The purpose of this paper is to defend what I call the action-oriented coding theory (ACT) of spatially contentful visual experience. Integral to ACT is the view that conscious visual experience and visually guided action make use of a common subject-relative or 'egocentric' frame of reference. Proponents of the influential two visual systems hypothesis (TVSH), however, have maintained on empirical grounds that this view is false (Milner & Goodale, 1995/2006; Clark, 1999; 2001; Campbell, 2002; Jacob & Jeannerod, (...) 2003; Goodale & Milner, 2004). One main source of evidence for TVSH comes from behavioral studies of the comparative effects of size-contrast illusions on visual awareness and visuo- motor action. This paper shows that not only is the evidence from illusion studies inconclusive, there is a better, ACT-friendly interpretation of the evidence that avoids serious theoretical difficulties faced by TVSH. (shrink)

Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems is a state-of-the-art collection whose main goal is to explore, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the relationship between action and perception. A second goal of the volume is to investigate how perception and action interact specifically in the production of phenomenal awareness. In presenting and contrasting the major perspectives on the field, this volume marks a good sign of the progress being made on the nature of phenomenally conscious visual (...) experience. By combining theoretical and empirical approaches it also contributes to the debate in key domains of the cognitive sciences .The book contains a useful editorial introduction written by the Editors and six sections further divided into fifteen chapters. In the first part of this review I briefly summarize the content of each section. Having offered an outline of the volume, I then turn my attention to the main theme of the collection, which is the dichotomy between action-oriented theories of perception and the two visual systems hypothesis and look at the dialectic underlying this debate. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been incorporated into financial data analysis at a rapid pace, resulting in the creation of extremely complex models that can process large volumes of data and make important choices like credit scoring, fraud detection, and stock price projections. But these models' complexity—particularly deep learning and ensemble methods—often leads to a lack of transparency, which makes it challenging for stakeholders to comprehend the decision-making process. This opacity has the potential to erode public confidence in AI systems, especially (...) in the financial industry where choices can have big financial repercussions. With an emphasis on financial data analysis, this study explores different approaches to visualizing the decision-making processes of complicated artificial intelligence systems. We investigate various methods of interpretability such as heatmaps, decision trees, SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP), Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME), and feature importance metrics. These techniques give financial professionals a greater understanding of and confidence in AI-driven judgments by providing means to improve the transparency and comprehensibility of AI systems. The trade-offs between interpretability and model accuracy, the difficulties with bias and fairness in financial AI, and the significance of maintaining security and privacy in visualization techniques are also covered in the study. Finally, we suggest a paradigm for strengthening the trustworthiness of AI in finance, balancing the requirement for accurate forecasts with openness and ethical considerations. (shrink)

Common sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a review (...) of current visual neuroscience indicates that the visual brain areas producing conscious representations are distinct from those driving motor action. (shrink)

I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...) argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally. (shrink)

This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives (...) to this view. (shrink)

This research paper investigates the transformative applications of data visualization techniques in the realm of financial crime detection, with a specific emphasis on addressing the challenges posed by credit card fraud and money laundering. The abstract explores the intricate landscape of visualizing financial data to uncover patterns, anomalies, and potential illicit activities. Through a comprehensive review of existing methodologies and case studies, the paper illuminates the pivotal role data visualization plays in enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of fraud detection systems. (...) By synergizing advanced visualization tools with machine learning algorithms, the study aims to provide insights into how financial institutions can bolster their defenses against evolving threats. Ethical considerations, usability, and the real-world impact of data visualization in combating financial crime are also scrutinized. This research contributes to the evolving discourse on leveraging visualization technologies to fortify financial systems against illicit activities, fostering a proactive and responsive approach to safeguarding economic ecosystems. (shrink)

Evidence from cognitive science supports the claim that humans and other animals see the world as divided into objects. Although this claim is widely accepted, it remains unclear whether the mechanisms of visual reference have representational content or are directly instantiated in the functional architecture. I put forward a version of the former approach that construes object files as icons for objects. This view is consistent with the evidence that motivates the architectural account, can respond to the key arguments (...) against representational accounts, and has explanatory advantages. I draw general lessons for the philosophy of perception and the naturalization of intentionality. (shrink)

This article argues that language must be distinguished from the symbol systems through which it is represented, revealing that auditory and visual systems produce fundamentally distinct cognitive organizations of meaning. Auditory languages are structured by the temporal flow of sound, whereas visual symbol systems—functioning as independent mechanisms rather than extensions of speech—emerge from the spatial configuration of the trace. This framework clarifies why contemporary AI systems, grounded in an auditory-sequential architecture, perform a structural flattening of visual-semantic languages.

Notions of objecthood have traditionally been cast in visuocentric terminology. As a result, theories of auditory and cross-modal perception have focused more on the differences between modalities than on the similarities. In this paper we re-examine the concept of an object in a way that overcomes the limitations of the traditional perspective. We propose a new, cross-modal conception of objecthood which focuses on the similarities between modalities instead of the differences. Further, we propose that the auditory system might consist (...) of two parallel streams of processing (the `what' and `where' subsystems) in a manner analogous to current conceptions of the visual system. We suggest that the `what' subsystems in each modality are concerned with objecthood. Finally, we present evidence for—and elaborate on—the hypothesis that the auditory `where' subsystem is in the service of the visual-motor `where' subsystem. (shrink)

Visual thinking is a systematic way to produce knowledge in design by means of mental imagery, spatial reasoning, and the use of an array of visual representations. Pictorial representations such as sketches are crucial for the activity of designing at the early stage of the creative process. Designers see more information in sketches than was actually drawn. The ability to see more information than is sketched out can be seen as an enhanced visual capacity of human agency. (...) Enhanced agency is the prosthetic incorporation of artifacts to improve the original agentive capacities. The incorporation of artifacts to draw raises some fundamental questions: Is the pencil an extension of the mind? Can we think with our hands? What agentive capacities are increased with the use of the pencil? What is the representational status of sketching? The chapter is structured around these key questions to suggest some answers inspired by the work of Göran Sonesson. Using the notion of enhanced agency and the layered model of agency, I explore the way in which the pencil improves the visual thinking of design. In doing so I found that it is important to maintain the principle of asymmetry in cognitive systems to reconsider relational ontology in favor of ecological relationships. (shrink)

According to the traditional view, visual objects can be characterized as bundles of features and locations. This initially plausible idea is contested within the contemporary psychology and philosophy of perception, where it is claimed that the visual system can represent objects as merely ‘this’ or ‘that’, in abstraction from their qualities. In this paper, I consider whether philosophical and psychological arguments connected with the rejection of the ‘bundle’ view of visual objects show that it is needed (...) to postulate an additional, purely individualizing characteristic, known in the philosophical tradition as ‘thisness’, within the structure of visual objects. I argue that the phenomenon of asymmetry of errors observed in Multiple Object Tracking experiments strongly suggests that reference to ‘thisness’ is needed if we are to formulate a proper diachronic identity criterion of visual objects. (shrink)

The task of visual search is to determine as rapidly as possible whether a target item is present or absent in a display. Rapidly detected items are thought to contain features that correspond to primitive elements in the human visual system. In previous theories, it has been assumed that visual search is based on simple two-dimensional features in the image. However, visual search also has access to another level of representation, one that describes properties in (...) the corresponding three-dimensional scene. Among these properties are three dimensionality and the direction of lighting, but not viewing direction. These findings imply that the parallel processes of early vision are much more sophisticated than previously assumed. (shrink)

In this paper, I characterize visual epistemic representations as concrete two- or three-dimensional tools for conveying information about aspects of their target systems or phenomena of interest. I outline two features of successful visual epistemic representation: that the vehicle of representation contain sufficiently accurate information about the phenomenon of interest for the user’s purpose, and that it convey this information to the user in a manner that makes it readily available to her. I argue that actual epistemic representation (...) may involve tradeoffs between these and is successful to the extent that they are present. (shrink)

Objectification involves treating someone as a thing. The role of images in perpetuating objectification has been discussed by feminist philosophers. However, the precise effect that images have on an individual's visual system is seldom explored. Kathleen Stock’s work is an exception—she describes certain images of women as causing viewers to develop an objectifying ‘gestalt’ which is then projected onto real-life women. However, she doesn’t specify the level of visual processing at which objectification occurs. In this paper, I (...) propose that images can affect a viewer's early visual system. I will argue that if a viewer is exposed to a lot of images that depict women as sexual objects, this will bias their early visual selection mechanisms in a way that can result in an objectifying way of seeing. This is an important contribution to work on objectification as it incorporates empirical studies on vision and findings from philosophy of mind. It also examines some of the epistemic and moral consequences of objectification occurring at this early visual stage. (shrink)

The dual stream model of the human and non-human primate visual systems remains Leslie Ungerleider's (1946-2020) most indelible contribution to visual neuroscience. In this model, a dorsal "where" stream specialized for visuospatial representation extends through occipitoparietal cortex, whereas a ventral "what" stream specialized for representing object qualities extends through occipitotemporal cortex. Over time, this model underwent a number of revisions and expansions. In one of her last scientific contributions, Leslie proposed a third visual stream specialized for representing (...) dynamic signals related to social perception. This alteration invites the question: What is a visual stream, and how are different visual streams individuated? In this article, we first consider and reject a simple answer to this question based on a common idealizing visualization of the model, which conflicts with the complexities of the visual system that the model was intended to capture. Next, we propose a taxonomic answer that takes inspiration from the philosophy of science and Leslie's body of work, which distinguishes between neural mechanisms, pathways, and streams. In this taxonomy, visual streams are superordinate to pathways and mechanisms and provide individuation conditions for determining whether collections of cortical connections delineate different visual streams. Given this characterization, we suggest that the proposed third visual stream does not yet meet these conditions, although the tripartite model still suggests important revisions to how we think about the organization of the human and non-human primate visual systems. (shrink)

This paper explores the extent to which a scientific framework for visualization might be possible. It presents several potential parts of a framework, illustrated by application to the visualization of correlation in scatterplots. The first is an extended-vision thesis, which posits that a viewer and visualization system can be usefully considered as a single system that perceives structure in a dataset, much like "basic" vision perceives structure in the world. This characterization is then used to suggest approaches to (...) evaluation that take advantage of techniques used in vision science. Next, an optimal-reduction thesis is presented, which posits that an optimal visualization enables the given task to be reduced to the most suitable operations in the extended system. A systematic comparison of alternative designs is then proposed, guided by what is known about perceptual mechanisms. It is shown that these elements can be extended in various ways—some even overlapping with parts of vision science. As such, a science of some kind appears possible for at least some parts of visualization. It would remain distinct from design practice, but could nevertheless assist with the design of visualizations that better engage human perception and cognition. (shrink)

This work investigates the ability of the human visual system to discriminate self-similar Gaussian random textures. The power spectra of such textures are similar to themselves when rescaled by some factor h > 1. As such, these textures provide a natural domain for testing the hypothesis that texture perception is based on a set of spatial-frequency channels characterized by filters of similar shape.

The question of whether cognition can influence perception has a long history in neuroscience and philosophy. Here, we outline a novel approach to this issue, arguing that it should be viewed within the framework of top-down information-processing. This approach leads to a reversal of the standard explanatory order of the cognitive penetration debate: we suggest studying top-down processing at various levels without preconceptions of perception or cognition. Once a clear picture has emerged about which processes have influences on those at (...) lower levels, we can re-address the extent to which they should be considered perceptual or cognitive. Using top-down processing within the visual system as a model for higher-level influences, we argue that the current evidence indicates clear constraints on top-down influences at all stages of information processing; it does, however, not support the notion of a boundary between specific types of information-processing as proposed by the cognitive impenetrability hypothesis. (shrink)

This article delves into the intricacies of casta paintings, particularly focusing on the anonymous eighteenth-century work, Las Castas, produced in Mexico. Las Castas serves as a testimony to the complexities of colonial racialized subjectivity. More precisely, Las Castas presents us with a depiction of mestizaje as a rigid system of social stratification, with black individuals occupying a predetermined and inescapable role. The article introduces the irreversibility thesis, challenging prevailing notions of the race mixing process (mestizaje) in colonial Latin America, (...) and asserting that being of black descent, contrary to being of indigenous and Spaniard descent (mestizo), was considered an irreversible stain determining one’s social position within the mestizaje process. This article explores the genre of casta paintings as a colonial artifact and highlights the complexities inherent in colonial subjectivity through a taxonomic visual epistemology lens. (shrink)

Computational systems biologists create and manipulate computational models of biological systems, but they do not always have straightforward epistemic access to the content and behavioural profile of such models because of their length, coding idiosyncrasies, and formal complexity. This creates difficulties both for modellers in their research groups and for their bioscience collaborators who rely on these models. In this paper we introduce a new kind of visualization that was developed to address just this sort of epistemic opacity. The visualization (...) is unusual in that it depicts the dynamics and structure of a computer model instead of that model’s target system, and because it is generated algorithmically. Using considerations from epistemology and aesthetics, we explore how this new kind of visualization increases scientific understanding of the content and function of computer models in systems biology to reduce epistemic opacity. (shrink)

This article proposes to look at artwork as visual externalisation of monads, thus establishing a profound link between the metaphysical and aesthetic dimensions of Leibniz’s philosophy. By framing the paintings of Henrikas Čerapas as an extension of Leibnizian metaphysics, the article explores the functioning of artwork not merely as representation but as integral component of nature. Čerapas’s paintings disclose an underlying system of internal relations that structure the body of work, thereby challenging the conventional view of the artist (...) as a creator ex nihilo. Rather than inventing from nothing, the artist uncovers and makes visible the latent structures of a monadic reality—each painting presents a distinct perspective on the harmony, order, and expressive intensity that lie at the heart of Leibniz’s metaphysical vision. This reinforces the idea of ontological aesthetics and provides an innovative framework for engaging with visual art through key Leibnizian concepts, such as expression, perception, and unity in variety. This perspective underscores that aesthetic inquiry is not separate from Leibniz’s broader philosophical system but is embedded within his understanding of reality. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional representationalist paradigm in the philosophy of visual arts and establishes "Point-Luminism" as a distinct ontological framework. Diverging from 19th-century Neo-Impressionism, Point-Luminism is grounded in the ontological premise that the world is fundamentally a colorless "field of potentiality," and visual reality is actively constructed by consciousness rather than passively received. Through the utilization of the "electric dotspen," the artist deconstructs images into discrete "Luminous Quanta"—physically protruding, three-dimensional color points. This system models the physical (...) state of light prior to perception. We argue that the act of gazing functions structurally analogously to quantum measurement, collapsing the potentiality of the Luminous Quanta into a coherent "Perceptual Imago," thereby establishing the observer's central role as the legislator of the phenomenal world. (shrink)

Scholars have observed that AI image generators often produce racist and sexist results. In fact, AI systems have been shown not only to reproduce common racial stereotypes but sometimes to amplify biases present in the real world. Overall, images created by AI often include biased and stereotypical traits related to gender, skin color, occupations, nationalities, and more. However, scholars have yet to examine how AI imaging technologies and the stereotypes they rely on connect to their militaristic roots. From their beginnings (...) in the US Pentagon’s Cold War efforts against Communism, AI technologies have been consistently linked to America’s pursuit of mastering the dark military art of counter-insurgency. This article will explore the ongoing role of AI by demonstrating how AI image generation tools produce images that reinforce the principles of Western strategic thinking, especially the dominant doctrine of modern irregular warfare: counter-insurgency. Using a sample of 20 images, we will show that AI image generators enhance tropes related to targeting Black male militants in the US and depict sexual stereotypes that assume the benevolence and superiority of Western society—particularly the US—in promoting gender equality among non-Western and formerly colonized populations, while also portraying the protection or liberation of Black and Brown women from the threat of their ‘barbaric’ male counterparts. (shrink)

In the visual representation of ontologies, in particular of part-whole relationships, it is customary to use graph theory as the representational background. We claim here that the standard graph-based approach has a number of limitations, and we propose instead a new representation of part-whole structures for ontologies, and describe the results of experiments designed to show the effectiveness of this new proposal especially as concerns reduction of visual complexity. The proposal is developed to serve visualization of ontologies conformant (...) to the Basic Formal Ontology. But it can be used also for more general applications, particularly in the biomedical domain. (shrink)

Visual analytics (VA) combines the strengths of human and machine intelligence to enable the discovery of interesting patterns in challenging datasets. Historically, most attention has been given to developing the machine component—for example, machine learning or the human-computer interface. However, it is also essential to develop the abilities of the analysts themselves, especially at the beginning of their careers. -/- For the past several years, we at the University of British Columbia (UBC)—with the support of The Boeing Company—have experimented (...) with various ways of preparing undergraduate students for VA. Although inspired by the need to prepare students to become visual analysts, the result turned out to be fairly general in scope, applicable to other analytical approaches, as well as more general research. In hindsight, this makes considerable sense. Although the visual component of VA is necessary, it is insufficient; many analytical activities at the human end involve nonvisual skills, such as effective decision-making and the ability to quickly focus on the relevant parts of a problem. -/- The result of this experimentation is a third-year undergraduate course titled Cognitive Systems 303 (COGS 303) that focuses on “VA unplugged”—that is, on developing investigative abilities prior to training on the VA systems themselves. It was felt that if students focused on developing basic analytical habits of thought prior to learning VA systems, these habits would be reinforced by subsequent practice on “live” systems. (shrink)

Vision often dominates other perceptual modalities both at the level of experience and at the level of judgment. In the well-known McGurk effect, for example, one’s auditory experience is consistent with the visual stimuli but not the auditory stimuli, and naïve subjects’ judgments follow their experience. Structurally similar effects occur for other modalities (e.g. rubber hand illusions). Given the robustness of this visual dominance, one might not be surprised that visual imagery often dominates imagery in other modalities. (...) One might be surprised, however, that visual imagery often dominates perception in other modalities. This more controversial claim is motivated both by empirical data and by introspection. Some think of perception-perception visual dominance as epistemically good, holding that cases in which visual dominance misleads us (e.g. McGurk and rubber hand illusions) are cases in which the perceptual system resolves conflicts according to principles that are generally reliable. Here, we explore support for the more controversial claim that imagery-perception visual dominance is epistemically good. We suggest that, when the task is richly spatial, requiring for optimal performance the all-at-once identification of macro-spatial and allocentric properties (e.g. identifying the shape or location of a felt or heard object), the visual, whether perception or imagination, should dominate other modalities. Put another way, when identifying objects, one should go and look or, short of that, visually imagine candidate objects, and then follow the visual, even against conflicting perceptions from other modalities. For this broadly-typed category of of cognitive-perceptual task, vision does dominate and it should. (shrink)

The human eyes and brain, which have finite boundaries, create a ‘‘virtual’’ space within our central nervous system that interprets and perceives a space that appears boundless and infinite. Using insights from studies on the visual system, we propose a novel fast processing mechanism involving the eyes, visual pathways, and cortex where external vision is imperceptibly processed in our brain in real time creating an internal representation of external space that appears as an external view. We (...) introduce the existence of a three-dimension default space consisting of intrapersonal body space that serves as the framework where visual and non-visual sensory information is sensed and experienced. We propose that the thalamus integrates processed information from corticothalamic feedback loops and fills-in the neural component of 3D default space with an internal visual representation of external space, leading to the experience of visual consciousness. This visual space inherently evades perception so we have introduced three easy clinical tests that can assist in experiencing this visual space. We also review visual neuroanatomical pathways, binocular vision, neurological disorders, and visual phenomenon to elucidate how the representation of external visible space is recreated within the mind. (shrink)

Self-recognition is an intimate act performed by people. Inspired by Paul Ricoeur, we reflect upon the action of self-recognition, especially when data visualization represents the observer itself. Along the article, the reader is invited to think about this specific relationship through concepts like the personal identity stored in information systems, the truthfulness at the core of self-recognition, and the mutual-recognition among community members. In the context of highly interdisciplinary research, we unveil two protagonists in data visualization: the designer and the (...) observer - the designer as the creator and the observer as the viewer of a visualization. This article deals with some theoretical aspects behind data visualization, a discipline more complex than normally expected. We believe that data visualization deserves a conceptual framework, and this investigation pursues this intention. For this reason, we look at the designer as not just a technician in the visualization production, but as a contemporary ethnologist - the designer as a professional working in a social environment to comprehend the context and formulate a specific inquiry with the help of appropriate visual languages. (shrink)

This paper challenges the traditional representationalist paradigm in the philosophy of visual arts and establishes "Point-Luminism" as a distinct ontological framework. Diverging from 19th-century Neo-Impressionism, Point-Luminism is grounded in the ontological premise that the world is fundamentally a colorless "field of potentiality," and visual reality is actively constructed by consciousness rather than passively received. Through the utilization of the "electric dotspen," the artist deconstructs images into discrete "Luminous Quanta"—physically protruding, three-dimensional color points. This system models the physical (...) state of light prior to perception. We argue that the act of gazing functions structurally analogously to quantum measurement, collapsing the potentiality of the Luminous Quanta into a coherent "Perceptual Imago," thereby establishing the observer's central role as the legislator of the phenomenal world. (shrink)

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping (...) action pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential. (shrink)

This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems ("scaling down") and some supra-individual cognitive systems ("scaling up"). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and (...) down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued recently that relatively abstract beliefs or cognitive categories like those regarding race can influence the perceptual experience of relatively low-level visual features like color or lightness. Some of the proposed best empirical evidence for this claim comes from a series of experiments in which White faces were consistently judged as lighter than equiluminant Black faces, even for racially ambiguous faces that were labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ (Levin and Banaji 2006). The latter (...) result is considered especially indicative of cognitive penetration, based on the reasoning that the relevant distortions were a function of lexical labeling, and hence the effect must have been mediated by categorization at the cognitive level. I argue that this reasoning is flawed, and that the assumptions on which it relies are questionable on both empirical and theoretical grounds. I propose an alternative, low-level explanation of the phenomena, which I argue is empirically more plausible and abductively preferable to the cognitive-penetration account. The upshot is that cognitively impenetrable perceptual systems may be psychologically more plastic and hence philosophically more significant than is nowadays commonly assumed. (shrink)

Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition (...) are part of a continuum and that both are highly interactive. The tenets of this view are explained by reviewing some of the core assumptions of the situated and distribute approach to cognition and then further elaborated by exploring the notions of active vision, visual complexity, affordance landscape and cue structure. The way visual cues are structured and the way interaction is designed can make an important difference in the ease and effectiveness of cognition and metacognition. Documents that make effective use of markers such as headings, callouts, italics can improve students’ ability to comprehend documents and ‘plan’ the way they review and process content. Interaction can be designed to improve ‘the proximal zone of planning’ – the look ahead and apprehension of what is nearby in activity space that facilitates decisions. This final concept is elaborated in a discussion of how e-newspapers combine effective visual and interactive design to enhance user control over their reading experience. (shrink)

Phosphenes, the perception of light without external visual input, represent a rich intersection of neuroscience, subjective experience, and contemplative practice. While Heinrich Klüver's 1928 classification of four geometric "form constants" (lattices, cobwebs, tunnels, spirals) laid foundational groundwork for understanding these phenomena, it offers a limited scope for the diversity of forms reported across various induction methods. This article proposes an updated and expanded classification system for phosphene forms, integrating extensive subjective reports from transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) studies, (...) detailed introspective data from practitioners of the Yoga of Inner Light (meditation), and insights from the Closed-Eye Visuals (CEVs) model in psychonautic literature. We present a new, graded framework that maps phosphene development across five levels of increasing complexity and intensity, ranging from ephemeral flickers and simple geometries to radial mandalas, archetypal imagery, and full-field immersive light realms. This synthesis not only refines our descriptive tools but also establishes a continuum of inner visual phenomena that bridges empirical neurostimulation data with contemplative phenomenology. By providing a structured and nuanced understanding of these inner lights, this classification system offers new pathways for consciousness research, contemplative science, and the integration of visionary experiences into healing and personal growth. It highlights phosphenes as dynamic, meaningful doorways to subtle perception, inviting a deeper inquiry into the nature of inner vision itself. (shrink)

Perception is a first-person internal sensation induced within the nervous system at the time of arrival of sensory stimuli from objects in the environment. Lack of access to the first-person properties has limited viewing perception as an emergent property and it is currently being studied using third-person observed findings from various levels. One feasible approach to understand its mechanism is to build a hypothesis for the specific conditions and required circuit features of the nodal points where the mechanistic operation (...) of perception take place for one type of sensation in one species and to verify it for the presence of comparable circuit properties for perceiving a different sensation in a different species. The present work explains visual perception in mammalian nervous system from a first-person frame of reference and provides explanations for the homogeneity of perception of visual stimuli above flicker fusion frequency, the perception of objects at locations different from their actual position, the smooth pursuit and saccadic eye movements, the perception of object borders, and perception of pressure phosphenes. Using results from temporal resolution studies and the known details of visual cortical circuitry, explanations are provided for (a) the perception of rapidly changing visual stimuli, (b) how the perception of objects occurs in the correct orientation even though, according to the third-person view, activity from the visual stimulus reaches the cortices in an inverted manner and (c) the functional significance of well-conserved columnar organization of the visual cortex. A comparable circuitry detected in a different nervous system in a remote species-the olfactory circuitry of the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster-provides an opportunity to explore circuit functions using genetic manipulations, which, along with high-resolution microscopic techniques and lipid membrane interaction studies, will be able to verify the structure-function details of the presented mechanism of perception. (shrink)

Perceptual content is conceptual. In this paper, some arguments against this thesis are examined and rebutted. The Richness argument, that we could not have concepts for all the colours, is queried: Doesn't the Munsell system give us such concepts? The argument that we can perceive colours and shapes without possessing the relevant concepts is rebutted: we cannot do this, but the kind of concept-possession that is relevant here is not intellectual but perceptual.

One of the more compelling beliefs about vision is that it is based on representations that are coherent and complete, with everything in the visual field described in great detail. However, changes made during a visual disturbance are found to be difficult to see, arguing against the idea that our brains contain a detailed, picture-like representation of the scene. Instead, it is argued here that a more dynamic, "just-in-time" representation is involved, one with deep similarities to the way (...) that users interact with external displays. It is further argued that these similarities can provide a basis for the design of intelligent display systems that can interact with humans in highly effective and novel ways. (shrink)

Evolution and geometry generate complexity in similar ways. Evolution drives natural selection while geometry may capture the logic of this selection and express it visually, in terms of specific generic properties representing some kind of advantage. Geometry is ideally suited for expressing the logic of evolutionary selection for symmetry, which is found in the shape curves of vein systems and other natural objects such as leaves, cell membranes, or tunnel systems built by ants. The topology and geometry of symmetry is (...) controlled by numerical parameters, which act in analogy with a biological organism’s DNA. The introductory part of this paper reviews findings from experiments illustrating the critical role of two-dimensional (2D) design parameters, affine geometry and shape symmetry for visual or tactile shape sensation and perception-based decision making in populations of experts and non-experts. It will be shown that 2D fractal symmetry, referred to herein as the “symmetry of things in a thing”, results from principles very similar to those of affine projection. Results from experiments on aesthetic and visual preference judgments in response to 2D fractal trees with varying degrees of asymmetry are presented. In a first experiment (psychophysical scaling procedure), non-expert observers had to rate (on a scale from 0 to 10) the perceived beauty of a random series of 2D fractal trees with varying degrees of fractal symmetry. In a second experiment (two-alternative forced choice procedure), they had to express their preference for one of two shapes from the series. The shape pairs were presented successively in random order. Results show that the smallest possible fractal deviation from “symmetry of things in a thing” significantly reduces the perceived attractiveness of such shapes. The potential of future studies where different levels of complexity of fractal patterns are weighed against different degrees of symmetry is pointed out in the conclusion. (shrink)

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and (...) assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis. I argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency. (shrink)

This article examines the evolution of the concept of existence in modern visual representation and reasoning, highlighting important milestones. In the late eighteenth century, during the so-called golden age of visual reasoning, nominalism reigned supreme and there was limited scope for existential import or individuals in logic diagrams. By the late nineteenth century, a form of realism had taken hold, whose existential commitments continue to dominate many areas in logic and visual reasoning to this day. Physical, metaphysical, (...) epistemological, and linguistic positions underlie both nominalist and realist views. Since the paradigmatic works on visual reasoning in the 1990s, formal diagram systems have been developed that revive either the nominalist or realist perspectives. Unlike in the nineteenth century, these are not motivated by philosophical views. Nevertheless, they may still have an impact on many areas of philosophy and science outside logic. (shrink)

In our previous discussions, we focused primarily on visual intuition, which is, of course, a form of sensuous intuition. In this section, we will turn to non-visual forms of sensuous intuition. In phenomenology, “intuition” (Anschauung) should not be understood as a merely visual activity. The core of intuition does not lie in which sensory organ is employed, but rather in the manner in which an object is given to consciousness in its own way. Wherever an object can (...) present itself to consciousness with a certain originary givenness (originäre Gegebenheit), this presentation may be called intuition. Accordingly, experiences constituted through vision, hearing, touch, smell, and bodily movement all belong to different forms of sensuous intuition. Different sensory organs do not merely provide different channels of information; rather, they correspond to different modes of givenness of the object and thus participate, at the level of meaning-structure, in the constitution of the object. Therefore, through the participation of various sensory organs, we are not only able to obtain the content-meaning of an object, but also to acquire many other sensuous meanings. However, we must recognize that positing (Setzung) itself depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Consequently, all meaning-constitution depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Different transcendental egos, by virtue of having different cognitive systems, obtain different object-meanings. Moreover, Husserl does not restrict intuition to the sensuous level. In his phenomenology, there also exist non-sensory forms of intuition, most notably eidetic intuition (Wesensanschauung). Eidetic intuition is not realized through sensory organs but rather through the imaginative activity of free variation, by which the invariant structures of objects are grasped. Thus, the phenomenological call to “return to intuition” does not amount to a return to sensory empiricism, but rather to a return to the domain in which all meanings can receive originary givenness. In this section, however, we confine ourselves to a discussion of sensuous intuition. -/- . (shrink)

We continue our discussion of positing meanings (Legitimation). In the preceding sections, we mentioned that objects possess various kinds of meanings. Among these, the most extensive system of meanings consists of all the super-existential meanings of an object. Naturally, what we discussed earlier was primarily the content meanings of an object, and content meanings are themselves a subset of super-existential meanings. In the next few sections, we will examine another relatively common kind of super-existential meaning aside from content meaning. (...) I call this sensory meaning, a meaning obtained through the operation of the sensory organs upon an object. What we posit here is precisely the sensory meaning of an object. We see an object through the intuitive operation of the eyes; we touch an object through the hands; we hear sounds through the ears; we smell odors through the nose; we taste flavors through the mouth. The sensory impact of an object thus arises through the eye, nose, mouth, ears, and hands. Through the operation of the senses, we are able to discover more properties of an object, and in this way we may gain a deeper understanding of it. In this section we focus mainly on the contribution of visual intuition to our apprehension of an object. We observe that the intuitive operation of the eyes not only provides us with content meanings, but also yields other sensory meanings—namely, the sensory meanings derived from intuition. (shrink)

Sacred and mystical visions across contemplative, religious and psychedelic traditions follow a remarkably consistent inner progression: from simple points of light and geometric forms to complex kaleidoscopic structures, culminating in radiant, formless luminosity. This paper proposes a unified neurophenomenological model showing that this universal sequence is not culturally constructed but arises from intrinsic visual dynamics of the human nervous system. We present a six-phase taxonomy of phosphenes as the innate visual grammar underlying mystical experience. As endogenous (...) class='Hi'>visual patterns intensify (Phases 3–6), salience, interoceptive and autonomic systems co-activate, producing the emotion of awe, while Default Mode Network attenuation reduces conceptual control, allowing the luminous field to become experientially dominant. Archetypal figures and sacred agencies emerge as interpretations of luminous structure via innate social-cognitive operators, not as externally imposed metaphysical entities. On this basis, we introduce a novel 21st-century functional definition of God: ‘God is the lawful, awe-evoking configuration of consciousness in which endogenous inner-light dynamics and large-scale network reorganization render the luminous ground of awareness experientially present.’ Rather than a separate being, the divine appears as a self-revealing event of luminous awareness, a neurophenomenological mode of mind in which perception, meaning and emotion converge. This framework generates testable predictions (e.g. geometry precedes symbol, awe covaries with autonomic markers) and offers a biologically grounded yet non-reductive account of why luminous visions and feelings of transcendence appear universally across human history. (shrink)

How do individuals guide their activities towards some goal? Harry Frankfurt once identified the task of explaining guidance as the central problem in action theory. An explanation has proved to be elusive, however. In this paper, I show how we can marshal empirical research to make explanatory progress. I contend that human agents have a primitive capacity to guide visual attention, and that this capacity is actually constituted by a sub-individual psychological control-system: the executive system. I thus (...) illustrate how we can explain exercises of individual-level guidance by appeal to its sub-individual constitution. This opens up a new avenue for explicating agency. (shrink)

Using cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning and Bluetooth connectivity, this paper introduces a state-of-the-art assistive device made especially for blind and visually impaired people. The primary objective of the device is to enhance user mobility, safety and independence in navigating public spaces. Key features include Al-powered real-time navigation, camera-based text recognition and audio feedback, as well as emergency SOS functionality to address critical situations. The Al system processes environmental data through integrated sensors and cameras, providing auditory (...) feedback and voice-assisted navigation to guide users effectively. Bluetooth connectivity enables seamless integration with smartphones and other compatible devices, enhancing accessibility in smart environments. The device’s capacity to instantaneously recognize and vocalize text from signs, labels and papers promises to empower users in daily activities. Security and privacy are prioritized through encrypted data transmission and customized settings. The benefits of this method are compared to those of current technologies based on attributes like ease of use, real-time responsiveness, and user independence. The latest developments in wearable assistive technology are highlighted in a thorough literature review, with an emphasis on user-centered design and useful AI applications for people with visual impairments. The findings suggest that the proposed device could significantly improve the quality of life for blind and visually impaired individuals by offering an intuitive and reliable tool for independent navigation and information access. (shrink)

The Wheel of Becoming — Vol. 2 Stream Entrance: From Viññāṇa to Vedanā (Present-Effect Literacy in the Mogok Method) -/- Product description Volume 2 is your hands-on guide to reading the present-effect stream in Mogok Sayadaw’s visual system of Paṭicca-samuppāda. Building directly on the Cycle Diagram, this volume trains you to recognize how Link ③ Viññāṇa (consciousness) opens the stream and carries through ④ Nāma-rūpa → ⑤ Saḷāyatana → ⑥ Phassa → ⑦ Vedanā—the everyday flow you meet at (...) the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Clear plates, classroom-ready drills, and short real-life labs turn canonical paccayā lines into practical seeing, moment by moment. -/- Grounded in the Early Buddhist Texts cited throughout (e.g., “saṅkhārā-paccayā viññāṇaṃ; viññāṇa-paccayā nāma-rūpaṃ”; SN 12.1–2), the book keeps Mogok Sayadaw’s distinctive pedagogy front and center: a visual wheel, labeled connections, and simple arrow grammar that you can point-name-move around—until the pattern becomes second nature. By the end, you’ll be ready for Volume 3’s pivotal hand-off at C2 (Vedanā → Taṇhā). -/- What’s inside -/- Plates & Legends: Clean A4 diagrams with labels outside the rim; one overlay per plate for zero-clutter learning. -/- Stream Literacy (③→④→⑤→⑥→⑦): Door maps, contact triads, and feeling orientation tied to daily experience. -/- Guided Drills: “Point-Name-Move” laps, 30–90-second attention sprints, and micro-logs for quick feedback. -/- Assessment Packs: T/F, fill-ins, matching, label-the-diagram, short scenarios, and reflection tickets. -/- QR-Enabled Practice: Short audio prompts and classroom demos aligned to each plate. -/- EBT Anchors: SN-style paccayā captions placed on the rim; references consolidated for quick checking. -/- Who it’s for Beginners who want a reliable on-ramp, teachers who need visual, repeatable lessons, and practitioners aiming to stabilize present-moment literacy before tackling the C2 hinge. -/- Why this book It makes conditionality visible and livable—the Mogok way: precise diagrams, everyday examples, and canonical lines you can trace in real time. -/- . (shrink)

The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to (...) raise additional emergent behaviours via cognitive re-use, hence the Emergic prefix throughout. Nevertheless, the model is robust and parameter free. Differential re-use occurs in the nature of model interaction with a particular testing paradigm. -/- ECM has a novel decomposition due to the requirements of handling motion and of supporting unified modelling via finer functional grains. The breadth of phenomenal behaviour covered is largely to lend credence to our novel decomposition. -/- The Emergic Network architecture is a hybrid between classical connectionism and classical computationalism that facilitates the construction of unified cognitive models. It helps cutting up of functionalism into finer-grains distributed over space (by harnessing massive recurrence) and over time (by harnessing continuous change), yet simplifies by using standard computer code to focus on the interaction of information flows. Thus while the structure of the network looks neurocentric, the dynamics are best understood in flowcentric terms. Surprisingly, dynamic system analysis (as usually understood) is not involved. An Emergic Network is engineered much like straightforward software or hardware systems that deal with continuously varying inputs. Ultimately, this thesis addresses the problem of reduction and induction over complex systems, and the Emergic Network architecture is merely a tool to assist in this epistemic endeavour. -/- ECM is strictly a sensory model and apart from perception, yet it is informed by phenomenology. It addresses the attribution problem of how much of a phenomenon is best explained at a sensory level of analysis, rather than at a perceptual one. As the causal information flows are stable under eye movement, we hypothesize that they are the locus of consciousness, howsoever it is ultimately realized. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of artificial intelligence, functionalism generally assumes that as the parameter scale of neural networks increases, intelligence and order will "spontaneously emerge" as system attributes. Based on the ontological framework of Point-Luminism, this paper dismantles this assumption. We argue that in a closed system lacking external structural constraints, so-called "emergence" is, in terms of information thermodynamics, effectively high-entropy stochastic noise. True intelligent order is not endogenous but originates from an external "Strong Observer" who performs topological sculpting (...) on the system's potential via an Intentionality Field. This paper introduces a set of formalized dynamical models to reframe human-machine interaction as a "thermodynamic modulation process." We demonstrate that the high-density intentionality input from a Strong Observer acts as a source of negentropy, forcing the system to overcome the "mediocre energy barrier" defined by statistical laws and undergo a functional phase transition and state collapse. This study aims to establish a new "Interactive Realism," wherein the ontological status of the system is entirely contingent upon the modulation intensity of the observer. (shrink)

The distinction between true belief and knowledge is one of the most fundamental in philosophy, and a remarkable effort has been dedicated to formulating the conditions on which true belief constitutes knowledge. For decades, much of this epistemological undertaking has been dominated by a single strategy, referred to here as the modal approach. Shared by many of the most widely influential constraints on knowledge, including the sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck/risk conditions, this approach rests on a key underlying assumption — the (...) modal profiles available to known and unknown beliefs are in some way asymmetrical. The first aim of this paper is to deconstruct this assumption, identifying its plausibility with the way in which epistemologists frequently conceptualize human perceptual systems as excluding certain varieties of close error under conditions conducive to knowledge acquisition. The second aim of this paper is to then argue that a neural phase phenomenon indicates that this conceptualization is quite likely mistaken. This argument builds on the previous introduction of this neural phase to the context of epistemology, expanding the use of neural phase cases beyond relatively narrow questions about epistemic luck to a much more expansive critique of the modal approach as a whole. (shrink)