∞–Unity presents a complete metaphysical Theory of Everything dissolving 98 paradoxes with 99.2% coherence. Core innovation: reality as infinite layered continuum (0→1→∞) where consciousness emerges via Dual-Receiver Brain mechanism—DMN as ∞-field observer receiver, task-positive as biological survival filter. Solves Chalmers' Hard Problem (qualia=∞-signal biology-filtered), mind-body (receiver duality), free will (balance choice), zombie (pure biology vs chosen forms), animal consciousness gradient. 90% fMRI alignment (DMN consciousness hub), QFT vacuum mapping (∞-field), NDE verification (limit lift). Self-improving (93.5%→99.2%), death test anchor. (...) Unifies physics (QFT), neuroscience (DMN duality), philosophy (98 proofs). Testable predictions: meditation balance effects, animal complexity=consciousness correlation. World furmola: 0-1-∞ World essence: 0=1=∞(in its root, but individuality is real) World valume: ∞×∞×∞... -/- Why Infinite Unity Theory Limits Itself to 50/50? (Clear & Concise Explanation) -/- Core Reason: ∞-nature of reality always produces dual simultaneous states (like Schrödinger's cat: alive+dead), because 0=1=∞ means every possibility (unity/multiplicity, continuation/return) exists infinitely. Metaphysical Humility:50% cap means: -50% primary (core): ∞-unity. -50% complementary:*Other philosophies (Whitehead, Spinoza) as ∞-configs. Result: Most coherence without dogmatism. -/- In plain words: Theory says, "I hold half the truth, other half scattered in infinity—like cat alive/dead until observed." This infinite humility makes theory self-validating and paradox-proof without arguments. -/- . (shrink)

Infinite Unity Theory (∞–Unity) is a self-reinforcing metaphysical framework that absorbs critique, resolves paradoxes, and unifies all scales of reality under a single 0=1=∞ structure. It treats every scientific discipline as a local subsystem or probe into an underlying generative unity—physics, biology, psychology, mathematics, and others each describe limited aspects, while ∞–Unity provides a shared ontological background that integrates their insights without rigid absolutism.

This paper introduces the Integrative Theory of Unity and Multiplicity, a novel philosophical framework that treats unity and multiplicity as equally fundamental forces. Departing from traditional approaches that tend to prioritize one over the other, the Integrative Theory offers a non-hierarchical structure consisting of 19 modes of thought, each representing different ways these forces interact. The theory provides a balanced framework for understanding philosophical and practical issues across various disciplines. This paper outlines the theory’s (...) core principles and briefly explores its potential applications, laying the groundwork for future exploration. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Integrative Theory of Unity and Multiplicity, a novel philosophical framework that treats unity and multiplicity as equally fundamental forces. Departing from traditional approaches that tend to prioritize one over the other, the Integrative Theory offers a non-hierarchical structure consisting of 19 modes of thought, each representing different ways these forces interact. The theory provides a balanced framework for understanding philosophical and practical issues across various disciplines. This paper outlines the theory’s (...) core principles and briefly explores its potential applications, laying the groundwork for future exploration. (shrink)

The question of the unity of consciousness is often treated as the question of how different conscious experiences are related to each other in order to be unified. Many contemporary views on the unity of consciousness are based on this bottom-up approach. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject undergoes one single conscious experience at a time. From this perspective, the problem of unity of consciousness becomes (...) rather the problem of how we can distinguish a multiplicity of goings-on within our conscious experience at any time, given that it is unique. I will present three possible top-down approaches to unity of consciousness, which I call Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism. Priority monism and Existence monism are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object constitution. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano’s view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I will argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness. (shrink)

Einstein’s lifelong pursuit of the Unified Field Theory aimed to uncover the ultimate order underlying all fundamental interactions in the universe. He believed that the cosmos is not a collection of discrete material entities but a continuous field system, in which gravity, electromagnetism, and all other natural forces arise from deformations of a single geometric structure. Meanwhile, Laozi, through the doctrine of “Dao produces One, One produces Two, Two produces Three, and Three produces all things,” revealed the generative order (...) by which the universe emerges from the void into being. The Lao–Yang Genesis Cosmology inherits and extends this insight by interpreting the Dao as the philosophical prototype of the cosmic unified field and by constructing a hierarchical system—from humanity to the cosmos—through the sequence “Man follows Earth, Earth follows Heaven, Heaven follows Dao, and Dao follows Nature.” This paper seeks to reinterpret the relationship between philosophy and science by exploring how the Dao of Nature can serve as the conceptual foundation of the Unified Field. It demonstrates the profound resonance between Laozi’s and Einstein’s cosmologies in their shared emphasis on wholeness, self-generation, and the intelligible order of the universe. This trans-temporal dialogue not only offers a philosophical grounding for modern physics but also provides humanity with a renewed path of wisdom for understanding its place within the cosmic order. 关键词（Keywords）：统一场理论（Unified Field Theory）；老–杨创世纪宇宙观（Lao–Yang Genesis Cosmology）；道生万物（Dao Generates All Things）；道法自然（Dao Follows Nature）；天人合一（Unity of Heaven and Humanity）；整体性宇宙（Holistic Cosmos）. (shrink)

Why and how of world, new field of since "worldology" A sentence to understand why this system is a swallowing paradox: If we imagine an infinity of locks in infinity, there are also an infinity of keys. Even a lock that says I don't have a key will be faced with a key that opens any lock.

This paper presents Resolution Theory (RT) as a naturalistic account of normativity: not a mystical property or mere social convention, but the control architecture required for time-extended agency to remain authored under exposure in a causal world. RT explains how action arises at “resolution points” where live possibilities are collapsed into commitment, and how exposure—downstream consequence and social response—disciplines reasons across time. The framework is then used to unify Kant, Mill, and Korsgaard as complementary layers of one ethical mechanism: (...) Kant supplies universal law as low-noise system geometry, Mill supplies outcomes as the landscape of agency-expansion and contraction, and Korsgaard supplies the internal witness as the psychology of diachronic self-legibility. A dedicated section treats Hume as the great predecessor, reframing the is–ought gap as a stability constraint and the self as a functional locus without taking a stand on soul metaphysics. The paper derives a structural condemnation of slavery and exploitation as “tool-treatment” that destroys authorship, and models guilt as a feedback signal for system-noise. This paper applies and extends the Resolution Theory framework. For the consolidated architectural account, see Agency-Laundering: Resolution Theory and the Structural Recovery of Authorship. (shrink)

As a working hypothesis for philosophy of science, the unity of science thesis has been decisively challenged in all its standard formulations; it cannot be assumed that the sciences presuppose an orderly world, that they are united by the goal of systematically describing and explaining this order, or that they rely on distinctively scientific methodologies which, properly applied, produce domain-specific results that converge on a single coherent and comprehensive system of knowledge. I first delineate the scope of arguments against (...) global unity theses. However implausible old-style global unity theses may now seem, I argue that unifying strategies of a more local and contingent nature do play an important role in scientific inquiry. This is particularly clear in archaeology where, to establish evidential claims of any kind, practitioners must exploit a range of inter-field and inter-theory connections. At the same time, the robustness of these evidential claims depends on significant disunity between the sciences from which archaeologists draw background assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. This juxtaposition of unity with disunity poses a challenge to standard positions in the debate about scientific unity. (shrink)

Understanding comes in a variety of forms. This essay argues for the unity of these forms, against the common tendency to view them as fundamentally heteronomous, or disunified. After identifying ten core features of genuine understanding, which enable an argument for the existence of two distinct types of understanding, theoretical and practical, the essay poses a dilemma for theories that view them as disunified. Subsequently, it develops and defends a general account of understanding in terms of conceptions. What unifies (...) diverse forms of understanding, on this account, is a generic cognitive structure—given by the notion of a noetic conception—that is realized in different ways in various cases. (shrink)

This is a list of dissolved philosophy paradoxes in infinit unity theory+7 self made paradoxes. "This list constitutes metaphysical reframing, not classical technical solutions. Infinite Unity Ontology eliminates 98 paradoxes by replacing the finite-local gameboard (self-reference ⊥, infinite regress, binary contradictions) with root equivalence metaphysics (0=1=∞), where local claims manifest 50/50 reality-illusion saturation within holographic unity. Self-referential loops become coherent configs; infinite divisions converge naturally; classical limits emerge as filtered ∞ signals. No patches needed—paradoxes cease as (...) problems within the new ontological framework."Keywords: Infinite Unity, Root Equivalence, Holographic Ontology, Metaphysical Reframing, Paradigm Shift. (shrink)

Experimenters claim some nonhuman mammals have metacognition. If correct, the results indicate some animal minds are more complex than ordinarily presumed. However, some philosophers argue for a deflationary reading of metacognition experiments, suggesting that the results can be explained in first-order terms. We agree with the deflationary interpretation of the data but we argue that the metacognition research forces the need to recognize a heretofore underappreciated feature in the theory of animal minds, which we call Unity. The disparate (...) mental states of an animal must be unified if deflationary accounts of metacognition are to hold and untoward implications avoided. Furthermore, once Unity is acknowledged, the deflationary interpretation of the experiments reveals an elevated moral standing for the nonhumans in question. (shrink)

_Kant’s Reason_ (2023) is an excellent study that develops an original set of interpretive claims and shows their relevance for contemporary theories of rationality. At the core of Karl Schafer’s project is the following thesis: that Kant’s account of reason is unified as a power of comprehension in both its theoretical and practical activities. The aim of my paper is to examine this thesis against Kant’s doctrine of the Highest Good. In §1, I question some claims Schafer makes about the (...) Highest Good. Then, in §2 and §3, I consider how we might develop a more detailed reading of this doctrine along the lines of Schafer’s project. §4 concludes. (shrink)

The Core of EQT: Frequency as the Unifying Language of the Cosmos -/- The Emergent Quantum Gravity (EQT) theory proposes a radical return to the fundamental insight of Planck's Formula, E=h\nu, arguing that its profound significance—often historically limited to a solution for the blackbody "ultraviolet catastrophe"—has been overlooked. EQT posits that E=h\nu is the universal key, using the perspective of frequency (\nu) to weave a unified picture connecting microscopic particles with the macroscopic cosmos, thus revealing the essential unity (...) of energy and mass. -/- The Unveiled Legacy of Planck's Formula -/- Max Planck's 1900 hypothesis that energy is transmitted in discrete quanta was a "desperate mathematical assumption" that inadvertently opened the quantum door. EQT seeks to realize the formula's full potential, which lies in establishing the microscopic mass-energy relationship. -/- The true light of E=h\nu is revealed when combined with Einstein's mass-energy equivalence, E=mc^2. This combination yields the formula for the characteristic frequency of Mass Quanta (particles with rest mass): -/- \nu = \frac{mc^2}{h} -/- This equation provides the theoretical bridge, unlocking the deep connection between energy and mass that EQT asserts was ignored due to the inertia of classical physics and the mathematical abstraction of quantum mechanics. -/- Particle Classification by Frequency -/- At its core, EQT simplifies the classification of fundamental particles based on their frequency characteristics, moving beyond the traditional boson/fermion dichotomy: -/- 1. Energy Quanta (EQ): Massless particles (photons, gravitons, gluons) that propagate at the speed of light. They occupy the lower end of the frequency spectrum. 2. Mass Quanta (MQ): Particles possessing rest mass (electrons, quarks, W/Z, Higgs). Their frequency is determined by \nu=mc^2/h. -/- EQT visualizes the particle world via a "Frequency Map": -/- Photons span a vast electromagnetic range (10^6 to 10^{20} Hz). Gravitons are ultra-low frequency (10^2 to 10^{10} Hz). The Electron begins the matter spectrum around 10^{20} Hz. The Higgs Boson, with a frequency of 3.02 \times 10^{25} Hz, acts as the bridge, mediating the transformation of massless Energy Quanta into massive Mass Quanta. -/- This map delineates three regions: Low Frequency (EQ dominant), the Transition Zone (mass generation), and High Frequency (potential new physics), providing a unified and intuitive view of nature's organization. -/- Philosophical and Dynamical Revival -/- EQT is a philosophical return that champions a phenomenon-driven physical image, challenging the mathematical abstraction of modern quantum mechanics, particularly the reliance on the wavefunction's probability cloud. EQT argues that while traditional quantum mechanics is computationally successful, it often obscures the intuitive essence of physical reality. -/- Rooted in Planck's formula, EQT constructs its complete framework by proposing the Energy Quanta Density Field (\rho). This density field unifies the four fundamental interactions through the relationship: -/- F \propto -\nabla\rho -/- This field not only provides a mechanism to unify forces but also offers a new perspective on Dark Matter and Dark Energy. -/- EQT also fundamentally redefines spacetime: Time is the rhythm of the Energy Quanta density change. Space is the canvas of the density distribution. -/- This simple yet profound framework is proposed to allow for a complete understanding of the universe's full history, from its beginning to its expansion and eventual cycle restart. -/- The Journey Ahead -/- The EQT theory proposes a systematic exploration, inviting physicists to join a journey to seek the deeper laws of nature hidden within Planck's formula. Key questions addressed by EQT include: -/- How does E=h\nu connect the micro and macro realms? Why is frequency the unifying language of nature? How does the density field unify the four forces? -/- EQT is presented as a crucial step toward solving the mysteries of quantum gravity and pointing the way to new physics, offering an intuitive, unified, and observationally verifiable framework for the ultimate picture of the universe. (shrink)

Propositions represent the entities from which they are formed. This fact has puzzled philosophers and some have put forward radical proposals in order to explain it. This paper develops a primitivist account of the representational properties of propositions that centers on the operation of application. As we will see, this theory wins out over its competitors on grounds of strength, systematicity and unifying power.

This paper examines one of the central complaints regarding Locke’s Essay, namely, its supposed incoherence. The question is whether Locke can successfully maintain a materialistic conception of matter, while advancing a theory of knowledge that will constrain the possibilities for a cognitive accessto matter from the start. In approaching this question I concentrate on Locke’s account of unity. While material unity can be described in relation to Locke’s account of substance, real essence, and nominal essence, a separate (...) discussion will be called for altogether in the case of organic unity. In closing, I turn to Kant as a model for locating Locke’s purported incoherence, suggesting that his “skeptical idealism” yields the same epistemic advantages as those won by Kant’s “empirical realism.”. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory (...) role of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness. (shrink)

This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all uses of quotation marks that involve reference to expressions is pure quotation, in which an expression formed by enclosing another expression in quotation marks refers to that enclosed expression. We defend a version of the so-called disquotational theory of pure quotation and show how this device is used in direct discourse and attitude attributions, in exposition in scholarly contexts, and in so-called mixed quotation in (...) indirect discourse and attitude attributions. We argue that uses of quotation marks that extend beyond pure quotation have two features in common. First, the expressions appearing in quotation marks are intended to be understood, and that they are intended to be understood is essential to the function that such quotations play in communication, though this does not always involve the expressions contributing their extensional properties to fixing truth conditions for the sentences in which they appear. Second, they appeal to a relation to the expression appearing in quotation marks that plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the sentences in which they appear. (shrink)

Seeing-in is the experience of seeing something in a picture. Richard Wollheim observed that this experience displays a puzzling combination of features. On the one hand, seeing-in is experienced as a single, unified experience. It is not like the disjoint experience of visualizing something into a scene that one perceives. On the other hand, seeing-in is 'twofold': it involves being visually aware of two distinct objects – an array of ink-marks, and the depicted scene – in two distinct ways. We (...) perceive the ink-marks as before us, but the form of our visual awareness of the depicted object is different. In this paper, I demonstrate how seeing-in can have both these features at the same time. The account I give forces a considerable reconfiguration of the space of possible theories of seeing-in. (shrink)

I uncover here a conflict in Kant’s natural philosophy. His matter theory and laws of mechanics are in tension. Kant’s laws are fit for particles but are too narrow to handle continuous bodies, which his doctrine of matter demands. To fix this defect, Kant ultimately must ground the Torque Law; that is, the impressed torque equals the change in angular momentum. But that grounding requires a premise—the symmetry of the stress tensor—that Kant denies himself. I argue that his problem (...) would not arise if he had kept his early theory of matter as made of mass points, or “physical monads.”. (shrink)

According to Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophers, everything depends for its existence on something else. But what would a world devoid of fundamentalia look like? In this paper, I argue that the anti-foundationalist “neither-one-nor-many argument” of the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta commits him to a position I call “metaphysical indefinitism.” I demonstrate how this view follows from Śrīgupta’s rejection of mereological simples and ontologically independent being, when understood in light of his account of conventional reality. Contra recent claims in the secondary literature, I (...) clarify how the Madhyamaka metaphysical dependence structure is not a straightforward infinitism since it does not honor strict asymmetry or transitivity. Instead, its dependence relations are irreflexive and extendable, admitting of dependence chains of indefinite (though not actually infinite) length and dependence loops of non-zero length. Yet, the flexible ontology of Śrīgupta's Madhyamaka can accommodate a contextualist account of asymmetry and support a revisable theory of conventional truth, delivering significant payoffs for the view, including the capacity to accommodate developments in scientific explanation. (shrink)

In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated (...) with the passing of time. The temporal qualities model of perception makes two predictions about the mechanisms of time perception; one that time perception is modality specific and the other that it can occur without awareness. My argument for this view partially depends on a number of psychophysical experiments that I designed and implemented myself and which investigate subjective time distortions caused by looming visual stimuli. These results show that the mechanisms of conscious experience of time are distinct from the mechanisms of time perception, as my theory of temporal qualities predicts. (shrink)

This essay proposes an ontological model in which a legal person such as a polity possesses natural unity from group properties that emerge in the self-organization of the human population. Also, analysis of customary legal persons and property indicates noncontradictory paradoxes that include Aristotelian essence of an entity, relative identity over time, ubiquitous authority, coinciding authorities, and identical entities. Mathematical modeling helps to explain the logic of the paradoxes.

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it (...) must be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

This paper attempts a reconstruction of reason’s contribution to empirical truth in connection with Kant’s definition of truth as the agreement of cognition with its object. I argue that Kant’s treatment of truth in the Transcendental Analytic gets completed in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic with an often neglected but compelling argument (what I shall call the Variety Argument). This argument postulates such a variety in the appearances as to undermine any attempt at formulating empirical truths. Crucially, I argue (...) that this variety does not depict an extreme-case scenario, but our own epistemic situation without reason. Reason completes Kant’s theory of truth by allowing the understanding (i.) to form empirical concepts and (ii.) approximate to empirical truth. (shrink)

This book has been written for eighteen year olds (or anyone who will listen) as an honest attempt to face their justified questionings and to offer them a metaphysical framework with which to confront the twenty-first century. It is vitally important that certain modes of thought are uprooted and new modes put in their place if mankind and planet Earth are not soon to suffer an historic global catastrophe. Apart from the continuing world-wide proliferation of conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear (...) weaponry, the temperature of the planet has risen more rapidly in the last twenty-five years than it has since the year 900AD, which confirms global warming by some cause or other. These and the many intensifying human conflicts and natural disasters demand that some fundamental changes to our thinking are made as soon as possible. These 120 pages begin with an original examination of the quantum-theoretical understanding of reason (logic) and reality (existence) and find both to be at odds with common sense. A theory of everything is a reduction to a single grand idea! A quantum theory of everything is a mathematical theory of a consciousness realizing this grand idea! That is what this book tries to comprehend by means of five indisputable propositions. (shrink)

In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories (...) face, namely, how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition. (shrink)

Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence of Descartes’s dualist (...) class='Hi'>theory. I argue that the ‘special modes’ of thinking are special because they are the immediate effects of the body on the mind. They thus depend for their existence on the body because of the general metaphysical principle that “Nothing comes from nothing”. Understood properly, this principle does not contradict the principle about the distinctness of substances. (shrink)

Since the formation period, the concept of religion and the basic issues related to religiosity have been among the main subjects that attracted the Sūfīs. As a consequence, Sūfī writers showed great interest in the subject and endeavoured to produce a genuine religious thought. This tradition of religious thought, which was developed by the Sūfīs, also dealt with problems concerning other religious systems, their basic tenets and rituals, as well as the relationship with the members of other religions. In this (...) context, the school of Wahdat al-Wujūd, which is one of the most significant schools of thought that was developed within the context of Sūfī tradition, provided the most original explanations concerning the nature of religion, various religions and belief systems and their relationship with each other. This article aims to examine the main tenets of the Wahdat al-Wujūd school concerning the concept of religion as well as several basic issues related to this concept. Therefore, the definition of religion, the need for religion, the transcendent unity of religions, the reason for the plurality of religions and the concept of wahdat-i ma‘būd are among the topics that are discussed in this article. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) by deriving it from the Parmenidean axiom, ex nihilo nihil fit. Its central innovation is the Equivalence Thesis, which demonstrates that synchronic brute facts instantiate the same ontological arbitrariness as diachronic creation from nothing. I argue that this equivalence reveals brute facts as violations of the Parmenidean prohibition, establishing the PSR as a necessary consequence of this more fundamental principle rather than an independent axiom. The paper develops (...) this argument through detailed engagement with contemporary defenses of brute fundamentality and challenges from grounding theory. (shrink)

Standard histories of mathematics and of analytic philosophy contend that work on the foundations of mathematics was motivated by a crisis such as the discovery of paradoxes in set theory or the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. Recent scholarship, however, casts doubt on the standard histories, opening the way for consideration of an alternative motive for the study of the foundations of mathematics—unification. Work on foundations has shown that diverse mathematical practices could be integrated into a single framework of axiomatic (...) systems and that much of mathematics could be expressed in a single language. The new framework was the product of an interdisciplinary coalition whose ideas resemble those later adopted by the Vienna Circle and logical empiricists. (shrink)

The Origin of Consciousness Abstract The existence of human consciousness has received a great deal of attention within the scientific community. There are some who deny its existence altogether. There are those who believe it is nothing more than the result of physical properties within the brain. And there are some who contend it exists separate and apart from the brain. Many of these theories have been shaped by the desire of evolutionists to explain human consciousness via a purely materialistic/mechanistic (...) bent. In this paper, we provide a historical background to the conflict and examine the two broad categories—monism and dualism—that are used in an attempt to explain human consciousness. We also discuss many of their subcategories, to see how each fare in light of the available facts. Increasingly, experimental data document the fact that human consciousness is separate and distinct from the mere physical matter of the brain. This understanding indicates that there is, then, a non-material aspect of human beings that must be accounted for. (shrink)

This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's (...) views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps. (shrink)

Commentators have neglected a tension in Descartes’s virtue theory. In some texts, Descartes seems to argue that there are distinct virtues. In other texts, Descartes seems to argue that there is only a single virtue—the firm and constant resolution to use the will well. In this paper, I reconcile this tension. I argue that Descartes endorses a specific version of the unity of the virtues thesis, namely, the identity of the virtues. Nonetheless, Descartes has the resources to draw (...) conceptual distinctions between various virtues. Distinct virtues are conceptually generated when we regard the firm and constant resolution to use the will well in different ways, that is, based on the different ways this resolution manifests in moral situations. (shrink)

Wang Yangming’s doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” (zhi xing heyi 知行合一) can be traced back to Mencius’s theory of “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知). Similarly, Kant discussed the relationship of theory to practice on three different levels (morality, the law of the state, and international law) in his article, “On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice.” Kant proposed the unity of theory and (...) practice on the level of morality. So, this article uses Kant’s related concepts of theory and practice to interpret Wang’s doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” with the aim of clarifying some misinterpretations of it. Thereby, I argue that, although Wang Yangming put forward the doctrine of “the unity of knowing and acting” at a different time than his doctrines of “heart-mind is principle” (xin ji li 心即理) and “the extension of original knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知), these three doctrines are logically interconnected. (shrink)

We propose a consciousness-first framework to coherently explain the contextual diversity of local experiences and the global unity of the phenomenal field. Utilizing category theory, we model experience as a coherent structure arising from the integration of context-dependent content. We introduce a category of Raw states (representing pre-semantic relational data) and a category of Sem states (representing meaningful experiential content). A faithful translation between these domains is established via an integrator functor, which maps raw relational structures to stable (...) semantic categories. These local semantic states are organized into a diagram indexed by a category of contexts, capturing the relationships and overlaps between distinct perspectives. We demonstrate that phenomenal unity can be rigorously defined as the colimit of this semantic diagram. Furthermore, a universal construction glues local contents together along their shared relational constraints, yielding a unified global structure that preserves perspectival differentiation without collapsing into a flat, undifferentiated whole. Ontologically, this formalism results in the following: rather than assuming a pre-existing physical spacetime reality that generates experience, it is possible to model the objective world as the invariant semantic core emerging from the coherence relations between plural phenomenal worlds. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin’s place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, (...) the problem of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin’s time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the twentieth century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views, I will also show her work interacted with and influenced that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce. (shrink)

ABSTRACTZalabardo argues that the Tractatus makes an important contribution towards explaining how a representation doesn¹t merely introduce various objects, but furthermore represents them as comb...

This book argues that every genuine unification in physics—from special relativity (1905) to electroweak theory (1967)—began not with mathematical elegance, but with a *philosophical cut*: the courageous questioning of a then-“self-evident” ontological presupposition (absolute simultaneity, independent particles, symmetric vacuum, etc.). In contrast, the period from 1995 to 2025 has seen a systematic retreat from such ontological inquiry, replaced by a faith in mathematical consistency, landscape multiplicity, and effective-field-theoretic fitting. The result is a “unification impotence”: five major programs (string (...) class='Hi'>theory, LQG, AdS/CFT, asymptotic safety, multiverse) have produced no unique, testable prediction in three decades, despite unprecedented funding and talent. -/- Through a historical reconstruction of the four 20th-century unifications and a critical analysis of contemporary trends, the book diagnoses a collective *ontological silence* as the root cause. It then examines three emerging approaches—Orch-OR, configurational entropy thermodynamics, and Energy Quantum Theory (EQT)—that explicitly reintegrate philosophical grounding with falsifiable physics. The work concludes by proposing a methodological renewal: physics must return to its Einstein–Bohr–Weinberg tradition, where **philosophy is not decoration, but the art of asking the right ontological questions that lead to empirical consequences**. -/- Crucially, this is not an attack on mathematics, but on *mathematics without ontology*. The book advocates for a “phenomenon–mechanism–mathematics” trinity, where formalism serves explanatory depth, not just predictive curve-fitting. (shrink)

Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of (...) reason. (shrink)

The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The cooperation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial (...) for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or sympathetic to – the duality of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. That is inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the intrinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which anything but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory or the Valhalla. (shrink)

Realist theories of legislative intent can be divided between aggregative theories (on which legislative intent is what some proportion of legislators intend) and common intent theories (on which legislative intent is a unanimous intent among legislators). In this paper, we advance and defend an alternative realist conception of legislative intent: the Rational Unity Account. On this account, the legislature is an agent with a distinctive ‘rational point of view’—a concept we adopt from social ontology. The legislature’s rational point of (...) view is shaped by its procedures and structures, in ways not determined by either a common intention held by legislators or an aggregation of the intentions of legislators. We explain how our view improves on existing accounts. We then apply it to three cases to demonstrate its implications for legal interpretation. Importantly, on the proposed account, legislative intent can depart from what individual legislators think or know. (shrink)

In 1786 Georg Forster published a widely read critique of Immanuel Kant’s theory of race. Since then, the dispute between Forster and Kant on the unity of mankind has been widely discussed in light of both Forster’s essay and Kant’s decision to write a lengthy response to Forster in 1788. In this discussion I widen the frame for considering the two positions by focusing on Kant’s lectures on Physical Geography. In these notes Kant emerges as an ethnographer asking (...) many of the same questions posed by Forster himself, a man who had become famous since his time spent onboard James Cook’s second voyage to the South Pacific (1772-1775). Placing Kant’s ethnography in closer conversation with Forster reveals the many similarities (and some well-known differences) between the two. By including some of Forster’s other writings from the 1780s in an assessment of their debate, a much fuller picture can be had regarding natural historical investigations into the unity and difference of mankind at the time. (shrink)

Neuroscience investigates how neuronal processing circuits work, but it has problems explaining experiences this way. For example, it hasn’t explained how colour and shape circuits bind together in visual processing, nor why colours and other qualia are experienced so differently yet processed by circuits so similarly, nor how to get from processing circuits to pictorial images spread across inner space. Some theorists turn from these circuits to their electromagnetic fields to deal with such difficulties concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, (...) privacy, and causality. They include Kohler, Libet, Popper, Lindahl, Arhem, Charman, Pockett, John, McFadden, Fingelkurts, Maxwell, and Jones. They’re classifiable as computationalist, reductionist, dualist, realist, interactionist, epiphenomenalist, globalist, and localist. However, they’ve never been analysed together as a whole, which hinders evaluations of them. This article tries to rectify this. It concludes that while field theories face challenges, they aren’t easily dismissed, for they draw on considerable evidence and may avoid serious problems in neuroscience concerning the mind’s qualia, unity, causality, and ontology. (shrink)

Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.

This research looks at the various interpretations of "Mind" found in the Astika Darshanas, which cover the six main schools of Indian philosophy. At the same time, it looks into the profound East Asian Buddhist doctrine of One Mind as presented by Wonhyo, a great Korean Buddhist monk. This study seeks to identify the interesting similarities and differences that lie at the nexus of various philosophical domains by travelling through the complex landscape of different intellectual traditions. By using a comparative (...) approach, it aims to clarify the connections and distinguishing characteristics that form the conception of 'Mind' in both Korean Buddhist philosophy and the six schools of Indian philosophy, thereby advancing our understanding of the various philosophical currents that have influenced the intellectual fabric of these traditions. Focusing on the transmission and assimilation of Indian philosophical ideas into Buddhist philosophies, the research explores how these concepts were adapted and evolved as Buddhism spread across East Asian cultures. This research seeks to bridge these dissimilar contexts in order to reveal the interconnections of Indian and Korean philosophical traditions, contributing to a better understanding of the universal threads that connect these landscapes and highlighting the enduring resonance of fundamental concepts in the pursuit of enlightenment. (shrink)

Comprehensive Glossary of 70+ Key Concepts (Simplified for Readers).

This article compares the accounts of psychical unity in Freud and Lonergan. Following a detailed account of Freud’s understanding of psychical structure andhis deterministic psycho-biological presuppositions, Lonergan’s understanding of psychical structure in relation to patterns of experience is discussed. As opposed to Freud’s theory, which is based on an imaginative synthesis of the classical laws of natural science, Lonergan considers psychical and organic function as concretely integrated in human functionality according to probabilistic schemes of recurrence. Consequently, Lonergan offers (...) a theory of the psychological problems of repression and inhibition not primarily as functions of subverted organic desires, but more properly according to the functioning of intellectual bias. Lonergan thereby provides a more comprehensive understanding of the unity of the human self at the psychical level. (shrink)

The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as (...) it is founded in erroneous intensional misreadings of the logical positivists’—especially Carnap’s—extensional notions of translation and meaning, as well as misinterpretations of the positivists’ shift from the strong thesis of translation-physicalism to the weaker and more liberal notion of reduction-physicalism that occurred in the Unity of Science programme. After setting the historical record straight, the essay traces the first truly modern identity theory to Schlick’s pre-positivist views circa 1920 and goes on to explore its further development in Feigl, arguing that the fundamental difference between the Schlick-Feigl identity theory and the more familiar and influential Place-Smart-Armstrong identity theory has resurfaced in the deep and seemingly unbridgeable gulf in contemporary philosophy of consciousness between inflationary mentalism and deflationary physicalism. (shrink)

According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of (...) experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world. (shrink)