I've previously suggested that the historical evidence used to challenge scientific realism should lead us to embrace what I call Uniformitarianism, but many recently influential forms of scientific realism seem happy to share this commitment. I trace a number of further points of common ground that collectively constitute an appealing Middle Path between classical forms of realism and instrumentalism, and I suggest that many contemporary realists and instrumentalists have already become fellow travelers on this Middle Path without recognizing how far (...) they have thereby diverged from those who share their labels and slogans. I conclude by describing their central remaining disagreement and the sorts of evidence needed to resolve it. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss the need for a theory of essences within Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and then formulate one. I will do so by drawing on Graham Harman’s work on OOO and Martin Heidegger’s thought on the essence of being, presented in his Introduction to Metaphysics. Harman touches on essences, describing them as the tension between a withdrawn object and its withdrawn qualities, but fails to distinguish between essential and inessential qualities within this framework. To fill in the (...) gaps, I will turn to Heidegger’s explication of phusis in order to show that an essential aspect of being is how one enters into causal relations and continually reveals oneself to other beings. In bringing OOO and Heidegger together, I will find that each object has a unique way of exerting itself in the world and that the domestic relations that make up this unique profile are essential to it, while other domestic relations, those that do not influence its particular way of exerting itself, are inessential. Thus, the essence will be found to be the set of domestic relations that make up the determinate form, or unique causal profile, of the object. (shrink)

UMI Number: 3319553 This study is a historical ethnography of religious diversity in post-revolutionary Nicaragua from the vantage point of Catholics who live in the city of Masaya located on the Pacific side of Nicaragua at the end of the twentieth century. My overarching research question is: How may ethnographically observed patterns in Catholic religious practices in contemporary Nicaragua be understood in historical context? Utilizing anthropological theory and method grounded in Weberian historical theory, I explore Catholic ritual as contested politico-religious (...) cultural terrain. The patron saint celebration of Masaya becomes a contested symbol in 1999 as those who carry Saint Jerome in street procession refuse to honor a sitting president, challenging his right to rule. The deep Marian devotion of the Nicaraguan people is reflected in the household and neighborhood celebrations of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, while nation-building elites have a long history of claiming the Virgin as patron saint of the nation. While these traditional Catholic saint celebrations figure in imagining a nation, three "new" Catholic movements also compete for attention, while the polity is increasingly exposed to Protestant and Pentecostal groups. When Anastasio Somoza Debayle was overthrown in 1979, ending the 40-year family dictatorship, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ruled for a decade with the attention of the world placed on its religion of revolution, the Christian base community and liberation theology. At the same time, however, two other movements began growing quietly. They, like liberation theology, draw their justification from the second Vatican Council. In Masaya, Catholic Charismatic Renewal and the Neocatechumenal Way are "exemplary" prophetic movements gaining ground within the Catholic Church in competition with the "ethical" prophets of the Christian base community. Selectively adopting "protestant-like" forms of worship through these modern movements, the Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church reacts to the challenge to its cultural hegemony coming from evangelical competitors. New history is continuously being made as people in this part of Nicaragua struggle over the direction of their country within a complex terrain of religious competition. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: The Seven Deadly Sins: Society and Evil. By Stanford M. Lyman. The Seven Deadly Sins Today. By Henry Fairlie.

In this paper we critically examine and seek to extend Philip Kitcher’s Ethical Project to weave together a distinctive naturalistic conception of how ethics came to occupy the place it does in our lives and how the existing ethical project should be revised and extended into the future. Although we endorse his insight that ethical progress is better conceived of as the improvement of an existing state than an incremental approach towards a fixed endpoint, we nonetheless go on to argue (...) that the metaethical apparatus Kitcher constructs around this creative metaethical proposal simply cannot do the work that he demands of it. The prospect of fundamental conflict between different functions of the ethical project requires Kitcher to appeal to a particular normative stance in order to judge specific changes in the ethical project to be genuinely progressive, and we argue that the virtues of continuity and coherence to which he appeals can only specify rather than justify the normative stance he favors. We conclude by suggesting an alternative approach for ethical naturalists that seems to us ultimately more promising than Kitcher’s own. (shrink)

Considerations of realism and pluralism pervade Feyerabend’s later works, as they do in his earlier corpus. However, Conquest of Abundance and surrounding papers mark Feyerabend’s first sustained foray into metaphysics. Specifically, he hypothesizes a pluralist realism that incorporates Kantian and constructivist elements. This work was composed when the ‘metaphysical disunity’ hypothesis was fashionable among members of the ‘Stanford School’. After building on previous explorations of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics (‘abundance realism’), we compare Feyerabend’s later works to prominent formulations of metaphysical (...) pluralism in the Stanford School. We point to overlaps and divergences between Feyerabend’s later metaphysical pluralism and the formulations in the Stanford School. Despite significant intellectual overlap, the historical connections between Feyerabend’s later work and the Stanford School remain minimal. We argue that this is largely due to Feyerabend’s self-isolation from academic philosophy in the 1980s and his radical antiscientism. Moreover, we argue that Feyerabend’s metaphysics naturally extend from his attempts to situate science in diverse, democratic societies with hints of his later metaphysics in earlier writings, suggesting that Feyerabend’s “metaphysical turn” represents a shift in emphasis rather than a substantive change of position. (shrink)

“Doğal din” terimi, bazen doğanın kendisinin ilahi olduğu bir panteistik doktrine atıfta bulunur. “Doğal teoloji” terimi ise aksine, başlangıçta gözlemlenen doğal gerçekler temelinde (ve bazen) Tanrı’nın varlığını savunmaya yönelik projeye atıfta bulunur. Bununla birlikte çağdaş felsefede, hem “doğal din” hem de “doğal teoloji” genel olarak, dinî veya teolojik konuları araştırmak için insana, “doğal” olan bilişsel yetilerini – akıl, algı, içgözlem- kullanma projesini ifade eder. Doğal din veya teoloji, mevcut anlayış üzerine, doğayla ilgili ampirik araştırmalarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte ayrıca panteistik bir (...) sonuçla da bağlantılı değildir. Bununla birlikte o, özel doğal olmayan yetilere (ESP, telepati, mistik deneyim) veya doğaüstü bilgi kaynaklarına (kutsal metinler, vahiy teolojisi, inanç otoriteleri, doğrudan doğaüstü iletişim) hitap etmekten kaçınır. Genel olarak, doğal din veya teoloji (bundan böyle “doğal teoloji” olarak anılacaktır), diğer felsefi ve bilimsel girişimlerle aynı rasyonel inceleme standartlarına uymayı amaçlamaktadır ve aynı değerlendirme ve eleştiri yöntemlerine tabidir. (shrink)

In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by (...) showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments. (shrink)

The many proclamations that “the 1930s are back,” coupled with the increasing use of the term “totalitarianism” to describe our present moment, prompt Simona Forti’s investigation: Is the current revival of the term appropriate? Forti aims to provide a philosophical approach to the concept in lieu of what she sees as the unsatisfactory accounts offered by political science and history. The term’s potential, for Forti, lies in its capacity to endow “the most tragic side of the twentieth century with a (...) unitary meaning,” although this meaning “has not been properly expressed.” She argues that totalitarianism provides “an extreme response to the questions that political modernity poses and cannot resolve.”. (shrink)

K. Stanford (2006, 2009) has offered an antirealist argument (the “problem of unconceived alternatives”, PUA) based on the argument that scientists are not able to grasp alternatives to a current scientific theory T. According to PUA, the mere existence of some epistemically inaccessible alternatives (T’, T”, …) weakens our trust in T and shakes the foundations of mainstream scientific realism. The realist may entertain the inkling that inter-theoretical relations (both existing and expected or ‘hoped-for’) play a role in accepting (...) or rejecting PUA. The most celebrated intertheoretical relations, such as consilience, reduction, realization, emergence, equivalence, or approximation—whether prospective, expected, or realized—bear relevance to the conceivability of their alternatives. This paper presents an ‘eliminative inference’ based on an ‘unification posit’ that weakens the PUA. We employ first a minimal model of inter-theoretical unification couched in terms of the ‘term identification’ of the theoretical terms of two initially different theories, T1 and T2. Then we rethink unification as an ‘ideological identification’ where predicates in different theories are identified. Finally, we can envision a more sophisticated unification as entailment relations among T1 and T2 and their empirical grounds. In all these cases, we propose scenarios of inconceivability based on a minimal consistency requirement run against the “syntactic view” of scientific theories. The upshot of this mechanism is that some alternatives to T1, which remain unconceived within the conceptual and ideological space of T1, can be eliminated because they are inconsistent with empirical constraints on T2. The overall space of ‘serious’ alternatives to both theories is ‘thinned.’ Consistency is a requirement that conditions inter-theoretical relations, mainly when the overlapping evidence supports theories. This argument illustrates in what sense PUA is lessened when scientists or scientific communities operate based on theoretical posits. (shrink)

A scientific theory is successful, according to Stanford (2000), because it is suficiently observationally similar to its corresponding true theory. The Ptolemaic theory, for example, is successful because it is sufficiently similar to the Copernican theory at the observational level. The suggestion meets the scientific realists' request to explain the success of science without committing to the (approximate) truth of successful scientific theories. I argue that Stanford's proposal has a conceptual flaw. A conceptually sound explanation, I claim, respects (...) the ontological order between properties. A dependent property is to be explained in terms of its underlying property, not the other way around. The applicability of this point goes well beyond the realm of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists. Any philosophers should keep the point in mind when they attempt to give an explanation of a property in their field whatever it may be. (shrink)

Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s challenge to scientific realism is analyzed. Mizrahi’s argument is worth of attention for at least two reasons: unlike other criticisms that have been made to Stanford’s view so far, Mizrahi’s argument does not question any specific claim of Stanford’s argument, rather it puts into question the very coherence of Stanford’s position, because it argues that since Stanford’s argument rests on the problem of the unconceived alternatives, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. Thus, (...) if Mizrahi’s argument is effective in countering Stanford’s view, it may be able to question the validity of other philosophical positions which similarly rest on the problem of the unconceived alternatives; Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s view is in part based on the development of a Stanford-like argument for the field of philosophy. This makes Mizrahi’s argument potentially relevant to the metaphilosophical debate. After careful examination, Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism is found wanting. Moreover, a Stanford-like argument is developed, which aims at challenging the metaphilosophical stance implied by Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls (...) short, and so it might figure in the most coherent account of scientific practice. However, this best account will be antirealist in some respects and about some theories. It will not be a sweeping antirealism about all or most of science. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford has recently given substance to the problem of unconceived alternatives, which challenges the reliability of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in remote domains of nature. Conjoined with the view that IBE is the central inferential tool at our disposal in investigating these domains, the problem of unconceived alternatives leads to scientific anti-realism. We argue that, at least within the biological community, scientists are now and have long been aware of the dangers of IBE. We re-analyze the (...) nineteenth-century study of inheritance and development (Stanford’s case study) and extend it into the twentieth century, focusing in particular on both classical Mendelian genetics and the studies by Avery et al. on the chemical nature of the hereditary substance. Our extended case studies show the preference of the biological community for a different methodological standard: the vera causa ideal, which requires that purported causes be shown on non-explanatory grounds to exist and be competent to produce their effects. On this basis, we defend a prospective realism about the biological sciences. (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford’s argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue that (...) class='Hi'>Stanford does not provide evidence that there are likely scientifically plausible unconceived alternatives to scientific theories accepted now and in the future. (shrink)

In 1966, Stanford psychiatrist Kenneth M. Colby published one of the first conceptual accounts of a chatbot for psychotherapy. It was the same year in which, at MIT, computer-science pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum released his famous natural-language processing program ELIZA, which many regard as the world’s first chatbot. The two concurrent publications marked the starting points of a fierce controversy about the moral limits of automating psychotherapy. With the advent of generative AI, many of the same questions are now reappearing. (...) Revisiting the early debate can therefore inform discussions on the boundaries of AI-based therapy at a time when it is being considered once again. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford formulated his New Induction over the History of Science in order to show that underdetermination of scientific theories by evidence is a genuine problem of scientific theorizing about the world and a one that all scientific realists should take seriously. His argument uses historical record to show that because successful theories of the past were typically, in the light of the then available evidence, underdetermined by theories which we could not at the time conceive, we should (...) expect that our best contemporary theories are also undetermined by some yet unconceived alternatives. The aim of this article is to show that the threat of New Induction is ultimately no different than the threat of classical Pessimistic Induction in the way that to give a successful response to the later on behalf of scientific realism is, at the same time, to give a successful response to the former. I point out to some recent realistic responses to Pessimistic Induction to show that there are now viable realist positions, which allow one to embrace Pessimistic Induction as to whole theories and still remain realistic about certain parts of our theoretical knowledge of the unobservable. I argue that since historical record gives us inductive rationale for expecting that certain parts of our best theories will be preserved in future theories, we can also rationally expect that those parts are not underdetermined by yet unconceived future alternatives, and hence New Induction poses no threat to some new forms of scientific realism. (shrink)

The role of probability is one of the most contested issues in the interpretation of contemporary physics. In this paper, I’ll be reevaluating some widely held assumptions about where and how probabilities arise. Larry Sklar voices the conventional wisdom about probability in classical physics in a piece in the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, when he writes that “Statistical mechanics was the first foundational physical theory in which probabilistic concepts and probabilistic explanation played a fundamental role.” And the conventional (...) wisdom about quantum probabilities is that they are basic, not reducible to the types of probabilities we see in statistical mechanics. In the first section of this paper, I’ll argue that in fact classical physics was steeped in probability long before statistical mechanics came on the scene, specifically, that an objective measure over phase space is an indispensable component of any informative physical theory. In the next section, I’ll argue that this objective measure is the fundamental form of physical probability and that quantum probabilities can be defined in terms of it. In the last, I’ll raise some questions about the metaphysical status of the fundamental measure. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between (...) a pessimistic and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism. (shrink)

In the present study, we tested whether civic identity consisting of moral and political identity via the bifactor model of civic identity with the Stanford Civic Purpose dataset. Previous research in youth development proposed that civic identity consists of two closely related identity constructs, i.e., moral and political identity. Given the bifactor model in factor analysis assumes the presence of both the general and specific factors, we hypothesized that the bifactor model would better fit the data than conventional alternative (...) models. Thus, we compared the candidate models, including the bifactor model, with confirmatory factor analysis. To address the concern about the potential overfitting of the bifactor model, we additionally conducted cross-validation and measurement invariance tests across different gender groups and time points. The analysis results supported our hypothesis that the bifactor model better fitted the data. Both the cross-validation and measurement invariance test results suggested that the overfitting issue was not a significant concern. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that the bifactor model of civic identity consisting of moral and political identity, which was supposed to be more consistent with the theoretical and conceptual framework of civic identity, better fitted the data than conventional alternative models. (shrink)

The optimality approach to modeling natural selection has been criticized by many biologists and philosophers of biology. For instance, Lewontin (1979) argues that the optimality approach is a shortcut that will be replaced by models incorporating genetic information, if and when such models become available. In contrast, I think that optimality models have a permanent role in evolutionary study. I base my argument for this claim on what I think it takes to best explain an event. In certain contexts, optimality (...) and game-theoretic models best explain some central types of evolutionary phenomena. ‡Thanks to Michael Friedman, Helen Longino, Michael Weisberg, and especially Elliott Sober for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2155; e-mail: potochnik@stanford.edu. (shrink)

After decades of intense debate over the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 1978), it has now become clear that it has at least the following four problems. First, it overlooks the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories. Second, it commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Third, it erroneously groups together past theories from different fields of science. Four, it misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. I argue that these four (...) problems entitle us to construct what I call the grand pessimistic induction that since the old pessimistic induction has infinitely many hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) also has infinitely many hidden problems. (shrink)

dynamic ontologies must be inferred and populated in part from the reference corpora themselves, but ontological rela-.

Nietzsche is not known for his theory of empathy. A quick skimming of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on empathy demonstrates this. Arthur Schopenhauer, Robert Vischer, and Theodor Lipps are among those whose views are considered representative, but Nietzsche has been simply forgotten in discussion of empathy. Nietzsche’s theory of empathy has not yet aroused sufficient interest among commentators. I believe that his views on this subject merit careful consideration. Nietzsche scholars have been interested in his naturalistic accounts (...) of other phenomena, but there seems to be relatively limited interest in his naturalistic account of a phenomenon that is so central to his disagreement with Schopenhauer, namely, empathic concern for others. This is surprising because Nietzsche makes a valuable contribution; he has views more in keeping with contemporary theories of empathy than others of his time. My goal here is to fill in this gap in the scholarship and provide the first thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s theory of empathy, which appears most clearly in Dawn. (shrink)

A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct (...) from currently accepted theories in the relevant respects. In other words, it may seem that realists should recommend that scientists be relatively conservative in their theoretical endeavors. This paper aims to show that this argument is mistaken. While realists should indeed be less optimistic of finding radically distinct alternatives to replace current theories, realists also have greater reasons to value the outcomes of such searches. Interestingly, this holds both for successful and failed attempts to identify and develop such alternatives. (shrink)

Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to (...) what she ought to do, but to what she actually does. That is, such explanations must be truth-apt, not mere rationalizations. My aim in this paper is to show how a non-causal account of action can provide explanations that are truth-apt and genuinely explanatory. To make this argument, I take as a given an account of the practical syllogism discussed by Michael Thompson and Eric Wiland, according to which the practical syllogism is truly practical rather than propositional in nature. Next, I present my primary positive thesis: reasons for actions have explanatory power in virtue of being parts of a structure—the practical syllogism—that contains the action being explained. I then argue that structural action explanations can meet Davidson’s challenge and that they genuinely explain actions. Finally, I conclude by addressing some objections to my argument. (shrink)

"This volume emerged from workshops held at Pennsylvania State University in 2003 and Stanford University in 2005"--P. vii.

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (...) (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A very brief summary presentation of western ancient logic for the non-specialized reader, from the beginnings to Boethius. For a much more detailed presentation see my "Ancient Logic" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopy (also on PhilPapers).

There are two primary arguments against scientific realism, one pertaining to underdetermination, the other to the history of science. While these arguments are usually treated as altogether distinct, P. Kyle Stanford's ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’ constitutes one kind of synthesis: I propose that Stanford's argument is best understood as a broad modus ponens underdetermination argument, into which he has inserted a unique variant of the historical pessimistic induction. After articulating three criticisms against Stanford's argument and the evidence (...) that he offers, I contend that, as it stands, Stanford's argument poses no threat to contemporary scientific realism. Nonetheless, upon identifying two useful insights present in Stanford's general strategy, I offer an alternative variant of the modus ponens underdetermination argument, one that, although historically informed by science, requires no inductive premises. I contend that this non-inductive but historically informed variant of the modus ponens clarifies and considerably strengthens the case against scientific realism. (shrink)

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of (...) the realists’ emphasis on power and selfinterest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states. Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The article presents a comprehensive picture of political realism. -/- Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (shrink)

Plant diseases are numerous in the world of agriculture. These diseases cause a lot of trouble to most farmers. Among these common diseases, we single out the diseases that affect the Passion fruit, which is affected by about seven diseases, with different symptoms for each disease. Today, technology is facilitating human life in all areas of life, and among these facilities are expert system, a computer program that uses artificial-intelligence methods to solve problems within a specialized domain that ordinarily requires (...) human expertise. The first expert system was developed in 1965 by Edward Feigen Baum and Joshua Lederberg of Stanford University in California, U.S. Dendral, as their expert system was later known, was designed to analyses chemical compounds. Expert systems now have commercial applications in fields as diverse as medical diagnosis, petroleum engineering, and financial investing and other areas, and with reference to expert systems and their importance to humans, an integrated expert system has been created in the agricultural field that diagnoses Passion diseases using CLIPS Expert System language. The system was used to design and implement the proposed expert system. The system facilitates the diagnosis of Passion -related diseases. There is no doubt that this expert system will help farmers and those involved in the agricultural field to diagnose Passion -related diseases. Objectives: is to help farmers diagnose Passion diseases in the correct way and how to treat these diseases. Method: The system contains a program project that diagnoses 7 diseases that affect Passion and the seven diseases are: Brown spot, Septoria spot, Root and crown rot, Fusarium wilt, Anthracnose, Woodiness virus, Scab. Results: The expert system was evaluated by farmers and praised for helping them with it. Conclusion: The expert system for diagnosing Passion diseases is effective and usable. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the American reception of logical positivism in the early 1930s. I argue that Moritz Schlick (who had visiting positions at Stanford and Berkeley between 1929 and 1932) and Herbert Feigl (who visited Harvard in the 1930-31 academic year) played a crucial role in promoting the *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*, years before members of the Vienna Circle, the Berlin Group, and the Lvov-Warsaw school would seek refuge in the United States. Building on archive material from the Wiener Kreis Archiv, (...) the Harvard University Archives, and the Herbert Feigl Papers, as well as a large number of publications in American philosophy journals from the early 1930s, I reconstruct the subtle transformation of the American philosophical landscape in the years immediately preceding the European exodus. I argue that (1) American philosophical discussions about meaning and significance and (2) internal dynamics in the Vienna Circle between 1929 and 1931 significantly impacted the way in which US philosophers came to perceive logical positivism. (shrink)

The first of its kind, this anthology in the burgeoning field of technology ethics offers students and other interested readers 32 chapters, each written in an accessible and lively manner specifically for this volume. The chapters are conveniently organized into five sections: I. Perspectives on Technology and its Value II. Technology and the Good Life III. Computer and Information Technology IV. Technology and Business V. Biotechnologies and Enhancement A hallmark of the volume is multidisciplinary contributions both in analytic and continental (...) philosophy and across several hot-button topics of interest to students, including the ethics of autonomous vehicles, psychotherapeutic phone apps, and bio-enhancement of cognition and in sports. The volume editors, both teachers of technology ethics, have compiled a set of original and timely chapters that will advance scholarly debate and stimulate fascinating and lively classroom discussion. An online eResources site provides a glossary of all relevant terms, sample classroom activities/ discussion questions relevant for chapters, and links to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries and other relevant online materials. Key Features: Examines the most pivotal ethical questions around our use of technology, equipping readers to better understand technology's promises and perils Explores throughout a central tension raised by technological progress: maintaining social stability vs. pursuing dynamic social improvements Provides ample coverage of the pressing issues of free speech and productive online discourse. (shrink)

According to the “Embodied Cognition” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the three landmark texts in the 4E cognitive science tradition are Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s The Embodied Mind, and Andy Clark’s Being There. In my first section, I offer a phenomenological interpretation of these three texts, identifying recuring affirmations of the figure of dance alongside explicit marginalization of the practice of dance, perhaps in part due to cognitive science’s overemphasis on (...) cognition to the exclusion of affect. In my second section, drawing on my previous interpretations of proto-affect theorists (including Spinoza, Deleuze, and Fanon), I channel this tension in 4E cognitive science into a dancing partnership with human science psychology, suggesting three “choreographic provocations” for therapeutic practice and psychological research, namely (1) treating clients/subjects as dancers, (2) reimagining research and therapy as improvised duets between practitioners and clients/subjects, and (3) pursuing an ideal of freer movement and an emergent flourishing singularity for clients/subjects. Finally, I reformulate these three choreographic provocations in terms of my new theoretical method of “dancing-with,” as well as the four psychological prerequisites for flourishing posited by my figuration philosophy of dance. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that (...) denying a key premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy. (shrink)

Blind Obedience: A Double-Edged Sword -/- Introduction -/- Blind obedience refers to unquestioning compliance with authority, where individuals follow orders or rules without critical thinking or moral evaluation. Throughout history, blind obedience has led to both progress and disaster. While obedience is necessary for maintaining order in societies, institutions, and organizations, blindly following authority without questioning its ethical implications can result in tragic consequences. -/- This essay explores the nature of blind obedience, its psychological roots, historical examples, its presence in (...) modern society, and the importance of critical thinking in preventing its dangers. By examining these aspects, we can better understand the balance between necessary obedience and the responsibility to challenge unethical commands. -/- The Psychology of Blind Obedience -/- Human beings are naturally inclined to obey authority. From childhood, people are taught to respect parents, teachers, and leaders, which helps maintain societal order. However, this conditioning can also suppress independent thought and personal moral judgment. -/- One of the most well-known psychological studies on obedience is Stanley Milgram’s experiment (1961). In this study, participants were instructed by an authority figure (a scientist) to administer electric shocks to another person (who was actually an actor and not harmed). Even as the “victim” screamed in pain, many participants continued delivering shocks simply because they were told to do so. The study demonstrated how ordinary individuals could commit harmful acts when instructed by an authority figure, proving that blind obedience is a powerful force that can override personal morality. -/- Another significant study is the Stanford Prison Experiment (1971), conducted by Philip Zimbardo. Participants were randomly assigned roles as either guards or prisoners in a simulated prison. The ”guards” quickly became abusive, using psychological and physical intimidation, while the “prisoners” became submissive. The experiment had to be stopped early due to the extreme behavior of the participants, showing how blind obedience to authority and roles can lead to cruelty and loss of moral reasoning. -/- Historical Examples of Blind Obedience -/- 1. Nazi Germany and the Holocaust -/- One of the most horrific examples of blind obedience occurred during World War II. Under Adolf Hitler’s rule, millions of ordinary citizens and soldiers followed orders that led to the mass genocide of Jews and other targeted groups. High-ranking officials like Adolf Eichmann, who played a major role in organizing the Holocaust, later defended their actions by claiming they were simply “following orders.” The Nuremberg Trials rejected this defense, emphasizing that individuals are responsible for their actions, even when acting under authority. -/- 2. The My Lai Massacre (Vietnam War, 1968) -/- During the Vietnam War, American soldiers carried out the My Lai Massacre, killing hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, including women and children. Soldiers later justified their actions by stating they were following direct orders from their superiors. This event became a symbol of the dangers of military obedience without ethical consideration, leading to global condemnation and changes in military training regarding moral responsibility. -/- 3. The Jonestown Mass Suicide (1978) -/- The Jonestown Massacre is a chilling example of blind obedience within a cult. Jim Jones, leader of the Peoples Temple, manipulated over 900 of his followers into committing mass suicide by drinking cyanide-laced punch. Many obeyed without resistance, demonstrating how charismatic leaders can exploit blind obedience to maintain control, even to the point of self-destruction. -/- 4. The Spanish Inquisition -/- During the Spanish Inquisition (1478–1834), religious authorities ordered the persecution, torture, and execution of individuals accused of heresy. Many officials and citizens participated in these brutal acts simply because they were told it was their duty. Blind obedience to religious authority justified unimaginable cruelty in the name of faith. -/- Blind Obedience in Modern Society -/- Although history provides extreme examples, blind obedience continues to manifest in various ways today. -/- 1. In the Workplace -/- Many corporate scandals, such as the Enron financial fraud, occurred because employees blindly followed unethical directives from executives. Employees who question unethical policies may risk losing their jobs, making it difficult to resist orders from higher-ups. -/- 2. In Politics -/- Authoritarian governments thrive on blind obedience. In North Korea, citizens are forced to obey government propaganda without question, and those who dissent face severe punishment. In many cases, blind obedience to political leaders leads to oppression, censorship, and human rights violations. -/- 3. In Religion -/- Religious extremism often arises from blind obedience. Groups like ISIS and past events like the Crusades show how unquestioning faith can be manipulated to justify violence, terrorism, and oppression. While religion can promote morality, blind obedience can be dangerous when it discourages critical thinking. -/- 4. In Social Media and Misinformation -/- In the digital age, blind obedience appears in the form of misinformation and propaganda. Many people accept fake news, conspiracy theories, and political lies without fact-checking. This has led to real-world consequences, such as vaccine hesitancy, political division, and even violent riots based on false information. -/- The Dangers of Blind Obedience -/- 1. Loss of Personal Responsibility -/- Blind obedience allows individuals to shift responsibility for their actions onto authority figures. This leads to moral disengagement, where people justify harmful actions by saying they were just following orders. -/- 2. Suppression of Critical Thinking -/- When individuals do not question authority, they lose the ability to think independently. This weakens societies by allowing corrupt leaders, unethical policies, and harmful ideologies to spread unchecked. -/- 3. Violation of Human Rights -/- Many human rights violations throughout history, including genocide, slavery, and discrimination, occurred because individuals and societies accepted orders without questioning their morality. -/- The Importance of Critical Thinking -/- To prevent the dangers of blind obedience, individuals must develop critical thinking skills. This involves: -/- Questioning Authority: Instead of blindly following orders, people should ask whether commands are ethical and justified. -/- Encouraging Open Dialogue: Societies must promote free speech and debate to challenge oppressive or unethical ideas. -/- Teaching Ethical Decision-Making: Schools and workplaces should educate individuals on how to recognize and resist unethical commands. -/- Holding Leaders Accountable: Governments, corporations, and religious institutions must be held responsible for their actions, preventing the abuse of authority. -/- Conclusion -/- Blind obedience is a powerful but dangerous force. While obedience is sometimes necessary for maintaining order, unquestioning submission to authority has led to some of the greatest tragedies in human history. From the Holocaust to modern corporate scandals, the consequences of blind obedience highlight the need for critical thinking, ethical reasoning, and personal responsibility. -/- To build a just and moral society, individuals must learn to balance obedience with independent thought. Questioning authority does not mean rejecting all rules, but rather ensuring that decisions align with ethical principles. By fostering education, awareness, and critical thinking, we can prevent the dangers of blind obedience and create a world where people act not out of fear or habit, but out of reason and moral responsibility. -/- . (shrink)

This paper critically responds to Peter Eastman’s 2014 essay, The Perpetual Emptiness of Academic Philosophy, which accuses contemporary academic philosophy of abandoning its existential and metaphysical roots. Through engagement with existentialist traditions, contemporary critiques, and philosophical methodologies, this essay challenges the view that academic philosophy is wholly sterile or irrelevant. While acknowledging the discipline’s increasing specialization and perceived inaccessibility, the paper argues that its analytical rigor remains vital for addressing complex human questions. Drawing on sources such as the Stanford (...) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, contemporary scholarship, and responses from Eastman’s critics, the author proposes that academic philosophy still retains the capacity to explore meaning, purpose, and fulfilment—particularly when its traditions are critically integrated with ancient wisdom and public-facing discourse. Ultimately, this work calls for a renewed commitment to bridging scholarly precision with existential relevance, advocating for a more accessible and reflective philosophical practice. (shrink)

A university may speak freely as a private actor. But if it seeks to define reality on behalf of the public using federal funding, tax exemption, and institutional authority, it must meet the legal threshold of truth based inquiry, not belief based classification. This Philosophy of Law paper extends the doctrine established in Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) to the modern higher education landscape. It shows that accredited institutions, while not formally government entities, operate under state charter, federal (...) nonprofit status, and the public trust doctrine. These foundations bind them to constitutional and statutory limits that govern education, research, and institutional legitimacy. This paper invokes 3 constitutional provisions, 10 federal statutes, 6 federal regulations, and 3 institutional standards that collectively define the legal framework within which such institutions must operate. The First Amendment is not a defense unless the goal is to accept the epistemic status of a sixth grade TikTok user—free to speak, but stripped of normative institutional academic privilege and public authority beyond personal art with no claims to educating or science. A case study involving researchers affiliated with Brown and Stanford University documents the classification of ideological dissent as psychological deviance through an undefined construct referred to here as "anti bad." The study lacked a null hypothesis, failed to define its central terms, and was presented to the public as scientific fact before peer review. This conduct meets the federal definition of research falsification under 42 C F R section 93.103, violates the First Amendment through compelled belief and viewpoint discrimination, and breaches the educational purpose requirement under section 501 c 3 of the Internal Revenue Code. When institutions use unfalsifiable belief systems to classify dissent as deviance under the appearance of science or education, and construct false representations of public belief to justify ideological enforcement, they exceed their lawful role. They no longer function as educational institutions but as unauthorized adjudicatory entities. This disqualifies them from the legal protections associated with federal educational status and severs the statutory and constitutional basis for their continued recognition. (shrink)

This paper identifies a class of expressions that have long remained on the margins of theoretical discussion, such as ‘Professor Russell’, ‘Stanford University’, ‘Mount Everest’, and ‘Iguazu Falls’. These expressions, which I call “complex names,” combine a simple proper name with a descriptor (e.g. ‘Professor’, ‘University’, ‘Mount’, ‘Falls’) to form a structured referential term. Complex names designate the same individual as the simple name they contain, while conveying a specific piece of information about that individual via the embedded descriptor. (...) The aim of the paper is to draw attention to these underexplored names, highlight their unique semantic challenges, and develop a general framework for their analysis. First, I demonstrate that the information encoded in complex names is best understood as a presupposition, rather than as a conversational or conventional implicature. Next, I critically examine descriptivist accounts that treat complex names as a kind of definite description and argue that complex names pattern more closely with simple, standard names. Finally, I sketch an account on which complex names are analyzed as structured presupposition triggers, syntactically built up from simple names and presuppositional descriptors in a hierarchical, template-governed manner. (shrink)

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold. *Received January 2007; revised (...) April 2008. †To contact the authors, please write to: Elisabeth Lloyd, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 130 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; e-mail: [email protected]; Richard Lewontin, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 26 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; Marcus Feldman, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: marc@charles.stanford.edu. (shrink)

Kyle Stanford’s reformulation of the problem of underdetermination has the potential to highlight the epistemic obligations of scientists. Stanford, however, presents the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives as a problem for realists, despite critics’ insistence that we have contextual explanations for scientists’ failure to conceive of their successors’ theories. I propose that responsibilist epistemology and the concept of “role oughts,” as discussed by Lorraine Code and Richard Feldman, can pacify Stanford’s critics and reveal broader relevance of the “new (...) induction.” The possibility of unconceived alternatives pushes us to question our contemporary expectation for scientists to reason outside of their historical moment. (shrink)

Helen Longino received her PhD from Johns Hopkins University in 1973. Her teaching and research interests are in philosophy of science, social epistemology, and feminist philosophy. In addition to many articles, Longino is the author of Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 1990), The Fate of Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2001), and Studying Human Behavior (University of Chicago Press, 2013). She is C. I. Lewis Professor in Philosophy, emerita, at Stanford University. This interview offers an accessible and wide-ranging (...) overview of Helen Longino’s intellectual trajectory, her scientific contributions, and the central themes of her philosophical thought. (shrink)

Understanding the nature of faith has always been a concern for believers, theologians, and philosophers of religion; and therefore, we have a long history of it. One of the ways to explain the nature of faith is to offer various models of it. In this article, based on John Bishop's categorization of faith models as 1) knowledge, 2) belief, 3) trust, 4) doxastic venture, 5) non-doxastic venture, and 6) hope in the "faith" entry of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (...) an effort has been made to first explain each of these models. Subsequently, relying on the degree of attention these models pay to three components: 1) cognitive, 2) affective, and 3) volitional, as criteria for evaluating them, it has been demonstrated which of these models have undergone reductionism. According to these criteria, the model of faith as knowledge has undergone reductionism, as it fails to adequately address the affective component in its definition of faith. The models of faith as trust, non-doxastic venture, and hope have not been subject to reductionism as they have considered all three of the aforementioned criteria. However, given the various interpretations of faith models as belief and doxastic venture, the assessment of reductionism or non-reductionism for each interpretation varies accordingly. (shrink)

-/- Populism: A Double-Edged Sword in Modern Democracy -/- Populism is one of the most frequently used yet often misunderstood terms in contemporary political discourse. It has influenced elections, swayed public opinion, and reshaped national policies across the globe. At its core, populism is a political strategy or approach that aims to represent the interests and voice of the “common people” in opposition to a perceived corrupt elite or establishment. While it can reinvigorate democracy and bring neglected issues to the (...) forefront, populism also poses significant risks to democratic institutions and social cohesion. -/- Defining Populism -/- Populism does not function as a comprehensive ideology like conservatism or socialism. Rather, it operates as a political logic or style, often characterized by a dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populist leaders claim to embody the general will of the people and typically frame their opposition as illegitimate or morally inferior. This approach often involves direct appeals to the masses, with disdain for traditional institutions like the judiciary, media, or political parties. -/- Populism can manifest across the ideological spectrum. Left-wing populism tends to focus on economic justice, inequality, and class struggle, while right-wing populism often emphasizes nationalism, cultural identity, and skepticism toward immigration or globalism. Regardless of political leaning, populism fundamentally seeks to mobilize people against established centers of power. -/- Historical Origins and Global Spread -/- The term “populism” originated from the U.S. People’s Party in the late 19th century. This movement represented the grievances of rural farmers against banks, railroads, and industrial monopolies (Kazin, 1995). Populism later gained prominence in Latin America through leaders like Juan Perón in Argentina and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, who blended charismatic leadership with policies aimed at empowering the poor and working class. -/- In the 21st century, populism has reemerged as a powerful force globally. In Europe, populist parties have capitalized on discontent stemming from economic crises, refugee influxes, and dissatisfaction with the European Union. In Asia and Africa, populist leaders have gained popularity by challenging colonial legacies, elite corruption, and foreign influence, often promising national revival and self-sufficiency. Populist movements have also gained traction in North America, where distrust in traditional political systems continues to grow. -/- The Appeal of Populism -/- Populism thrives in environments of crisis, inequality, and mistrust. Economic instability, unemployment, cultural change, and political disillusionment create fertile ground for populist narratives (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Populist leaders offer clear, emotionally resonant messages that speak directly to people’s fears, frustrations, and hopes. -/- The modern media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, has intensified the populist surge. Populist figures often bypass traditional media outlets to communicate directly with their supporters, spreading simple, relatable messages that may resonate more than complex policy debates (Moffitt, 2016). This direct connection fosters a sense of authenticity and responsiveness, further building trust among followers. -/- Criticisms and Dangers -/- Despite its potential to increase democratic engagement, populism carries several risks. First, by dividing society into binary opposites—good versus evil, people versus elite—it tends to polarize the political landscape. This can lead to the erosion of democratic dialogue, compromise, and mutual respect. -/- Second, populist leaders often challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. By attacking the press, judiciary, or electoral processes, they may consolidate power and undermine checks and balances (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Some populist regimes have curtailed civil liberties, weakened the rule of law, or manipulated elections under the guise of fulfilling the people’s will. -/- Third, populism can result in unrealistic promises and short-term policies. Leaders may appeal to emotional grievances without addressing underlying structural problems. When results fail to materialize, disillusionment can set in, potentially fostering instability or extremism. -/- Feasible Solutions -/- To mitigate the dangers of populism while addressing its root causes, a multi-pronged approach is essential: -/- 1. Strengthen Democratic Institutions: Governments should reinforce the independence and credibility of democratic institutions—such as courts, electoral commissions, and public broadcasters. Transparent, accountable institutions build public trust and can resist manipulation by populist actors. -/- 2. Promote Inclusive Economic Policies: Economic inequality fuels populist discontent. Policymakers should implement inclusive policies that promote equitable access to jobs, education, and healthcare. Investment in rural areas and marginalized communities can reduce the perception of systemic neglect. -/- 3. Improve Political Communication and Civic Education: Citizens need to understand how democracy functions and how their participation matters. Educational systems should promote critical thinking, media literacy, and awareness of democratic norms to make citizens more resistant to demagoguery and misinformation. -/- 4. Address Legitimate Grievances Responsibly: Rather than dismissing populist concerns outright, mainstream parties and institutions should listen to citizens’ real frustrations—whether they stem from globalization, immigration, or corruption—and address them through practical and evidence-based policy solutions. -/- 5. Encourage Transparent and Ethical Leadership: Ethical governance, anti-corruption measures, and public accountability are key to countering the appeal of populists who promise to “clean up the system.” Leaders must lead by example to restore faith in politics. -/- 6. Foster Social Dialogue and Unity: Building platforms for dialogue between different social, ethnic, and political groups can reduce polarization. Promoting mutual understanding and cooperation, especially at the local level, fosters social cohesion and resilience against divisive rhetoric. -/- Conclusion -/- Populism is a complex and dynamic force in modern democracy. It reflects genuine grievances and has the capacity to rejuvenate political engagement. However, it also poses serious risks if it erodes democratic norms, institutions, and societal unity. The challenge for democratic societies is to respond constructively: by listening, reforming, and educating—rather than by repressing or ignoring. -/- If the root causes of populism are addressed with empathy, transparency, and sound policy, its energy can be redirected into positive democratic renewal rather than destructive division. Only through this balanced approach can democracies survive and thrive in an age of uncertainty and change. -/- References -/- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. Harvard Kennedy School. -/- Kazin, M. (1995). The Populist Persuasion: An American History. Cornell University Press. -/- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown Publishing. -/- Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Stanford University Press. -/- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. -/- . (shrink)

În această lucrare analizez posibilitatea călătoriei în timp pe baza mai multor lucrări de specialitate, printre care cele ale lui Nicholas J.J. Smith ("Time Travel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”), William Grey (”Troubles with Time Travel”), Ulrich Meyer (”Explaining causal loops”), Simon Keller și Michael Nelson (”Presentists should believe in time-travel”), Frank Arntzenius și Tim Maudlin ("Time Travel and Modern Physics") și David Lewis (“The Paradoxes of Time Travel”). Lucrarea începe cu o Introducere în care fac o scurtă prezentare (...) a călătoriei în timp, și continuă cu o Istoria conceptului de călătorie în timp, prezentarea principalelor Aspecte fizice ale călătoriei în timp, inclusiv călătoria în timp în trecut în relativitatea generală și în fizica cuantică și călătoria în timp în viitor, apoi o prezentare a Paradoxul bunicului care este abordat în aproape toate lucrările de specialitate, urmat de o secțiune dedicată Filosofiei călătoriei în timp, și o secțiune în care analizez Buclele cauzale pentru călătoria în timp. Finalizez lucrarea cu Concluzii, în care expun opiniile personale privind călătoria în timp, și Bibliografia pe care se bazează lucrarea. (shrink)

Dans un texte désormais célèbre, Ferdinand de Saussure insiste sur l’arbitraire du signe dont il vante les qualités. Toutefois il s’avère que le symbole, signe non arbitraire, dans la mesure où il existe un rapport entre ce qui représente et ce qui est représenté, joue un rôle fondamental dans la plupart des activités humaines, qu’elles soient scientifiques, artistiques ou religieuses. C’est cette dimension symbolique, sa portée, son fonctionnement et sa signification dans des domaines aussi variés que la chimie, la théologie, (...) les mathématiques, le code de la route et bien d’autres qui est l’objet du livre La Pointure du symbole. -/- Jean-Yves Béziau, franco-suisse, est docteur en logique mathématique et docteur en philosophie. Il a poursuivi des recherches en France, au Brésil, en Suisse, aux États-Unis (UCLA et Stanford), en Pologne et développé la logique universelle. Éditeur-en-chef de la revue Logica Universalis et de la collection Studies in Universal Logic (Springer), il est actuellement professeur à l’Université Fédérale de Rio de Janeiro et membre de l’Académie brésilienne de Philosophie. SOMMAIRE -/- PRÉFACE L’arbitraire du signe face à la puissance du symbole Jean-Yves BÉZIAU La logique et la théorie de la notation (sémiotique) de Peirce (Traduit de l’anglais par Jean-Marie Chevalier) Irving H. ANELLIS Langage symbolique de Genèse 2-3 Lytta BASSET -/- Mécanique quantique : quelle réalité derrière les symboles? Hans BECK -/- Quels langages et images pour représenter le corps humain? Sarah CARVALLO Des jeux symboliques aux rituels collectifs. Quelques apports de la psychologie du développement à l’étude du symbolisme Fabrice CLÉMENT Les panneaux de signalisation (Traduit de l’anglais par Fabien Shang) Robert DEWAR Remarques sur l’émergence des activités symboliques Jean LASSÈGUE Les illustrations du "Songe de Poliphile" (1499). Notule sur les hiéroglyphes de Francesca Colonna Pierre-Alain MARIAUX Signes de vie Jeremy NARBY Visualising relations in society and economics. Otto Neuraths Isotype-method against the background of his economic thought Elisabeth NEMETH Algèbre et logique symboliques : arbitraire du signe et langage formel Marie-José DURAND – Amirouche MOKTEFI Les symboles mathématiques, signes du Ciel Jean-Claude PONT La mathématique : un langage mathématique? Alain M. ROBERT. (shrink)

Can new technology enhance purpose-driven, democratic dialogue in groups, governments, and societies? Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice is the first book that attempts to sample the full range of work on online deliberation, forging new connections between academic research, technology designers, and practitioners. Since some of the most exciting innovations have occurred outside of traditional institutions, and those involved have often worked in relative isolation from each other, work in this growing field has often failed to reflect the full (...) set of perspectives on online deliberation. This volume is aimed at those working at the crossroads of information/communication technology and social science, and documents early findings in, and perspectives on, this new field by many of its pioneers. CONTENTS: Introduction: The Blossoming Field of Online Deliberation (Todd Davies, pp. 1-19) Part I - Prospects for Online Civic Engagement Chapter 1: Virtual Public Consultation: Prospects for Internet Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin, pp. 23-35) Chapter 2: Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence (Vincent Price, pp. 37-58) Chapter 3: Can Online Deliberation Improve Politics? Scientific Foundations for Success (Arthur Lupia, pp. 59-69) Chapter 4: Deliberative Democracy, Online Discussion, and Project PICOLA (Public Informed Citizen Online Assembly) (Robert Cavalier with Miso Kim and Zachary Sam Zaiss, pp. 71-79) Part II - Online Dialogue in the Wild Chapter 5: Friends, Foes, and Fringe: Norms and Structure in Political Discussion Networks (John Kelly, Danyel Fisher, and Marc Smith, pp. 83-93) Chapter 6: Searching the Net for Differences of Opinion (Warren Sack, John Kelly, and Michael Dale, pp. 95-104) Chapter 7: Happy Accidents: Deliberation and Online Exposure to Opposing Views (Azi Lev-On and Bernard Manin, pp. 105-122) Chapter 8: Rethinking Local Conversations on the Web (Sameer Ahuja, Manuel Pérez-Quiñones, and Andrea Kavanaugh, pp. 123-129) Part III - Online Public Consultation Chapter 9: Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass Participation (David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski, and Stuart Shulman, pp. 133-148) Chapter 10: Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy (Peter M. Shane, pp. 149-162) Chapter 11: Baudrillard and the Virtual Cow: Simulation Games and Citizen Participation (Hélène Michel and Dominique Kreziak, pp. 163-166) Chapter 12: Using Web-Based Group Support Systems to Enhance Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decision Making in South Africa (Hossana Twinomurinzi and Jackie Phahlamohlaka, pp. 167-169) Chapter 13: Citizen Participation Is Critical: An Example from Sweden (Tomas Ohlin, pp. 171-173) Part IV - Online Deliberation in Organizations Chapter 14: Online Deliberation in the Government of Canada: Organizing the Back Office (Elisabeth Richard, pp. 177-191) Chapter 15: Political Action and Organization Building: An Internet-Based Engagement Model (Mark Cooper, pp. 193-202) Chapter 16: Wiki Collaboration Within Political Parties: Benefits and Challenges (Kate Raynes-Goldie and David Fono, pp. 203-205) Chapter 17: Debian’s Democracy (Gunnar Ristroph, pp. 207-211) Chapter 18: Software Support for Face-to-Face Parliamentary Procedure (Dana Dahlstrom and Bayle Shanks, pp. 213-220) Part V - Online Facilitation Chapter 19: Deliberation on the Net: Lessons from a Field Experiment (June Woong Rhee and Eun-mee Kim, pp. 223-232) Chapter 20: The Role of the Moderator: Problems and Possibilities for Government-Run Online Discussion Forums (Scott Wright, pp. 233-242) Chapter 21: Silencing the Clatter: Removing Anonymity from a Corporate Online Community (Gilly Leshed, pp. 243-251) Chapter 22: Facilitation and Inclusive Deliberation (Matthias Trénel, pp. 253-257) Chapter 23: Rethinking the ‘Informed’ Participant: Precautions and Recommendations for the Design of Online Deliberation (Kevin S. Ramsey and Matthew W. Wilson, pp. 259-267) Chapter 24: PerlNomic: Rule Making and Enforcement in Digital Shared Spaces (Mark E. Phair and Adam Bliss, pp. 269-271) Part VI - Design of Deliberation Tools Chapter 25: An Online Environment for Democratic Deliberation: Motivations, Principles, and Design (Todd Davies, Brendan O’Connor, Alex Cochran, Jonathan J. Effrat, Andrew Parker, Benjamin Newman, and Aaron Tam, pp. 275-292) Chapter 26: Online Civic Deliberation with E-Liberate (Douglas Schuler, pp. 293-302) Chapter 27: Parliament: A Module for Parliamentary Procedure Software (Bayle Shanks and Dana Dahlstrom, pp. 303-307) Chapter 28: Decision Structure: A New Approach to Three Problems in Deliberation (Raymond J. Pingree, pp. 309-316) Chapter 29: Design Requirements of Argument Mapping Software for Teaching Deliberation (Matthew W. Easterday, Jordan S. Kanarek, and Maralee Harrell, pp. 317-323) Chapter 30: Email-Embedded Voting with eVote/Clerk (Marilyn Davis, pp. 325-327) Epilogue: Understanding Diversity in the Field of Online Deliberation (Seeta Peña Gangadharan, pp. 329-358). For individual chapter downloads, go to odbook.stanford.edu. (shrink)