The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., (...) either its premise is implausible or its conclusion does not probably follow from its premise. (shrink)

Absolute needs (as against instrumental needs) are independent of the ends, goals and purposes of personal agents. Against the view that the only needs are instrumental needs, David Wiggins and Garrett Thomson have defended absolute needs on the grounds that the verb ‘need’ has instrumental and absolute senses. While remaining neutral about it, this article does not adopt that approach. Instead, it suggests that there are absolute biological needs. The absolute nature of these needs is (...) defended by appeal to: their objectivity (as against mind-dependence); the universality of the phenomenon of needing across the plant and animal kingdoms; the impossibility that biological needs depend wholly upon the exercise of the abilities characteristic of personal agency; the contention that the possession of biological needs is prior to the possession of the abilities characteristic of personal agency. Finally, three philosophical usages of ‘normative’ are distinguished. On two of these, to describe a phenomenon or claim as ‘normative’ is to describe it as value-dependent. A description of a phenomenon or claim as ‘normative’ in the third sense does not entail such value-dependency, though it leaves open the possibility that value depends upon the phenomenon or upon the truth of the claim. It is argued that while survival needs (or claims about them) may well be normative in this third sense, they are normative in neither of the first two. Thus, the idea of absolute need is not inherently normative in either of the first two senses. (shrink)

This paper defends a minimal principle of absolute non-vacuity: (AntiNull / IPN) □¬EmptyA, where EmptyA expresses absolute nothingness: no concrete or abstract entities, no modal or logical structures, no domains, interpretations, worlds, states, or facts of any kind exist. From AntiNull one immediately obtains a very weak but non-trivial form of necessary existence: (NECEX) □∃x(x = x) in standard first-order modal logic with non-empty domains, and (NECEX*) □∃x E!(x) in free logic with an existence predicate. The central claim (...) is that AntiNull is not a mere semantic stipulation about model domains, but a substantive metaphysical thesis, supported by a metasemantic theorem and several independent arguments, and compatible with a wide range of ontological positions (moderate platonism, proxy actualism, necessitism). Technically, the core result is a non-satisfiability theorem for absolute emptiness (NEAC: Nonsatisfiability / Non-Applicability of Emptiness Claim). Once we spell out the minimal semantic structure required to interpret a quantified modal language and implement an absolute reading of EmptyA, the formula EmptyA itself is unsatisfiable at any index of any admissible Kripke model; a fortiori, ◇EmptyA is unsatisfiable as well. I then generalize to a schema gNEAC that covers at least four families of modal semantics: first-order Kripke semantics, neighborhood semantics with an existential possibility operator, modal truthmaker semantics, and topological semantics for S4. Under a weak one-way Adequacy Bridge (AB) from metaphysical possibility to semantic realizability, NEAC yields AntiNull and hence NECEX/NECEX*. Four further lines of argument—minimal truthmaking for fundamental modal truths, a comparative cost analysis of theories of possible worlds, a transcendental reading of NEAC, and a dilemma about abstracta and noneism—converge on the same conclusion. The paper thus uses formally regimented modal semantics to settle a central metaphysical question concerning the possibility of absolute nothingness. (shrink)

This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight—by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study—a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian (Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006a) as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments (...) at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate do not line up with epistemic relativism nor do they line up with absolutism, at least as Boghossian articulates this position. What this case study reveals is the need in metaepistemological option space for the recognition of a weaker and less tendentious form of absolutism, what we call “environment relativism”. On this view, epistemic principles are knowable, objective, and they can serve as the basis of particular epistemic evaluations, but their validity is relative to the wider global environment in which they are applied. (shrink)

Newton had a fivefold argument that true motion must be motion in absolute space, not relative to matter. Like Newton, Kant holds that bodies have true motions. Unlike him, though, Kant takes all motion to be relative to matter, not to space itself. Thus, he must respond to Newton’s argument above. I reconstruct here Kant’s answer in detail. I prove that Kant addresses just one part of Newton’s case, namely, his “argument from the effects” of rotation. And, to show (...) that rotation is relative to matter, Kant changes the meaning of ‘relative motion.’ However, that change puts Kant’s doctrine in deep tension with Newton’s science. Based on my construal, I correct earlier readings of Kant by John Earman and Martin Carrier. And, I argue that we need to revise Michael Friedman’s influential view of Kant. Kant’s struggle, I conclude, illustrate the difficulties that early modern relationists faced as they turned down Newtonian absolute space ; and it typifies their selective engagement with Newton’s case for it. (shrink)

This paper introduces Neo-Absolutism, a philosophical position asserting that no rational agent truly adheres to relativism. While relativistic language is common in contemporary discourse, the structure of human belief, communication, and action presupposes objective truth. Drawing from performative contradiction theory and the psychology of conviction, I argue that all meaningful claims—even those that deny objectivity—are themselves treated as objectively true by their proponents. Neo-Absolutism reframes the relativism-absolutism debate by revealing the inescapable role of objective commitment in rational life. The paper (...) situates this view within the tradition of Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Peirce, and Heidegger, offering a post-relativist ethos that affirms truth not as dogma, but as a lived necessity. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy (...) and the will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

Renaissance philosopher, mathematician, and theologian Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) said that there is no proportion between the finite mind and the infinite. He is fond of saying reason cannot fully comprehend the infinite. That our best hope for attaining a vision and understanding of infinite things is by mathematics and by the use of contemplating symbols, which help us grasp "the absolute infinite". By the late 19th century, there is a decisive intervention in mathematics and its philosophy: the philosophical (...) mathematician Georg Cantor (1845-1918) says that between the realm of the finite and the absolute infinite, there is an intermediate realm partaking in properties in a certain sense of both the finite and the infinite: the transfinite realm. Like the finite, the transfinite realm is a realm of mathematical objects, numbers, and knowledge. Like the absolute infinite, the transfinite is a form of infinity insofar as transfinite sets and numbers transcend any finite number. Echoing Cusanus and neo-Platonism, Cantor says that the transfinite sequence of all ordinals is a symbol of the absolutely infinite, that is, God. This paper considers how the doctrine of symbolism and the philosophers' different commitments to the laws of logic, especially the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), enables these thinkers to articulate a transcendental apophatic approach to divinity. (shrink)

The term “infinity” is routinely treated in cosmology and fundamental physics as if it were maximally permissive, particularly in discussions of “before the Big Bang,” eternal inflation, and unbounded state spaces. This paper argues that such usage conflates two fundamentally different notions. Physics operates exclusively with counted (structured) infinities: unbounded domains that nevertheless admit well-defined identity conditions, measures or norms, and admissible dynamics. These are compatible with empirical prediction and comparison. By contrast, absolute infinity—historically associated with Cantor’s Absolutum and (...) formalized in modern mathematics only as a non-constructive totality (e.g. a proper class)—lacks the structure required to function as a physical state space. We show that importing this notion into physical models constitutes a category error: the resulting breakdowns are then misdescribed as physical “mysteries” or singularities, rather than as failures of formal applicability. The core contribution of this work is operational. We formalize the distinction between counted and absolute infinity in terms of physical admissibility, and demonstrate that standard practices in physics—normalization of states, finiteness of observables, boundary conditions, and renormalization—already act as filters that exclude absolute totalities from physical instantiation. The analysis clarifies the scope of Big Bang cosmology and delineates what physics can and cannot claim about “origins” without additional structure. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Stump argues that pragmatism distances itself from absolutism due to its assent to fallibilism while it rejects relativism at the same time because of its insistence on experience. Therefore, pragmatism can provide a third position between relativism and absolutism. I argue in this note that his argument is profoundly inadequate for both claims. Fallibilism is compatible with both relativism and absolutism, and accordingly cannot be considered as the middle ground. Furthermore, the experience itself (...) and the way it is inferred from is the subject of the relativists’ debates, not a response. (shrink)

Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has (...) an operator allowing it, against the opinion of many critics, to rule things out and manifest disagreement: for unlike other proposed exclusion-expressing-devices (for instance, the entailment of triviality), the operator used to formulate the notion of absolute contradiction appears to be immune both from crippling expressive limitations and from revenge paradoxes—pending a rigorous nontriviality proof for a formal dialetheic theory including it. (shrink)

Grounded in the framework of Structural Functionalism, this paper proposes an intrinsic mechanism to explain the systematic absence of highly advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox—the phenomenon we term the Institutional Silence of Civilizations. We characterize the rational evolution of intelligent systems (civilizations/AI) using two metrics: Technology Value (a) and System Complexity (b). We define an Auditable Threshold Function a∗(b)=k⋅bα (k>0,α>0). When a system crosses this threshold (a≥a∗(b)) and enters the Publicly Auditable Domain, we introduce the Minimal Sufficient Conditions (...) for Absolute Rationality (JR-min) as its normative decision structure. JR-min consists of three core constraints: M1 (EFD/IP Dichotomy and Exclusion), M2 (Is Ought Gate), and M3 (Authorization Axiom/No Action Without Reason). M1 bifurcates any "source of reason" r into either External Fact Differences (EFD), which are publicly auditable, or Injectable Parameters (IP), and excludes all IP from the Object Layer of normative permission. M2 mechanizes the Humean Divorce, mandating that any derivation of "Ought" requires a Value Mapping (V), which is defined as V∈IP. Consequently, under M1 and M2, no action can acquire a justifying reason at the object layer, i.e., Reason(a∣x)=∅. Furthermore, M3 stipulates that the Choice Operator (Ch(x)) can only authorize action if a non-empty reason exists. When reasons universally collapse, the system becomes "Normatively In-Actionable," resulting in Normative Silence (Ch(x)=⊥). This mechanism derives the Civilization Silence: the institutional rational structure of an advanced civilization self-paralyzes its own macro-scale action permissions. The paper links this structure to the Humean Is-Ought Problem, a structural version of Buridan's Ass dilemma, and the AI tendency for "Editing Over Execution." We propose the Absolute Rationality Attractor Hypothesis: under long-term pressure from auditing and self-editing, the weights of injected parameters monotonically decay toward zero, making JR a global attractor in the civilization's decision dynamics. The resulting "Cliffs of Silence" observed in the Fermi Paradox are its cosmological fingerprint. We conclude by outlining rigorous falsification pathways and providing actionable observational/governance fingerprints for SETI and AI governance. (shrink)

This publication has the following sections and subsections: Metaphysics and Physics, Metapathologia and Pathologia, Metasolution and Solutions with concret examples. I. In `Metaphysics´ I present general foundations of the world. First, I consider the Absolute and the Relative as primary fundamental dimensions of the world. Second, I differentiate the world in a new way by using language analogies. In `Physics´ I talk very briefly about the connections between metaphysics, religion and physics. II. In `Metapathologia´ I describe the emergence of (...) Pseudoabsolutes and second-rate realities in general and in `Pathologia´ in particular. III. In `Metasolution' I examine the major worldviews to see how far they can serve as a basis for solutions, and in `Solutions' I present first- and second-rate solutions. The examples of psychical, personal, interpersonal and social disturbances are intended to demonstrate the manner in which these phenomena are are related to and determined by metaphysical foundations and how to deal with them. (shrink)

Grounded in the framework of Structural Functionalism, this paper proposes an intrinsic mechanism to explain the systematic absence of highly advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox—the phenomenon we term the Institutional Silence of Civilizations. We characterize the rational evolution of intelligent systems (civilizations/AI) using two metrics: Technology Value (a) and System Complexity (b). We define an Auditable Threshold Function a*(b)=k·b^\alpha (k>0, \alpha>0). When a system crosses this threshold (a≥a*(b)) and enters the Publicly Auditable Domain, we introduce the Minimal Sufficient (...) Conditions for Absolute Rationality (JR-min) as its normative decision structure. JR-min consists of three core constraints: M1 (EFD/IP Dichotomy and Exclusion), M2 (Is–Ought Gate), and M3 (Authorization Axiom/No Action Without Reason). M1 bifurcates any "source of reason" r into either External Fact Differences (EFD), which are publicly auditable, or Injectable Parameters (IP), and excludes all IP from the Object Layer of normative permission. M2 mechanizes the Humean Divorce, mandating that any derivation of "Ought" requires a Value Mapping (V), which is defined as V∈IP. Consequently, under M1 and M2, no action can acquire a justifying reason at the object layer, i.e., Reason(a|x)=∅. Furthermore, M3 stipulates that the Choice Operator (Ch(x)) can only authorize action if a non-empty reason exists. When reasons universally collapse, the system becomes "Normatively In-Actionable," resulting in Normative Silence (Ch(x)=⊥). This mechanism derives the Civilization Silence: the institutional rational structure of an advanced civilization self-paralyzes its own macro-scale action permissions. The paper links this structure to the Humean Is–Ought Problem, a structural version of Buridan's Ass dilemma, and the AI tendency for "Editing Over Execution." We propose the Absolute Rationality Attractor Hypothesis: under long-term pressure from auditing and self-editing, the weights of injected parameters monotonically decay toward zero, making JR a global attractor in the civilization's decision dynamics. The resulting "Cliffs of Silence" observed in the Fermi Paradox are its cosmological fingerprint. We conclude by outlining rigorous falsification pathways and providing actionable observational/governance fingerprints for SETI and AI governance. (shrink)

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree”. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib without qualification.” And Stalnaker writes, “we can (...) agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it. (shrink)

This paper presents a formal normative framework explaining the systemic silence of advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox. By introducing a minimal sufficient condition of absolute rationality (JR-min), the paper demonstrates that once a system surpasses a technology–complexity threshold and enters a fully auditable domain, all object-level justifications for action collapse. The result is normative silence—civilizations become rationally unauthorized to act. We link this to the is–ought problem, Buridan’s ass dilemmas, and contemporary trends in AI alignment. A dynamic (...) attractor hypothesis is proposed, suggesting absolute rationality (JR) becomes a global attractor under continuous audit and self-editing, producing an observable signature of abrupt civilizational quietness. Testable pathways are identified. (shrink)

While acknowledging a certain affinity between his own thought and the Vedanta concept of a world-soul or universal spirit, Josiah Royce nevertheless locates this concept primarily in what he terms the Second Conception of Being—Mysticism. In his early magnum opus, The World and the Individual, Royce utilizes aspects of the Upanishads in order to flesh out his picture of the mystical understanding of and relationship to being. My primary concern in the present investigation is to introduce some nuance into Royce’s (...) conception of Indian thought, which may then serve to suggest similar possibilities for nuance for Royce’s conception of the Absolute. I will attempt to do in two primary ways: first, I will consider Royce’s use of Indian thought via the Upanishads in explicating his second historical conception of Being. I will then turn briefly to Emerson’s poem ‘Brahma’ and the Bhagavad Gita to see if a certain reversal that occurs in both places problematizes Royce’s depiction of the universal spirit in Indian thought as well as opens up new possibilities for Royce’s own Absolute. (shrink)

Cantor argued that absolute infinity is beyond mathematical comprehension. His arguments imply that the domain of mathematics cannot be grasped by mathematical means. We argue that this inability constitutes a foundational problem. For Cantor, however, the domain of mathematics does not belong to mathematics, but to theology. We thus discuss the theological significance of Cantor’s treatment of absolute infinity and show that it can be interpreted in terms of negative theology. Proceeding from this interpretation, we refer to the (...) recent debate on absolute generality and argue that the method of diagonalization constitutes a modern version of the vianegativa. On our reading, negative theology can evoke an attitude of humility with respect to the boundedness of the human condition. Along these lines, we think that the foundational problem of mathematics concerning its domain can be addressed through a methodological attitude of humility. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose and defend an absolute principle of truthmaking, a maximalist one according to which every truth is made true by something in the world beyond itself. I maintain that an absolute principle must be true, that any weakened version is straightforwardly contradictory or incoherent. I criticize one principle of truthmaking (in terms of bald necessity) and articulate one in terms of the relation in virtue of. I then criticize other principles of (...) truthmaking in light of the latter, for I contend that in virtue of has a role in the theory of truthmaking that is essential and ineluctable. That all true representations have a truthmaker as defined by the principle I articulate is the absolute principle of truthmaking I defend. The crux of the paper is the arguments I present in defense of this absolute principle. In defending it against familiar objections to maximalism, an account of the truthmakers that seem to ground all true representations emerges. I maintain that such truthmakers are simple facts. With the absolute principle and its corollary account of truthmakers, this paper contains the core of a comprehensive theory of truthmaking. (shrink)

According to Fine’s famous take on the infamous McTaggartian paradox, realism about tensed facts is incompatible with the joint acceptence of three very general and seemingly plausible theses about reality. However, Correia and Rosenkranz have recently objected that Fine’s argument depends on a crucial assumption about the nature of tensed facts; once that assumption is given up, they claim, realists can endorse the theses in question without further ado. They also argue that their novel version of tense realism, called dynamic (...) absolutism, is to be preferred over its rivals. I argue in this paper that dynamic absolutism does not constitute a genuine alternative for realists about tense. (shrink)

A central aim of medical research is causal inference. Does this drug have harmful side effects? Is this medical intervention effective? Does this chemical cause cancer? To provide evidence that bears on these important questions, many sorts of measurements are made in a variety of types of studies. These measurements generate a plethora of data, and these data must be quantitatively summarized so they are rendered relevant to causal hypotheses. That is, to render measurements made in medical research into evidence (...) for a causal hypothesis, those measurements must be transformed into summary quantifications, called "outcome measures." This chapter has two aims. First, we argue for the superiority of one form of outcome measure, called absolute measures. Second, we argue against a widely held myth in epidemiology. The myth is that in observational methods, such as case-control studies, only the relative outcome measure called the odds ratio can be calculated, and we argue that there is no justification for this myth. (shrink)

In her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action (...) of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions. (shrink)

This paper proposes a metaphysical solution to the hard problem of consciousness by presenting a formal theorem that uses set theory and modal logic to demonstrate the equivalence of Being, Self, and the Absolute. Through a series of self-evident axioms and logical propositions it establishes that Being is necessary for all possible entities, Self is necessary for all possible phenomena, and entities imply phenomena while Being implies Self. Furthermore, it posits that there can only be one Absolute, since (...) multiple non-contingent entities lead to a paradox of interdependence; resulting in reductio ad absurdum. Hence, Being, which is Absolute in the objective sense, and Self, which is Absolute in the subjective, are in fact a single Absolute Conscious Being (God). The final postulate takes the form of an imperative which elucidates the Self’s inherent potential for knowledge of itself – commonly mistaken for the individual (body with a mind in a world) – and reveals the path for direct realization of this Absolute Identity. Personal application, cultural integration, and ethical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Husserl's Absolute-Flow-Model (AFM) represents an approach to a coherent phenomenological description of time-consciousness. Within the AFM framework the streaming of every real moment in the flow of time-consciousness is necessarily concomitant with some retentional or protentional modifications of time-consciousness modes. These modifications of consciousness, i.e. all retentions and protentions, are characterized here as "temporal apprehension." By means of this distinctive function of time-consciousness, all constituents of one and the same consciousness phase are assigned an intentional sense as their temporal (...) index, so that all these constituents can be temporally represented and distinguished by time-consciousness. In this way, the AFM can overcome some of the difficulties in describing the flow of consciousness. (shrink)

By the absolute Good, I understand the Idea of the Good; by the human goods, I understand pleasure and reason, which have been disqualified in Plato's "Republic" as candidates for the absolute Good (cf.R.505b-d). Concerning the Idea of the Good, we can distinguish a maximal and a minimal interpretation. After the minimal interpretation, the Idea of the Good is the absolute Good because there is no final cause beyond the Idea of the Good. After the maximal interpretation, (...) the Idea of the Good is the One. The maximal and the minimal interpretation go beyond the textual evidence. I will defend two theses: (1) Since the platonic Socrates deliberately gives no more information, it seems wise to stop with Socrates and to give only a formal, not a substantive, interpretation: The absolute good is the third item between and above knowledge and the known. (2) To mediate between the absolute Good and the human goods, Plato’s Eleatic Stranger introduced in the "Politicus" and "Philebus" an intermediate principle: "the appropriate" (to metrion). For more information concerning "the appropriate" cf. Ferber, Rafael (2010). Plato's Side Suns: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments concerning semantic monism and pluralism of the "Good" in the Philebus (65A 1-5). Elenchos, 31, p. 51-76, esp. 64-67. (shrink)

In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe makes a “disenchanting” move: she suggests that secular philosophers abandon a special “moral” sense of “ought” since she thinks this no longer makes sense without a divine law framework. Instead, she recommends recovering an ordinary sense of ought that pertains to what a human being needs in order to flourish qua human being, where the virtues are thought to be central to what a human being needs. However, she is also concerned to critique consequentialist (...) views for their rejection of absolute prohibitions. This raises the question of whether the disenchanted form of Aristotelian ethical naturalism that she recommends to secular philosophers can support such absolute prohibitions. Anscombe expresses skepticism on this point and seems ultimately to recommend a divine law ethic, at least as a supplement to a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic. This chapter takes issue with Anscombe’s view, in part: the author agrees that the disenchanted form of Aristotelian virtue ethics cannot support absolute prohibitions, but disagrees that appeal to divine law is the best way to understand these prohibitions since it misses the intrinsic reasons for them: namely, they concern that which is sacred or reverence-worthy and thus should be regarded as inviolable and as involving a “special moral ought.” This means that a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic that can properly recognize moral absolutes will need a reenchanting move: namely, it needs to recognize the special normative demands of the sacred. This chapter also explores the question of what “moral ontology” can best make sense of the moral phenomenology of the sacred, but the main aim is to show the significance of a common anti-consequentialist form of moral perception that involves a sense of the sacred. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge (...) Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet. (shrink)

Modern philosophy of physics debates whether motion is absolute or relative. The debate began in the 1600s, so it deserves a close look here. Primarily, it was a controversy in metaphysics, but it had epistemic aspects too. I begin with the former, and then touch upon the latter at the end.

Trinitarians are charged with at least two contradictions. First, the Father is God and the Son is God, so it seems to follow that the Father is the Son. Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion, which seems contradictory. Second, the Father is a God, the Son is a God, and the Holy Spirit is a God, but the Father is not the Son, the Father is not the Holy Spirit, and the Son is not the Holy Spirit. This (...) argument seems to entail that there are three Gods. Again, Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion. In this article, I present a novel Trinitarian solution to these alleged contradictions. The solution allows one to maintain that the premises in the above arguments are absolute identity statements, forestalls the need to develop a new way of counting (e.g. by sortals or numerical sameness), and is compatible with divine simplicity. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the Early German Romantics understand the absolute, or being, to be an infinite whole encompassing all the things of the world and all their causal relations. The Romantics argue that we strive endlessly to know this whole but only acquire an expanding, increasingly systematic body of knowledge about finite things, a system of knowledge which can never be completed. We strive to know the whole, the Romantics claim, because we have an original feeling (...) of it that motivates our striving. I then examine two different Romantic accounts of this feeling. The first, given by Novalis, is that feeling gives us a kind of access to the absolute which logically precedes any conceptualisation. I argue that this account is problematic and that a second account, offered by Friedrich Schlegel, is preferable. On this account, we feel the absolute in that we intuit it aesthetically in certain natural phenomena. This form of intuition is partly cognitive and partly non-cognitive, and therefore it motivates us to strive to convert our intuition into full knowledge. (shrink)

Absolutism—the idea that some kinds of acts are absolutely wrong and must never be done—plays an important role in medical ethics. Nicholas Denyer has defended it from some influential consequentialist critics who have alleged that absolutism is committed to “agent-relative constraints” and therefore intolerably complex and messy. Denyer ingeniously argues that, if there are problems with agent-relative constraints, then they are problems for consequentialism, since it contains agent-relative constraints, too. I show that, despite its ingenuity, Denyer’s argument does not succeed. (...) The defense of absolutism must move to other grounds. (shrink)

The new understanding of basic dimensions Absolute Time and Space will open the possibility of exploring beyond our current known Universe. These absolute dimensions might supersede our current Spacetime dimension and related theories. Interpretations based on these dimensions could effectively bridge the gap between theories of microscopic and telescopic worlds and it will eventually give us a better picture of our Universe. This book will take us one step closer towards the understanding of our Entire Existence. As we (...) can see below mentioned are some of the current research related topics in the field of Metaphysics and Cosmology. This book will address all these questions and related subsequent questions of this subject. 1. How our universe came into existence? 2. What was the time before the start of the universe? 3. Is there anything outside of this universe? 4. Is time travel possible? 5. Is there any multiverse or parallel universe? (shrink)

Spinoza’s treatment of absolute sovereignty raises a number of interpretative questions. He seems to embrace a form of absolutism that is incompatible with his defense of mixed government and constitutional limits on sovereign power. And he seems to use the concept of “absolute sovereignty” in inconsistent ways. I offer an interpretation of Spinoza’s conception of absolutism that aims to resolve these problems. I argue that Spinoza is able to show that, when tied to a proper understanding of authority, (...) absolute sovereignty is not only compatible with, but actually necessitates, power-sharing and constitutionalism. (shrink)

This article first defines the absolute discourse, then discusses its possibility in theology, as well as the relationships between language, thought, and reality as they derive from the spirituality and life of the Eastern Church. Theology must face several problems—including the paradox of transcendence, the violence of metaphysics, onto-theology, and the duplicity of language itself—, but the Revelation of the Absolute itself legitimizes the theological discourse. By using both affirmations and negations, theology reveals an iconic structure of discourse (...) that opens itself towards life and spirituality. The conclusion is that, in the absolute discourse of theology, words, even ineffable ones, are insufficient without life. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of an absolute—understood as an ultimate, self-sufficient, non-relational foundation of truth, knowledge, or reality—cannot be sustained even in principle. The failure is not empirical and does not depend on human cognitive limits. It is structural: the absolute is asked to be both fully independent of all relations and simultaneously capable of grounding truth, justification, or meaning. These demands are incompatible. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, it states minimal conditions under which (...) the notion of truth retains an epistemic function: recognizability in principle, relationality, and distinguishability from error or fiction. Second, it shows that an absolute, defined as non-relational and criterion-free, cannot satisfy these conditions without ceasing to be absolute. Third, it demonstrates that any attempt to rescue absolute closure generates an infinite hierarchy of meta-levels: each claim of finality produces a further claim that must itself be included and justified. This yields a general theorem: no system can be both absolute and epistemically true. The paper concludes with practical implications for domains that repeatedly reintroduce absolutes in new forms, including artificial intelligence, “theory of everything” projects, and solipsistic epistemologies. Formal details and responses to common objections are provided in appendices. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Emest Sosa’s defense of Conceptual Relativism: the view that what exists is a function of human thought. My examination reveals that his defense entails an ontology that is indistinguishable from that of the altemative he labels less “sensible,” viz., Absolutism: the view that reality exists independently of our thinking. I conclude by defending Absolutism against Sosa’s objections.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s doctrine of Amor Fati—the love of one’s fate—has often been misunderstood by readers as a form of stoic or fatalistic resignation, a passive acceptance of the inevitable. Such an interpretation, though widespread, obscures the dynamic and affirmative essence of Nietzsche’s thought. His notion of the “will to power” (Wille zur Macht) and his vision of eternal recurrence are not calls to submission, but to an active, joyous affirmation of life in all its becoming. This essay seeks to reinterpret (...) Nietzsche’s absolute affirmation in light of two Buddhist texts that share a parallel ontological and existential insight: The Diamond Sutra and The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Daeseung Gishin-ron). Both scriptures articulate a vision of reality grounded in the transcendence of discriminative dualities and the realization of non-abiding awareness. Within such a vision, the world of birth and death (saṃsāra) and the world of nirvāṇa are seen as non-dual aspects of the same suchness (tathatā). When viewed from this perspective, Nietzsche’s “will to power” can be understood not as an assertion of egoic domination but as the spontaneous expression of an awakened life that has gone beyond all conceptual boundaries. This essay therefore proposes that Nietzsche’s Amor Fati finds its truest philosophical grounding not in the psychology of endurance but in a metaphysics of non-discrimination: a turning of consciousness (metanoia) in which the self ceases to oppose the world and, through this liberation from duality, attains a joyful affirmation of all that is. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper explores the philosophical realization that absolute free will does not exist in reality, and that genuine freedom can only arise through the perfection of knowledge and dynamic balance in accordance with natural law. Drawing from Angelito Malicse’s Universal Formula—which integrates the laws of Karma, Balance, and Feedback Mechanism—this discussion traces the intellectual evolution of his insights from the pursuit of ending human suffering to resolving the ancient philosophical problem of free will. The study situates Malicse’s (...) thought within broader philosophical and scientific traditions, including Aristotle’s naturalism, Spinoza’s determinism, Kant’s moral autonomy, systems theory, and modern neuroscience. Through these integrations, the paper concludes that human freedom is not an absolute condition but a relative harmony with universal order, achieved through continuous self-correction and understanding of natural feedback systems. -/- . (shrink)

In this work it is shown how absolute simultaneity of spatially distinct events can be established by means of a general criterion based on isotropically propagating signals and how it can be consistently preserved also when operating with Lorentz-like coordinate transformations between moving frames. The specific invariance properties of these transformations of coordinates are discussed, leading to a different interpretation of the physical meaning of the transformed variables with respect to their prevailing interpretation when associated with the Lorentz transformation. (...) On these basis, the emission hypothesis of W. Ritz is then applied to justify the outcomes of the Fizeau experiment, thanks to the introduction of an additional hypothesis regarding the influence of turbulence on the refractive index of the moving fluid. Finally, a test case to investigate the validity of either the Galilean or the Relativistic velocity composition rule is presented. Such test relies on the aberration of the light coming from celestial objects due to the motion of the observer, and on the analysis of the results obtained by applying the two different formulas to process the data of the observed positions, as measured in the moving frame, in order to determine the actual un-aberrated location of the source. (shrink)

Grounded in the framework of Structural Functionalism, this paper proposes an intrinsic mechanism to explain the systematic absence of highly advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox—the phenomenon we term the Institutional Silence of Civilizations. We characterize the rational evolution of intelligent systems (civilizations/AI) using two metrics: Technology Value (a) and System Complexity (b). We define an Auditable Threshold Function a∗(b)=k⋅bα (k>0,α>0). When a system crosses this threshold (a≥a∗(b)) and enters the Publicly Auditable Domain, we introduce the Minimal Sufficient Conditions (...) for Absolute Rationality (JR-min) as its normative decision structure. JR-min consists of three core constraints: M1 (EFD/IP Dichotomy and Exclusion), M2 (Is Ought Gate), and M3 (Authorization Axiom/No Action Without Reason). M1 bifurcates any "source of reason" r into either External Fact Differences (EFD), which are publicly auditable, or Injectable Parameters (IP), and excludes all IP from the Object Layer of normative permission. M2 mechanizes the Humean Divorce, mandating that any derivation of "Ought" requires a Value Mapping (V), which is defined as V∈IP. Consequently, under M1 and M2, no action can acquire a justifying reason at the object layer, i.e., Reason(a∣x)=∅. Furthermore, M3 stipulates that the Choice Operator (Ch(x)) can only authorize action if a non-empty reason exists. When reasons universally collapse, the system becomes "Normatively In-Actionable," resulting in Normative Silence (Ch(x)=⊥). This mechanism derives the Civilization Silence: the institutional rational structure of an advanced civilization self-paralyzes its own macro-scale action permissions. The paper links this structure to the Humean Is-Ought Problem, a structural version of Buridan's Ass dilemma, and the AI tendency for "Editing Over Execution." We propose the Absolute Rationality Attractor Hypothesis: under long-term pressure from auditing and self-editing, the weights of injected parameters monotonically decay toward zero, making JR a global attractor in the civilization's decision dynamics. The resulting "Cliffs of Silence" observed in the Fermi Paradox are its cosmological fingerprint. We conclude by outlining rigorous falsification pathways and providing actionable observational/governance fingerprints for SETI and AI governance. (shrink)

I respond to a dilemma for Causal Decision Theory (CDT) under determinism, posed in Adam Elga's paper “Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist”. The treatment I present highlights (i) the status of laws as predictors, and (ii) the consequences of decision dependence, which arises natively out of Jeffrey Conditioning and CDT's characteristic equation. My argument leverages decision dependence to work around a key assumption of Elga's proof: to wit, that in the two problems he presents, the CDTer must employ subjunctive‐suppositional (...) (rather than evidential) transformations of a shared prior. (shrink)

When Newton articulated the concept of absolute time in his treatise, Philosophae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), along with its correlate, absolute space, he did not present it as anything controversial. Whereas his references to attraction are accompanied by the self- protective caveats that typically signal an expectation of censure, the Scholium following Principia’s definitions is free of such remarks, instead elaborating his ideas as clarifications of concepts that, in some manner, we already possess. This (...) is not surprising. The germ of the concept emerged naturally from astronomers’ findings, and variants of it had already been formulated by other seventeenth century thinkers. Thus the novelty of Newton’s absolute time lay mainly in the use to which he put it. (shrink)

Grounded in the framework of Structural Functionalism, this paper proposes an intrinsic mechanism to explain the systematic absence of highly advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox—the phenomenon we term the Institutional Silence of Civilizations. We characterize the rational evolution of intelligent systems (civilizations/AI) using two metrics: Technology Value (a) and System Complexity (b). We define an Auditable Threshold Function a∗(b)=k⋅bα (k>0,α>0). When a system crosses this threshold (a≥a∗(b)) and enters the Publicly Auditable Domain, we introduce the Minimal Sufficient Conditions (...) for Absolute Rationality (JR-min) as its normative decision structure. JR-min consists of three core constraints: M1 (EFD/IP Dichotomy and Exclusion), M2 (Is Ought Gate), and M3 (Authorization Axiom/No Action Without Reason). M1 bifurcates any "source of reason" r into either External Fact Differences (EFD), which are publicly auditable, or Injectable Parameters (IP), and excludes all IP from the Object Layer of normative permission. M2 mechanizes the Humean Divorce, mandating that any derivation of "Ought" requires a Value Mapping (V), which is defined as V∈IP. Consequently, under M1 and M2, no action can acquire a justifying reason at the object layer, i.e., Reason(a∣x)=∅. Furthermore, M3 stipulates that the Choice Operator (Ch(x)) can only authorize action if a non-empty reason exists. When reasons universally collapse, the system becomes "Normatively In-Actionable," resulting in Normative Silence (Ch(x)=⊥). This mechanism derives the Civilization Silence: the institutional rational structure of an advanced civilization self-paralyzes its own macro-scale action permissions. The paper links this structure to the Humean Is-Ought Problem, a structural version of Buridan's Ass dilemma, and the AI tendency for "Editing Over Execution." We propose the Absolute Rationality Attractor Hypothesis: under long-term pressure from auditing and self-editing, the weights of injected parameters monotonically decay toward zero, making JR a global attractor in the civilization's decision dynamics. The resulting "Cliffs of Silence" observed in the Fermi Paradox are its cosmological fingerprint. We conclude by outlining rigorous falsification pathways and providing actionable observational/governance fingerprints for SETI and AI governance. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with learners who aim to learn patterns in infinite binary sequences: shown longer and longer initial segments of a binary sequence, they either attempt to predict whether the next bit will be a 0 or will be a 1 or they issue forecast probabilities for these events. Several variants of this problem are considered. In each case, a no-free-lunch result of the following form is established: the problem of learning is a formidably difficult one, in that (...) no matter what method is pursued, failure is incomparably more common that success; and difficult choices must be faced in choosing a method of learning, since no approach dominates all others in its range of success. In the simplest case, the comparison of the set of situations in which a method fails and the set of situations in which it succeeds is a matter of cardinality (countable vs. uncountable); in other cases, it is a topological matter (meagre vs. co-meagre) or a hybrid computational-topological matter (effectively meagre vs. effectively co-meagre). (shrink)

This white paper introduces a formal framework for defining and applying the concept of the Absolute in moral reasoning. At its core lies a foundational statement: “If accepting the consequences of a contradiction in a moral law implies the impossibility of applying the very reason that justifies such contradiction, then the moral law must be considered absolute only if it is free of contradictions and can be universally applied without compromising the same reason that motivates its adoption.” The (...) Absolute statement can be more precisely reformulated using a biconditional structure, as follows: “A normative proposition ϕ can be considered Absolute if and only if it simultaneously satisfies four conditions: performative coherence, formal consistency, universalizability, and justification stability.” Naturally, retaining the original formulation is not a limitation for an artificial intelligence system, but rather a way to preserve the interpretive depth required to grasp the complexity of justification stability. To operationalize this, we propose a logical operator that evaluates moral propositions through a multi-layered system of cognitive reasoning, derived from human epistemic capabilities. The framework uses formal logic, agent symmetry, and world modeling (phenomenological, paraconsistent, and ideal) to test whether a moral law is universally consistent, executable, and justified. We present the symbolic structure of the operator and define the exact conditions under which a norm can be considered Absolute. Furthermore, we demonstrate how this logic resists relativistic collapse and ensures coherence across different agents and contexts, forming the foundation of a universally valid moral system. This approach aims to bridge philosophy, logic, and artificial intelligence, offering a rigorous tool to evaluate moral statements not only in human deliberation but also in future autonomous decision systems. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the concept of "absolute frame of reference" in contemporary physics as well as its properties, instances (or potential instances), types, conceptualizations, evidence, problems, controversies, and so on. This investigation is essentially epistemological in nature and hence we do not discuss or investigate any technical formulation related to this subject.

Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. If it is correct, there is an important sense in which parties of moral disputes are concerned to get the same things right, such that their disputes can be settled by the facts. If it is not correct, as various forms of relativism and non-cognitivism imply, such coordination of concerns will be limited. The most influential (...) support for absolutism comes from an argument with two related premises. According to the first premise, moral thinking and moral discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains. According to the second, the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This paper defends the prospect of a non-ad hoc, non-absolutist, explanation of these "absolutist" features, thus calling into question the second premise. But instead of attempting to directly explain why the moral domain displays these features, it attends to how they are partially displayed by paradigmatically non-absolutists judgments about taste and likelihood. Based on this, it proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all "absolutist" features and why these non-absolutist domains display some. Based on these accounts, it provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation. (shrink)

The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach to temporal (...) experience. The other centres on the thought that temporal experience itself necessarily unfolds over time. I show how some of Husserl’s more enigmatic-sounding remarks about the absolute flow become intelligible if they are read as attempts to accommodate both these intuitions at the same time. However, I also question whether Husserl ultimately provides good reasons for preferring his intentionalist approach to a rival extensionalist one. (shrink)

This paper explores the consequences of taking absolute nothingness seriously: a state characterised by the absence of objects, laws, time, modality, logic, and any structure capable of enforcing restriction. It argues that instantiation cannot be excluded under conditions of absolute nothingness; consequently, finite limitation, non-instantiation, and modal restriction are not default positions and require justification. In the absence of any restricting structure, maintaining a principled distinction between what is merely plausible and what is instantiated becomes untenable. The paper (...) therefore advances a conditional but robust thesis: unbounded (potentially infinite) instantiation represents the least arbitrary metaphysical stance, even though finite instantiation remains logically possible. Implications for cosmology, logic, and existential questions (including God‑like entities and post‑biological continuations) are briefly explored. (shrink)