then it must be a sort of random happening, over which the agent lacks the control required (...) for free will. If successful, these arguments are fatal for libertarian accounts of free will, which are committed to the view that free actions must be both undetermined and under the agent’s control. In this paper, we defend libertarian free will against this challenge from luck. We argue that most formulations of the Luck Objection presuppose a conceptual model of indeterministic decision-making that is not well aligned with recent advances in the natural sciences; specifically, we argue that they make assumptions about the nature of indeterminacy and about the causal structure of decision-making, which libertarians have good empirical reason (from both physics and neuroscience) to reject. We develop a more empirically plausible model of agential decision-making and apply this to the problem of luck. We argue that, under such a model, it is entirely natural to think of an agent’s actions as both ‘undetermined’ (in the sense of being under-determined) and under their own control. We conclude that indeterminism poses no threat to a more naturalistic version of libertarian free will. (shrink)

The concepts of choice, negation, and infinity are considered jointly. The link is the quantity of information interpreted as the quantity of choices measured in units of elementary choice: a bit is an elementary choice between two equally probable alternatives. “Negation” supposes a choice between it and confirmation. Thus quantity of information can be also interpreted as quantity of negations. The disjunctive choice between confirmation and negation as to infinity can be chosen or not in (...) turn: This corresponds to set-theory or intuitionist approach to the foundation of mathematics and to Peano or Heyting arithmetic. Quantum mechanics can be reformulated in terms of information introducing the concept and quantity of quantum information. A qubit can be equivalently interpreted as that generalization of “bit” where the choice is among an infinite set or series of alternatives. The complex Hilbert space can be represented as both series of qubits and value of quantum information. The complex Hilbert space is that generalization of Peano arithmetic where any natural number is substituted by a qubit. “Negation”, “choice”, and “infinity” can be inherently linked to each other both in the foundation of mathematics and quantum mechanics by the meditation of “information” and “quantum information”. (shrink)

What electoral system should a democracy choose? I argue for proportional representation (PR). My main empirical premise is Duverger’s law: Under PR there are more viable candidates in district-level elections than there are under single-member plurality (SMP) systems. My main normative premise is that democracy is valuable because it enables ordinary citizens to rule themselves. To enjoy the value of self-rule, citizens must be able to make an autonomous vote choice. Yet, how autonomous any choice is depends on (...) the diversity of one’s adequate options. The fewer adequate options one can choose between, the less autonomous is one’s choice. So PR augments self- rule by increasing the diversity of adequate options citizens have at election time. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. (...) An examination of the event-based transformative choices of L. A. Paul and Edna Ullman-Margalit, however, suggests that event-based transformative choices don’t raise any difficulties for standard approaches to rational choice. An account of choice-based transformative choices—and what it is to be transformed—is then proposed. Transformative choices so understood not only capture paradigmatic cases of transformative choice but also point the way to a different way of thinking about rational choice and agency. (shrink)

Sometimes citizens disagree about political matters, but a decision must be made. We have two theoretical frameworks for resolving political disagreement. The first is the framework of social choice. In it, our goal is to treat parties to the dispute fairly, and there is no sense in which some are right and the others wrong. The second framework is that of collective decision-making. Here, we do believe that preferences are truth apt, and our moral consideration is owed not to (...) those who disagree but to the community that stands to benefit or suffer from the decision. In this chapter, I describe and explore these two frameworks. I conclude two things. First, analysis of real-world disagreement suggests that collective decision-making is the right way to model politics. In most, possibly even all, political disagreement, all parties believe (if implicitly) that there is an objective standard of correctness. Second, this matter is connected to the concept of pluralism. If pluralism is true, then collective decision-making cannot be applied to some political disagreements. More surprisingly, pluralism may rule out the applicability of social choice theory as well. (shrink)

A decision maker (DM) selects a project from a set of alternatives with uncertain productivity. After the choice, she observes a signal about productivity and decides how much effort to put in. This paper analyzes the optimal decision problem of the DM who rationally filters information to deal with her post-decision cognitive dissonance. It is shown that the optimal effort level for a project can be affected by unchosen projects in her choice set, and the nature of the (...) choice set-dependence is determined by the signal structure. Some comparative statics of choice set-dependence is also provided. Finally, based on the results, the optimal choice set design is also explored. This paper offers a simple framework to explain the experimental finding in psychology that people’s effort level for a project can be enhanced when the project is chosen by themselves rather than by others. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis (...) of these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice. (shrink)

Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text (...) is essential for reconstructing the meaning and the evolution of science. In the present paper we try to substantiate this contention by means of a pragma-rhetorical study of this particular controversy. First, we reconstruct, through an analysis of a chunk of the correspondence, a micro-level of specific moves and countermoves which constitute a sequential structure within which also meta-scientific and meta-controversial considerations play a role. We then move to a macro-level of analysis, looking for recurrent patterns of argumentation. Finally, we draw epistemological conclusions on the nature of rationality and progress as manifested in actual scientific controversies. (shrink)