This paper presents a multi-faceted critique of the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), focusing on its semantic and epistemic weaknesses. The analysis identifies a dual failure within the argument's structure. First, logically, the MOA fails because it treats "necessary existence" as a first-order predicate. This results in an ill-typed application within standard Kripke semantics and constitutes a misuse of S5 modal operators. Second, epistemologically, the argument engages in circular reasoning by embedding the conclusion (necessary existence) within the initial definition of a (...) "Maximally Great Being" (MGB) and assuming the coherence of MGB's properties without independent justification. The argument is also vulnerable to the logical symmetry problem, where the counter-argument ("Possibly an MGB does not exist") is structurally equipollent. In conclusion, the MOA is not a pure logical proof; rather, it is a formalization of premise-dependent metaphysical assumptions and thus fails to uniquely establish God's existence as a necessary truth. (shrink)

This paper examines the contemporary theistic use of the modal system S5 and argues that it is methodologically unjustified. By treating S5 as a neutral logical framework, such arguments import strong metaphysical assumptions that allow necessity to be derived from possibility. The paper shows that this results in framework-dependent conclusions and modal symmetry problems, undermining claims of genuine epistemic warrant.

This discourse proposes Inferential Stability (S) as a supreme epistemic criterion beyond atomic propositional accuracy. I define doxastic architecture through a formal mapping A: p. Through structural stability analysis, I demonstrate that true knowledge is a function of the resilience of logical paths under high-order informational perturbations (Δ). By integrating S5 modal logic, Bayesian Robustness principles, and Quinean holism, this treatise establishes the boundary between contingent belief and invariant structural knowledge. My analysis concludes that modern epistemic failures are rooted in (...) architectural fragility rather than a mere deficiency of data. (shrink)