Climate change appears to be a classic aggregation problem, in which billions of individuals perform actions none of which seem to be morally wrong taken in isolation, and yet which combine to drive the global concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) ever higher toward environmental (and humanitarian) catastrophe. When an individual can choose between actions that will emit differing amounts of GHGs―such as to choose a vegan rather than carnivorous meal, to ride a bike to work rather than drive a car, (...) or to take a reusable bag to the supermarket rather than send another plastic bag to landfill―does she have any reason to choose the lower-emitting actions? In this chapter I'll reject the claim that individuals don't make a difference when it comes to climate change. I first discuss making a difference with every action, as a way of getting clearer about how individuals' actions impact causally on the harms resulting from climate change, making a distinction so far overlooked in the climate ethics discussion between 'macro' thresholds like ice-cap melt, and 'micro' thresholds like severe weather events. I set aside making a difference with every action as implausible, and then move on to discuss both low probability of major difference, and high probability of minor difference. I argue that both of these are plausible characterizations of individuals' causal contributions to climate change. I conclude by noting some policy implications of having (probabilistic) individual difference-making back in play. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a concept of behavioural ecological individuality. Using findings from a case study which employed qualitative methods, I argue that individuality in behavioural ecology should be defined as phenotypic and ecological uniqueness, a concept that is operationalised in terms of individual differences such as animal personality and individual specialisation. This account make sense of how the term “individuality” is used in relation to intrapopulation variation in behavioural ecology. The concept of behavioural ecological individuality can sometimes be (...) used to identify individuals. It also shapes research agendas and methodological choices in behavioural ecology, leading researchers to account for individuals as sources of variation. Overall, this paper draws attention to a field that has been largely overlooked in philosophical discussions of biological individuality and highlights the importance of individual differences and uniqueness for individuality in behavioural ecology. (shrink)

Consider the following causal exclusion principle: For all distinct properties F and F* such that F* supervenes on F, F and F* do not both cause a property G. Peter Menzies and Christian List have proven that it follows from a natural conception of causation as difference-making that this exclusion principle is not generally true. Rather, it turns out that whether the principle is true is a contingent matter. In addition, they have shown that in a wide range of (...) empirically ordinary cases, it follows that F* causes G and F does not. These cases plausibly include instances where F* is a mental property and F and G are physical properties. If this is the right conception of causation, it therefore turns out that the physical world is not causally closed. In this paper I show that there is an alternative conception of causation as difference-making that does not have the same consequences. Whether the physical world is causally closed therefore turns out to depend, inter alia, on which conception of difference-making is correct. I give a number of arguments for the alternative conception of difference-making. (shrink)

The graph tong同and its associated concepts, such as da-tong (Great tong大同) and xuan-tong (mystic or dark tong玄同), have played important roles in the development of Chinese philosophy. Yet tong has received scant attention from either western or eastern scholarships. This paper is a first attempt to remedy such regret. Unlike usual understandings of tong as sameness or unity, this paper presents a nuanced account from early China, that is, ‘difference to one,’ a definition from the Mozi墨子. This definition can (...) be supported from etymological, textual, and lexical evidence. ‘Difference to one’ should not be solely attributed to a Mohist understanding; it in fact represents a common understanding of tong across philosophical streams in early China. This nuanced account provides new insights into the concept of tong in early philosophical texts, and furthermore breaks solid grounds for further studies of tong and its associated concepts. (shrink)

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior (...) and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death. (shrink)

Generational differences in societies are characteristics generally attributed to people’s age that constitute a sociocultural phenomenon. Divisions in the generations differ across nations and extend even to civilizations. Perception and recognition of the different characteristics of each generation affect the cooperation between people in social, political, and economic capacities, and subsequently extend to entities in the public, informal, commercial, and nongovernmental sectors. From the perspective of social justice, it is important to draw attention to how workplace management techniques are used (...) to promote equal opportunities among representatives of various generations. (shrink)

Empirical evidence shows that while some people report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes, others report that this is not how things seem. The question then arises as to why we find such different reports. Previously research has shown that beliefs about the future being open (in one of several ways) vary across the population. While to date no association has been found regarding people’s beliefs about time robustly passing, and their beliefs about the (...) future being open, no work has probed the connection between people’s beliefs about the future being open and their reports regarding their temporal experiences. We empirically investigate the experiential open-future hypothesis, according to which people are more inclined to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes if they have certain beliefs about the future being open, and that this at least partially explains why we find differential reporting regarding temporal experiences. We failed to find any evidence in favour of the experiential open-future hypothesis. However, we suggest that given other recent evidence regarding the connection between people’s sense of agency and their reports regarding robust passage, there is reason to investigate the idea that differences in people’s experiences of future openness may explain the variation in their reports regarding time’s robust passage. (shrink)

In a recent paper, I argued that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust both across demographic groups and across development. Machery and Stich reply by reviewing a series of studies that do show significant differences in philosophical intuition between different demographic groups. This is a helpful point, which gets at precisely the issues that are most relevant here. However, even when one looks at those very studies, one finds truly surprising robustness. In other words, despite the presence of statistically significant differences (...) between demographic groups, a core finding coming out of those studies is that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. (shrink)

Passages from the recently excavated Guodian manuscripts bear a surprising resemblance to a position ascribed to Gaozi and his followers in the Mengzi at 6A4-5, namely that righteousness is “external.” Although such a resemblance has been noted, the philosophical implications of it for the debate between Gaozi and Mengzi and, by extension, for Mengzian ethics have been largely unexplored. I argue that a Guodian-inspired reading of 6A4-5 is one that takes the debate to be about whether standing in certain family (...) relations makes a difference to whether one’s actions are righteous. Gaozi denies that it does, holding the view that one’s family relations, i.e., relations internal to the household, are irrelevant when it comes to matters of righteousness, while Mengzi disagrees, arguing that all relational properties, including family relations, are just as much reason-giving properties for performing righteous actions as they are in the case of performing benevolent actions. I argue that such a Guodian-based reading provides us a simple, yet explanatorily powerful reading of 6A4-5 that has broader implications for Mengzian ethics and our understanding of the early Chinese intellectual milieu in general. (shrink)

I argue that an individual has aspects numerically identical with it and each other that nonetheless qualitatively differ from it and each other. This discernibility of identicals does not violate Leibniz's Law, however, which concerns only individuals and is silent about their aspects. They are not in its domain of quantification. To argue that there are aspects I will appeal to the internal conflicts of conscious beings. I do not mean to imply that aspects are confined to such cases, but (...) the best way to start is to recognize them experientially. We can feel the conflicts within ourselves. In doing so we can feel some of our aspects. I will try to enhance our understanding of the concept of aspect by listing and formalizing some principles for its use. After that I will argue that all sorts of individual things have aspects, not just people who are conflicted. (shrink)

The standard view about sex differences in sexual desire is that males are lusty and loose, while females are cool and coy. This is widely believed and is a core premise of some scientific programs like evolutionary psychology. But is it true? A mountain of evidence seems to support the standard view. Yet, this evidence is shot through with methodological and philosophical problems. Developments in the study of sexual desire suggest that some of these problems can be resolved, and when (...) they are, the standard view looks, at best, to be an exaggeration. (shrink)

Standard decision theory has trouble handling cases involving acts without finite expected values. This paper has two aims. First, building on earlier work by Colyvan (2008), Easwaran (2014), and Lauwers and Vallentyne (2016), it develops a proposal for dealing with such cases, Difference Minimizing Theory. Difference Minimizing Theory provides satisfactory verdicts in a broader range of cases than its predecessors. And it vindicates two highly plausible principles of standard decision theory, Stochastic Equivalence and Stochastic Dominance. The second aim (...) is to assess some recent arguments against Stochastic Equivalence and Stochastic Dominance. If successful, these arguments refute Difference Minimizing Theory. This paper contends that these arguments are not successful. (shrink)

In this study we investigate the influence of reason-relation readings of indicative conditionals and ‘and’/‘but’/‘therefore’ sentences on various cognitive assessments. According to the Frege-Grice tradition, a dissociation is expected. Specifically, differences in the reason-relation reading of these sentences should affect participants’ evaluations of their acceptability but not of their truth value. In two experiments we tested this assumption by introducing a relevance manipulation into the truth-table task as well as in other tasks assessing the participants’ acceptability and probability evaluations. Across (...) the two experiments a strong dissociation was found. The reason-relation reading of all four sentences strongly affected their probability and acceptability evaluations, but hardly affected their respective truth evaluations. Implications of this result for recent work on indicative conditionals are discussed. (shrink)

Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.

The value-free ideal for science holds that values should not influence the core features of scientific reasoning. We defend the difference-to-inference model of value-permeation, which holds that value-permeation in science is problematic when values make a difference to the inferences made about a hypothesis. This view of value-permeation is superior to existing views, and it suggests a corresponding maxim—namely, that scientists should strive to eliminate differences to inference. This maxim is the basis of a novel value-free ideal for (...) science. -/- . (shrink)

Many metaphysical and scientific frameworks presuppose actuality as a given: a domain of determinate states, a background temporal order, or a fully actualised world in which events occur. While such assumptions enable explanation, they leave unexamined a more fundamental question: what must be the case for anything to count as actual at all. This paper develops a minimal, conditional ontology that targets this structural gap. Starting from the single assumption that difference is necessary for anything to appear or have (...) effect, the framework articulates the least organisation required for local actuality to be intelligible without presupposing time, a global observer, or a globally actualised domain. It introduces a small set of structural distinctions—tension as organised unresolved possibility, tendency as the minimal asymmetry required for difference to remain intelligible, loci of sensitivity as boundary-forms of registration, and fixation as the fact that a contrast can be closed relative to a boundary at all. These notions are not proposed as entities, mechanisms, or processes, but as structural necessary conditions implicit in taking difference as fundamental. Taking difference as fundamental it becomes clear that actuality is intrinsically local and boundary-relative; temporal order is not primitive but identifiable with the ordering of closed differences; and shared reality arises through partial structural alignment rather than global closure. The framework does not compete with scientific or metaphysical theories at the level of explanation. Instead, it specifies the minimal structural conditions under which anything can count as actual at all. Rejecting these conditions amounts not to adopting an alternative account, but to abandoning the intelligibility of actuality itself. (shrink)

According to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are justified only when they maximize the benefits of the least advantaged. John Rawls attempted to justify this principle using the thought experiment known as the veil of ignorance. The idea is that it would be rational for all people to agree to the principle if they did not know what position they would occupy in society. John Harsanyi objected to this argument on the grounds that the difference principle (...) is rational only for people with low-risk propensity. For those willing to risk their position, the utilitarian expected-utility maximization principle is no less rational. Thus, Rawls’s veil of ignorance discriminates against people based on their risk propensity. Many Rawlsians respond to this objection by arguing that there is no discrimination because people leave their risk propensity behind the veil of ignorance. This article defends Harsanyi’s objection against this response. People cannot leave their risk propensity behind a veil because they need it to choose principles of justice based on their impact on their own life prospects. However, the article offers a different response to Harsanyi’s objection. His objection fails because it ignores the fact that principles of justice must not only be rational but also reasonable. The expected-utility maximization principle is rational but not reasonable because it imposes risks on other people, which is not the case with the difference principle. However, to use this response to Harsanyi’s objection, Rawlsians must abandon the neutralist liberalism of later Rawls and elaborate the Kantian foundations of his early philosophical project. (shrink)

Excellence in sport performance is normally taken to be a matter of superior performance of physical movements or quantitative outcomes of movements. This paper considers whether a wider conception can be afforded by certain kinds of nature based sport. The interplay between technical skill and aesthetic experience in nature based sports is explored, and the extent to which it contributes to a distinction between different sport-based approaches to natural environments. The potential for aesthetic appreciation of environmental engagement is found to (...) be strongly dependent on whether or not environmental engagement is exploited for the end of producing a quantifiable result or enhancing technical skill. It is also argued that an existential rather than spectatorial attitude to aesthetic experience is offered by specifically nature oriented sport. Aesthetic experience achieved in this way is therefore neither passive nor detached, but extends Berleant's concept of participatory environmental aesthetics and underpins both an alternate (wide) conception of excellence in sport activity and a richer experience of aesthetic engagement than more objectivised standpoints. (shrink)

Why do we value higher-level scientific explanations if, ultimately, the world is physical? An attractive answer is that physical explanations often cite facts that don’t make a difference to the event in question. I claim that to properly develop this view we need to commit to a type of deterministic chance. And in doing so, we see the theoretical utility of deterministic chance, giving us reason to accept a package of views including deterministic chance.

Semantic memory tasks can focus on intensions (features and properties) or extensions (reference and categorization). The two aspects, intension and extension, should in principle be closely related. It is in virtue of possessing the intensional properties of a concept that an individual entity will be included in the extension of that concept. For example, any feathered creature that hatches from eggs and has two legs and a beak will be a bird, and any creature lacking any of these features will (...) be something else. There is evidence for stable individual differences in each of these tasks, but these differences do not correspond across tasks. Two further studies show that, under certain conditions, the correspondence can be demonstrated. This chapter discusses reasons for the lack of connection in terms of different systems for conceptual understanding involving similarity versus theory-based conceptualization. (shrink)

Investigation of neural and cognitive processes underlying individual variation in moral preferences is underway, with notable similarities emerging between moral- and risk-based decision-making. Here we specifically assessed moral distributive justice preferences and non-moral financial gambling preferences in the same individuals, and report an association between these seemingly disparate forms of decision-making. Moreover, we find this association between distributive justice and risky decision-making exists primarily when the latter is assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task. These findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies (...) of brain function during moral and risky decision-making. This research also constitutes the first replication of a novel experimental measure of distributive justice decision-making, for which individual variation in performance was found. Further examination of decision-making processes across different contexts may lead to an improved understanding of the factors affecting moral behaviour. (shrink)

In “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier -style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Car case, but failed to detect a cross - cultural difference. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI’s 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross - cultural (...) class='Hi'>difference about the intuition concerning the Gettier car case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication studies, our results provide strong evidence that the purported cross - cultural difference in Gettier intuitions does not exist. (shrink)

Generic statements express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non-human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alternative (...) hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects reflect differences between human and non-human categories more generally, as adults showed a negativity bias for categories of non-human animals, but not for categories of humans. These findings suggest the presence of important, early-emerging domain differences in people's judgments about generics. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss some possible connections between philosophical proposals about the social organisation of science and developments towards a greater democratisation of science policy. I suggest that there are important similarities between one approach to objectivity in philosophy of science—Helen Longino’s account of objectivity as freedom from individual biases achieved through interaction of a variety of perspectives—and some ideas about the epistemic benefits of wider representation of various groups’ perspectives in science policy, as analysed by (...) Mark Brown. Given these similarities, I suggest that they allow one to approach developments in science policy as if one of their aims were epistemic improvement that can be recommended on the basis of the philosophical account; analyses of political developments inspired by these ideas about the benefits of inclusive dialogue can then be used for understanding the possibility to implement a philosophical proposal for improving the objectivity of science in practice. Outlining this suggestion, I also discuss the possibility of important differences between the developments in the two spheres and show how the concern about the possible divergence of politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes may be mitigated. In order to substantiate further the suggestion I make, I discuss one example of a development where politically motivated and epistemically motivated changes converge in practice—the development of professional ethics in American archaeology as analysed by Alison Wylie. I suggest that analysing such specific developments and getting involved with them can be one of the tasks for philosophy of science. In the concluding part of the paper I discuss how this approach to philosophy of science is related to a number of arguments about a more politically relevant philosophy of science. (shrink)

Problem Statement: DOMS has been primarily studied in trained athletes, leaving a significant gap in knowledge about untrained populations. Objectives: This study aimed to examine the relationships and differences in delayed onset muscle soreness and muscle strength between dynamic warm-up alone and dynamic warm-up with static stretching among untrained female agriculture students. Methods: Thirty-nine out of 76 qualified university students from a state university in the Philippines completed the interventions. The students consist of females enrolled in Physical Activity Towards Health (...) and Fitness from two blocks, supervised by the researchers. The study utilized a mixed model design with two groups; each group underwent five series of similar field tests following the intervention. Results: The study found significant reductions in DOMS for both dynamic warm-up (DWG) and dynamic warm-up with static stretching (DSWG) across various time intervals, with the most notable effects observed from 1 to 12 hours and 48 to 72 hours. Muscle strength recovery showed no significant differences in the first 24 hours for DWG, but improvements were significant from 24 to 72 hours, while no significant changes were observed for DSWG. Additionally, a significant relationship between muscle strength and DOMS emerged in the DWG group from 48 to 72 hours, but no such relationship was found in DSWG. Conclusions: Dynamic warm-up effectively reduces DOMS and promotes muscle strength recovery, particularly between 24 and 72 hours post-exercise, while static stretching does not offer additional benefits for muscle strength recovery. (shrink)

This study examines gender differences in perceptions of infrastructure development and economic growth in Nigeria. The data for the study was obtained through questionnaires administered to a sample size of 400 respondents. Data collection involved closed-ended questionnaires, brief interviews, and controlled observations, focusing on the perceived impact of infrastructure on economic growth. The Chisquare test was employed to analyze the data, examining the relationship between gender and perceptions of infrastructural development and economic growth. Hypotheses were formulated to test for significant (...) associations between these variables, with results tabulated and statistically analyzed to determine the significance of gender-based differences. The study found a significant association between gender and perceptions of the state of infrastructure and manufacturing output, with a Chi-square statistic of 15.709 and a p-value of 0.001, indicating a highly statistically significant relationship. The largest contributions to this statistic came from responses regarding the impact of infrastructure on the cost of doing business and the quality of services rendered, with notable deviations from expected counts in both male and female responses. These findings suggest that gender-specific perceptions play a crucial role in shaping views on infrastructure and economic activities. Conversely, when examining the relationship between gender and perceptions of the contribution of infrastructural development to GDP growth, the Chi-square statistic of 3.336 and a p-value of 0.503 indicated no significant association. This suggests that both males and females perceive the impact of infrastructural development on GDP growth similarly, with no substantial genderbased differences in their views. The results indicated the importance of considering gender-specific perspectives in infrastructure and economic policy planning. Policymakers and stakeholders should recognize the significant gender differences in perceptions of infrastructure's impact on business costs and service quality while also acknowledging the similarities in perceptions regarding its contribution to GDP growth. Addressing these gender-specific concerns through targeted policies and inclusive approaches can enhance the effectiveness of infrastructure development initiatives and support more equitable economic growth in Nigeria. (shrink)

This paper reinterprets Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) through the structural lens of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), moving beyond the traditional deficit model. We argue that the core autistic experience originates from a structural divergence in the 'Receptivity' axis of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF), a state of 'hyper-receptivity' characterized by a failure of sensory gating. This hypothesis is grounded in neurophysiological evidence, particularly the atypical P50 suppression patterns frequently observed in autistic individuals. This foundational hyper-receptivity leads to a cascade of consequences, most (...) notably a state of 'affective overload' from excessive, unmodulated Resonance (R) and a subsequent difficulty in constructing a stable, coherent (C2) worldview. From this perspective, behaviors often pathologized as 'symptoms'—such as repetitive actions and restricted interests—are reinterpreted as meaningful and rational self-regulation strategies. These are active attempts to manage sensory and affective overload by creating a predictable, controllable environment to achieve a stable, self-regulating form of R. This structural account demands a paradigm shift in therapeutic approaches, moving from 'correction' towards 'expanding pathways of R'. We demonstrate that this JP model aligns strongly with modern, child-centered developmental therapies (e.g., Floortime/DIR) that respect the individual's unique resonant world and aim to co-design safer, more expansive ways of being, ultimately reframing autism as a different, but coherent, path of R. (shrink)

In theoretical work about the language of personal taste, the canonical example is the simple predicate of personal taste, 'tasty'. We can also express the same positive gustatory evaluation with the complex expression, 'taste good'. But there is a challenge for an analysis of 'taste good': While it can be used equivalently with 'tasty', it need not be (for instance, imagine it used by someone who can identify good wines by taste but doesn't enjoy them). This kind of two-faced behavior (...) systematically arises with complex sensory-evaluative predicates, including those with other appearance verbs, such as 'look splendid' and 'sound nice'. I examine two strategies for capturing these different uses: one that posits an ambiguity in appearance verbs, and one that does not. The former is in line with an approach to 'look'-statements prominent in work in philosophy of perception, and I consider how the motivation given in that tradition carries over to the present context. I then show how the data used to support the verbal ambiguity approach can equally be captured on the second strategy, which appeals only to independently-motivated flexibility in adjective meaning. I close by discussing some considerations that are relevant for choosing between the two options. (shrink)

Motion–Difference (MD) 2.1 presents a minimal ontology derived from two co-primitive facts: (1) that the relational configuration does not remain identical to itself (motion), and (2) that the configuration is not perfectly symmetric (difference). From these co-primitives follow a small set of structural consequences: wake (lasting asymmetry), non-erasure (the refusal to posit subtraction machinery), and adjacency (the concrete asymmetries through which subsequent motion must propagate). These entail reinforcement (accumulation of asymmetry), constraint (stable asymmetry structure), and the existence of (...) membranes as maximal closure sets under accumulated asymmetry. Membranes provide the structural basis for form, bounded persistence, and identity, the latter understood as the fixed-point stability of closure classes under recursive alteration. Recursion itself is defined non-temporally, as wake acting on an already altered configuration; time emerges perspectivally from a bounded form’s internal tracking of recursive dependency. MD 2.1 derives these structures without positing substances, substrates, space, time, causation, laws, or essences. It provides the foundation for Lucid Ontology (LO) and The Architecture of Consciousness (AoC) by showing how bounded, self-maintaining forms and perspectival ordering arise solely from motion, difference, and their necessary structural consequences. The result is an ontology of irreducible becoming that is both ontologically austere and derivationally complete. (shrink)

In Metaphysics N 2, Aristotle criticizes Plato and the Academics for setting up the problem of principles “in an obsolete way”. For they thought all things would be one (viz. Being itself) if they did not demonstrate, against Parmenides, that not-being is. And this assumption, for Aristotle, betrays a more fundamental and questionable Eleatic debt in their ontology, namely their commitment to the obsolete view that being, taken in its own right, is one. By contrast, Aristotle believes being is originally (...) multiple and said in many ways, so there is no need to demonstrate that not-being is, to justify as much. In his commentary on Book N, Syrianus replies to Aristotle and argues, among other things, both that his criticisms are flawed and that his own ontology can only stand if the Platonist account of multiplicity, difference and not-being is also endorsed. I scrutinize these counterobjections and argue that this debate reflects two essentially different ways of explaining fundamental facts in the structure of reality. (shrink)

Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence (...) in one’s own reasoning. Finally we will explore how agents who employ distinct yet equally rational methods of reasoning should respond to interactions with the products of each others’ reasoning. We find that the epistemology of multiple reasoning methods has been misunderstood by a number of authors writing on epistemic permissiveness and peer disagreement. (shrink)

Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous. I claim that one species of horrendous evil is what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. I distinguish two subspecies of horrendous-difference disabilities based in part on the temporal relation between one’s rational moral wishing for a certain human function F and its being thwarted by intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Next, I offer a theodicy for each subspecies of horrendous-difference disability. Although I (...) appeal to some claims made by Marilyn Adams for this theodicy, I reject one particular claim. I deny that one must be aware that one participates in a horrendous evil when the horrific event occurs. To develop this point and its relevance for a theodicy for horrendous-difference disabilities, I engage with Andrew Chignell’s work on infant suffering. In doing so, I show that what partly motivates the claim is a time-bias, i.e., near-bias. By rejecting this time-bias, I show how it is possible, given post-mortem life, for persons with profound cognitive disabilities to participate in horrendous evils and how these might be defeated by God. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, if moral agency is understood in behaviourist terms, robots could become moral agents that are as good as or even better than humans. Given the behaviourist conception, it is natural to think that there is no interesting moral difference between robots and humans in terms of moral agency (call it the _equivalence thesis_). However, such moral differences exist: based on Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitude and Scanlon’s relational account of blame, I argue that a (...) distinct kind of reason available to humans—call it _human-relative reason_—is not available to robots. The difference in moral reason entails that sometimes an action is morally permissible for humans, but not for robots. Therefore, when developing moral robots, we cannot consider only what humans can or cannot do. I use examples of paternalism to illustrate my argument. (shrink)

This paper is a critical investigation of the concept of inclusion. It argues that the alternatives or disjuncts in the strict or exclusive disjunction are mutually exclusive: either we exclude, or we include – no middle ground. The choice to either totally exclude or totally include is a political exercise of freedom of being indifferent to differences or being deferent to differences respectively. In this context, inclusion is viewed as a critical attitude towards pluralism that accepts, but not without deep (...) examination, the breaches of totality and the advances of the radical alterity. The paper begins with [1] a careful examination of the politics of exclusion that exposes and discusses exclusive tendencies of some laws, systems, policies, views, traditions, cultures, and practices. The succeeding parts deal heavily with [2] the navigation of inclusive spaces as a response to conditional or quasi-inclusive spaces, [3] moral justifications of inclusion using Immanuel Kant and John Rawls’ ethical frameworks, and [4] a thoughtful exploration of the role of language in the inclusion of the alterity in a pluralistic age in the lenses of Emmanuel Levinas and Paulo Freire. The paper ends with [5] an articulation of the logic of exclusion-inclusion towards the dialectics of inclusion as a necessarily transforming or transformative process - the means and the end. Save a few, most of the concrete historical examples that are [re]presented in the discussions are admittedly landmark Philippine jurisprudence. Even the laws that are [re]cited never escaped the Philippine context. (shrink)

Felix Pinkert has proposed a solution to the no-difference problem for AC. He argues that AC should be supplemented with a requirement that agents’ optimal acts be modally robust. We disagree.

(written in 2017) According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus’ arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related (...) to a memory are present and new emotional responses to that past event. I then criticize Debus’ thesis tout court for being a direct consequence of assuming a particular conceptualization of the nature of emotions: emotions as physiological changes. Finally, based on a different conceptualization of emotions that focuses on their relational nature, I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the different possible emotional aspects of our personal memories. This leads me to conclude, contrary to Debus, that some emotional aspects of our memories are not occurrent emotions but are better conceived as quasi-emotions. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

Most psychological research aims to uncover generalizations about the mind that hold across subjects. Philosophical discussions of scientific explanation have focused on such generalizations, but in doing so, have often overlooked an important phenomenon: variation. Variation is ubiquitous in psychology and many other domains, and an important target of explanation in its own right. Here I characterize explananda that concern individual differences and formulate an account of what it takes to explain them. I argue that the notion of actual (...) class='Hi'>difference making, the only causal concept in the literature that explicitly addresses variation, cannot be used to ground such an account. Instead, I propose a view on which explaining individual differences involves identifying causes that could be intervened on to reduce the variability in the population. This account provides criteria of success for explaining variation and deepens our understanding of causal explanation. (shrink)

-/- The Difference Between Being Born and Not Being Born: A Reflection Through the Lens of Free Will and Balance -/- To be born is to exist; to not be born is to never have existed. On the surface, this appears to be a simple contrast. Yet, when examined through the philosophical, scientific, and spiritual dimensions—and then placed within the framework of natural laws and Angelito Malicse’s universal formula for Free Will and balance in nature—this difference becomes not (...) only profound, but foundational to understanding human life and society. -/- Philosophical Perspective: Meaning, Suffering, and the Weight of Existence -/- Philosophers have long questioned the value of existence. Existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus argued that being born into a seemingly purposeless universe forces individuals to invent their own meaning. Life, then, becomes a test of courage and authenticity. Meanwhile, antinatalists like David Benatar suggest that not being born is preferable, since existence inevitably involves suffering, and non-existence spares a being from this harm. -/- However, from a humanist lens, being born is a gift. It offers an opportunity to grow, create, connect, and leave a positive mark on others. Within this view, not being born equates to a total absence—not only of pain, but also of beauty, meaning, and transformation. -/- This tension between suffering and meaning directly mirrors the first principle of Angelito Malicse’s universal formula: the law of karma as a natural system, where outcomes arise from causes. In this system, being born grants the capacity for choice and consequence. Free Will operates only within the context of existence—never in non-being. -/- And here, we must state clearly: the true nature of Free Will is to make decisions that do not violate the universal law of balance in nature. When a conscious observer makes decisions that create imbalance—whether in thought, behavior, or systems—it leads directly to human suffering. Examples of such violations include: -/- Overpopulation, which puts extreme pressure on food systems, housing, healthcare, and the environment. -/- Unchecked industrialization and consumerism, which lead to environmental degradation, climate change, and loss of biodiversity. -/- Unsustainable economic growth, which exploits natural resources beyond their regenerative limits. -/- Extreme income inequality, which disturbs social equilibrium and breeds violence, resentment, and societal fragmentation. -/- Misinformation and ideological manipulation, which distort public consciousness and lead to poor collective decision-making. -/- These imbalances are not isolated problems—they are symptoms of decisions made without regard for the natural balance that sustains life. Free Will, when used recklessly or selfishly, becomes a source of suffering instead of liberation. -/- Scientific Perspective: The Mechanics of Existence and Consciousness -/- Science views being born as the result of complex biological processes—genetic combination, cellular development, and neurological evolution leading to consciousness. To be born is to become a biological system capable of interacting with the world through senses, cognition, and emotion. Not being born, from a scientific standpoint, is simply the absence of this system—no brain, no consciousness, and thus, no experience. -/- This purely material view aligns with Angelito Malicse’s systemic understanding of reality. Just as an engine must be free of defects to function, so too must the human system operate within a balanced environment to produce proper function—whether biological, mental, or social. -/- When this balance is ignored, consequences follow. For example: -/- Pollution of air, water, and soil disrupts ecosystems and human health. -/- Nutritional imbalances, stress, and lifestyle excesses result in disease and mental disorders. -/- Technological systems that prioritize speed and profit over human well-being lead to social isolation and ethical erosion. -/- These imbalances in natural and man-made systems are violations of the law of balance, and they illustrate how important it is for Free Will to be exercised in harmony with natural limits. -/- Spiritual Perspective: Birth, Karma, and the Evolution of the Soul -/- Various spiritual traditions also offer rich perspectives on the meaning of birth and non-birth. In Hinduism and Buddhism, to be born is to enter samsara, the cyclical flow of birth, death, and rebirth. Life is both an opportunity and a burden—it is the field where karma plays out, and spiritual evolution occurs. Liberation (moksha or nirvana) is achieved when one transcends this cycle through knowledge and detachment. -/- In Christianity and Islam, birth grants a soul the chance to seek divine truth, grow in virtue, and fulfill a moral destiny. Life is viewed as a sacred trial, and not being born means never entering this sacred arena. -/- Angelito Malicse’s interpretation of the universal law of balance integrates these spiritual ideas into a natural framework. In his view, all systems—whether cosmic, biological, or conscious—must follow the law of balance to maintain harmony. Spiritual evolution and Free Will are not in opposition to natural laws, but must conform to them. -/- For instance, religious dogmas that deny scientific truths, such as overpopulation limits or environmental constraints, create conflict between belief and reality. When doctrines are used to justify imbalances—such as promoting population growth without considering ecological limits—they become spiritually and materially harmful. Thus, even in spirituality, decisions must align with the universal balance to truly serve life. -/- Connecting It All: Free Will, Balance, and the Responsibility of Being Born -/- What makes being born ultimately distinct from not being born is the capacity for decision-making. This is the core insight of Angelito Malicse’s universal formula: Free Will exists, but it is not outside the laws of nature. It operates within them—specifically within the law of balance. -/- To be born is to enter a world of dynamic feedback systems. Our bodies respond to the environment; our minds respond to ideas; societies respond to collective behavior. Every decision we make shifts the balance—internally (within our consciousness) and externally (in our relationships and systems). Being born means participating in these interactions. Not being born, on the other hand, means remaining outside of all causal systems. There is no karma, no suffering, but also no growth, no balance, and no Free Will. -/- Therefore, the essence of Free Will is not unlimited choice, but conscious alignment with balance. If imbalance is created—by ignorance, false beliefs, unchecked desires, or flawed systems—suffering arises as a natural consequence. It is the feedback of nature reminding us that balance has been disturbed. This is why the proper use of Free Will is not arbitrary, but lawful. -/- Conclusion: Birth as a Sacred Responsibility -/- In the end, being born is more than just existing—it is being entrusted with Free Will, with the ability to align oneself with the universal law of balance or to ignore it at great cost. Not being born spares the individual from the weight of this responsibility, but it also denies them the opportunity to learn, to love, to suffer, to heal, and ultimately, to grow. -/- Angelito Malicse’s universal formula reminds us that Free Will is not absolute chaos—it is structured within the laws of nature. The true nature of Free Will is to make decisions that do not violate the universal law of balance in nature, because creating imbalances by the conscious observer creates human suffering. And only those who are born can take part in this sacred, complex dance of balance. -/- . (shrink)

Although being widely considered as only a Western tradition, individualism is not absent in traditional Chinese philosophy and culture. In some of the classic Chinese philosophic works such as Zhuangzi, we can clearly identify some elements which can be appropriately attributed to “individualism”, such as the awareness of individual “self” as an independent and unique existence, advocating individual freedom and liberty, emphasizing on the value and dignity of individual life, favoring individuals’ autonomy and privacy, pursuing unconstrained development in personality and (...) spirituality. However, due to its particular pre-Qin social cultural background and its unique Daoist philosophic origin, this kind of individualism in Zhuangzi has its own unique characteristics, which has made it distinguishable from the variety of other individualist thoughts emerged in different times and places in the West. Zhuangzi has a dynamic and open view on individual or “self”, he does not consider individuals as fixed and interchangeable “atoms” but as dynamic, changing and unique beings, he set the unlimited and indefinable Dao as the only and ultimate source for individuals to conform to, thus to release individual mind into an realm of infinite openness and freedom. Zhuangzian individualism is “inward” rather than “outward”, which means while concentrating on individuals’ freedom of spirit and innate nature, it cares less about individuals’ outside material interests and rights in social reality, and does not encourage competition and rivalry among individuals. The special type of individualism in Zhuangzi has a profound influence on Chinese culture, providing a spiritual space for the development of individuality and personality in ancient China. It also provides an alternative understanding of individual as an existence. (shrink)

In the development of humanity, it seems that everything is in a state of balance, and this vague feeling may have always accompanied humanity. The pervasiveness of trade-offs is conventionally attributed to physical limitations. This paper demonstrates that the necessity for trade-offs is not a contingent limitation of our universe, but an ontological cost inherent to existence itself. Wherever there is discernible difference, computation and balance inevitably arise.

All morally wrong actions deserve some form of moral condemnation. But the degree of that condemnation is not the same in all cases. Some wrongs are so morally extreme that they seem to belong to a different category because they deserve our very strongest form of moral condemnation. For example, telling a white lie to make a friend feel better might be morally wrong, but intuitively such an act is in a different moral category to the sadistic, brutal, and violent (...) rape and torture of a child. The former act is merely wrong and not evil. In contrast, the latter act seems so morally extreme that we need to call it “evil” and not merely “wrong” if we are to do justice both to the moral seriousness of that act and the strength of our condemnation of it. The task of a theory or substantive conception of evil is to spell out what is an evil action and how it differs from a merely wrongful action. But what does a plausible substantive theory of evil look like? To explore this question, I spell out the concept of evil and illustrate four different types of substantive conceptions of evil actions: victim, perpetrator, spectator, and mixed theories. Of these four options, I argue that mixed theories are the most plausible type of theory, before investigating in detail the promising mixed theory recently defended by Matthew Kramer (2014b). Finally, in light of my analysis of Kramer’s view, I present a reformulated version of my combination theory of evil (Formosa 2008; Formosa 2013). (shrink)

In the book “A Theory of Justice”, John Rawls examines the notion of a just society. More specifically, he develops a conception of justice—Justice as Fairness—derived from his novel interpretation of the social contract. Central to his account are two lexically-ordered principles of justice by which primary social institutions, or the basic structure of society, are ideally to be organized and regulated. Broadly speaking, the second of Rawls’ two principles pertains to “the distribution of income and wealth”, and its formulation (...) is to be understood as an expression of Rawls’ Difference Principle—roughly, the principle that “inequality in expectation is permissible only if lowering it would make the [worst-off] class even more worse off.”1 2 I want to suggest that Rawls’ Difference Principle (DP) entails the following worrisome outcome: Because DP maximizes the absolute level of expectation (and disregards the relative level), it authorizes potentially immense levels of inequality, such that this inequality itself can become a source of social discord and injustice. This paper will (§2) present Rawls’ formulation of DP, (§3) motivate the worrisome outcome entailed by DP, and (§4) offer a prima facie plausible solution in the form of an addendum to DP. (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)

Several prominent voices have called for a democratization of science through deliberative processes that include a diverse range of perspectives and values. We bring these scholars into conversation with extant research on democratic deliberation in political theory and the social sciences. In doing so, we identify systematic barriers to the effectiveness of inclusive deliberation in both scientific and political settings. We are particularly interested in what we call misidentified dissent, where deliberations are starkly framed at the outset in terms of (...) dissenting positions without properly distinguishing the kinds of difference and disagreement motivating dissent. (shrink)

Research has uncovered consistent gender differences in attitudes toward gay men, with women expressing less prejudice than men (Herek, 2003). Attitudes toward lesbians generally show a similar pattern, but to a weaker extent. The present work demonstrated that motivation to respond without prejudice importantly contributes to these divergent attitudes. Study 1 revealed that women evince higher internal motivation to respond without prejudice (IMS, Plant & Devine, 1998) than do men and that this difference partially mediates the relationship between gender (...) and attitudes toward gay men. The second study replicated this finding and demonstrated that IMS mediates the relationship between gender and attitudes toward lesbians. Study 2 further revealed that gender-role variables contribute to the observed gender differences in motivation to respond without prejudice. These findings provide new insights into the nature of sexual prejudice and for the first time point to possible antecedents of variation in motivation to respond without prejudice. (shrink)

This article examines the seventeenth-century debate between the Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza and the British scientist Robert Boyle, with a view to explicating what the twentieth-century French philosopher Gilles Deleuze considers to be the difference between science and philosophy. The two main themes that are usually drawn from the correspondence of Boyle and Spinoza, and used to polarize the exchange, are the different views on scientific methodology and on the nature of matter that are attributed to each correspondent. (...) Commentators have tended to focus on one or the other of these themes in order to champion either Boyle or Spinoza in their assessment of the exchange. This paper draws upon the resources made available by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their major work What is Philosophy?, in order to offer a more balanced account of the exchange, which in its turn contributes to our understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the difference between science and philosophy. (shrink)

How should we respond to historical figures who played an important role in their country's history but have also perpetrated acts of great evil? Much of the existing philosophical literature on this topic has focused on explaining why it may be wrong to celebrate such figures. However, a common response that is made in popular discussions around these issues is that we should not judge historical figures by today's standards. Our goal in this article is to examine the most plausible (...) way to understand this objection. We will examine three different interpretations of this argument. First, we will examine a view we call Temporal Moral Relativism, according to which moral standards are relative to particular points in time. Next, we outline Blame Relativism, the view that people from the past may be excused from blame for acts of conventionalised wrongdoing. Finally, we outline Ideals Relativism, according to which our moral ideals are partially relative to the time in which we live. We argue that Ideals Relativism provides the most plausible interpretation of this argument. (shrink)