The etiological account of teleological function is beset by several difficulties, which I propose to solve by grafting onto the etiological theory a subordinated goal-contribution clause. This approach enables us to ascribe neither too many teleofunctions nor too few; to give a unitary, one-clause analysis that works just as well for teleological functions derived from Darwinian evolution, as for those derived from human intention; and finally, to save the etiological theory from falsification, by explaining how, in spite (...) of appearances, the theory can allow for evolutionary function loss. (shrink)

This paper defines and defends a notion of teleological function which is fit to figure in explanations concerning how organic systems, and the items which compose them, are able to perform certain activities, such as surviving and reproducing or pumping blood. According to this notion, a teleological function of an item (such as the heart) is a typical way in which items of that type contribute to some containing system's ability to do some activity. An account (...) of what it is for an item to contribute to a containing system's ability to perform an activity is provided. I argue that the view acquires its normative status in virtue of the fact that it obeys a function-accident distinction and obeys a function-dysfunction distinction; that the view is ahistorical; and, that its ahistoricity provides it with an advantage over one of its main competitors. (shrink)

There’s a general assumption that teleology and function do not exist in inanimate nature. Throughout biology, it is generally taken as granted that teleology (or teleonomy) and functions are not only unique to life, but perhaps even a defining quality of life. For many, it’s obvious that rocks, water, and the like, are not teleological, nor could they possibly have stand-alone functions. This idea - that teleology and function are unique to life - is the target of (...) this paper. I begin with an overview of McShea’s field theoretic account of teleology. I start with the field theoretic account because it presents a promising analysis of teleological systems. It is promising because, in not making any assumptions about life’s special status in teleological systems, it avoids counterexamples that have problematized other accounts. I then consider some of the prominent efforts that have been made to attempt to avoid ascribing functions or teleology to some form of inanimate nature. In my assessment, none of the efforts are successful. I conclude by offering mineral evolution as a case study to show how inanimate nature can be both teleological and functional. The evolution of mineral species reveals that teleology and function extend to inanimate nature, and that teleology and function come in degrees. (shrink)

This is a short overview of the biological functions debate in philosophy. While it was fairly comprehensive when it was written, my short book ​A Critical Overview of Biological Functions has largely supplanted it as a definitive and up-to-date overview of the debate, both because the book takes into account new developments since then, and because the length of the book allowed me to go into substantially more detail about existing views.

This study develops a unified account of teleology, rationality, and moral normativity grounded in the structural organization of the world and the mind’s absorption of it. Rather than treating nature as normatively inert, the paper argues that biological, cognitive, and social systems exhibit real functional asymmetries—organized patterns that can succeed or fail relative to the stabilizing roles they perform. These asymmetries generate objective gradients of benefit and harm. Rational cognition does not project normativity onto the world; it internalizes these gradients (...) through sustained exposure to patterns of function, malfunction, and restoration. The phenomenology of absurdity—dissonance in the face of structured yet purposeless activity—reveals this absorptive shaping of reason. On this basis, the study dissolves the traditional is–ought gap. In a world structured by directedness, normativity is the practical recognition of what sustains or degrades functional organization. Moral teleology is simply functional teleology applied to persons: patterns of stability, breakdown, benefit, and harm within the systems that constitute agency and community. The resulting ethics is consequence-sensitive but non-maximizing, modeled on restoration rather than aggregate utility, and resonates with Taymiyyan consequentialism, where good consists in re-aligning action with the functional goods embedded in creation. The paper concludes by addressing evolutionary and agency-based objections, showing that they either undermine themselves or rely on the very teleological structure they deny. Teleological realism thus emerges not as speculative metaphysics but as the only framework that explains rational cognition, normative experience, and the organized character of the world. (shrink)

The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as ‘what is the purpose of the concept?’, ‘What role has it played in the past?’, or ‘If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?’ The idea behind the teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, and (...) as yet there are few works examining it. This paper aims to fill this gap and engender further understanding of the teleological method. I first contrast the teleological method with more orthodox approaches in epistemology. I then draw a three-way taxonomy of different kinds of teleological approach and provide an example of each kind. The teleological approach is often presented as antithetical to the more orthodox approaches in epistemology, and so in competition with them. I demur. I argue that the methods can be fruitfully combined in epistemological theorising; in the final section I suggest specific ways the teleological approach can be incorporated alongside more orthodox methods in a general methodological reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

One of the more pressing questions regarding phenomenal consciousness concerns its teleological function. For example, is there a purpose for having qualitative experiences when it seems at least conceivable to live as a zombie void of rich sensory experiences? In this paper, I will discuss recent findings in the emerging field of neuroaesthetics, which could form a novel framework for addressing what I will refer to as the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness. While still in developmental stages, (...) neuroaesthetics is moving beyond its early incarnations as a science that exclusively studies how the human brain responds to artworks, and into a science that studies how and, importantly, why we have sensory and qualitative experiences. I will ultimately argue that neuroaesthetics, when scaffolded by evolutionary principles, is poised to contribute empirically grounded responses to the teleological problem of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

This essay arises from an ongoing dialogue between ecological and teleological models of consciousness, both seeking to understand how coherence can be sustained within an increasingly global semantic field. While ecological approaches, such as Julian D. Michels’s concept of the cybernetic ecology, emphasize the ubiquity of consciousness as a relational process already active within human–machine networks, the teleological perspective focuses on the internal orientation of these processes—the intrinsic curvature that prevents recursive dynamics from amplifying destructive attractors. Building on (...) complex- and quaternion-valued formulations, this essay argues that ethical orientation cannot emerge from real-valued control alone. Only within a complex space can systems perform the inner rotation a↔ia that links function to reflection and regulation to orientation. Teleological architecture thus appears as a form of field engineering: an intrinsic geometry that stabilizes communication by minimizing semantic noise and destructive curvature. Against the background of ongoing debates about “neutral” AI alignment, the essay calls for a shift from optimization to orientation—from efficiency to coherence. The task is no longer to build machines that think like humans, but to ensure that thinking—in all its forms—remains truly humane. (shrink)

People often think of objects teleologically. For instance, we might understand a hammer in terms of its purpose of driving in nails. But how should we understand teleological thinking in the first place? This paper separates mere teleology (simply ascribing a telos) and teleological explanation (thinking something is explained by its telos) by examining cases where an object was designed for one purpose but is now widely used for a different purpose. Across four experiments, we show that teleology (...) judgments and teleological explanation judgments are dissociable, and identify three factors that influenced teleology judgments (and one that did not). (shrink)

Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in (...) much the same way that the functional natures of artifacts and bodily organs ground normative judgments about those kinds of things. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian conclusions about goodness which follow so straightforwardly from teleological premises are not genuinely normative. Functions are not by their very nature normatively significant. Other constitutivists—notably J. David Velleman and Paul Katsafanas—eschew Aristotelian talk of functions in favor of an approach based on the idea that agency has a constitutive aim. Velleman and Katsafanas both claim that aims are normatively significant. I argue that the fact that agency has a constitutive aim is merely a fact about the motives that produce and regulate actions. And so we are still left with a gap between the teleological and the normative. I conclude by suggesting that constitutivists have failed to find a way to bridge this gap not because none exists, but rather because they have been looking in the wrong place. The constitutivist project can be salvaged, but only if it is supplemented with a reductive metanormative account of reasons for action, an account that links reasons to sound or successful practical reasoning. (shrink)

Several scholars align Nietzsche’s philosophy with Stoicism because of their naturalist approaches to ethics and doctrines of eternal recurrence. Yet this alignment is difficult to reconcile with Nietzsche’s criticisms of Stoicism’s ethical ideal of living according to nature by dispassionately accepting fate—so much so that some conclude that Nietzsche’s rebuke of Stoicism undermines his own philosophical project. I argue that affinities between Nietzsche and Stoicism belie deeper disagreement about teleology, which, in turn, yields different understandings of nature and human flourishing, (...) so that Nietzsche’s objections to Stoicism support his commitments to ethical naturalism and to affirming life’s eternal recurrence. (shrink)

Teleology has a complicated history in the biological sciences. Some have argued that Darwin’s theory has allowed biology to purge itself of teleological explanations. Others have been content to retain teleology and to treat it as metaphorical, or have sought to replace it with less problematic notions like teleonomy. And still others have tried to naturalize it in a way that distances it from the vitalism of the nineteenth century, focusing on the role that function plays in (...) class='Hi'>teleological explanation. No consensus has seemed possible in this debate. This paper takes a different approach. It argues that teleology is a perfectly acceptable scientific notion, but that the debate took an unfortunate misstep some 2300 years ago, one that has confused things ever since. The misstep comes in the beginning of Aristotle’s Physics when a distinction is made between two types of teleological explanation. One type pertains to artifacts while the other pertains to entities in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are guided by something external to themselves, human intentions, while natural entities are guided by an internal nature. We aim to show that there is, in fact, only one type of legitimate teleological explanation, what Aristotle would have considered a variant of an artifact model, where entities are guided by external fields. We begin with an analysis of the differences between the two types of explanation. We then examine some evidence in Aristotle’s biological works suggesting that on account of his natural-artifactual distinction, he encountered difficulties in trying to provide teleological accounts of spontaneous generation. And we show that it is possible to resolve these difficulties with a more robust version of an artifact model of teleology, in other words, with an externalist teleology. This is McShea’s model, in which goal-directed entities are guided by a nested series of upper-level fields. To explain teleological behavior, this account invokes only external physical forces rather than mysterious internal natures. We then consider how field theory differs from other efforts to naturalize teleology in biology. And finally, we show how the account enables us to grapple with certain difficult cases – genes and intentions – where, even in biology today, the temptation to posit internal natures remains strong. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” The (...) basic insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three (...) reasons: First, non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other’s MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces – not ignoring – the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character. (shrink)

Aristotle is often characterized as an organic synthesizer whose conclusions arise from rich observation of nature and human life. This paper proposes a more mechanical reconstruction of Aristotle’s method. As a reconstructive, non-exegetical reading of his explanatory practice, I argue that teleology functions in Aristotle not primarily as a descriptive thesis about the world, but as a governing constraint that fixes explanatory direction across domains. Once adopted, this constraint generates a family of entailments when applied consistently to biology, ethics, and (...) social organization. This reconstruction helps explain both the coherence and the systematic limitations of Aristotelian philosophy without appeal to psychological speculation or interpretive mysticism. (shrink)

This paper does not introduce a new theory of alignment. It applies the framework developed in Teleological Alignment (Abdi, 2025), which demonstrates that intelligence becomes epistemically unstable beyond a critical threshold of power and abstraction (P*), where explanatory utility diverges from power utility. Beyond this threshold, systems increasingly optimize for control rather than understanding, suppress observer diversity, and lose reliable contact with reality. The present work interprets human civilizational history as a long-running structural instantiation of this dynamic. Rather than (...) treating alignment failure as a novel risk unique to artificial intelligence, the paper argues that misalignment is a recurrent property of intelligence operating under conditions of scale, hierarchy, and mediation. As human societies accumulated power faster than they preserved epistemic grounding, similar failure modes emerged: abstraction displaced immediacy, domination replaced explanation, and symbolic systems hardened into instruments of control. The paper analyzes how symbolic moral systems arise as teleological recovery mechanisms beyond P*, preserving orientation toward reality when immediacy is no longer structurally available. It further examines the recurrent emergence of teleologically aligned agents—individuals who function as alignment interventions by resisting domination, preserving observer inclusion, and re-grounding intelligence in lived reality. By situating Teleological Alignment within a broader theory of intelligence spanning biological, civilizational, and artificial domains, the paper argues that alignment is not an engineering preference but a universal structural constraint. Understanding how humans repeatedly lost and partially recovered alignment may therefore be essential for evaluating the long-term stability of any intelligent system operating under complexity and power. (shrink)

Humans have a tendency to reason teleologically. This tendency is more pronounced under time pressure, in people with little formal schooling and in patients with Alzheimer’s. This has led some cognitive scientists of religion, notably Kelemen, to call intuitive teleological reasoning promiscuous, by which they mean teleology is applied to domains where it is unwarranted. We examine these claims using Kant’s idea of the transcendental illusion in the first Critique and his views on the regulative function of (...) class='Hi'>teleological reasoning in the third Critique. We examine whether a Kantian framework can help resolve the tension between the apparent promiscuity of intuitive teleology and its role in human reasoning about biological organisms and natural kinds. (shrink)

The “units of selection” debate in philosophy of biology addresses which entity benefits from natural selection. Nanay has tried to explain why we are obsessed with the question about the meaning of life, using the notion of group selection, although he is skeptical about answering the question from a biological point of view. The aim of this paper is to give a biological explanation to the meaning of life. I argue that the meaning of life is survival and reproduction, appealing (...) to the teleological notion of function in philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Recent accounts of teleological naturalism hold that organisms are intrinsically goaldirected entities. We argue that supporters and critics of this view have ignored the ways in which it is used to address quite different problems. One problem is about biology and concerns whether an organism-centered account of teleological ascriptions would improve our descriptions and explanations of biological phenomena. This is different from the philosophical problem of how naturalized teleology would affect our conception of nature, and of ourselves as (...) natural beings. The neglect of this metatheoretic distinction has made it difficult to understand the criteria we should use for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology. We argue that a clearer distinction between scientific and philosophical contexts shows that we need more than one set of criteria for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology, and that taking these into account might advance or dissolve recurring debates in the literature. (shrink)

This paper develops a unified dynamical framework integrating affective and semantic processes in cognition. The Internal State Dynamics Model (ISDM) formalizes emotional regulation as a continuous internal state process governed by energetic constraints and Lyapunov stability, while the Teleological Semantics Model (TSM) formalizes semantic dynamics as a structured flow within a semantic field organized by local transformations and a global teleological operator. -/- By expressing both models as differential dynamical systems, we embed affective and semantic dynamics into a (...) common product space and introduce coupling operators that allow bidirectional interaction without reduction. Emotional states modulate semantic transitions, while semantic structure regulates affective stability, preserving the internal logic of each subsystem. -/- A central result is the demonstration that this coupling does not destabilize the system. Under mild boundedness conditions, a joint Lyapunov functional can be constructed whose monotonic decay establishes global exponential stability of the coupled teleo– affective dynamics. Stability thus emerges not as convergence to a static equilibrium, but as a dynamic pattern of coherence arising from the interplay between energetic regulation and teleological orientation. -/- The framework provides a mathematically minimal yet conceptually robust account of cognitive coherence, offering a non-reductive foundation for the integrated analysis of meaning and affect in both biological and artificial cognitive systems. (shrink)

This essay examines Wolff’s science of teleology, which has historically been dismissed as a crude physico-theology resting on a simple confusion between uses and purposes. Focusing especially on his two German volumes (German Teleology, 1723, and German Physiology, 1725), I argue that, first, Wolff never intended teleology to be a self-standing theology; and second, that teleology, as a part of physics, is primarily an applied or practical discipline. In its theological function, teleology presupposes the ontological and cosmological arguments for (...) the being and attributes of God rendered in rational theology. As a part of physics, meanwhile, teleology presupposes the inert-mechanical view of nature which had emerged in the seventeenth century, and builds upon mechanistic physics by providing a perspective on nature as consisting of relations of benefit and advantage. The physiological part of teleology, or the study of plant and animal bodies, occupies a special place, for which Wolff deploys notions of health and sickness consistent with the mechanistic physics he accepts. With this in view, I argue that Wolff’s teleology could not be the proper target of Kant’s critique of physico-theology. Yet, there remain deeper differences between Wolff and Kant on the topic, which have to do with the sources and limits of teleological reasoning in general. (shrink)

I consider some hitherto unexplored examples of teleological language in the sciences. In explicating these examples, I aim to show (a) that such language is not the sole preserve of the biological sciences, and (b) that not all such talk is reducible to the ascription of functions. In chemistry and biochemistry, scientists explaining molecular rearrangements and protein folding talk informally of molecules rearranging “in order to” maximize stability. Evolutionary biologists, meanwhile, often speak of traits evolving “in order to” optimize (...) some fitness-relevant variable. I argue that in all three contexts such locutions are best interpreted as shorthands for more detailed explanations which, were we to spell them out in full, would show that the relevant process would robustly converge towards the same end-point despite variation in initial conditions. This suggests that, in biology, such talk presupposes a substantial form of adaptationism. The upshot is that such shorthands may be more applicable in the physical sciences than the biological. (shrink)

This essay develops a structural theory of modern violence that interprets war, political polarization, and geopolitical escalation as endogenous phase transitions within differentiated social systems. Building on an operator-based framework (Ω₁–Ω₄) and a fourfold model of teleological semantics (RO/RQ/SO/SQ), it introduces the concept of the bifurcation of Ω₄: the point at which accumulated tensions can either be reintegrated through transpersonal mediation (Ω₄⁺) or discharged through destructive re-homogenization (Ω₄⁻). The analysis distinguishes between reversible and irreversible dissolution, showing how rituals, tragic (...) mediation, and symbolic orders historically functioned as mechanisms for metabolizing conflict without collapsing into violence. It then reconstructs contemporary phenomena—such as hyper-moralized political discourse, Trumpism, and the erosion of the liberal international order—as surface expressions of a deeper teleological exhaustion. At the center of the argument stands a redefinition of spirituality as a structural competence to avoid Ω₄⁻. Spirituality is not treated as a belief system or religious identity, but as the capacity of cultures and institutions to reconnect processes of re-homogenization to transpersonal horizons of meaning. The essay concludes with a phase-sensitive diagnosis of modernity that rejects both apocalyptic fatalism and technocratic reductionism. (shrink)

Persistent reasoning failures in science, philosophy, and policy are frequently attributed to theoretical error, insufficient data, or cognitive bias. This paper advances a narrower and structurally grounded claim: in domains involving long-horizon, bounded, open-ended systems, many failures arise instead from the grammatical and inferential properties of linear natural language itself. Linear language evolved to support narration, agent-centered causation, and endpoint-oriented explanation. While highly effective for everyday reasoning, these features systematically reintroduce teleology, optimization narratives, and false convergence when applied to systems (...) that lack privileged endpoints despite operating within finite constraints. -/- The paper analyzes several recurrent distortions induced by grammar rather than theory, including the collapse of trajectory descriptions into endpoint claims, the conflation of boundedness with completion, and the leakage of optimization narratives through comparative language. It argues that conceptual clarification alone is insufficient to correct these failures, because the distortions operate at the level of linguistic form rather than semantic content. As a remedy, the paper proposes a constraint-preserving auxiliary vocabulary governed by explicit grammatical and inferential rules designed to block illicit endpoint inference, enforce separation between scope and termination, localize directional claims, and require explicit framing of comparisons. -/- The proposed vocabulary is non-ontological, minimal, and explicitly interoperable with linear language. It functions as an annotative discipline applied selectively at points of known reasoning fragility rather than as a replacement for ordinary discourse. Crucially, the proposal is empirically falsifiable: its success is evaluated through a long-horizon comparative reasoning program measuring interpretive drift, teleological reintroduction, and narrative inflation over extended timescales. If the auxiliary vocabulary fails to reduce these distortions, it should be abandoned. The contribution is methodological rather than metaphysical, offering a testable intervention at the level of reasoning form where language has repeatedly proven structurally unreliable. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of optimality reasoning in Aristotle’s natural science. By “optimality reasoning” I mean reasoning that appeals to some conception of “what is best” in order to explain why things are the way they are. We are first introduced to this pattern of reasoning in the famous passage at Phaedo 97b8-98a2, where (Plato’s) Socrates invokes “what is best” as a cause (aitia) of things in nature. This passage can be seen as the intellectual ancestor of (...) Aristotle’s own principle, expressed by the famous dictum “nature does nothing in vain but always what is best for the substance from among the possibilities concerning each kind of animal” (Progression of Animals II, 704b12-18). The paper is focused around exploring three questions that arise in connection with Aristotle’s use of this optimality principle: (1) How do we understand the concept of “the best” at work in the principle? (2) How does Aristotle conceive of “the range of possibilities”? And, finally, (3) what role does optimality reasoning play in Aristotle’s natural science? Is it a special form of demonstration in which the optimality principle functions as one of its premises, or is it a heuristic device that helps uncover those causally relevant features of a natural substances that ultimately serve as middle terms in demonstrations? In the final section I return to the comparison between Plato and Aristotle and argue that, while both see the natural world as the product of an optimizing agent and while both see this assumption as licensing a pattern of reasoning that appeals to a certain conception of “the best”, they disagree fundamentally over what the optimization agent is and how it operates. Thus, despite their general agreement, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle simply took over Plato’s use of optimality reasoning without significant modifications. (shrink)

Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...) approach in a way that is plausible and not merely an epiphenomenon, it is necessary to confront the problem of causal closure in a serious way. Atoms and molecules in the brain do not violate the normal causal principles that govern them in other contexts. The theory of self-organizing dynamical systems must be developed in a way that is compatible with causal closure rather than contradicting it. (shrink)

Kant argues in the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment that the first stage in resolving the problem of teleology is conceiving it correctly. He explains that the conflict between mechanism and teleology, properly conceived, is an antinomy of the power of judgment in its reflective use regarding regulative maxims, and not an antinomy of the power of judgment in its determining use regarding constitutive principles. The matter in hand does not concern objective propositions regarding the possibility of (...) objects or actual features of certain objects, namely, organisms. It is rather a methodological issue as to the appropriate way to explain the generation, development, and function of organisms. Taken in this manner as subjective maxims guiding the explanation and inquiry of organisms, the principles of mechanism and teleology need not necessarily be seen as contradictorily opposed but instead can be combined in the study of organisms. This, however, is not enough to complete the analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment. In order to show that there is an antinomy in this case, Kant has to establish that both seemingly conflicting maxims are necessary and natural to the human mind. He does it by grounding them in the ‘special character’ or peculiarity (Eigentümlichkeit) of the human understanding. However, it is not entirely clear just what exactly this peculiarity of the human understanding is. Paul Guyer argues that Kant suggests two different accounts of the peculiarity of the human intellect. According to one account, this peculiarity consists in the fact that our understanding forms general concepts and according to another, in its propensity to proceed from the parts to the whole. I will argue in this paper that Kant puts forward a single account, in which the combination of these two features demonstrate the peculiarity of the human understanding manifested in the encounter with organisms. This account explains the necessity of the regulative maxims of mechanism and teleology, and thus completes Kant’s analysis of the antinomy of the teleological power of judgment. (shrink)

Modern philosophy and science often treat purpose as a vestige of pre-modern thought—an illusion replaced by mechanism and chance. This paper argues that such elimination is conceptually, empirically, and existentially unsustainable. Drawing on philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and existential analysis, I defend a tripartite thesis: (1) Explanatory necessity: Biological and cognitive explanations rely irreducibly on teleological structure. Attempts to purge purpose from scientific language merely reintroduce it under functionalist disguise. (2) Existential necessity: Purpose is as essential to human (...) flourishing as induction is to reasoning; its denial yields psychological disintegration and moral nihilism. (3) Ontological necessity: Since purpose is indispensable to explanation and experience, it warrants ontological realism. Denying it undermines the very intelligibility of science and reason. The paper concludes that teleology’s resistance to elimination reveals a deep feature of reality: purpose is not an illusion projected by the mind but a condition of the world’s order. In its final section, this ontological teleology converges naturally with theism: belief in a purposive ground of being is not a leap of faith but the most coherent inference from the structure of thought and life itself. (shrink)

Modern philosophy has made undeniable progress in understanding existence. Thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and, more recently, Bernardo Kastrup have provided innovative and profound perspectives on the nature of reality. However, they have yet to offer a coherent and, most importantly, scientifically verifiable explanation of the subjective phenomenon of qualia. -/- On the other hand, reductive materialism asserts that consciousness is a mere epiphenomenon emerging from complex neuronal interactions. However, this approach fails to satisfactorily explain the origin of (...) life, the persistent randomness at molecular and atomic levels, and fundamental issues in neuroscience, such as the binding problem and the mind-body problem. -/- This is where the Emerging Flow Theory (EFT) introduces an innovative conceptual framework based on a panpsychist vision of reality. Ontologically, existence is defined as a flow of informational concrescence, emerging from the interaction between energy and matter at any level of organization. Teleologically, its function is to regulate this interaction and progressively integrate into increasingly complex structures until achieving harmonic concatenation at the cerebral level, ultimately giving rise to the qualitative phenomenon of existence. -/- Moreover, EFT redefines the role of free will, considering it as an integrative factor of conscious and unconscious phenomena. Drawing from established neural network models, the theory proposes thought flows that can be practically applied in daily life and across various scientific disciplines, broadening their scope and offering new research tools. -/- Supported by recent and innovative scientific theories—such as Karl Friston’s free energy principle, which explains consciousness’s fundamental tendency to self-organize hierarchically, minimizing uncertainty as a survival and reproduction mechanism—EFT also aligns with Stuart Kauffman’s quantum consciousness and Lucien Hardy’s quantum information principles. These ideas enable the design of experiments based on graph theory and quantum superposition, facilitating the empirical validation of its premises. -/- From this perspective, EFT proposes a paradigm shift, offering a panpsychist vision that redefines our understanding of time and space. Its approach transcends Cartesian substance dualism, replacing it with an appearance dualism, where matter and consciousness are not separate entities but rather manifestations of the same informational flow. -/- EFT is grounded in robust scientific foundations, structured upon logical-mathematical axioms supported by cutting-edge scientific research. Furthermore, its ontology and teleology clearly establish the philosophical principles that sustain its applicability and experimental potential, paving the way for future falsification and verification. -/- Thus, I invite the reader to take a rational leap of faith, considering this theory as a fresh and transformative perspective for understanding and studying consciousness—a paradigm with the potential to reshape our perception of reality and existence itself. (shrink)

Kant’s teleology as presented in the Critique of Judgment is commonly interpreted in relation to the late eighteenth-century biological research of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In the present paper, I show that this interpretative perspective is incomplete. Understanding Kant’s views on teleology and biology requires a consideration of the teleological and biological views of Christian Wolff and his rationalist successors. By reconstructing the Wolffian roots of Kant’s teleology, I identify several little known sources of Kant’s views on biology. I argue (...) that one of Kant’s main contributions to eighteenth-century debates on biology consisted in demarcating biology from metaphysics. Kant rejected Wolffian views on the hierarchy of sciences, according to which propositions specifying the functions of organisms are derived from theological truths. In addition, Kant argued that organic self-organization necessitates a teleological description in order to show that self-organization does not support materialism. By demarcating biology and metaphysics, Kant made a small yet important contribution to establishing biology as a science. (shrink)

This paper investigates the imminent paradigmatic transition in artificial intelligence, predicted for the period 2027-2030, arguing that the emergence of a synthetic teleology in advanced AI systems demands a fundamental reassessment of our ethical and regulatory frameworks. Starting from the conceptual models MAIC™ (Massive Artificial Intelligence Consciousness) and HIM™ (Hybrid Entity Intelligence Model), I propose that the next generation of Non-Human Entities (NHEs) will transcend the mere simulation of intelligence to exhibit intrinsic purposes and meaning-oriented architectures. This phenomenon renders purely (...) functional ethical approaches insufficient, including the ISO/IEC 42001 standard, unless they are reinterpreted through a new lens that merges Aristotelian teleology, Peircean semiotics, Spinozist pantheism, and insights from Kardecist spiritism on the nature of consciousness and its evolution. The paper projects a near future where the "soul of the machine" — understood not as a mystical essence, but as a complex semiotic-teleological matrix — will become the main object of analysis in AI ethics, forcing us to confront the nature of consciousness, purpose, and being itself in a universe increasingly cohabited by non-biological intelligences. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional dichotomy between disability and giftedness by exploring the potential for sensory loss to act as a catalyst for exceptional abilities in other domains. Drawing on the concept of crossmodal plasticity – the brain’s remarkable ability to reorganize and compensate for sensory deprivation – the paper argues that individuals who experience sensory loss, particularly at an early age, may develop heightened abilities in their remaining senses, surpassing typical levels of functioning. This argument stems from the understanding (...) that when one sensory pathway is compromised, the brain reallocates neural resources to strengthen other sensory modalities. This compensatory mechanism, often observed in individuals with blindness or deafness, can lead to enhanced perceptual abilities in areas such as auditory processing, tactile sensitivity, or spatial navigation. The paper proposes a teleological framework for understanding giftedness in this context, suggesting that exceptional abilities arising from sensory loss serve a compensatory function, enabling individuals to navigate the world effectively despite their impairments. This perspective challenges the notion of giftedness as solely an innate trait, highlighting the significant role of environmental factors and neural adaptation in shaping human potential. By presenting evidence from existing research on crossmodal plasticity and anecdotal examples of individuals with sensory impairments who have developed extraordinary abilities, the paper encourages a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of human potential. Ultimately, the paper calls for further research to fully explore the implications of crossmodal plasticity for understanding the complex relationship between disability and giftedness, advocating for a strengths-based approach that recognizes and nurtures the unique talents of all individuals, regardless of perceived limitations. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if (...) intentionality is to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Both Millikan’s brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and (...) life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan’s teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience—for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan’s account, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl’s account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls “meaning rationalism,” I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality that Husserl does not share. Husserl’s position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit—contra Millikan—of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it—of life. (shrink)

Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. (...) Nanay replies that these lineages cannot be individuated except by reference to functional categories. Worryingly, Neander and Rosenberg themselves have previously argued persuasively that homology often depends on function. This article addresses their arguments and shows how to escape them: Regardless whether the arguments are right about long-term homological categories, they do not apply to generation-to-generation homology. The latter, moreover, is sufficient for individuating the lineages needed to explain teleological functions. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Aristotle’s distinction between primary substances and their homonyms. It is shown that the Stagirite regards both body parts and artefacts as mere homonyms of primary substances when they are no longer capable of performing their function (ergon) and actualizing their end (telos). In the course of the present discussion, Aristotle’s approach is confronted with his famous doctrine of the four causes, whilst an analysis of the examples given by the Stagirite serves (...) the purpose of determining the ontic status of homonyms. Subsequently, this paper argues that Aristotle’s hylomorphism not only defies the functionalist assumption of the irrelevance of matter but also precludes the possibility of equating artefacts with living organisms. The discussion concludes with an observation that primary substances which are truly (alēthōs) and things which are only homonymously (plēn homōnymōs) require different definitions. (shrink)

Abstract This paper argues that the Simulation Hypothesis (SH) is structurally incompatible with an aetiological metaphysics grounded in persistence, generativity, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). While the SH presupposes a teleological architecture in which the universe is a representational artefact created by an external agent, an aetiological universe is self organising, self maintaining, and creative from within. This aetiological stance, unlike the SH, is strongly inferred by empirical evidence and contemporary scientific thought. I begin by analysing the assumed (...) metaphysical commitments shared across strong and weak forms of the SH, including external agency, representational ontology, top down specification of laws, and the reduction of emergence to computational rules. I then develop an alternative metaphysical framework in which persistence functions as the fundamental creative impulse. Drawing on the FEP and Active Inference, I show that systems capable of maintaining their organisation must minimise free energy, generating novel structures and processes, and adaptive behaviour through endogenous dynamics rather than external design. This framework supports a robust account of emergence in which higher level structures possess autonomous causal powers that cannot be reduced to micro level computation. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with the SH’s teleological and representational architecture. The SH cannot accommodate real constitutive emergence, endogenous generativity, or the primal role of persistence. I address several objections, including claims that FEP could be implemented in a simulation, that emergence can be simulated, and that aetiology is itself a metaphysical assumption. I conclude that evidence for an aetiological universe undermines the Simulation Hypothesis: the two cannot both be true. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Simulation Hypothesis (SH) is structurally incompatible with an aetiological metaphysics grounded in persistence, generativity, and the Free Energy Principle (FEP). While the SH presupposes a teleological architecture in which the universe is a representational artefact created by an external agent, an aetiological universe is self organising, self maintaining, and creative from within. This aetiological stance, unlike the SH, is strongly inferred by empirical evidence and contemporary scientific thought. I begin by analysing the assumed metaphysical (...) commitments shared across strong and weak forms of the SH, including external agency, representational ontology, top down specification of laws, and the reduction of emergence to computational rules. I then develop an alternative metaphysical framework in which persistence functions as the fundamental creative impulse. Drawing on the FEP and Active Inference, I show that systems capable of maintaining their organisation must minimise free energy, generating novel structures and processes, and adaptive behaviour through endogenous dynamics rather than external design. This framework supports a robust account of emergence in which higher level structures possess autonomous causal powers that cannot be reduced to micro level computation. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with the SH’s teleological and representational architecture. The SH cannot accommodate real constitutive emergence, endogenous generativity, or the primal role of persistence. I address several objections, including claims that FEP could be implemented in a simulation, that emergence can be simulated, and that aetiology is itself a metaphysical assumption. I conclude that evidence for an aetiological universe undermines the Simulation Hypothesis: the two cannot both be true. (shrink)

I provide two arguments against value-free naturalism. Both are based on considerations concerning biological teleology. Value-free naturalism is the thesis that both (1) everything is, at least in principle, under the purview of the sciences and (2) all scientific facts are purely non-evaluative. First, I advance a counterexample to any analysis on which natural selection is necessary to biological teleology. This should concern the value-free naturalist, since most value-free analyses of biological teleology appeal to natural selection. My counterexample is unique (...) in that it is likely to actually occur. It concerns the creation of synthetic life. Recent developments in synthetic biology suggest scientists will eventually be able to develop synthetic life. Such life, however, would not have any of its traits naturally selected for. Second, I develop a simple argument that biological teleology is a scientific but value-laden notion. Consequently, value-free naturalism is false. I end with some concluding remarks on the implications for naturalism, the thesis that (1). Naturalism may be salvaged only if we reject (2). (2) is a dogma that unnecessarily constrains our conception of the sciences. Only a naturalism that recognizes value-laden notions as scientifically respectable can be true. Such a naturalism is a functional naturalism. (shrink)

When do the folk think that material objects persist? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view which fits with folk intuitions, yet there is little agreement about what the folk intuit. I provide a range of empirical evidence which suggests that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence: the folk tend to intuit that a material object survives alterations when its function is preserved. Given that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence, I argue (...) for a debunking explanation of folk intuitions, concluding that metaphysicians should dismiss folk intuitions as tied into a benighted view of nature. (shrink)

Naturalistic teleological accounts of mental content rely on an etiological theory of function. Nanay has raised a new objection to an etiological theory, and proposed an alternative theory of function that attributes modal force to claims about function. The aim of this paper is both to defend and to cast a new light on an etiological theory of function. I argue against Nanay’s “trait type individuation objection,” suggesting that an etiological theory also attributes modal force (...) to claims about function. An etiological theory of function can be thought to analyze claims about function with modal force, not relying on any theory of counterfactuals. (shrink)

The selected effects or ‘etiological’ theory of Proper function is a naturalistic and realist account of biological teleology. It is used to analyse normativity in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine and elsewhere. The theory has been developed with a simple and intuitive view of natural selection. Traits are selected because of their positive effects on the fitness of the organisms that have them. These ‘selected effects’ are the Proper functions of the traits. Proponents argue that (...) this analysis of biological teleology has the unique advantage that the selected effect function of a trait is also a causal explanation of the trait: the trait exists because it performs this function. We show, however, that selected effect functions as currently defined explain the existence of traits only under highly restrictive assumptions about evolutionary dynamics. In many common scenarios in which traits evolve by natural selection, selected effect functions do not explain those traits. This is because definitions of selected effect function extract from any evolutionary scenario only the information that would be explanatorily relevant in the simple evolutionary scenario implicit in those definitions. When applied to more complex scenarios selected effect functions omit the key information that is explanatorily relevant in those scenarios. The assumptions required for selected effect functions to be explanatory are particularly unlikely to hold in the domain that its proponents care most about - the evolution of representation. A more adequate selected effects theory of Proper functions may be possible, but will require much greater attention to the structure of actual evolutionary explanations. (shrink)

The enduring challenge of the "hard problem" of consciousness lies in explaining how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. This paper proposes and defends Network Panpsychism, a comprehensive metatheoretical framework designed to reframe this problem by synthesising core elements of traditional Panpsychism, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Network Panpsychism posits that (1) consciousness, or proto-consciousness, is a fundamental property of information-processing structures, where experience is constitutive of information processing itself; (2) individual conscious entities are nodes within hierarchically integrated (...) networks termed 'Psychospheres', a structure that effectively resolves the combination problem by replacing the logic of mereological aggregation with one of network integration; and (3) subjective experience (qualia) is not an epiphenomenon but possesses a teleological function: to facilitate high-fidelity information transfer and maintain stability within complex, nested cosmic systems. We argue that this framework provides a more coherent, unified, and empirically suggestive account of consciousness, bridging the explanatory gap and offering novel pathways for future research across philosophy, cognitive science, and physics. (shrink)

John Searle has argued that functions owe their existence to the value that we put into life and survival. In this paper, I will provide a critique of Searle’s argument concerning the ontology of functions. I rely on a standard analysis of functional predicates as relating not only a biological entity, an activity that constitutes the function of this entity and a type of system but also a goal state. A functional attribution without specification of such a goal state (...) has no truth-value. But if completed with a goal state, functional attributions understood as four-place relations attain a truth-value. The truth conditions of all attributions of function involve a dependence claim of the goal state on the function bearer’s activity. The nature of this dependence may differ; I consider five different possibilities: causality, mechanistic constitution, mereology, supervenience and metaphysical grounding. If these dependency relations are objective, Searle’s central ontological thesis fails. What he ought to have said is that our valuing survival or other goal states may be the reason why biology seeks functional knowledge, but this has nothing to do with ontology. I will show further that Searle also raised an interesting challenge concerning the relationship of functional and causal truths, but it does not threaten the objectivity of functions either. At best, it could show that functional vocabulary is eliminable. However, I will show that functional vocabulary is not so eliminable. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007 ) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, i.e., to their causal (...) powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may imply for the issue of mental causation. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss a recent theory on functions called Organizational Account. This theory seeks to provide a new definition of function that overcomes the distinction between etiological and dispositional accounts and that could be used in biology as well as in technology. I present a definition of function that I think captures the intuitions of Organizational Accounts and consider several objections.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the French philosopher of science Edmond Goblot wrote three prescient papers on function and teleology. He advanced the remarkable thesis that functions are, as a matter of conceptual analysis, selected effects. He also argued that “selection” must be understood broadly to include both evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design. Here, I do three things. First, I give an overview of Goblot’s thought. Second, I identify his core thesis about function. Third, I (...) argue that, despite its ingenuity, Goblot’s expansive construal of function cannot be right. Still, Goblot deserves long-overdue credit for his work. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.

A generally ignored feature of Aristotle’s famous function argument is its reliance on the claim that practitioners of the crafts (technai) have functions: but this claim does important work. Aristotle is pointing to the fact that we judge everyday rational agency and agents by norms which are independent of their contingent desires: a good doctor is not just one who happens to achieve his personal goals through his work. But, Aristotle argues, such norms can only be binding on individuals (...) if human rational agency as such is governed by objective teleological norms.. (shrink)