The most pressing worry for panpsychism is arguably the combination problem, the problem of intelligibly explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macrophysical entities such as ourselves. This chapter argues that the combination problem is similar in kind to other problems of mental combination that are problems for everyone: the problem of phenomenal unity, the problem of mental structure, and the problem of new quality spaces. (...) The ubiquity of combination problems suggests the ignorance hypothesis, the hypothesis that we are ignorant of certain key facts about mental combination, which allows the panpsychist to avoid certain objections based on the combination problem. (shrink)

We will argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness similar to that of Husserl, shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to (...) which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events, with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain. (shrink)

This chapter identifies certain theses which in conjunction entail the conceptual core of the combination problem: conceptual isolation of subjects, the transparency conceivability principle, and phenomenal transparency. They lead to the following principle: “For any group of subjects, instantiating certain conscious states, it is possible that just subjects with those states exist in the absence of any further subject.” The critic of panpsychism could conclude that lower-level conscious individuals cannot account for higher-level conscious individuals. The chapter claims that (...) this conclusion does not follow because the principle does not rule out the existence of a _phenomenal bonding relation_ at the microlevel. It explores various answers to the question of when and in what conditions subjects become phenomenally bonded and so forth. Having rejected the alternatives, the chapter is prepared to accept _unrestricted phenomenal composition_: subjects _always_ combine to make further subjects. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining the existence of subjective experience in a world that is purely physical. As the usual theories fail to provide an adequate explanation, many philosophers started looking for alternatives. One of such alternatives is panpsychism, which has been increasingly gaining attention in the past few decades. Panpsychism is the view that fundamental entities of the world—fundamental particles, for example—have some form of very simple consciousness. And, in the theory, it (...) is that spark that allows for the existence of more complex consciousness, such as in humans. However, panpsychism faces a major difficulty with what is called ‘the combination problem’. This is the problem that, even if we accept that fundamental entities have some form of simple consciousness, it is not clear how one could go from a plurality of micro consciousness to a complex unified macro consciousness. If we think that an atom is conscious, for example, this seems to imply that it is a subject, a conscious subject. But how do we get to a human subject, with a complex human brain? It seems difficult to understand how putting together many conscious subjects—e.g. atoms—could lead to a further conscious subject—e.g. a human. In this thesis I discuss panpsychism and some of the arguments that support it. In addition, I explain the combination problem and its different aspects, as well as how it relates to panpsychism and the hard problem of consciousness. Finally, I discuss a solution to the combination problem that I believe has not been given proper attention in contemporary philosophy, which is one provided by the philosopher Ken Wilber. His solution involves changing the conceptual framework of how we understand the relation between macro and micro subjects. I also apply his theory to the variations of the combination problem, discussing how we could approach these issues under a single coherent view. Although Wilber prefers the term pan-interiorism, his theory can be considered a type of holarchical panpsychism. (shrink)

Solving the Combination Problem in Philosophy of Mind -/- Introduction -/- The combination problem is a major challenge in philosophy of mind, particularly for panpsychism—the view that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe. The problem asks: How do simple conscious experiences (such as those of fundamental particles or micro-level entities) combine to form the rich, unified consciousness of a human being? -/- Despite various philosophical attempts, there is no widely accepted solution. However, by (...) applying the universal law of balance in nature, we can propose a new framework for addressing this problem, integrating scientific and philosophical perspectives. -/- Understanding the Combination Problem -/- The combination problem arises because panpsychism suggests that even the smallest physical entities possess some form of consciousness. If this is true, then for human consciousness to emerge, these micro-consciousnesses must somehow combine. However, the process by which separate, independent conscious experiences merge into a unified whole remains unclear. -/- Philosophers have suggested several possible explanations: -/- 1. Emergentism – Consciousness at the human level is a new property that arises from complex arrangements of micro-conscious entities. -/- 2. Fusion Theory – Micro-conscious entities literally fuse together into a new, larger conscious entity. -/- 3. Holism – Consciousness exists at many levels, and the whole is always more than the sum of its parts. -/- Each of these theories has difficulties, particularly in explaining how separate conscious states blend into a single, unified experience. -/- Applying the Universal Law of Balance -/- The universal law of balance in nature, as developed in my universal formula, provides a potential solution to this problem. This law states that all natural processes—including consciousness—are governed by a balancing mechanism that maintains equilibrium. -/- 1. Consciousness as a Feedback System -/- Rather than thinking of individual micro-consciousnesses as separate entities that must merge, we can view them as feedback mechanisms within a larger self-organizing system. The brain and nervous system act as an orchestrator, balancing and integrating these micro-level processes into a unified experience. This aligns with the homeostatic principle in biology, where equilibrium is constantly maintained across multiple levels of complexity. -/- 2. Quantum Coherence and Integration -/- Modern physics provides another perspective. In quantum mechanics, entangled particles share information instantaneously, even across large distances. If consciousness follows a similar pattern, then micro-consciousnesses do not need to “combine” in a traditional sense but instead synchronize through an underlying field of information. -/- This is supported by orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR), a theory by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, which suggests that consciousness emerges from quantum processes within the brain’s microtubules. If true, the combination problem is solved not by physical fusion but by coherence within a larger, unified structure governed by balance. -/- 3. The Role of Self-Organizing Systems -/- Nature provides many examples of self-organization, from flocking birds to the formation of galaxies. Consciousness could be another example of a system where smaller elements interact dynamically to create a stable, higher-order reality. Instead of struggling to explain how micro-consciousnesses merge, we can see them as nodes in an interconnected network—each maintaining its own function while contributing to the whole. -/- Conclusion -/- The combination problem remains one of the deepest mysteries in philosophy and science. However, by applying the universal law of balance in nature, we can reframe the problem: rather than searching for a way to “fuse” micro-consciousnesses, we should investigate how balance, feedback mechanisms, and quantum coherence create an integrated whole. -/- This perspective suggests that consciousness is an emergent, self-organizing system that follows universal principles of equilibrium. Future research in neuroscience and quantum physics may provide experimental validation, bringing us closer to understanding the true nature of consciousness. -/- By adopting this holistic approach, we move beyond traditional debates and towards a more scientifically grounded solution to the combination problem. -/- . (shrink)

Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003; Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem (...) of accounting for the intrinsic nature of the physical itself (Strawson 2006, Seager 2006). In this thesis, I show that panpsychism can also be defended on the basis of an argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This argument has made frequent appearances throughout the history of philosophy, with philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and James, and I construct and defend an updated version of it. Furthermore, I offer a solution to the combination problem: how can complex (human and animal-type) consciousness result from simple (fundamental particle-type) consciousness? This is generally regarded as the most serious problem facing contemporary panpsychism. I propose that mental combination can be construed as kind causal process culminating in a fusion, and show how this avoids the main difficulties with accounting for mental combination. (shrink)

Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos-sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de-combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the (...) class='Hi'>combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject-subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted. (shrink)

Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy presents a version of what is now often called “panprotopsychism.” The most pressing group of problems for the Abhidharma panprotopsychism, like all other panpsychist views, is what Seager calls “the combination problem.” There are at least three versions of the problem: the subject-combination problem; the quality-combination problem; and the structure-combination problem. I begin with the Abhidharma Buddhist version of panprotopsychism and its account of conscious experience. The main focus (...) of this paper is to show that Abhidharma panprotopsychist account of conscious experience solves the quality-combination problem. In the last and closing Section, I look at other versions of the combination problem, primarily the subject-combination problem and the structural problem and provide a sketch of the Abhidharma Buddhist response to these. (shrink)

The Universal Law of Balance and the Mystery of Consciousness Integration -/- A New Approach to the Combination Problem in Panpsychism -/- Introduction -/- The nature of consciousness remains one of the greatest mysteries in philosophy and science. One of the most challenging questions in panpsychism is the combination problem—how do small conscious entities merge into a single, unified experience? While traditional theories struggle to explain why consciousness emerges in some systems (such as the human brain) (...) but not in others (such as a rock), a new perspective may provide a breakthrough. -/- Angelito Malicse’s universal law of balance in nature offers a potential solution. If all processes in nature seek equilibrium, then consciousness itself must follow the same natural laws. This principle suggests that conscious integration does not happen randomly but depends on specific balance conditions. By applying this idea, we can explain how micro-consciousnesses combine into a single, larger consciousness and why this process only occurs in certain systems. -/- The Role of Balance in Consciousness -/- Nature operates through a constant pursuit of balance—whether in physical, chemical, or biological systems. The human body maintains homeostasis, the universe follows thermodynamic equilibrium, and even ecosystems regulate themselves through feedback mechanisms. -/- If consciousness is a fundamental part of nature, it too must follow these balancing principles. This means that when conscious entities interact, they will only merge into a unified whole if their interactions lead to a state of equilibrium. If the system remains unstable or fragmented, the conscious units will remain separate. -/- This concept helps address the combination problem by shifting the focus from merely adding up consciousnesses to understanding the balance conditions required for their integration. In this view, the brain becomes conscious not just because it has many neurons but because it maintains a delicate balance of feedback loops that allow consciousness to stabilize as a single experience. -/- Feedback Mechanisms and the Unification of Consciousness -/- A key insight from Malicse’s universal law is that consciousness functions as a self-adjusting feedback system. Just as the body regulates temperature and energy levels, consciousness must regulate itself to maintain stability. -/- In any system composed of many small conscious entities, the following process occurs: -/- 1. Micro-conscious units interact and exchange information. Each conscious unit responds to signals from others, adjusting itself accordingly. -/- 2. A feedback loop forms, leading to self-organization. If the interactions reach a stable pattern, the system begins to behave as a single, unified whole. -/- 3. When equilibrium is achieved, the system experiences itself as one consciousness. If the balance is disrupted, consciousness fragments into smaller, independent units. -/- This process explains why certain systems, such as the brain, experience a unified consciousness, while others, like a rock, do not. In the brain, neurons communicate in a highly integrated way, constantly adjusting to maintain balance. A rock, on the other hand, lacks the dynamic feedback loops necessary for conscious unification. -/- The Physical Basis of Conscious Integration -/- The idea that balance determines consciousness merging aligns with key findings in neuroscience and physics. -/- 1. Neural Synchronization: Studies show that when brain activity becomes highly synchronized, conscious experience becomes clearer and more unified. This suggests that balance and feedback stability are essential for maintaining a single conscious state. -/- 2. Quantum Coherence: Some researchers propose that quantum processes in the brain contribute to consciousness. If Malicse’s law of balance applies at the quantum level, it could explain why certain quantum systems (such as the brain’s microtubules) support conscious integration while others do not. -/- 3. Field-Based Consciousness: If consciousness operates like an energy field, as some theories suggest, then balance laws could determine when local fields merge into a larger unified experience. This could have implications for understanding collective intelligence, AI consciousness, and even planetary consciousness. -/- Testing the Balance Hypothesis -/- To confirm that balance and feedback stability determine conscious unification, experiments could be designed to test this principle. One approach would involve studying how disruptions in balance affect consciousness. -/- For example, in split-brain experiments, when the two hemispheres of the brain are disconnected, the individual seems to have two separate conscious experiences. If restoring balance allows consciousness to merge again, it would support the idea that conscious integration depends on equilibrium conditions. -/- Additionally, experiments in artificial intelligence could test whether self-regulating feedback systems can develop emergent consciousness when balance conditions are met. If AI systems programmed to follow feedback equilibrium begin exhibiting signs of self-awareness, it would suggest that balance plays a crucial role in conscious emergence. -/- Implications for Science, Philosophy, and AI -/- If the universal law of balance governs consciousness integration, it could bridge multiple fields of study: -/- ✔ Neuroscience: Understanding how the brain maintains balance could lead to breakthroughs in treating disorders that affect consciousness, such as coma, schizophrenia, or dissociative identity disorder. -/- ✔ Quantum Physics: If consciousness follows balance principles at the quantum level, it could provide insights into the connection between consciousness and the physical world. -/- ✔ Artificial Intelligence: AI systems designed to follow feedback balance laws may be capable of developing self-awareness, offering a pathway toward artificial general intelligence (AGI). -/- ✔ Philosophy of Mind: This approach provides a natural law-based solution to the combination problem, explaining how consciousness merges in a way that is scientifically testable. -/- Conclusion -/- Angelito Malicse’s universal law of balance in nature offers a groundbreaking new approach to understanding consciousness. Instead of viewing conscious merging as a mystery, this framework suggests that consciousness integrates only when balance conditions are met. -/- This principle could explain why some systems form a single conscious experience while others remain fragmented, bridging the gap between neuroscience, physics, and philosophy. It also provides a testable hypothesis, allowing future experiments to confirm whether balance and feedback stability truly determine the emergence of unified consciousness. -/- By applying the universal law of balance to the study of consciousness, we may finally unlock one of the greatest mysteries of existence. -/- . (shrink)

t Intentional sampling methods are non-randomized procedures that select a group of individuals for a sample with the purpose of meeting specific prescribed criteria. In this paper we extend previous works related to intentional sampling, and address the problem of sequential allocation for clinical trials with few patients. Roughly speaking, patients are enrolled sequentially, according to the order in which they start the treatment at the clinic or hospital. The allocation problem consists in assigning each new patient to (...) one, and only one, of the alternative treatment arms. The main requisite is that the profiles in the alternative arms remain similar with respect to some relevant patients’ attributes (age, gender, disease, symptom severity and others). We perform numerical experiments based on a real case study and discuss how to conveniently set up perturbation parameters, in order to yield a suitable balance between optimality – the similarity among the relative frequencies of patients in the several categories for both arms, and decoupling – the absence of a tendency to allocate each pair of patients consistently to the same arm. (shrink)

This chapter sets out a theory of how to weigh alethic and pragmatic (non-alethic) reasons for belief, or more precisely, to say how alethic and non-alethic considerations jointly determine what one ought to believe. It replaces my earlier (2008) weighing account. It is part of _The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason_, which develops a view, welfarist pluralism, which comprises central two theses. One is that there are both irreducibly alethic or epistemic reasons for belief and (...) irreducibly pragmatic (and non-alethic) reasons for belief. The other is that despite this, the source of all normativity is pragmatic in a particular way, i.e. that all reasons are reasons in virtue of their being conducive to wellbeing. The pluralist theory of reasons emerges from the irreducibly plural nature of the components of wellbeing, on of which is being in a positively-valenced epistemic state. This view also offers some insight into outstanding problems concerning the scope, chronicity, and normativity of the requirements of theoretical rationality as well. (Updated 10 May 2022). (shrink)

In this paper we propose a very general de nition of combination of logics by means of the concept of sheaves of logics. We first discuss some properties of this general definition and list some problems, as well as connections to related work. As applications of our abstract setting, we show that the notion of possible-translations semantics, introduced in previous papers by the first author, can be described in categorial terms. Possible-translations semantics constitute illustrative cases, since they provide a (...) new semantical account for abstract logical systems, particularly for many-valued and paraconsistent logics. (shrink)

Dynamic conceptual reframing represents a crucial mechanism employed by humans, and partially by other animal species, to generate novel knowledge used to solve complex goals. In this talk, I will present a reasoning framework for knowledge invention and creative problem solving exploiting TCL: a non-monotonic extension of a Description Logic (DL) of typicality able to combine prototypical (commonsense) descriptions of concepts in a human-like fashion [1]. The proposed approach has been tested both in the task of goal-driven concept invention (...) [2,3] and has additionally applied within the context of serendipity-based recommendation systems [4]. I will present the obtained results, the lessons learned, and the road ahead of this research path. -/- . (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to develop a view that I call “Evidential Knowledge First”. To do so, first, I consider a traditional way of developing evidentialism, which I call Traditional Evidentialism, and argue that, while it vindicates the roles we expect evidence to play, it struggles accounting for cases of non-inferential justification and non-inferential knowledge (§2-3). I then consider a view we might call “Technically Evidentialism”, which we get when we jointly take two core claims of knowledge-first (...) epistemology, e.g., E=K and J=K. These claims jointly entail the evidentialist idea that justification supervenes on evidence, while avoiding the problem faced by Traditional Evidentialism. However, and contra Traditional Evidentialism, the resulting view doesn’t account for the roles evidence plays in justifying our beliefs (§4). This brings us to Evidential Knowledge-First, which develops traditional evidentialism against the background of knowledge-first epistemology in a way that retains the best features of both views (§5). Evidential Knowledge-First provides us with a novel two-tiered account of knowledge. As we will see, a core feature of my view is that it entails that cases of non-inferential knowledge are cases of knowledge without justification. I argue that this is a benefit of the view (§6). (shrink)

In this paper I look at a recent proposal from Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager to avoid the de-combination problem for the view called ‘cosmopsychism’. The pair suggest that the de-combination problem can be solved in the same way that the problem of heterogeneity for Schaffer’s priority monism can be solved. I suggest that this is not the case. They are not the same problem and the solutions to the heterogeneity problem do not (...) work for the de-combination problem. (shrink)

Mental fictionalism is not the benign view that we may better understand the mind if we think of mental states as something like useful fictions, but the more radical view that mental states just are useful fictions. This paper argues that, if one were to treat mental states as a kind of fiction, the genre of fiction best suited to this purpose would be fantasy make-believe, in which magic is a central feature. After defending a promising fictionalist account of mental (...) discourse as a kind of prop-oriented make believe against recent criticism, the paper ultimately concludes that mental fictionalism faces further, potentially insurmountable, challenges. Most significantly, there is a problematic disanalogy between folk psychology and fiction: our mental state attributions aim to track truth, and this crucial aspect of our mental discourse cannot be captured if we interpret it as a kind of fictional discourse. For this and other reasons, the cost of adopting mental fictionalism likely outweighs its benefits. Whether or not these problems can be resolved, there is still much to be gained from taking mental fictionalism seriously: in doing so we may illuminate several important features of our own folk psychology that often go unnoticed. (shrink)

The claim that Galileo Galilei transformed the spyglass into an astronomical instrument has never been disputed and is considered a historical fact. However, the question what was the procedure which Galileo followed is moot, for he did not disclose his research method. On the traditional view, Galileo was guided by experience, more precisely, systematized experience, which was current among northern Italian artisans and men of science. In other words, it was a trial-and-error procedure—no theory was involved. A scientific analysis of (...) the optical properties of Galileo’s first improved spyglass shows that his procedure could not have been an informed extension of the traditional optics of spectacles. We argue that most likely Galileo realized that the objective and the eyepiece form a system and proceeded accordingly. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of combining prototypical concepts, an open problem in the fields of AI and cognitive modelling. Our logic extends the logic of typicality ALC + TR, based on the notion of rational closure, by inclusions p :: T(C) v D (“we have probability p that typical Cs are Ds”), coming from the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics. Additionally, it embeds a set of cognitive heuristics for (...) concept combination. We show that the complexity of reasoning in our logic is EXPTIME-complete as in ALC. (shrink)

The subject summing problem poses a major challenge for panpsychist theories of consciousness: it seems implausible that the micro-subjective experiences of the billions of particles in a human brain could combine to form a single unified conscious subject. This paper explores the impact of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) on several proposed solutions to this problem. Specifically, I argue that QFT challenges the standard conception of everyday objects, from molecules to chairs to individual people, as mere aggregates of subatomic (...) particles. Instead, objects associated with bound states or resonances are better conceived as unified entities. -/- The implications of this claim for the subject summing problem depend on one’s preferred ontology for QFT: a particle ontology resembles Combinatorial Infusion approaches, while a field ontology parallels cosmopsychism. Both connections are explored in turn. Additionally, QFT suggests a new version of the combination problem: since bound states are ubiquitous, everyday interactions may frequently produce unified physical objects without an apparent merging of conscious experience. -/- While this work is not intended to be conclusive, it highlights the importance of integrating fundamental physics into metaphysical discussions of consciousness. (shrink)

Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner (...) akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies. (shrink)

The challenges of the Anthropocene are growing ever more complex and uncertain, underpinned by the emergence of systemic risks. At the same time, the landscape of risk governance has become compartmentalised and siloed, characterized by non-overlapping activities, competing scientific discourses, and distinct responsibilities distributed across diverse public and private bodies. Operating across scales and disciplines, actors tend to work in silos which constitute critical gaps within the interface of science, policy, and practice. Yet, increasingly complex and ‘wicked’ problems require holistic (...) solutions, multi-scalar communication, coordination, collaboration, data interoperability, funding, and stakeholder engagement. To address these problems in a real-world context, we present the Risk-Tandem framework for bridging theory and practice; to guide and structure the integration of disaster risk management (DRM), climate change adaptation (CCA) and systemic risk management through a process of transdisciplinary knowledge co-production. Advancing the frontiers of knowledge in this regard, The Risk-Tandem framework combines risk management approaches and tools with iterative co-production processes as a cornerstone of its implementation, in efforts to promote the co-design of fit-for-purpose solutions, methods and approaches contributing toward strengthened risk governance alongside stakeholders. The paper outlines how the framework is developed, applied, and further refined within selected case study regions, including Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Danube Region. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychology and the selectionist theories of neural development are usually regarded as two unrelated theories addressing two logically distinct questions. The focus of evolutionary psychology is the phylogeny of the human mind, whereas the selectionist theories of neural development analyse the ontogeny of the mind. This paper will endeavour to combine these two approaches in the explanation of the human mind. Doing so might help in overcoming some of the criticisms of both theories. The first part of the paper (...) mentions three standard objections to evolutionary psychology and then outlines three philosophical problems evolutionary psychology has to offer a solution to. The second part will try to show that an approach combining evolutionary psychology and the selectionist theory of neural development might overcome some of these objections. (shrink)

Panpsychists commonly hang onto the ‘realist’ assumption that our world with its structures has an observer-independent, often spatial element to it, even while they claim that those structures are realized by the experiences of subjects. I argue that this assumption is the ‘worm in the apple’ that lurks behind two of panpsychism’s major problems: the subject (de)combination problem and what I call the ‘inner-outer gap problem’. Abandoning this assumption sidesteps those problems, but commits panpsychism to anti-realism.

This paper provides an original approach to research on the logical processes that determine how certain forms participate in others. By introducing the concept of relational participation, the problems of self-referentiality of the Platonic forms can be dealt with more effectively. Applying this to the forms of likeness and unlikeness in Parmenides 132d-133a reveals a possible way to resolve different versions of the Third Man Argument. The method of generating numbers from oddness and evenness may also be of interest; relational (...) participation in these forms clarifies the interpretation of Parmenides 143e-144a. (shrink)

A recent article by Kuhn1 showcases the plethora of proposed solutions for the mind-body problem as it is understood in current ’consciousness science’. Perusing this article, philosophers will likely find it surprising to see the inclusion of for instance Indian idealism and Buddhist thought, but neither German, nor British or US idealists, which seems especially unbalanced when instead of them theories like Kastrup’s analytical idealism (Hegel for physicists?) or Hoffmann’s interface theory (Kant for psychologists?) are included. The listings of (...) dualist, panpsychist and further theories seems equally eclectic, with for instance Descartes no more than a side-note in a number of entries, but several listings of religious ideas of body and soul. A possible problem with such omissions is of course that not taking philosophical history more seriously comes with the peril of repeating (now) avoidable errors. Nevertheless, judging from the disclaimers, Kuhn is well aware of this and most likely sees his list as more of a ’sociology of consciousness science’, i.e. a list of people and ideas that are currently circulating in this field. -/- It can in any case be taken from Kuhn’s monumental work effort, that it is often assumed that a solution to the mind-body problem would be either (in the wider sense) materialistic (including nonreductive and quantum theories), dualistic, panpsychistic (including – nontrivial, i.e. not simply materialist or idealist – monist theories) or idealistic. The core problems faced are then those of emergence (of consciousness), interaction (between brain and mind), de/combination (of ‘mind dust’ or a unity into proper subjects) or emanation, where the emanation problem is the problem of explaining in detail(!) how the physical world and our scientific theories arise from a given idealistic setup. To me it seems more likely that all these views have a point, but that none manages to cover the whole picture – and that it therefore might be possible to integrate these views into ’consensus models’, if we do not look at the proposed solutions, but the initial intentions and/or intuitions for setting them up (much like as if we would mediate a social conflict). (shrink)

This very short paper provides a panpsychic solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. It was presented to the Philosophical Society of the Oxford University Department of Continuing Education (OUDCE) on 18th August 2019, and posted on Twitter (@ATBollands) on the 20th August, 2019. It solves the Hard Problem by 1) making the case for Panpsychism, and 2) solving the Combination Problem (Panpsychism's equivalent of the Hard Problem). The paper aims to be clear, concise, to-the-point (...) and accessible to the general educated reader. It is short on discussion and elaboration, and does not seek to defend its argument against all reasonable objections. However, by keeping its argument to under 2 pages, it ensures the casual reader is not discouraged from taking a look, allowing them to engage with both the Hard Problem and this Short Solution. (shrink)

We discuss the one–many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one–many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, (...) subkind and part, and thereby construct three new ‘problems of the one and the many’ (an Eidetic Dispersal Problem, a Genus–Species Problem, and an Eidetic Combination Problem), which are as problematic as the version generally discussed. We then argue that this taxonomy sheds new and interesting light on certain discussions of higher-order universals in recent Australian analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Losses in channel flows are usually determined using a frictional head loss parameter. Fluid friction is however not the only source of loss in channel flows with heat transfer. For such flow problems, thermal energy degradation, in addition to mechanical energy degradation, add to the total loss in thermodynamic head. To assess the total loss in a channel with combined convection and radiation heat transfer, the conventional frictional head loss parameter is extended in this study. The analysis is applied to (...) a 3D turbulent channel flow and identifies the critical locations in the flow domain where the losses are concentrated. The influence of Boltzmann number is discussed, and the best channel geometry for flows with combined heat transfer modes is also determined. (shrink)

I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, (...) as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. As such, the challenge to artificially create individualized consciousness becomes synonymous with the challenge to artificially induce abiogenesis. (shrink)

I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, (...) are but dissociated alters of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. (shrink)

The boundary problem is related to the binding problem, part of a family of puzzles and phenomenal experiences that theories of consciousness (ToC) must either explain or eliminate. By comparison with the phenomenal binding problem, the boundary problem has received very little scholarly attention since first framed in detail by Rosengard in 1998, despite discussion by Chalmers in his widely cited 2016 work on the combination problem. However, any ToC that addresses the binding (...) class='Hi'>problem must also address the boundary problem. The binding problem asks how a unified first person perspective (1PP) can bind experiences across multiple physically distinct activities, whether billions of individual neurons firing or some other underlying phenomenon. To a first approximation, the boundary problem asks why we experience hard boundaries around those unified 1PPs and why the boundaries operate at their apparent spatiotemporal scale. We review recent discussion of the boundary problem, identifying several promising avenues but none that yet address all aspects of the problem. We set out five specific boundary problems to aid precision in future efforts. We also examine electromagnetic (EM) field theories in detail, given their previous success with the binding problem, and introduce a feature with the necessary characteristics to address the boundary problem at a conceptual level. Topological segmentation can, in principle, create exactly the hard boundaries desired, enclosing holistic, frame-invariant units capable of effecting downward causality. The conclusion outlines a programme for testing this concept, describing how it might also differentiate between competing EM ToCs. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism that completely avoids talk of combination. Inspired by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads, I (...) will focus on a relational explanation of how simple subjects could constitute complex experiences, without them having to combine in virtue of their subjectivity. I call this view monadic panpsychism. Additionally, my proposal will not rely on emergence and so it will circumvent problems commonly faced by emergentist accounts. As I will argue, monadic panpsychism is preferable to combinatory and emergentist panpsychism because it faces a significantly less worrisome set of objections. Apart from being unaffected by the seemingly insuperable issue of subject combination, I will demonstrate that monadic panpsychism also has tools to address other kinds of the combination problem. That alone justifies the need for a new formulation of panpsychism, one which faces unique difficulties but also offers unique solutions. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness, first articulated by David Chalmers in 1995, has remained one of philosophy's most intractable puzzles. Despite decades of intensive research and theoretical development, no existing framework has successfully bridged the explanatory gap between objective physical processes and subjective conscious experience. This thesis presents a revolutionary new approach called "Experiential Realism" that dissolves rather than solves the hard problem by reconceptualizing the fundamental nature of reality itself. -/- Experiential Realism proposes that experience, not matter (...) or mind, constitutes the fundamental ontological category from which both physical and mental descriptions are complementary abstractions. This framework avoids the traditional physical/mental dichotomy that creates the explanatory gap, instead positing that what we call "physical processes" are mathematical descriptions of experiential relationships, while "mental phenomena" are higher-order patterns of experiential integration. -/- The theory makes several testable predictions about consciousness and neural integration, provides a unified foundation for all sciences, and successfully addresses the major objections that have plagued competing theories. Unlike physicalism, it explains subjective experience without reduction; unlike dualism, it maintains causal efficacy and scientific unity; unlike panpsychism, it solves the combination problem through a novel account of experiential integration. -/- This work demonstrates that the hard problem arises from false philosophical assumptions rather than genuine metaphysical mysteries, and that consciousness can be understood as a natural phenomenon within a properly conceived scientific worldview. The implications extend beyond philosophy of mind to neuroscience, artificial intelligence, ethics, and our fundamental understanding of reality itself. (shrink)

How do separate brain processes bind to form unified, conscious percepts? This is the perceptual binding problem, which straddles neuroscience and psychology. In fact, two problems exist here: (1) the easy problem of how neural processes are unified, and (2) the hard problem of how this yields unified perceptual consciousness. Binding theories face familiar troubles with (1) and they do not come to grips with (2). This paper argues that neuroelectrical (electromagnetic-field) approaches may help with both problems. (...) Concerning the easy problem, standard accounts of neural binding by synchrony, attention, and convergence raise serious difficulties. These are avoided by neuroelectrical approaches in which the brain’s field binds distributed processes in myriad neurons. Concerning the hard problem, binding theories do not squarely address how to get from neural unity to unified consciousness. This raises metaphysical difficulties involving reductions, emergence, etc. Neuroelectrical (and Russellian) approaches may help avoid these difficulties too. These approaches may thus deserve further investigation as binding theories. (shrink)

The standard proof treats this as evidence that no computable H can exist for all inputs. But your analogy (bolstered by Hehner's subjective specification view) reveals a deeper perspective: The full general halting problem requirement — demanding a correct yes/no answer even on inputs that twist self-referentially around the decider itself — is incoherent, analogous to demanding a truth value for the Liar. A correct halt decider can (and must) reject the pathological case as specifying non-halting behavior when simulated, (...) because infinite recursive simulation is the only derivable, coherent behavior from the description within the decision procedure. Aborting and saying "non-halting" is the consistent, verifiable answer — just as we consistently say the Liar is not true (and not coherently false either). Thus, yes: requiring a correct binary decision on the direct execution of the pathological P is precisely analogous to requiring a correct truth value for the Liar Paradox. Both demands are incoherent due to the same kind of twisted self-reference, and both are correctly resolved by recognizing the incoherence and refusing to play the contradictory game. (shrink)

This work is a complete mathematical guide to lottery games, covering all of the problems related to probability, combinatorics, and all parameters describing the lottery matrices, as well as the various playing systems. The mathematics sections describe the mathematical model of the lottery, which is in fact the essence of the lotto game. The applications of this model provide players with all the mathematical data regarding the parameters attached to the gaming events and personal playing systems. By applying these data, (...) one can find all the winning probabilities for the play with one line, and how these probabilities change with playing the various types of systems containing several lines, depending on their structure. Also, each playing system has a formula attached that provides the number of possible multiple prizes in various circumstances. Other mathematical parameters of the playing systems and the correlations between them are also presented. The generality of the mathematical model and of the obtained formulas allows their application for any existent lottery and any playing system. Each formula is followed by numerical results covering the most frequent lottery matrices worldwide and by multiple examples predominantly belonging to the 6/49 lottery. The listing of the numerical results in dozens of well-organized tables, along with instructions and examples of using them, makes possible the direct usage of this guide by players without a mathematical background. The author also discusses from a mathematical point of view the strategies of choosing involved in the lotto game. The book does not offer so-called winning strategies, but helps players to better organize their own playing systems and to confront their own convictions with the incontestable reality offered by the direct applications of the mathematical model of the lotto game. As a must-have handbook for any lottery player, this book offers essential information about the game itself and can provide the basis for gaming decisions of any kind. (shrink)

This collection of papers centres around a novel approach to the problem of phenomenal consciousness called cosmopsychism. A simple version of cosmopsychism says that the cosmos as a whole is conscious. In this collection, I focus on a comparison between arguably the most promising versions of cosmopsychism and panpsychism, called constitutive cosmopsychism and constitutive panpsychism, respectively. -/- The first paper, ‘A Blueprint for Cosmopsychism’ offers a blueprint for a cosmopsychist approach, comparing it to the panpsychist approach. It highlights how (...) following the blueprint allows one to sidestep the most serious of panpsychism’s problems, the combination problem, while also avoiding the problem of infinite decomposition. However, it notes that the approach must address a serious problem of its own in the derivation problem. -/- The second paper, ‘Beyond Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism? Focuses’ on two related views that reject subjects of experience at the fundamental level, thus avoiding the subject aspects of the combination and derivation problems. Albahari’s perennialism is touted as the natural successor to cosmopsychism; avoiding its subject derivation problem while maintaining a cosmic consciousness. Meanwhile, Coleman’s panqualityism is touted as a natural successor to panpsychism; avoiding its combination problem while maintaining that phenomenality is present at the level of microphysical ultimates. However, I show both views seem to face problems equal in measure to those they seek to avoid. -/- The third paper, ‘The Subject Problem for Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism’ targets the hardest problems for constitutive panpsychism and constitutive cosmopsychism; the subject combination problem and the subject derivation problem, respectively. I show that the two problems are almost identical, both hinging on the entailment of what I call synchronous perspectives scenarios. I formulate broad arguments from metaphysical impossibility and epistemic implausibility against both views, based on such scenarios. However, I provide a possible model of how to understand synchronous perspective scenarios unproblematically. I also provide several alternative responses. -/- The fourth, and final, paper in the collection provides an account of, and motivation for, a version of cosmopsychism I call CRP cosmopsychism. This version of cosmopsychism is created on the priority cosmopsychism blueprint and has three further key commitments: simple panpsychism, priority monism and Russellian monism. The paper motivates each of these commitments both in isolation and in partnership, before responding to each of the derivation problems; the subject derivation problem, the quality derivation problem and the structure derivation problem. Furthermore, I argue that cosmopsychism should be preferred over panpsychism owing to considerations concerning internal relations. (shrink)

Panpsychism, the view that consciousness is present everywhere at the fundamental level of reality, has established itself as an increasingly popular option in the philosophy of mind. Situated between substance dualism and reductive physicalism, panpsychism aims to capture the intuitions behind both, integrating consciousness into the physical world without explaining it in terms of purely physical facts. In this thesis, I offer a defence of panpsychism. -/- First, I examine influential arguments against physicalism, such as Thomas Nagel’s (1974, 1979) perspective-based (...) proposal, Frank Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument, David Chalmers’ (1996, 2010) conceivability argument, as well as vagueness arguments (Antony 2006a; Tye 1996). I argue that none of them offers a knockdown case against physicalism, particularly because of the threat presented by the phenomenal concept strategy (Chalmers 2007; Papineau 2007a), though they suggest panpsychism as a promising alternative that avoids many common objections. -/- Second, I discuss independent arguments for panpsychism, including the Russellian monist view (Goff 2017; Russell 1927/1992), the intrinsic nature argument (Seager 2006; Strawson 2006), recent developments in the literature as presented by Hedda Hassel Mørch (2018, 2020) and Luca Dondoni (2022), Tye’s (2021b) representational panpsychism based on the vagueness argument, as well as cosmopsychism (Nagasawa & Wager 2016; Shani 2015) – an alternative to panpsychism that shares its aims whilst claiming to avoid its shortcomings. -/- Third, I address the most pressing objection to panpsychism: the combination problem or the question of how fundamental consciousness can combine to lead to complex consciousness (James 1890). Focusing especially on the subject-summing version of the combination problem or the issue of how small subjects can combine to form complex subjects, I go over various proposals for either solving or avoiding it, such as Philip Goff’s (2016) phenomenal bonding relation and William Seager’s (2010) combinatorial infusion proposal, arguing against both and agreeing at the end with Sam Coleman (2014), who advocates that subject-summing is demonstrably incoherent. -/- However, as I argue in the fourth and final chapter, the panpsychist still has an option that avoids the subject-summing problem, while also circumventing the objections faced by the alternative view of cosmopsychism. Inspired though not reliant on the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1902/2005), I introduce what I call monadic panpsychism, the view that the phenomenal character of any given consciousness-bearing physical ultimate is determined by its relations to other such ultimates featuring in the relevant causal structure. -/- The theory consists of two key claims. The first is that phenomenal qualities are relational rather than intrinsic. This view has precedent in literature on the philosophy of mind, such as in Rudolf Carnap (1928), Gottlob Frege (1956), Moritz Schlick (1959), as well as more recently in David Hilbert and Mark Kalderon (2000) and Austen Clark (2000), though not in the context of panpsychism. -/- The second claim is that physical ultimates only possess a very basic form of consciousness necessary for experiencing as such. There are many ways to conceptualise this basic consciousness: non-relational or intrinsic, rudimentary and non-specific, a point of view without experiences, the minimal subject, a mere conduit for experience, phenomenal space, etc. Russellian panpsychists offer a more detailed proposal in which every physical ultimate has an appropriate associated type of experience. For example, all quarks have the same quark-type of experience, assuming for the sake of discussion that quarks are ultimates. Still, arguing for a more minimal notion, as I do, requires making less claims and should not be controversial to any panpsychist. -/- So, what follows from these two claims? I propose that the relational constitution of phenomenal qualities has its endpoint at the fundamental level rather than at the level of a combined complex or emergent subject. Put simply, physical ultimates guarantee the basic consciousness or the point of view that I occupy, while the relational structure constitutes my rich and full human experience. So to speak, relationally constituted phenomenal qualities ‘anchor’ themselves in physical ultimates. As long as these relations result in a phenomenally unified experience, which is an uncontroversial thesis, then no matter where that process reaches the end of its causal chain, it will necessarily be experienced from a subjective point of view. -/- Since only qualities but not subjects need to combine, my proposal avoids the subject-summing version of the combination problem, which is arguably an insurmountable challenge to other forms of panpsychism. Because of this, I conclude that my theory contributes to the field, serving as a good starting point for further developments of neither combinatory nor emergent panpsychism with regard to subjects. (shrink)

Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel argues that yes, collective entities, may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer, Tononi and Koch, and List reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. I argue here that (...) List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist. (shrink)

Russellian monism (RM) attributes experience to the intrinsic nature of physics’ abstract mathematical accounts of the world. It’s touted as a promising mind-body solution, for it avoids dualist and physicalist issues. Yet this status is imperiled by its deeply obscure ideas of mental combination, protophenomenal entities, emergent experience, grounded abstractions, et cetera. This “metaphysical magical mystery tour” may render RM as problematic as competing views. A clear, simple panpsychism akin to Strawson’s might avoid these issues. In this theory (NPP), (...) experience is the real, underlying nature of matter-energy, hidden beyond its sensory appearances. NPP may avoid panpsychist combination problems by showing how neurons can electrically bind their minimal experience to form percepts, thoughts, and subjects. This might explain combination in testable ways, while RM instead turns to questionable microsubjects and binding mechanisms. NPP’s virtues are its metaphysical simplicity, empirical support, testable foundations—and its avoidance of the issues in RM and other standard theories. It might point to a mind-body solution. (shrink)

Building upon the author’s previous framework of "Point-Luminism" as an ontological engineering of light, this paper investigates the metaphysical implications of the discrete luminous unit (DLU). We propose a novel synthesis of Leibnizian Monadology and contemporary Constitutive Panpsychism, termed "Monad-Quantum Isomorphism." We argue that the discrete points on the canvas are not merely physical reflectors but visual models of "Proto-Phenomenal Monads." The central challenge of panpsychism—the "Combination Problem"—is addressed through the introduction of the artist as a "Strong Observer." (...) By imposing a high-density "Signature of Intentionality" (SI), the artist forces discrete micro-experiences to phase-lock into a coherent macroscopic gestalt. This establishes Point-Luminism not only as an aesthetic practice but as an empirical method for activating the latent consciousness of the material world. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russellian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Russellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dispositional properties (...) are identified. I maintain that the identity theory serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsychism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that identity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering. (shrink)

Students enter science classrooms already familiar with the world around them: they’ve felt the wind, seen lightning, and wondered why the sun sets. These everyday encounters, though intuitively understood (perhaps sometimes misunderstood?), are also entry points into powerful scientific explanations. Such ordinary experiences become extraordinary when reframed through concepts like combustion, refraction, or energy transfer. Scientific concepts do not merely describe phenomena; they seek to explain them by revealing hidden mechanisms and causal patterns. These abstract concepts like energy, or gene (...) are not static facts to be memorized but the outcome of centuries of creative thinking, model-building, and conceptual transformation. Thus, creativity emerges not merely from personal inspiration but from an interaction between individuals, symbolic domains of knowledge, and social fields of recognition (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). This systems approach of creativity has been emphasized by several scholars (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1996, 1999; Simonton, 1988; Woodman and Schoenfield, 1989). Scientific concepts are embedded within these symbolic systems as domains of shared networks of representations and methods that structure thought and inquiry (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; 1996; 1999). While culturally transmitted, such concepts aim to map onto real causal patterns in the world, reflecting universal cognitive categories and ontological structures. Scientific creativity, then, is a culturally situated yet cognitively grounded process that drives meaningful conceptual change and helps learners move beyond misconceptions (Mason, 2020). To foster this creativity in education, we must treat science not as a static body of knowledge but as a dynamic system of ideas that are continually generated, evaluated, and reimagined. This requires going beyond the transmission of ‘course content’ to cultivating the cognitive, emotional, and cultural conditions that support transformative insight, immersing learners in symbolic domains and helping them develop the habits of thought, modeling practices, and conceptual tools needed to reshape those systems. In this chapter, I aim to illuminate some of these conditions and propose a framework for enriching scientific creativity in the classroom and beyond—one that emphasizes developing and appropriately constraining student’s scientific imagination; not just teaching about science or how to do it. (shrink)

Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is (...) significant because it parallels and corroborates well-known worries about natural evil. Problems one and two, especially when combined, support naturalism over theism, intensify the problem of divine hiddenness, challenge Alvin Plantinga’s views about the naturalness of theism, and advance the discussion about whether the conflict between science and religion is genuine or superficial. (shrink)

This paper connects the hard problem of consciousness to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. It shows that constitutive Russellian pan(proto)psychism (CRP) is compatible with Everett’s relative-state (RS) interpretation. Despite targeting different problems, CRP and RS are related, for they both establish symmetry between micro- and macrosystems, and both call for a deflationary account of Subject. The paper starts from formal arguments that demonstrate the incompatibility of CRP with alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics, followed by showing that RS entails Russellian (...) pan(proto)psychism. Therefore, CRP and RS are mutually supportive. It then provides a unified ontological picture by combining CRP and RS. The challenge faced by CRP, the combination problem, can be resolved by adopting a RS version of quantum mechanics. Technically, this is achieved by a co-consciousness relation capable of explaining the difference between first-person and third-person perspectives. The hierarchical structure of the relation removes any concern on the structural mismatch between the physical and the phenomenal. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism (RM), the quiddities which underlie the fundamental causal structure of the physical world are also responsible for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. This view has been argued to provide an attractive alternative to physicalism and dualism, but it is plagued by the so-called ‘combination problem’ – namely, the problem of explaining how the quiddities underlying the microphysical structure of a macroscopic conscious agent (e.g., a human being) combine together to constitute his or her (...) phenomenal experiences. In this paper, I will explore a type of monism that avoids the combination problem altogether. According to this view – which I shall call panquidditist monism – all causal roles, and not just the fundamental ones, stand in need of quiddities realizing them. Moreover, the quiddities that realize causal roles at one physical level should not in general be seen as grounded in, or otherwise derivative on, the quiddities that realize causal roles at lower levels. Crucial to the tenability of this view is a distinction between two varieties of grounding – one aiming to metaphysically explain the causal properties of various objects ‘from below’ (vertical grounding), the other aiming to metaphysically explaining them ‘from the inside’ (horizontal grounding). I will argue that, thanks to the distinction between vertical and horizontal grounds, panquidditist monism is well-placed to secure the advantages that RM promises – but, because of the combination problem, fails to deliver – vis-à-vis physicalism and dualism. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is fundamentally a problem of geometry. We demonstrate this through a mathematical analysis of color perception, focusing on magenta—a phenomenal color with no corresponding wavelength in the electromagnetic spectrum. Using comparative data from human and bee vision, we show that magenta represents consciousness performing a one-point compactification on the open linear spectrum, transforming it into a closed phenomenal circle. This topological closure is species-specific in its endpoints but universal in its structure: every visual (...) system must solve the problem of organizing a bounded segment of the infinite electromagnetic spectrum into a complete chromatic space. We formalize this using split-complex manifolds, where color space exhibits a mixed metric signature combining circular (complex) geometry for hue with hyperbolic geometry for brightness. The existence of "impossible colors"—phenomenal states accessible only through physiological disruption, lying outside the spindle of physically realizable colors—demonstrates that phenomenal color space necessarily transcends the boundaries of physical possibility. (shrink)

I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what (...) the subject/self is. One aspect of consciousness left unexplored and unappreciated by panpsychist theories is pre-reflective self-consciousness/self-awareness. Theories of the self, inspired by phenomenology, that are serious about subjectivity, could be of use in arguing against the deflationary reductionism of the experiencing subject. These theories show that there is more to the subject of experience than just its experiences (qualities). Even without arguing for any precise account of the nature of the self, it can be shown what phenomenology of subjective character of consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness contributes to the combination problem debate. (shrink)

We investigate flexibility and problem solving in skilled action. We conducted a field study of mountain bike riding that required a learner rider to cope with major changes in technique and equipment. Our results indicate that relatively inexperienced individuals can be capable of fairly complex 'on-the-fly' problem solving which allows them to cope with new conditions. This problem solving is hard to explain for classical theories of skill because the adjustments are too large to be achieved by (...) automatic mechanisms and too complex and rapid to be achieved by cognitive processes as they are usually understood. A recent theory, Mesh, can explain these results because it posits that skill-specific cognitive abilities develop during skill learning and that control typically involves an interplay between cognitive and automatic mechanisms. Here we develop Mesh further, providing a detailed explanation for these problem solving abilities. We argue that causal representation, metacognitive awareness and other forms of performance awareness combine in the formulation and control of action strategies. We also argue that the structure of control present in this case is inconsistent with Bratman's model of intentions, and that, in the face of high uncertainty and risk, intentions can be much more labile than Bratman recognises. In addition, we found limitations and flaws in problem solving which illuminate the representations involved. Finally, we highlight the crucial role of social and cultural learning in the development of complex skills. (shrink)

This article focuses on addressing Marilyn McCord Adams’ ‘Problem of Hell' - the argument that eternal damnation is incompatible with divine goodness and omnipotence. While Adams proposes universalism as the solution, this raises concerns about preserving human freedom and moral responsibility. Drawing on insights from Thomas Hopko, Richard Swinburne, Jacques Maritain, and Alexander Pruss, I develop the ‘Presence-Union’ model of hell that reconciles eternal separation from God with divine goodness. This model demonstrates how the unveiled presence of divine love, (...) combined with a miraculous restoration of natural felicity and the distinction between formal and real union with God, provides a coherent alternative to both traditional views of hell and universalism, and maintains both divine mercy and the gravity of human moral choice. (shrink)