This paper offers a phenomenological and developmental investigation into constructive play as a legitimate pathway in the architecture of human becoming. Beginning with first-person reflection on the author's childhood pattern of building scenarios rather than animating narratives—creating airports, cities, and functional systems rather than voicing characters or enacting dramas—the analysis integrates Sara Smilansky's taxonomy of play types with Erik Erikson's psychosocial framework and existentialist attention to authentic self-formation. The paper argues that the developmental literature's privileging of sociodramatic (...) play as "the most mature type of play" obscures the distinct cognitive orientations and developmental contributions of constructive, object-oriented play. Drawing on the Van Gogh Curve framework—which reconceptualizes apparent deficits as specialized excellences—and neurodiversity research demonstrating that "grounded-in-reality" play preferences represent legitimate cognitive specialization rather than failed dramatic competence, the paper reframes the central question from "was my play normal?" to "was my play true to my nature?" This PsyPhi integration—the consilience of psychological empiricism and philosophical reflection—reveals that constructive play serves developmental functions in spatial reasoning, systems thinking, and goal-directed achievement while anticipating adult capacities as architects of possibility. The paper concludes that the scenario-builder who creates structures within which others may find space to become offers not animation but architecture, not stories but the stages on which stories can be told. (shrink)

The notion of social construction plays an important role in many areas of social philosophy, including the philosophy of gender and sex, the philosophy of race, and the philosophy of disability. Yet it is far from clear how this notion is to be understood. One promising proposal in the recent literature is that social construction may be analyzed in terms of the notion of metaphysical grounding. In this paper, I introduce a new problem for this ground-theoretic approach to social construction, (...) and I argue that extant ground theoretic accounts are unable to avoid this and other problems. I then propose a novel ground-theoretic account of social construction which avoids these problems. The core idea is that cases of social construction involve a distinctively social means of construction. I develop this idea using the notion of meta-ground, so that on the resulting view the distinctive feature of socially constructed facts is that their associated meta grounds include a suitable connective social fact. (shrink)

Constructive realism (CR) is an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with naïve realism and radical constructivism. There are different versions for CR. In this paper, I defend a particular version of CR. Complexity of reality, on the one hand, and the impact of human mind, language, and culture, on the other, leads to the inevitable contribution of constructs in knowledge development. According to the CR, even if mental, linguistic and cultural side of constructs could not be avoided in (...) principle, a certain proportion of reality-contact can be considered and defended for the constructs. In this sense, human mind and culture has a constitutive role to play in knowledge acquiring instead of being an innocent means in the process of acquiring knowledge. On the other hand, the role played by the reality in this process cannot be ignored because, according to the CR, knowledge consists after all of knowing 'something' in the real world. On the whole, taking into account both the constitutive role of mind and culture, on the one hand, and the inevitable role of the reality, on the other, shows the difference between the CR and pure realism, pure constructivism, and those versions of CR that do not take the constitutive role of mind into account. There are requirements for the CR in science education. First of all, there must be a constant caution for making sure that our scientific theories have caught the proportion of reality-contact. This point shows the difference between the CR and pure constructivism. This caution should be present in our science teaching as well. Secondly, we should encourage our students to develop imaginative alternative constructs when they are learning sciences. This shows the difference between the CR with naïve realists who ignore the importance of students' imaginations in suggesting alternative constructs. Notwithstanding, while we encourage the students to develop their imaginative constructs, there should be considered a limitation for their over-justification about their constructs. In this way, we as teachers should urge them to take counter-evidence most seriously into account. This is a point in which constructive realists are distinguished from pragmatists too. Pragmatists do not give up their theories in confrontation with counter-evidence but rather look for almost limitless changes in their constructs in order for making the counterevidence compatible with their theories, whereas constructive realists will be ready to take counterevidence more serious and correct their constructs accordingly. (shrink)

Kant's reasoning in his special metaphysics of nature is often opaque, and the character of his a priori foundation for Newtonian science is the subject of some controversy. Recent literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science has fallen well short of consensus on the aims and reasoning in the work. Various of the doctrines and even the character of the reasoning in the Metaphysical Foundations have been taken to present insuperable obstacles to accepting Kant's claim to ground Newtonian science. (...) Gordon Brittan and Gerd Buchdahl, amongst others, have argued that Kant's stated aims in this case are not to be taken at face value, and that prior ontological commitments play a hidden but central role in Kant's special metaphysics. ;Michael Friedman has shown how Kant's stated aims can be taken seriously with his ingenious reconstruction of the Metaphysical Foundations as a demonstration of the a priori basis for our thinking bodies to be in true motion and in absolute space. However, Friedman does not address the issue of matter theory--despite the importance of the issue to Kant. I argue that a strict reading of both the stated aims and doctrines of the Metaphysical Foundations is possible, since much of Kant's reasoning about the empirical concept of matter can be explained by his views on how the construction of empirical concepts is possible. ;Kant's quasi-mathematical constructions are pivotal in Friedman's interpretation. Constructibility is Kant's criterion of acceptability for the concepts of natural science. Yet Kant notoriously fails to construct the dynamical concept of matter, and accepts this failure with an equally notorious complacency. I argue that Kant's criteria of empirical concept construction, apart from any prior ontological commitments, are enough to generate his views on matter. Kant's failure to construct the requisite concept of matter can be ascribed to a missing law of nature, a law of the relation of forces the discovery of which Kant thought imminent. I conclude that matter theory is central to the Metaphysical Foundations, but that this does not undermine Kant's stated aim of giving the a priori ground of Newtonian science. (shrink)

Road construction projects play an important role in enhancing mobility, economic activities, and social well-being. However, when abandoned, they often create more challenges than benefits for affected communities. Consequently, abandoned road projects have become recurring problems that disrupt environmental stability and socioeconomic development. This study evaluated the environmental and socioeconomic effects of abandoned road construction projects on residents of Awka South L. G. A. of Anambra State. The study employed a survey research design. The population for this study comprised (...) all the residents of the five towns of Amawbia, Awka, Isiagu, Nibo and Okpuno in Awka South Local Government Area. The selected roads are; Dan Mmaduka Avenue, Amawbia, Ifite road, Awka, Isiagu Road, Isiagu, Onyenwochi road, Nibo and ObyOkoli Avenue, Okpuno. Sampling combined purposive, proportionate stratified, and systematic techniques to ensure representativeness across five locations. The study employed structured questionnaire as the primary instrument for data collection, targeting residents within a 500-meter radius of abandoned road projects in Awka South L. G. A. Using Yamane’s formula, a sample size of 399 was determined, with 386 valid responses returned (96.7% rate). In addition, semi-structured interviews with health workers, business owners, and drivers provided qualitative insights. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and ANOVA. Environmental issues identified include air pollution (32.6%), erosion (23.1%), water stagnation (15.3%), and flooding (14.2%), while socioeconomic effects include increased transport costs (34.5%), loss of business income (23.1%), reduced market access (13.5%), among others. The ANOVA and post hoc tests revealed that abandoned road construction projects significantly affect residents’ socioeconomic activities across the selected road locations in Awka South L.G.A. (p = .000). Impacts varied across locations, with Dan Mmaduka Avenue least affected and Onyenwochi most impacted. From the findings, it was recommended that active involvement of host communities in planning, land acquisition, and monitoring can reduce resistance and foster ownership. Continuous dialogue with stakeholders ensures smoother execution and reduces the risk of abandonment. (shrink)

How Moore’s open question argument works, insofar as it does, remains a matter of controversy. My purpose here is to construct an open question argument based on a novel interpretation of how Moore’s argument might work. In order to sidestep exegetical questions, I do not claim here to be offering Moore’s own argument. Rather, I offer a reconstruction making use of important elements of Moore’s methodology and assumptions that could be reasonable within a Moorean viewpoint. The crucial role within the (...) argument is played by what I call the real thought move. I show that the reconstructed argument is more defensible from some standard objections than the common construction. I finish by drawing attention to a neglected objective that would make sense within Moore’s viewpoint, showing that it fits with a major commitment of Bonjour’s moderate rationalism, and show how the package might be important for the non-naturalist today. (shrink)

Autobiographical interviews are a key tool in various social science disciplines. Autobiographical narratives, the product of these interviews, suggest that individuals use self-narration to construct their identity. In addition to remembering, interviewees often engage in parallel additional mental tasks (AMTs), such as action evaluation, counterfactual imagination, and value expression. Although research on autobiographical interviews has highlighted the occurrence of these AMTs, the cognitive processes behind them remain underexplored. In this article, I draw on the theoretical framework of Simulation Theory, which (...) is influential in the psychology and philosophy of memory, to examine the nature of AMTs and their role in identity construction. According to simulationist accounts, remembering personal past events relies on mental simulation as a general mechanism for episodic construction. I argue that this mechanism not only enables recalling information about the past but also supports AMTs that help achieve the agent’s current goals. In autobiographical interviews, the coordinated use of recalling information about the past and engaging in AMTs serves to construct identity through self-narration. AMTs play a key role in reinforcing or altering beliefs about the self by tapping into the malleability of memory and the need for coherence between memories and self-conceptions. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to elucidate Russell’s construction of spatial points, which is to be <br>considered as a paradigmatic case of the "logical constructions" that played a central role in his epistemology and theory of science. Comparing it with parallel endeavours carried out by Carnap and Stone it is argued that Russell’s construction is best understood as a structural representation. It is shown that Russell’s and Carnap’s representational constructions may be considered as incomplete and sketchy harbingers of (...) Stone’s representation theorems. The representational program inaugurated by Stone’s theorems was one of the success stories of 20th century’s mathematics. This suggests that representational constructions à la Stone could also be important for epistemology and philosophy of science. More specifically it is argued that the issues proposed by Russellian definite descriptions, logical constructions, and structural representations still have a place on the agenda of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Finally, the representational interpretation of Russell’s logical constructivism is used to shed some new light on the recently vigorously discussed topic of his structural realism. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper explores the confrontation of physical and contextual factors involved in the emergence of the subject of color measurement, which stabilized in essentially its present form during the interwar period. The contentions surrounding the specialty had both a national and a disciplinary dimension. German dominance was curtailed by American and British contributions after World War I. Particularly in America, communities of physicists and psychologists had different commitments to divergent views of nature and human perception. They therefore had to (...) negotiate a compromise between their desire for a quantitative system of description and the perceived complexity and human-centeredness of color judgment. These debates were played out not in the laboratory but rather in institutionalized encounters on standards committees. Such groups constitute a relatively unexplored historiographic and social site of investigation. The heterogeneity of such committees, and their products, highlight the problems of identifying and following such ephemeral historical “actors”. (shrink)

My main purpose here is to provide an account of context selection in utterance understanding in terms of the role played by schemata and goals in top-down processing. The general idea is that information is organized hierarchically, with items iteratively organized in chunks—here called “schemata”—at multiple levels, so that the activation of any items spreads to schemata that are the most accessible due to previous experience. The activation of a schema, in turn, activates its other components, so as to predict (...) a likely context for the original item. Since each input activates its own schemata, conflicting schemata compete with (and inhibit) each other, while multiple activations of a schema raise its likelihood to win the competition. There is therefore a double movement—with bottom-up activation of schemata enabling top-down prediction of other contextual components—triggered by multiple sources. Another claim of the paper is that goals are represented by schemata placed at the highest-levels of the executive hierarchy, in accordance with Fuster’s model of the brain as a hierarchically organized perception action cycle. This account can be considered, in part at least, a development of ideas contained in Relevance Theory, though it may imply that some other claims of the theory are in need of revision. Therefore, a secondary purpose of the paper is a contribution to the analysis of that theory. (shrink)

I describe an account of ontological categories which does justice to the facts that not all categories are ontological categories and that ontological categories can stand in containment relations. The account sorts objects into different categories in the same way in which grammar sorts expressions . It then identifies the ontological categories with those which play a certain role in the systematization of collections of categories. The paper concludes by noting that on my account what ontological categories there are (...) is partially interest-relative, and that furthermore no object can belong essentially to its ontological category. (shrink)

According to Kant, pure intuition is an indispensable ingredient of mathematical proofs. Kant‘s thesis has been considered as obsolete since the advent of modern relational logic at the end of 19th century. Against this logicist orthodoxy Cassirer’s “critical idealism” insisted that formal logic alone could not make sense of the conceptual co-evolution of mathematical and scientific concepts. For Cassirer, idealizations, or, more precisely, idealizing completions, played a fundamental role in the formation of the mathematical and empirical concepts. The aim of (...) this paper is to outline the basics of Cassirer’s idealizational account, and to point at some interesting similarities it has with Kant’s and Peirce’s philosophies of mathematics based on the key notions of pure intuition and theorematic reasoning, respectively. (shrink)

In this article , I first engage in some conceptual clarification of what the words "imagine," "imagining," and "imagination" can mean. Each has a constructive sense, an attitudinal sense, and an imagistic sense. Keeping the senses straight in the course of cognitive theorizing is important for both psychology and philosophy. I then discuss the roles that perceptual memories, beliefs, and genre truth attitudes play in constructive imagination, or the capacity to generate novel representations that go well beyond (...) what's prompted by one's immediate environment. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Time Consciousness Principle (TCP), a novel theoretical framework proposing that time is not an external physical metric, but an emergent property of conscious awareness. In contrast to traditional physics, which treats time as a dimension derived from motion and anchored by the constancy of light, TCP asserts that time originates within the perceptual and cognitive processes of observers. This model invites a shift in how we understand temporal flow—not as a passive backdrop to matter and energy (...) but as an active construct of consciousness. TCP challenges the circular logic of defining time through light while also using light to define time. By decoupling time from light and gravity, and rooting it instead in consciousness, the principle opens up a fresh line of inquiry connecting phenomenology, quantum observation, and cosmology. If conscious observation plays a central role in quantum mechanics, then the experience of time must also be subjective and context-sensitive. The paper explores how this approach might provide new perspectives on unresolved cosmological phenomena such as dark energy and the arrow of time. TCP aligns with contemporary philosophical arguments by thinkers like Rovelli, Penrose, and Wigner, who have questioned the objectivity and linearity of time. Ultimately, TCP offers a bridge between physics and phenomenology, suggesting that any complete theory of the universe must account not just for matter and forces—but also for conscious experience. (shrink)

People construe reality by using words as basic units of meaningful categorization. The present theory-driven study applied the method of a free association task to explore how people express the concepts of the world and the self in words. The respondents were asked to recall any five words relating with the word world. Afterwards they were asked to recall any five words relating with the word self. The method of free association provided the respondents with absolute freedom to choose any (...) words they wanted. Such free recall task is suggested as being a relatively direct approach to the respondents’ self- and world-related conceptual categories, without enormous rational processing. The results provide us, first, with associative ranges for constructs of the world and the self, where some associative dimensions are defined by semantic polarities in the meanings of peripheral categories (e.g., Nature vs. Culture). Second, our analysis showed that some groups of verbal categories that were associated with the words world and self are central, while others are peripheral with respect to the central position. Third, the analysis of category networks revealed that some categories play the role of a transmitter, mediating the pathway between other categories in the network. (shrink)

To construct a synthetic cell we need to understand the rules that permit life. A central idea in modern biology is that in addition to the four entities making reality, matter, energy, space and time, a fifth one, information, plays a central role. As a consequence of this central importance of the management of information, the bacterial cell is organised as a Turing machine, where the machine, with its compartments defining an inside and an outside and its metabolism, reads and (...) expresses the genetic program carried by the genome. This highly abstract organisation is implemented using concrete objects and dynamics, and this is at the cost of repeated incompatibilities (frustration), which need to be sorted out by appropriate «patches». After describing the organisation of the genome into the paleome (sustaining and propagating life) and the cenome (permitting life in context), we describe some chemical hurdles that the cell as to cope with, ending with the specific case of the methionine salvage pathway. (shrink)

Any philosophy of science ought to have something to say about the nature of mathematics, especially an account like constructive empiricism in which mathematical concepts like model and isomorphism play a central role. This thesis is a contribution to the larger project of formulating a constructive empiricist account of mathematics. The philosophy of mathematics developed is fictionalist, with an anti-realist metaphysics. In the thesis, van Fraassen's constructive empiricism is defended and various accounts of mathematics are considered (...) and rejected. Constructive empiricism cannot be realist about abstract objects; it must reject even the realism advocated by otherwise ontologically restrained and epistemologically empiricist indispensability theorists. Indispensability arguments rely on the kind of inference to the best explanation the rejection of which is definitive of constructive empiricism. On the other hand, formalist and logicist anti-realist positions are also shown to be untenable. It is argued that a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics must be fictionalist. Borrowing and developing elements from both Philip Kitcher's constructive naturalism and Kendall Walton's theory of fiction, the account of mathematics advanced treats mathematics as a collection of stories told about an ideal agent and mathematical objects as fictions. The account explains what true portions of mathematics are about and why mathematics is useful, even while it is a story about an ideal agent operating in an ideal world; it connects theory and practice in mathematics with human experience of the phenomenal world. At the same time, the make-believe and game-playing aspects of the theory show how we can make sense of mathematics as fiction, as stories, without either undermining that explanation or being forced to accept abstract mathematical objects into our ontology. All of this occurs within the framework that constructive empiricism itself provides the epistemological limitations it mandates, the semantic view of theories, and an emphasis on the pragmatic dimension of our theories, our explanations, and of our relation to the language we use. (shrink)

Geometry, etymologically the “science of measuring the Earth”, is a mathematical formalization of space. Just as formal concepts of number may be rooted in an evolutionary ancient system for perceiving numerical quantity, the fathers of geometry may have been inspired by their perception of space. Is the spatial content of formal Euclidean geometry universally present in the way humans perceive space, or is Euclidean geometry a mental construction, specific to those who have received appropriate instruction? The spatial content of the (...) formal theories of geometry may depart from spatial perception for two reasons: first, because in geometry, only some of the features of spatial figures are theoretically relevant; and second, because some geometric concepts go beyond any possible perceptual experience. Focusing in turn on these two aspects of geometry, we will present several lines of research on US adults and children from the age of three years, and participants from an Amazonian culture, the Mundurucu. Almost all the aspects of geometry tested proved to be shared between these two cultures. Nevertheless, some aspects involve a process of mental construction where explicit instruction seem to play a role in the US, but that can still take place in the absence of instruction in geometry. (shrink)

Freud uses paradoxical and conflictual rhetoric to create an unstable and conflictual picture of the mind. Thus he diverges from both dominant traditions of thought in the West: the Judeo-Christian way of filling all gaps in meaning by putting a single omnipotent divinity in charge of them, and the Enlightenment quest for a final, causal language to describe reality. By both suggesting and displacing a plurality of perspectives on the unconscious, Freud’s text mirrors what it claims happens in our minds, (...) in which unconscious impulses undermine the pretense of total rational self-control. Though Freud suggests that a mechanistic description of the mind may bring us nearer to the reality of the unconscious, he also explains that this reality will remain dark. He not only develops an ostensibly mechanistic vocabulary for unconscious mental processes, but also clarifies that his terminology is most fictional precisely when it seems most scientific. Hence, Freud’s science of the unconscious cannot be assimilated to an empiricist position; its philosophical underpinnings are both Kantian and Nietzschean, with metaphors and analogies playing a crucial role. Two dramatic images, in which the mind appears as a domain of warring gods and a realm of political conflict, demonstrate that Freud did not regard the unconscious as some kind of true inner self. He depicts the mind in general and the unconscious in particular as a pagan, conflictual universe over which no god or goddess can gain exclusive control and where no rigid dictatorship is possible. (shrink)

Various understandings and definitions of time will be reviewed. The nature and structure of time will be reviewed and the concepts of time and passage of time will be refreshed. The fundamental role played by energy and four natural forces in the actions, reactions and interactions concerning matter, anti-matter, energy in space and time will be critically analyzed. The reality how time is constructed during the construction of materials will be presented and discussed. The classical and quantum ideas in this (...) regard will be comprehensively studied. How these ideas will give us a fresh insight about the nature, structure and role of time in the construction of materials through natural scientific and manmade processes will be highlighted. The relations among matter, anti-matter, energy and time will be freshly stated. The milli-, micro-, nano, pico-, femto-, atto-times will be qualitatively analyzed considering physical, inorganic, organic and bio-materials and their construction and structure. The physics of timelessness also will be put forward. -/- . (shrink)

Much of the ethical debate about artificial intelligence turns on a single question: do AI systems behave in line with human preferences, norms, or regulation? This question has primarily been the focus in AI ethics. This paper offers a conceptual and philosophical contribution. Here we give an alternative basis for AI ethics by evaluating the role technology plays in building and stabilising worlds of meaning. Experience is modelled as passing through nested representational layers: the world W, the screen of perceived (...) reality W′ on which agents encounter and interpret the world, and the artificial screens W′′ built by digital platforms, recommender systems, and immersive environments. Meaning is formed, held, and acted on within a minimal cycle of perception, integration, and action. On that basis, many familiar ethical problems around AI show up less as simple failures of behaviour or compliance and more as breakdowns in semantic coherence i.e. in the preservation of meaning along the chain W → W′ → W′′. Fairness, transparency, accountability, privacy, and safety are recast as aspects of these deeper coherence conditions, not as free-standing technical or policy goals. We derive a four-level hierarchy of ethical depth (L0 - L3) and sketch governance aimed at the integrity of constructed worlds, with consequences for how risk, responsibility, and regulation are conceived when technological mediation is everywhere. (shrink)

This paper presents a speculative framework proposing that the human mind plays an active role in the construction of reality. Drawing on concepts from quantum mechanics, cosmology, and philosophy of time, it suggests that both temporal and spatial structures emerge in relation to conscious observation. The framework introduces the distinction between “quantum time” – the rapid, microscopic temporal scale underlying fundamental processes – and “macro time” – the experienced, linear, macroscopic temporal flow. The central thesis asserts that conscious observation is (...) not merely a passive measurement but a generative force, potentially shaping the emergence of the universe as experienced. Implications include the possibility that objective reality is a derived concept, that multiple mind-constructed realities may coexist, and that time itself may be a cognitive construct. This work aims to stimulate interdisciplinary dialogue between consciousness studies, quantum physics, and cosmology, and invites reevaluation of the foundational assumptions regarding existence, time, and reality. (shrink)

The notion of coolness is connected with a broad range of different meanings that involve personal attitude, taste, fashion choices but also the recognition of uniqueness and authenticity by others. Moreover, coolness is related to self-confidence and imperturbability, as the usual historical reconstructions of its meaning show. In fact, the manifestation of subjective invulnerability is the expression of the general need to avoid any weakness that could challenge one’s own autonomy through other people’s gaze. In other words, the opposite of (...) cool is to be excessively self-conscious, too dependent on the approval of others, and to be exposed and vulnerable to external judgment. Taking cues from these different meanings, this contribution will try to argue how the need for individual autonomy, social recognition and aesthetic fulfilment are closely intertwined in the practices of coolness, defined as acts of “self-construction” and, in particular, as aesthetic self-fashioning. From this perspective, it will be argued that even the most frivolous search for coolness as a stylistic attitude in everyday’s aesthetic domain like fashion, consumption and lifestyle, plays a role in the dynamics of self-assertion and becomes an instrument for recognition and autonomy. (shrink)

Identity labels like “woman”, “Black,” “mother,” and “evangelical” are pervasive in both political and personal life, and in both formal and informal classification and communication. They are also widely thought to undermine agency by essentializing groups, flattening individual distinctiveness, and enforcing discrimination. While we take these worries to be well-founded, we argue that they result from a particular practice of using labels to rigidly label others. We identify an alternative practice of playful self-labelling, and argue that it can function as (...) a tool for combating oppression by expressing and enhancing individual and collective agency. (shrink)

In this paper, I first suggest that Nietzsche and James, two otherwise very different thinkers, both endorse the controversial constructivist view that human representational practices bring all material objects into existence. I then explore their views concerning why and how constructivism can play a vital role in helping us find reality and our lives valuable.

Public debates over the morality of new or emerging technologies tend to devolve into false dichotomies of optimism versus pessimism. Playing God with Emerging Technologies: How to Avoid the Traps of Techno-Optimism and Techno-Pessimism provides a conceptual apparatus for engaging in such debates in a critical manner through the constructive lens of “playing God” arguments. Moti Mizrahi sketches a conceptual framework consisting of an argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments along with Critical Questions. This framework can be used to (...) analyze and evaluate “playing God” arguments as they are made in debates over the ethical development and deployment of new and emerging technologies, such as solar geoengineering, Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous vehicles, autonomous weapons, and more. Mizrahi argues that “playing God” arguments allow us to assume an intermediate, critical attitude between the extremes of hype and panic as well as to approach the governance of new or emerging technologies in ways that might help to increase our control over, improve our understanding of, and prevent our misuse or abuse of such technologies. (shrink)

The arrival of ChatGPT has sparked a broad debate about the future of education in the context of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI). Initial reactions ranged from enthusiasm to fear, but recent research suggests that, assuming ChatGPT has the potential to be a useful teaching tool, it could play a constructive role in the classroom if used with a clear educational purpose. In this article, I analyze the educational role that ChatGPT should play in different learning modalities, considering (...) the latest empirical studies in higher education. Based on a critical synthesis of the current literature, I consider how students and teachers interact with ChatGPT and review different types of usage profiles, ranging from behaviors derived from automated practices to those of collaborative teaching and reflection. I examine the tensions between the tool's efficiency and deep learning, and I argue that its integration requires technical training, but above all, broader AI literacy that considers ethical, critical, and metacognitive aspects. It also examines the extent to which the arrival of ChatGPT challenges course design and traditional forms of assessment, forcing us to redefine the concepts of originality, authorship, and assessment in education. The argument demonstrates that ChatGPT's instructional mediation is more valuable than its outcome. I argue that institutions should not prevent its use; instead, they should establish rules and regulations that encourage responsible, fair, and useful use. In conclusion, it seems to me that ChatGPT should not be considered a substitute for teaching, but rather a way to rethink our education, give students more freedom, and enhance the learning experience. (shrink)

While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival (since giving a wrong answer to the king’s question amounts to losing their life). Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit (implicitly) (...) purposive it is, however, without (explicit) purpose (something akin to Kant’s aesthetic judgement). Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘telos’ in its connection with Platonic ‘paideia’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose (we compete to excel or persuade and win) or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)

I am interested in the use Kant makes of the pure intuition of space, and of properties and principles of space and spaces (i.e. figures, like spheres and lines), in the special metaphysical project of MAN. This is a large topic, so I will focus here on an aspect of it: the role of these things in his treatment of some of the laws of matter treated in the Dynamics and Mechanics Chapters. In MAN and other texts, Kant speaks of (...) space as the “ground,” “condition,” and “basis” of various laws, including the inverse-square and inverse-cube laws of attractive and repulsive force, and the Third Law of Mechanics. Moreover, in his proofs of all the laws just mentioned, the language of “construction” figures prominently, which suggests that Kant’s proofs (somehow) rest on or involve mathematical construction in his technical sense. Such claims give rise to a number of questions. How do properties and principles of space and spaces serve to ground this particular set of laws? Which spatial properties and principles is Kant appealing to? What, if anything, does the spatial grounding of the inverse-square and inverse-cube laws of diffusion (treated in the Dynamics Chapter) have in common with that of the Third treated in the Mechanics Chapter)? What role—if any—does mathematical construction play in Kant’s proofs of these laws? Finally, how if at all, are Kant’s grounding claims consistent with his other commitments—for example, how are they consistent with his notorious denial in Prolegomena §38 that there are any laws that “lie in space” (Prol 4:321)? I offer answers to these questions. (shrink)

In this article, a new, idealizing-hermeneutic methodological approach to developing a theory of philosophical arguments is presented and carried out. The basis for this is a theory of ideal philosophical theory types developed from the analysis of historical examples. According to this theory, the following ideal types of theory exist in philosophy: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. idealizing-hermeneutic, 3. technical-constructive, 4. ontic-practical. These types of theories are characterized in particular by what their basic types of theses are. The main task of (...) this article is then to determine the types of arguments that are suitable for justifying these types of theses. Surprisingly, practical arguments play a key role here. (shrink)

From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But (...) are visual attentional mechanisms sufficient to achieve joint attention, in all cases? Besides cases where visual information is missing, we show how combining it with other senses can be helpful, and even necessary to certain uses of joint attention. We explain the two ways in which non-visual cues contribute to joint attention: either as enhancers, when they complement gaze and pointing gestures in order to coordinate joint attention on visible objects, or as modality pointers, when joint attention needs to be shifted away from the whole object to one of its properties, say weight or texture. This multisensory approach to joint attention has important implications for social robotics, clinical diagnostics, pedagogy and theoretical debates on the construction of a shared world. (shrink)

In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...) predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman's claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. (shrink)

The examination of "Taiwanese Philosophy" is intricately influenced by the complex meanings of its terms4, fostering a range of interpretations and understandings that play a crucial role in the methodological discussions on how Taiwanese philosophical ideas are analyzed and developed. I highlight that the conventional approaches to interpreting "Taiwanese Philosophy" are mainly divided into two models: the PIT framework, signifying "Philosophical activities in Taiwan," and the TP framework, indicating "Taiwanese Philosophy noted for its unique subjectivity" (see Hung & Gao (...) 2018)5. In the early twentieth century, Mou Zongsan's emergence of New Confucianism shaped the academic reception towards the PIT model and elicited critiques of the TP perspective. This trend guided scholars in Chinese philosophy towards the CPIT (Chinese Philosophy in Taiwan) approach for deciphering "Taiwanese Philosophy," typically viewing it as a form of "Chinese philosophical endeavors in Taiwan." The prevailing contemporary academic opinion posits that initial supporters of New Confucianism failed to recognize Taiwanese philosophy’s unique characteristics and position following colonialism, reducing it to the CPIT model. This stance places "Taiwanese Philosophy" within the broader realm of Chinese Philosophy, highlighting the hierarchical differences between Chinese and Taiwanese philosophical traditions, which later drew substantial critique from supporters of Western liberalism and decolonization efforts. Recently, the importance of "Taiwanese Philosophy" and "Taiwanese Theory" has been increasingly acknowledged, with a growing agreement that "Taiwanese Philosophy," ideally interpreted through the TP model6, mirrors Taiwan's collective ethos and academic value rather than the more exhaustive PIT classification, which encompasses diverse philosophical lineages. Proponents of TP recognize the historical importance of the PIT model in documenting the evolution of Taiwanese Philosophy but strongly dispute its completeness for grasping the essence of "Taiwanese Philosophy." I intend to argue that, notwithstanding the recent criticisms against the PIT approach, revisiting PIT with the aid of extensive textual collections, cultural archives, and the study of intellectual history might offer a solid basis for a deeper appreciation of TP. It will explore how the PIT model can lead to significant misunderstandings by introducing two main biases: the belief that PIT sufficiently encapsulates "Taiwanese Philosophy," and the limitation of PIT to a mere geographical context. In addressing these biases, I offer a potential amicable reinterpretation and reassess the critical elements for a metaphysical description of the subjectivity emphasized in TP. -/- Keywords: Optimal interpretation of Taiwanese Philosophy, Subjectivity and Agency, Genealogy of Knowledge, Methodology of Constructing Theories, Characteristics of Regional Philosophy. (shrink)

Violence is one of the most pervasive problems in the world today. Despite all efforts to apply the powers of reason in order to contain, if not completely eliminate violence, violence proves to be capable of escaping capture and re-emerging in new and unexpected forms. Reason and rationality appear to be powerless against violence. The paper explores some philosophical issues that shed new light on the persistence of violence in the modern world. It argues that the failure of modernity to (...) recognize and come to grips with the process of construction that constitutes the basis of our relationship with reality plays a critical role in the continued survival of violence. (shrink)

Semantics plays a role in grammar in at least three guises. (A) Linguists seek to account for speakers‘ knowledge of what linguistic expressions mean. This goal is typically achieved by assigning a model theoretic interpretation in a compositional fashion. For example, *No whale flies* is true if and only if the intersection of the sets of whales and fliers is empty in the model. (B) Linguists seek to account for the ability of speakers to make various inferences based on semantic (...) knowledge. For example, *No whale flies* entails *No blue whale flies* and *No whale flies high*. (C) The wellformedness of a variety of syntactic constructions depends on morpho-syntactic features with a semantic flavor. For example, *Under no circumstances would a whale fly* is grammatical, whereas *Under some circumstances would a whale fly* is not, corresponding to the downward vs. upward monotonic features of the preposed phrases. It is usually assumed that once a compositional model theoretic interpretation is assigned to all expressions, its fruits can be freely enjoyed by inferencing and syntax. What place might proof theory have in this picture? (shrink)

Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from (...) this work, there appear to be a variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life. (shrink)

FROM THE HISTORY OF PHYSICS TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS By Antonino Drago, formerly at Naples University “Federico II”, Italy – drago@unina,.it (Size : 391.800 bytes 75,400 words) The book summarizes a half a century author’s work on the foundations of physics. For the forst time is established a level of discourse on theoretical physics which at the same time is philosophical in nature (kinds of infinity, kinds of organization) and formal (kinds of mathematics, kinds of logic). (...) This double side of the two dichotomies assures a deep comprehension of theoretical physics by avoiding both a purely philosophical analysis and a purely formal analysis, each manifestly insufficient for representing all the aspects of theoretical physics. Among the many formulations of a physical theory, e.g. Mechanics, also Mach(1) recognized technical differences only, Instead my suggestion is to consider their differences as revealing the characteristic features of their foundations. No more radical differences may exist than those concerning both their kinds of Mathematics and their kinds of Logic. As a fact, after the 20th Century within each of these sciences there exist two antagonist foundations, within Mathematics either the classical one or the constructive one(2); within Mathematical Logic either the classical logic or the intuitionist one(3). Let us take Mechanics as an instance. Being the choices of the Newton’s formulation respectively the actual infinity of the differential equations relying on the infinitesimals and the classical logic, a formulation based on the alternative choices is Lazare Carnot’s,(4) whose mathematics is no more than algebraic-trigonometric and the logic is the intuitionist one, because this formulation makes use of doubly negated propositions, whose corresponding affirmative propositions are idealistic or false; i.e. in these cases the law of double negation fails, as in intuitionist logic occurs. By considering these two dichotomies as the foundations of the physical theories, each couple of choices upon them fashions one out four models of scientific theory, which are baptized through the authors of their most representative theories: Newtonian, Carnotian, Lagrangian, Descartesian. In correspondence four versions of the principle of inertia are recognized, as suggested by respectively: Descartes. Lazare Carnot, Enriques and Cavalieri.(5) All that suggests that the four models of scientific theory may be graphically represented as a compass orientating our minds amid the so numerous physical theories. By taking these dichotomies as interpretative categories, a new interpretative history of Physics including both classical and modern physics results according to a quadrilinear development. The birth of modern physics is characterized by the two theories - Einstein’s paper on special relativity and Einstein’s first paper on quanta - whose choices are the alternative ones to those of the previously dominant physical theory, Newtonian mechanics: in the latter paper Einstein i) declares the dichotomy on the kinds of mathematics (“Introduction”) and then he chooses the discrete mathematics; ii) by using doubly negated propositions he organizes his theory in an alternative way to the deductive-axiomatic one.(6) Moreover, a new history of Philosophy of knowledge results. Kant’s first two a priori transcendental categories represent the physical interpretation of the two choices out of the four pairs of choices on the two dichotomies, i.e. the choices of the dominant theory of mechanics, Newton’s. Hegel’s dialectic was a misleading attempt of anticipating the subsequent intuitionist logic. The book starts by a comparison of different formulations of thermodynamics in order to recognize the first dichotomy on the kind of organization. In chapter 2 the dichotomy on the kind of infinity is recognized through a comparison of Newrton’s mechanics and Lazare Carnot’s. A quickly history of the other classical physical theories is illustrated in chapter 3; it results a foundational conflict between the last two theories, and hence a conflict between their opposite couples of choices. The two main theories of modern physics, special realtivity and quantum mechanics confirm the foundational role played by the two dichotomies which gives reason for the radical change in the history of theoretical physics. Indeed, the opposition of the two main pairs of choices gives reason of the crisis in theoretical physics in the early 1900s. As a global result, the book represents the first interpretation of the entire history of Physics, both classical and modern; This fact proves that the four models of scientific theories can works as a compass (that of the front cover) suggesting a direction among the many physical theories. This new history of physics leads to re-visit both Koyré’s and Kuhn’s historiographies. Their interpretative categories are interpreted and explained through the two dichotomies so that it is possible to suggest à la Koyré categories based on the alternative choices theories to Newton’s as the suitable categories for interpreting the alternative theories to Newton’s mechanics. All that suggests a new interpretation of the crucial step in the history of Western philosophy of knowledge, i.e. the passage from Leibniz to Kant: Leibniz’s suggestion of the two labyrinths of human minds may be seen as a close anticipation of the two above dichotomies. Kant applied them in order to construct the well-known four cosmological proofs, which however he misinterpreted as leading to contradictions, instead to tow different methods of investigation corresponding to the two different kinds of logic.(7) Bibliography 1. Mach E. (1883), Die Mechanik, Leipzig: Brockhaus, Chap. IV, Sect. III. 2. Bishop E. (1967), Constructive Analysis, New York: Mc Graw-Hill. 3. Heyting A. (1962), Intuitionism. An Introduction, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 4. L. Carnot (1783), Essai on the Machines en général, Defay, Dijion (Enlish translation: Springer, Berlin, 2020). Drago A. (2004), “A new appraisal of old formulations of mechanics”, Am. J. Phys., 72(3), pp. 407-9. 5. Vella M.R. (2007), “Le quattro versioni del principio di inerzia”, in M. Leone et al. (eds.), L’eredità di Fermi, Majorana e altri Temi. Napoli: ESI, pp. 147-151. 6. Drago A. (2014), “The emergence of two options from Einstein°s first paper on Quanta”, in Pisano R., Capecchi D., Lukesova A. (eds.), Physics, Astronomy and Engineering. Critical Problems in the History of Science and Society, Scientia Socialis P., Siauliai, 2013, pp. 227-234. 7. This and all in the above points are illustrated by the book Drago A. (2017), Dalla Storia della Fisica ai Fondamenti della Scienza, Roma: Aracne. (shrink)

This book provides a deep inquiry into cognitive constructivism, exploring the active role of the subject in constructing understanding of the world and the self through individual and social processes. The work is structured around the development and function of mental models—internal frameworks shaped by experience that categorize, interpret, and predict the world. The title Fabrica Mundi (Construction of the World) signifies this ongoing, dynamic process of making and revising understanding. -/- The analysis integrates multiple domains, examining the foundational role (...) of social interaction in learning, the neurobiological underpinnings of memory and perception, and the challenge to absolute objectivity, suggesting that our access to truth is mediated by cognitive and cultural frameworks. It explores the implications of this constructivist view across disciplines, including developmental psychology (e.g., Barbara Rogoff's work on guided participation), the objective construction of physical and biological reality, and the influence of technological constructs, such as virtual environments and AI, on reshaping human cognition. The book concludes by considering the existential construction of identity and meaning, asserting that the subjective world is a personal universe that dissolves with the cessation of cognitive activity. -/- Availability and Acquisition -/- Hardcover Edition (Lulu): Fabrica Mundi EN Hardcover Paperback Edition (Lulu): Fabrica Mundi Paperback E-book Edition (Lulu): Fabrica Mundi E-book -/- Audiobook (Google Play): Fabrica Mundi Audiobook on Google Play Audiobook (Apple Books): Tenzin C. Trepp on Apple Books Audiobook (Spotify): Spotify Audiobook Link. (shrink)

We develop a simple framework called ‘natural topology’, which can serve as a theoretical and applicable basis for dealing with real-world phenomena.Natural topology is tailored to make pointwise and pointfree notions go together naturally. As a constructive theory in BISH, it gives a classical mathematician a faithful idea of important concepts and results in intuitionism. -/- Natural topology is well-suited for practical and computational purposes. We give several examples relevant for applied mathematics, such as the decision-support system Hawk-Eye, and (...) various real-number representations. -/- We compare classical mathematics (CLASS), intuitionistic mathematics (INT), recursive mathematics (RUSS), Bishop-style mathematics (BISH) and formal topology, aiming to reduce the mutual differences to their essence. To do so, our mathematical foundation must be precise and simple. There are links with physics, regarding the topological character of our physical universe. -/- Any natural space is isomorphic to a quotient space of Baire space, which therefore is universal. We develop an elegant and concise ‘genetic induction’ scheme, and prove its equivalence on natural spaces to a formal-topological induction style. The inductive Heine-Borel property holds for ‘compact’ or ‘fanlike’ natural subspaces, including the real interval [g, h]. Inductive morphisms respect this Heine-Borel property, inversely. This partly solves the continuous-function problem for BISH, yet pointwise problems persist in the absence of Brouwer’s Thesis. -/- By inductivizing the definitions, a direct correspondence with INT is obtained which allows for a translation of many intuitionistic results into BISH. We thus prove a constructive star-finitary metrization theorem which parallels the classical metrization theorem for strongly paracompact spaces. We also obtain non-metrizable Silva spaces, in infinite-dimensional topology. Natural topology gives a solid basis, we think, for further constructive study of topological lattice theory, algebraic topology and infinite-dimensional topology. The final section reconsiders the question of which mathematics to choose for physics. Compactness issues also play a role here, since the question ‘can Nature produce a non-recursive sequence?’ finds a negative answer in CTphys . CTphys , if true, would seem at first glance to point to RUSS as the mathematics of choice for physics. To discuss this issue, we wax more philosophical. We also present a simple model of INT in RUSS, in the two-players game LIfE. (shrink)

James Sterba has constructed a powerful argument for there being a conflict between the presence of evil in the world and the existence of God. I contend that Sterba’s argument depends on a crucial assumption, namely, that God has an obligation to act according to the principle of meticulous providence. I suggest that two of his analogies confirm his dependence on this requirement. Of course, his argument does not rest on either of these analogies, but they are illustrative of the (...) role that meticulous providence plays in his argument. I then investigate the ethical principles Sterba invokes in his use of meticulous providence and suggest that not only do we often not predicate goodness of human persons based on these principles of obligation, but that these principles are much too stringent to function to determine moral obligations and moral goodness. From there, I contend that to think that God has a similar obligation regarding meticulous providence in order to be good encounters several serious problems, especially with respect to the soul-building Sterba wants to preserve. I conclude by considering Sterba’s reply in terms of a limited application of meticulous providence. (shrink)

We face two urgent challenges concerning consciousness and AI. Challenge One is that millions of users will soon misattribute human-like consciousness to AI friends, partners, and assistants on the basis of mimicry and role-play, and we don’t know how to prevent this. Challenge Two is that profoundly alien forms of consciousness might genuinely be achieved in AI, but our theoretical understanding of consciousness is too immature to provide confident answers one way or the other. Centrism about AI consciousness is (...) the position that we must take both challenges seriously. The two challenges interact in ways that make this difficult. Steps to address Challenge One might undermine attempts to address Challenge Two by portraying the idea of conscious AI as impossible or inherently unlikely. Conversely, attempts to address Challenge Two might lead to higher levels of misattribution from ordinary users. This “manifesto” attempts to construct mutually consistent strategies for addressing both challenges. (shrink)

Although nonliberal nationalism has played a prominent role in previously and currently colonized nations of the Third World, its assessment by liberal political theorists has been less than favorable. These theorists believe that nonliberal nationalisms are bound to be oppressive to marginalized members, since they view nonliberal cultures, which such movements aim to protect and maintain, to be essentialist and static monoliths that do not recognize the fundamental value of individual rights. In this article, I defend nonliberal nationalisms of previously (...) or currently colonized nations—what I call nonliberal polycentric nationalisms—by arguing that they can be morally justified, provided that they are democratic. This argument is supported by communitarian constructions of moral agency and culture, which show that nonliberal cultures hold emancipatory potential for the insiders who actively participate in the reconstruction of their national culture. (shrink)

The thought that empathy plays an important role in moral motivation is almost a platitude of contemporary folk psychology. Parallel themes were mooted in German moral philosophy and aesthetics in the 1700s, and versions of the empathy construct remained prominent in continental accounts of moral motivation through the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. This chapter elucidates the Empathic Motivation Hypothesis (EMH) and sets out some of the conceptual and empirical challenges it faces. It distinguishes empathic concern from other dimensions (...) of empathy (e.g., resonance, attunement, distress, and non-empathic concern) and examines the merits of EMH as a developmental thesis, focusing on evidence from psychopathology and attachment theory. (shrink)

This essay aims to construct a relationship between Aristotle's account of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics and the ideal of companionship articulated and lived out by St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order. Although on the surface, it may seem as though Aristotelian friendship and Ignatian companionship have little in common, given that the accounts were developed in such different contexts, I argue that there are similarities worth exploring. Taken together, the accounts can help illuminate the good (...) of friendship as we experience it in the current age. The essay has three parts. In Part I, I set out Aristotle's account of friendship, focusing especially on his claims about shared activity in friendship and the role that friends play in times of suffering and bad fortune. In Part II, I turn to the Ignatian idea of companionship, both as he wrote about it and as he lived it. Ignatian spirituality takes it as a given that human life often follows a very rocky and difficult path. The spiritual practices of the Ignatian tradition are designed to help us cultivate the dispositions and habits necessary to sustain us through those experiences of grief, agony, and isolation. Those same dispositions and habits, I will suggest, also enable us to sustain our friends and be good companions during times of both joy and despair. In Part III, I will draw these two accounts together and consider what friendship on this Aristotelian-Ignatian model might look like today. Here I will focus on the ways in which friends are companions to each other during the despair and isolation occasioned by serious illness, trauma, and death. Both Aristotle and Ignatius have important insights into the value and function of friendship in these moments, insights that can help us think through the contemporary version of the same problem. (shrink)

‘Visualisations play an important role in science’, this seems to be an uncontroversial statement today. Scientists not only use visual representations as means to communicate their research results in publications or talks, but also often as surrogates for their objects of interest during the process of research. Thus, we can make a distinction between two contexts of usage here, namely the explanatory and the exploratory context. The focus of this paper is on the latter one. Obviously, using visualisations as (...) surrogates for their objects of depiction presupposes the assumption that the former can tell us something relevant about the latter. Thus, a particular referential relation between object and image has to be assumed that can transfer the relevant information. Furthermore, as science is a collaborative enterprise – a social activity – this information has to be intersubjectively accessible and stable. Nonetheless, philosophers of science still quarrel about the epistemic and ontological status of such visualisations. After all, they are means to visualise theoretical entities, such as the Higgs Boson, i.e. entities that are principally not observable with the unaided eye. Especially the significant reliance on information technology devices to access this world of the unobservable provokes a lot of suspicion with regard to the referential status of such visualisations. In this sense, quite a few philosophers adopt social constructivism as an explanatory hypothesis. A particular image is constructed with the aid of instruments and theoretical assumptions; hence it does not refer to an entity outside this system. In this paper, I will critically analyse this assumption and try to argue for an alternative point of view. (shrink)

The mass media play a crucial role in modern societies. Media allows reaching with information’s about current events to the broad masses of recipients, they interpret it and construct their meanings, they create a community of values, organize entertainment in leisure time and mediate in mobilizing social movements. Mass communication is also related to conduct of public debate and developing public opinion awareness about social problems. The aim of this article is to bring closer look on the results of (...) empirical analysis of selected messages perceived by older people in the press, radio and television that are related to their image, problems and interests. Work outlines the expectations of senior citizens towards activities of mass media on local and national level. ** Środki komunikowania masowego odgrywają kluczową rolę w społeczeństwach nowoczesnych. Media umożliwiają docieranie informacji o bieżących wydarzeniach do szerokich rzesz odbiorców, interpretują je i konstruują ich znaczenia, wytwarzają wspólnotę wartości, organizują rozrywkę w czasie wolnym oraz pośredniczą w mobilizowaniu ruchów społecznych. Komunikacja masowa jest też związana z prowadzeniem debaty publicznej i uwrażliwianiem opinii publicznej na problemy społeczne. Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie wybranych wyników analiz empirycznych przekazów dostrzeganych przez ludzi starych w prasie, radiu i telewizji związanych z ich wizerunkiem, problemami i interesami. Praca zarysowuje również oczekiwania seniorów wobec działalności mass mediów na poziomie lokalnym i krajowym. (shrink)

In his 1923 play R.U.R.: Rossum s Universal Robots, Karel Capek coined In 1993, we began a humanoid robotics project aimed at constructing a robot for use in exploring theories of human intelligence. In this article, we describe three aspects of our research methodology that distinguish our work from other humanoid projects. First, our humanoid robots are designed to act autonomously and safely in natural workspaces with people. Second, our robots are designed to interact socially with people by exploiting (...) natural human social cues. Third, we believe that robotics offers a unique tool for testing models of human intelligence drawn from developmental psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper sketches some elements that define the pedagogical significance of play for the construction and the conservation of a democratic community. Starting from the main principles of Dewey's pedagogy, the discourse focuses on play, intended as the philosophic category of the ludic, first, in connection to doing and experience, two fundamental notions of Dewey’s thought and his philosophy of education; then, it moves towards the relationship between play and work to come, finally, to play in (...) connection to the social and political sphere. Along this path, it will be highlighted the central place occupied by the aesthetic side and affective element, concentrated especially in the definition of emotion given by Dewey, in order to show the link that connects play and democracy. (shrink)

Recent theories of remembering and of reference (or singular thought) have de-emphasised the role causation was thought to play in mid- to late-twentieth century theorising. According to postcausal theories of remembering, such as simulationism, instances of the psychofunctional kind _remembering_ are not, in principle, dependent on appropriate causal chains running from some event(s) remembered to the occurrence of remembering. Instead they depend only on the reliability, or proper functioning, of the cognitive system responsible for their production. According to broadly (...) reliabilist accounts of _singular thought_, such thought is not, in principle, dependent on causal chains running from the object(s) of thought to the occurrence of thinking. Despite this common trend, accounts of the two phenomena have been pursued separately. In this paper, we argue that the two lines of research can profitably converge to address a neglected question: what enables occurrences of remembering to _refer_ to particular events, and what determines _which_ event a given occurrence of remembering refers to? We motivate and present a reliabilist account of reference-fixing for postcausal theories of remembering, focusing in particular on simulationism. We then show that this account draws attention to the possibility of _referential mnemic confabulation:_ cases where the reliability requirement for reference is met despite the improper functioning of the episodic construction system. We suggest that this makes sense of some underdiscussed phenomena described in the empirical literature on confabulation and argue that our reliabilist account of mnemic reference-fixing accommodates these more naturally than could causal theories of remembering. (shrink)

People routinely appeal to ‘beliefs’ in explaining behavior; psychologists do so as well (for instance, in explaining belief polarization and learning). Across three studies (N = 1,843, U.S-based adults), we challenge the assumption that ‘belief’ picks out a single construct in people’s theory of mind. Instead, laypeople attribute different kinds of beliefs depending on whether the beliefs play predominantly epistemic roles (such as truth-tracking) or non-epistemic roles (such as social signaling). We demonstrate that epistemic and non-epistemic beliefs are attributed (...) under different circumstances (Study 1) and support different predictions about the believer’s values (Study 2) and behavior (Study 3). This differentiation emerges reliably across three distinct signatures of attributed belief, and even when the believed content and attributed level of certainty about that content are held constant across cases. Our findings call for a more fine-grained characterization of theory of mind and provide indirect support for the hypothesis that human cognition itself features multiple varieties of belief. (shrink)