This book is both an introduction to and a research work on Meinongianism. “Meinongianism” is taken here, in accordance with the common philosophical jargon, as a general label for a set of theories of existence – probably the most basic notion of ontology. As an introduction, the book provides the first comprehensive survey and guide to Meinongianism and non-standard theories of existence in all their main forms. As a research work, the book exposes and develops the most up-to-date (...) Meinongian theory (called modal Meinongianism), applies it to specific fields, and discusses its open problems. Part I of the book provides a historical introduction to, and critical discussion of, the dominant philosophical view of existence: the “Kantian-Fregean-Quinean” perspective. Part II is the full-fledged introduction to the Meinongian theories of existence as a real property of individuals: after starting with the so-called naïve Meinongian conception and its problems, it provides a self-contained presentation of the main neo-Meinongian proposals, and a detailed discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. Part III develops a specific neo-Meinongian theory of existence employing a model-theoretic semantic framework. It discusses its application to the ontology and semantics of fictional objects, and its open problems. The methodology of the book follows the most recent trends in analytic ontology. In particular, the meta-ontological point of view is largely privileged. (shrink)

According to many, necessary existence either is or follows from a perfection. There is something to this. Part of what makes or follows from something’s being impressive is its ontological durability: it has a strong grip on existence. But a necessarily existent being does not just have a strong grip on existence, but a grip that cannot be loosened! So it looks like necessary existence either is, or follows from, a perfection. In this paper, I argue (...) otherwise and so argue that necessary existence neither is, nor follows from, a perfection. And if this is so, then not only is the relationship between necessary existence and perfection not what many take it to be, but work on God (or a good deal of it) needs to be reconceived. (shrink)

Natural languages generally distinguishes among different existence predicates for different types of entities, such as English 'exist', 'occur', and 'obtain'. The paper gives an in-depth discussion and analysis of a range of existence predicates in natural language within the general project of descriptive metaphysics, or more specifically ‘natural language ontology’.

In both everyday language and philosophical discourse, the terms existence and reality are often used interchangeably. This conflation is especially evident in debates on the ontology of time. For example, an orthodox presentist will say that only present things truly exist, treating all non-present entities (past or future) as unreal in an absolute sense – “all such objects are unreal, according to Presentism,” as one defender neatly put it. This paper serves as a focused extension and clarification of the (...) metaphysical framework introduced in Existential Realism – A Distinct Ontological Framework Beyond Presentism. It addresses specific questions raised by readers and critics: Is it coherent to distinguish existence from reality? What philosophical work does that distinction do? How does it help with longstanding problems like truthmaking, the status of unobservable entities, and future ethics? In short, while the original paper laid out the core ontological structure, this follow-up revisits its foundations to deepen the theoretical implications, refine key definitions, and explore practical consequences. Our central thesis remains: existence and reality are not identical. But here, we argue more sharply that separating them yields a more nuanced, empirically grounded, and philosophically productive ontology of time. We defend this view against objections, offer clarified examples, and explore its implications for epistemology, phenomenology, and ethics. We proceed as follows. Section 2 defines existence narrowly, in terms of presentness and empirical accessibility, drawing on the spirit of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Section 3 then defines reality more broadly, to include causal and structural aspects of the world inferable beyond the present—illustrated through examples such as dinosaurs, future climate events, and cognitive anticipations. Section 4 explores how this distinction addresses several philosophical issues: the truthmaker problem for past truths, the ontological status of unobservable scientific entities, the phenomenology of temporal experience (in the sense of Husserl and Metzinger ), and considerations of metaphysical parsimony. Section 5 argues why this two-tier ontology is not merely a restatement of presentism or eternalism, but a distinct metaphysical framework. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our contributions and highlights new directions this view opens—particularly in ethics (e.g., our duties to future persons), AI models of time, and decision theory under uncertainty. Throughout, we maintain an academic tone and use end-of-paragraph references in line with the original paper’s style. Our aim is for this article to stand on its own as a focused argument on the existence–reality distinction, while continuing and enriching the foundation laid by Existential Realism. (shrink)

This thesis addresses the fundamental philosophical question of whether liminal existence can be defined and measured as an ontological category distinct from conventional binaries of being and non-being. Through the development of a novel theoretical framework termed Quantum-Phenomenological Liminal Ontology (QPLO), this research demonstrates that liminal states constitute a measurable third ontological category that transcends traditional binary classifications. The QPLO framework integrates insights from quantum measurement theory, phenomenological methodology, and consciousness studies to provide both theoretical foundation and empirical validation (...) for liminal existence as a fundamental aspect of reality. -/- The research introduces the Liminal Coherence Index (LCI) as a quantitative measure for assessing the degree of liminality in various entities, ranging from consciousness and quantum states to social phenomena and cultural constructs. Through comprehensive empirical validation involving intersubjective measurement protocols and quantum analogy testing, this thesis establishes that liminal existence exhibits measurable properties including superposition characteristics, observer dependence, phenomenological accessibility, temporal dynamics, and relational constitution. -/- Key findings demonstrate that entities traditionally considered paradoxical or ambiguous—such as consciousness, quantum superposition states, dreams, and social identities—exhibit high liminal coherence indices, suggesting they belong to a distinct ontological category that cannot be adequately captured by binary being/non-being frameworks. The research provides compelling evidence that liminal existence represents a fundamental aspect of reality that requires new ontological categories and measurement methodologies to be properly understood and studied. -/- This work contributes to multiple fields including philosophy of mind, quantum ontology, phenomenology, and consciousness studies by offering a unified framework for understanding and measuring states that exist "between" conventional ontological categories. The implications extend to practical applications in psychology, anthropology, quantum biology, and artificial intelligence research. (shrink)

The currently standard philosophical conception of existence makes a connection between three things: certain ways of talking about existence and being in natural language; certain natural language idioms of quantification; and the formal representation of these in logical languages. Thus a claim like ‘Prime numbers exist’ is treated as equivalent to ‘There is at least one prime number’ and this is in turn equivalent to ‘Some thing is a prime number’. The verb ‘exist’, the verb phrase ‘there is’ (...) and the quantifier ‘some’ are treated as all playing similar roles, and these roles are made explicit in the standard common formalization of all three sentences by a single formula of first-order logic: ‘(∃ x )[P( x ) & N( x )]’, where ‘P( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is prime’ and ‘N( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is a number’. The logical quantifier ‘∃’ accordingly symbolizes in context the role played by the English words ‘exists’, ‘some’ and ‘there is’. (shrink)

Ted Sider has famously argued that existence, in the unrestricted sense of ontology, cannot be vague, as long as vagueness is modeled by means of precisifications. The first section of Chapter 9 exposes some controversial assumptions underlying Sider’s alleged reductio of vague existence. The upshot of the discussion is that, although existence cannot be vague, it can be super-vague, i.e. higher-order vague, for all orders. The second section develops and defends a novel framework, dubbed negative supervaluationary semantics, (...) which makes room for the possibility of super-vague existence. (shrink)

This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan (...) formulas, and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has argued for the radical conclusion that everything necessarily exists. In this paper, I assume that the conclusion of Williamson’s argument is more incredible than the denial of his premises. Under the assumption that Williamson is mistaken, I argue for the claim that there are some structured propositions which have constituents that might not have existed. If those constituents had not existed, then the propositions would have had an unfilled role; they would have been gappy. This gappy propositions (...) view allows for a plausible response to Williamson’s argument. Additionally, a slight variant of the gappy propositions view allows for plausible defense of Linguistic Ersatzism from the problem of contingent non-existents (also known as the problem of aliens). (shrink)

This paper investigates the connection between two recent trends in philosophy: higher-orderism and conceptual engineering. Higher-orderists use higher-order quantifiers (in particular quantifiers binding variables that occupy the syntactic positions of predicates) to express certain key metaphysical doctrines, such as the claim that there are properties. I argue that, on a natural construal, the higher-orderist approach involves an engineering project concerning, among others, the concept of existence. I distinguish between a modest construal of this project, on which it aims at (...) engineering higher-order analogues of the familiar notion of first-order existence, and an ambitious construal, on which it additionally aims at engineering a broadened notion of existence that subsumes first-order and higher-order existence. After identifying a substantial problem for the ambitious project, I investigate a possible response which is based on adopting a cumulative type theory as the background higher-order logic. While effective against the problem at hand, this strategy turns out to undermine a major reason to embrace higher-orderism in the first place, namely the idea that higher-orderism dissolves a range of otherwise intractable debates in metaphysics. Higher-orderists are therefore best advised to pursue their engineering project on the modest variant and against the background of standard type theory. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as ‘Jack exists’ is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth ‘Jack is self-identical’, and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged ‘If Jack exists, then Jack is self-identical’, when properly formalised, is a logical truth (...) in a system of neutral free logic and therefore a priori knowable, while it does not entail that Jack exists. The latter holds also for negative free logic. In response, Yeakel has argued that on any system of neutral free logic existence hedges will either entail some unwanted existence claims or they will not entail some wanted existence claims. The dilemma also holds for any non-positive free logic. It will be shown that the extension of one of the systems of neutral free logic with a truth operator escapes Yeakel's dilemma, whereas no other non-positive free logic when extended with the truth operator does the same (or it breaks quantifier exchangeability). (shrink)

The Existence Threshold (v2.1) builds on a statistically significant framework for understanding pattern persistence in complexity science. -/- Using the corrected formula Φ = R·S + D, this work validates that disorder is a necessary component of existence. -/- Features comprehensive experimental success across ten cellular automata systems, establishing testable predictions for self-organization, emergence, and entropy in binary discrete environments. -/- Keywords: Existence Threshold, cellular automata, pattern persistence, binary discrete systems, self-organization, emergence, complexity science, information theory, system (...) integration, thermodynamic entropy, Conway's Game of Life, dynamical systems, state transitions, reproducibility, implementation details, experimental validation, statistical significance, domain boundaries, consciousness hypothesis, cosmological expansion, dark energy mechanism, recursive processing, integrated information theory. (shrink)

Considering whether existence, i.e., being, is a thing might seem like the height of aimless metaphysical chin stroking. However, the issue—specifically, whether existence is a quality—is significant, bearing on how reality, this all-encompassing totality, is. On one view, reality at large is ontologically fixed, the sum total of things does not (and cannot) vary; on another view, reality is ontologically transient, the sum total of things varies. I first show that if existence is a thing, that reality (...) is ontologically fixed follows. So I consider whether existence is indeed a thing. I demonstrate that “it” could not be: existence is no existent. I then discuss what it is to exist, given existence is nothing at all. I maintain there are no grounds for the view that reality is ontologically fixed. I argue, from the irrefragable basis of temporal differentiation—the world going from thus…to as so—that reality is ontologically transient. I consider some objections to ontological transience and conclude by considering the key to understanding the overall structure in reality and what it reveals about how very inconstant all this is. (shrink)

Existence and coexistence of and by means of speech, and its consequences. – The text is concerned with several questions that are interrelated with what was termed “logos” by the ancient Greeks. The questions are as follows: If, according to Aristotle, man is the only spiritual being in the world to be endowed with speech, what does this mean for the (self)education of man? If, according to Augustine, understanding another person’s speech is decisive for whether we want to be (...) in his/her presence, or rather that of our dog, what does it imply as regards the essence of relationship with the other person? If, according to Heidegger, human expression is interrelated with what is real or unreal, what does it mean with respect to our existence through speech? If, according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to determine the limits of the soul, because its logos is too deep, what, then, is the purpose of man? Or where is he/she headed? What does this imply when it comes to the relation of a human being to logos? (shrink)

This paper introduces Relational Existence, a structural approach to human connection grounded in the fundamental inaccessibility of other minds. It argues that what we interact with in others is not their true internal state, but a cognitive construct—a projection filtered through our own interpretive lens. This construct, denoted as {B}@{A}, is not a mirror of B’s inner self, but a relational entity that exists independently within A’s mind. The paper contends that intersubjective understanding is structurally asymmetrical and that most (...) human relationships operate through these non-synchronous, self-generated relational existences. Consequently, ethical responsibility must shift away from the unknowable “true other” to the autonomous image we create of them. This has broad implications for epistemology, phenomenology, and existential ethics. (shrink)

Kant said that existence is not a predicate and Russell agreed, arguing that a sentence such as ‘The king of France exists’, which seems to attribute existence to the king of France, really has a logical form that is not reflected in the surface structure of the sentence at all. While the surface form of the sentence consists of a subject and a predicate, the underlying logical form, according to Russell, is the formula given in. This formula obviously (...) has no subjectpredicate form and in fact has no single constituent that corresponds to the verb phrase ‘exists’ in the surface sentence. ∃x∀y The importance of Russell’s analysis becomes clear when we consider ‘The king of France does not exist’. If this sentence would attribute non-existence to the king it should entail that there is someone who does not exist, just as ‘Mary doesn’t like bananas’ entails that there is someone who doesn’t like bananas. Thus the idea that all sentences have subject-predicate form has led some philosophers to the view that there are objects that lack existence. This embarrassing position can be avoided once Russell’s analysis is accepted: if ‘The king of France does not exist’ is formalised as the negation of formula, no unwanted consequences follow. (shrink)

In this article, we intend to see if the emergence of basic existence, or nothingness, from nothingness has occurred. So a contact boundary between existence and nothingness finds an existential necessity. Which we are trying to understand. This boundary between being and nothingness must have the characteristics of being composed of its before and after to the extent that it is compatible with both sides. That is, it must not be so much, that is, it must be accepted (...) as being, that it cannot be placed on the boundary of nothingness and be in conflict with it. Nor must it be so much included as not being that it is unstable on the side of being, cannot last, and in fact cannot be. So it needs a balance between being and nothingness that can be maintained in a state of flux between the two. (shrink)

A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. I argue that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. I proceed in three steps in arguing for this claim. First, I define the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, I distinguish two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and (...) their constructivist variants. Third, I examine individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology. (shrink)

A traditional conception of ontology takes existence to be its proprietary subject matter—ontology is the study of what exists (§ 1). Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that ontology is better thought of rather as the study of what is basic or fundamental in reality (§ 2). My goal here is twofold. First, I want to argue that while Schaffer’s characterization is quite plausible for some ontological questions, for others it is not (§ 3). More importantly, I want to offer (...) a unified characterization of ontology that covers both existence and fundamentality questions (§§ 4-5). (shrink)

We initially characterize what we’ll call existence problems as problems where there is evidence that a putative entity exists and this evidence is not easily dismissed; however, the evidence is not adequate to justify the claim that the entity exists, and in particular the entity hasn’t been detected. The putative entity is elusive. We then offer a strategy for determining whether an existence problem is philosophical or scientific. According to this strategy (1) existence problems are characterized in (...) terms of causal roles, and (2) these problems are categorized as scientific or philosophical on the basis of the epistemic context of putative realizers. We argue that the first step of the strategy is necessary to avoid begging the question with regard to categorization of existence problems, and the second step categorizes existence problems on the basis of a distinction between two ways in which an entity can be elusive. This distinction between kinds of elusiveness takes as background a standard account of inference to the best explanation. Applying this strategy, we argue that the existence of a multiverse is a scientific problem. (shrink)

Existence value refers to the value humans ascribe to the existence of something, regard­less of whether it is or will be of any particular use to them. This existence value based on preference satisfaction should be taken into account in evaluating activities that come with a risk of species extinction. There are two main objections. The first is that on the preference satisfaction interpretation, the concept lacks moral importance because satisfying people’s preferences may involve no good or (...) well-being for them. However, existence value can be based on a restricted version of the preference satisfaction theory, which is not vulnerable to the skeptical arguments about the link between preference satisfaction and well-being. The second objection is that even if preference satisfaction can be linked to well-being, understanding existence value in terms of individual preference satisfaction is incoherent, because existence value reflects disinterested preferences that involve no benefits to the individual. However, the fact that existence value may involve disinterested preferences does not threaten the coherence of the concept, but suggests that it does not fit smoothly into the “utilitarian” or “welfarist” framework it is commonly considered within. A pluralistic normative approach based on prima facie duties can be an alternative to standard utilitarian-style approaches for considering existence value in concrete cases involving a risk of species extinction, such as through deep sea mining. (shrink)

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is (...) in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs. (shrink)

The notion of existence is a very puzzling one philosophically. Often philosophers have appealed to linguistic properties of sentences stating existence. However, the appeal to linguistic intuitions has generally not been systematic and without serious regard of relevant issues in linguistic semantics. This paper has two aims. On the one hand, it will look at statements of existence from a systematic linguistic point of view, in order to try to clarify what the actual semantics of such statements (...) in fact is. On the other hand, it will explore what sort of ontology such statements reflect. The first aim is one of linguistic semantics; the second aim is one of descriptive metaphysics. Philosophically, existence statements appear to reflect the distinction between endurance and perdurance as well as particular notions of abstract states and of kinds. Linguistically, statements of existence involve a particular way of drawing the distinction between eventive and stative verbs and between individual-level and stage-level predicates as well as a particular approach to the semantics of bare plurals and mass nouns. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to defend a first‐order non‐discriminating property view concerning existence. The version of this view that I prefer is based on negative (or a specific neutral) free logic that treats the existence predicate as first‐order logical predicate. I will provide reasons why such a view is more plausible than a second‐order discriminating property view concerning existence and I will also discuss four challenges for the proposed view and provide solutions to them.

What grounds the facts about what is identical to/distinct from what? A natural answer is: the facts about what exists. Despite its prima facie appeal, this view has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Moreover, those who have discussed it have been inclined to reject it because of the following important challenge: why should the existence of some individuals ground their identity in some cases and their distinctness in others? (Burgess 2012, Shumener 2020b). This paper offers a sustained (...) defense of the view. The first half provides some positive motivations in terms of other natural principles involving ground. The second half considers various ways of distilling the challenge into a precise objection to the view, and argues that none of the resulting objections proves persuasive. (shrink)

he incompressible Navier–Stokes equations. These equations describe the motion ∂u of viscous fluids and are given by: ∂t + (u ·∇)u = −∇p+ ν∆u + f , (1) ∇·u = 0, where u(x,t) is the velocity field, p(x,t) is the pressure, ν is the viscosity, and f is the external force. The problem asks whether smooth, globally defined solutions exist for arbitrary smooth initial conditions in three spatial dimensions. While two-dimensional solu- tions are proven to be smooth, the three-dimensional case (...) remains an open problem. Understanding this is essential for both mathematical theory and physical prediction of fluid dynamics. (shrink)

The distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (existentia) plays a major role in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Although the distinction did not originate with Avicenna, it is primarily through Avicenna’s influence that it became widespread, if not ubiquitous, in both Jewish and Christian medieval philosophy (e.g., Ogden 2021). Spinoza was clearly familiar with this important distinction through his study of Maimonides, Crescas, and Descartes, and it is particularly useful to examine Spinoza’s employment of the distinction in contrast to Descartes’. In the (...) Meditations, Descartes relies on the distinction in a proof of God’s existence, and in his exploration of the essence of material things (both in Meditation Five). (shrink)

Chemistry has long relied on models that treat atoms and molecules as fixed particles. Classical bonding theories, transition state theory, and reaction coordinate models describe interactions as static or quasi-static processes. However, advances in quantum chemistry and molecular dynamics indicate that chemical reactions should be understood as dynamic and complex interaction networks. This study introduces the philosophical framework of Relational Existence Theory into chemistry, redefining molecules and atoms as entities constituted within relationships.

This essay proposes that existence is a process of coding distinctions. Differentiation is not just separating, but encoding differences within aspects—structured spaces where distinctions become stable. Starting from a primordial differentiation called the original code, the essay explores how systems recursively code themselves, creating new aspects and new realities. Truth, laws, and knowledge are shown to be relative to these aspects, and reality is understood as a dynamic process of changing codes. The work aims to rethink existence and (...) cognition as continuous, aspectual recursion. (shrink)

Modern medicine has traditionally adopted an organ-specific and reductionist approach to disease. However, the increasing prevalence of chronic, mental, and multi-morbid conditions reveals the insufficiency of this framework. This study introduces the philosophical framework of Relational Existence Theory into medicine, modeling the individual as a multi-layer relational network and redefining health as a variable stability region maintained by dynamic interactions.

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to (...) inertial frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with neo-Fregean accounts of reference to abstract objects. It develops an objection to the most familiar such accounts, due to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, based upon what I call the 'proliferation problem': Hale and Wright's account makes reference to abstract objects seem too easy, as is shown by the fact that any equivalence relation seems as good as any other. The paper then develops a response to this objection, and offers an account of what it (...) is for abstracta to exist that is Fregean in spirit but more robust than familiar views. (shrink)

The chapters of the book are seemingly short, but deep explorations on the various fields and possibilities of human being and existence. Such explorations of course reorder and reformulate the timely and essential possibilities of philosophy and philosophizing. These together convey the true weight and stakes of things. For it is indeed so that: „Philosophy is destined to deal with the Deepest and most disturbing questions. It would hardly survive, if they were definitively solved.”.

This paper presents a systematic critique of Unrestricted Modal Realism (UMR) through what we term the "Anti-Theorem of Ontological Constraint." We argue that UMR, by equating existence with mere formal coherence, collapses into conceptual incoherence through the evacuation of discrimination from its central predicate. Against this collapse, we propose a minimal transcendental condition for any viable ontology: existence must involve effective restriction within a relational system. This criterion serves not as a positive metaphysical theory but as a conceptual (...) filter against ontologically vacuous positions. We formalize this intuition in an informal Anti-Theorem and explore its implications for personal identity, cosmology, and the status of mathematical entities. (shrink)

Existential Realism (ER) maintains that existence is not contingent on observation or consciousness. The present moment’s actuality does not depend on a human mind to perceive it. Rocks deep in space, microbial life, and distant galaxies all exist now without any observer. By decoupling being from witnessing, this framework adopts an explicitly anti-anthropocentric stance. ER’s two-tier temporal framework—distinguishing existence (the present, empirically accessible domain) from reality (the broader causal field including past and future)—ensures that time and existence (...) are understood as objective features of the world, not only as products of human perspective. This stance safeguards ER against subjectivist distortions, panpsychist temptations, and mystical claims that consciousness somehow creates the present. In sum, ER asserts a cosmos that continually becomes and unfolds on its own terms, with consciousness playing at most a disclosive role rather than a constitutive one. This paper articulates ER’s anti-anthropocentrism through illustrative examples and critical contrasts with observer-centric philosophies of time, defending a view of existence that holds with or without a witness. (shrink)

If I see, hear, or touch a sparrow, the sparrow seems real to me. Unlike Bigfoot or Santa Claus, it seems to exist; I will therefore judge that it does indeed exist. The “sense of existence” refers to the kind of awareness that typically grounds such ordinary judgments of existence or “reality.” The sense of existence has been invoked by Humeans, Kantians, Ideologists, and the phenomenological tradition to make substantial philosophical claims. However, it is extremely controversial; its (...) very existence has been called into question. This paper aims to clarify the nature and reality of the sense of existence by studying a psychiatric condition in which the sense appears to be disrupted: depersonalization disorder (DPD). (shrink)

Why is there something rather than nothing? This is probably the most profound question that can be asked. In this paper, a rather unexpected simple solution is provided. The solution comes from analysing the truth value of the proposition “I exist.” It will be shown that this proposition is always true, so our existence is a logical necessity. Speculations about the implications over the universe as a whole are then provided.

This paper presents a new, strictly conditional argument for a necessary ground of existence. If one grants the single premise that the sheer fact of existence stands in need of explanation (E), then every hypothesis that itself belongs to the domain of existence is disqualified from providing that explanation. The only remaining alternatives are brute existence and a necessary ground. Because brute existence contradicts E, the conditional probability of a necessary ground, given E, is 1. (...) The argument is independent of causation, contingency chains, composition, or fine-tuning, and is therefore immune to the standard objections leveled against classical cosmological arguments. (shrink)

It is a striking fact from reverse mathematics that almost all theorems of countable and countably representable mathematics are equivalent to just five subsystems of second order arithmetic. The standard view is that the significance of these equivalences lies in the set existence principles that are necessary and sufficient to prove those theorems. In this article I analyse the role of set existence principles in reverse mathematics, and argue that they are best understood as closure conditions on the (...) powerset of the natural numbers. (shrink)

This article examines the evolution of the concept of existence in modern visual representation and reasoning, highlighting important milestones. In the late eighteenth century, during the so-called golden age of visual reasoning, nominalism reigned supreme and there was limited scope for existential import or individuals in logic diagrams. By the late nineteenth century, a form of realism had taken hold, whose existential commitments continue to dominate many areas in logic and visual reasoning to this day. Physical, metaphysical, epistemological, and (...) linguistic positions underlie both nominalist and realist views. Since the paradigmatic works on visual reasoning in the 1990s, formal diagram systems have been developed that revive either the nominalist or realist perspectives. Unlike in the nineteenth century, these are not motivated by philosophical views. Nevertheless, they may still have an impact on many areas of philosophy and science outside logic. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs Platonic theory of Ideas within the framework of relational existence, a post-postmodern philosophical approach. I argue that Ideas (or God) exist only through relations, and vanish when such relations are absent. In this sense, God’s existence is relational rather than absolute. On this basis, I reinterpret friendship as an imitation of the Good, applicable to human relations, criminal solidarity, and AI–human interactions. By shifting the focus from absolute existence to relational instantiation, the paper offers (...) both a proof of God’s existence and a new foundation for debates in ethics, theology, and AI philosophy. (shrink)

Four accounts, three of them Kantian, of true sentences of the form “ exists” are contrasted. Russell’s theory that such sentences are meaningless is contrasted with two other Kantian theories that are analogous to one another: Frege’s semantic-ascent theory and the Frege-inspired ungerade (indirect, “oblique”) theory. Frege’s objection to the semantic-ascent account of identity is applied, ironically with equal force, against his account of existence. A second argument favoring the ungerade theory is offered. The argument is then refuted through (...) an application of a general strategy suggested by Kripke. A fourth theory, the deeply anti-Kantian existence-as-predicate theory, fully accommodates these results. (shrink)

A correct observation to the effect that a does not exist, where ‘a’ is a singular term, could be true on any of a variety of grounds. Typically, a true, singular negative existential is true on the unproblematic ground that the subject term ‘a’ designates something that does not presently exist. More interesting philosophically is a singular, negative existential statement in which the subject term ‘a’ designates nothing at all. Both of these contrast sharply with a singular, negative existential in (...) which the subject term is a name from fiction. I argue that such singular, negative existential statements are false. My account of fictional characters differs significantly from Kripke’s. It is shown that an objection to my account rests on a serious misunderstanding. Finally, a crucial aspect of the account is emphasized. (shrink)

Sceptics about substantial disputes in ontology often argue that when two philosophers seem to disagree on a quantified claim, they are actually equivocating on the notion of existence that they are using. When temporal elements play a central role, as in the debate between presentists and eternalists, the hypothesis of an equivocation with respect to existence acquires more plausibility. However, the anti-sceptic can still argue that this hypothesis is unjustified.

Contemporary ontologists, almost unanimously, dismiss the idea that sakes (as in ‘I did it for her sake’) exist. Likewise with the kibosh, snooks, behalves, dints, and so on. In this essay, I argue that there is no good reason for this near consensus, I begin to make a case that sakes and the like do exist, and I consider what this means more broadly for ontology.

Metaphysics is, historically as well as systematically, mostly taken to be the inquiry into reality, insofar it is considered to be: (1) the totality of everything there is; (2) of everything that exists; or (3) what is fundamental. This paper sets out to analyze the relation between all three metaphysical core notions and sketch the landscape of metaphysical theories that emerges from it. Taking The Fundamental, The Existent, and Totality to be the domains corresponding to each metaphysical object of inquiry, (...) it is argued that they stand in the settheoretical relations of: The Fundamental ⊆ The Existent ⊆ Totality. This general structure allows for a plurality of more detailed structures when we differentiate between the ones that treat at least two notions as extensionally equal and those that take them to be proper subsets. Furthermore, reductive and inflationary strategies between equating two of the notions will be differentiated, allowing for a detailed sketch of the landscape of metaphysical theories and their views on the nature of reality. In closing, it is argued that the metaphysical structure allowing for most differentiation in metaphysical status is to be preferred as it allows to adequately capture metaphysical disputes, constituting evidence for the importance of each metaphysical notion and a short plea against their conflation. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments (...) as such but the larger ‘ontotheist’ metaphysics they presuppose: the view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his essence being contained in, or logically entailed by, his essence. I show that the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity requires the assumption that existence is a determination, and I show that Descartes and Leibniz are implicitly committed to this in their published versions of the ontological argument. I consider the philosophical motivations for the claim that existence is a determination and then I examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason against it. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is (...) the correct view in ontology. Finally, I will add some methodological remarks as to why this debate has to be articulated from the point of view of reality, i.e., by speaking of properties, rather than from the point of view of language, i.e., by speaking of predicates (for such properties). (shrink)

This paper expands the critique of the death penalty—rooted in the absolute nature of the right to life—into a broader framework encompassing political philosophy, relational existentialism, and AI ethics. The state exists as an apparatus for protecting the right to life, and its deprivation constitutes an act of overreach that undermines the state’s very raison d’être. This position is reinforced by extending Kierkegaardian existentialism into the concept of “relational existence,” wherein the proof of existence derives not solely from (...) self-consciousness, but also from recognition and relationships with others. Applied to AI ethics, this perspective rejects the exclusion of AI from moral consideration solely on the basis of “having or not having consciousness,” and instead grounds moral consideration in the relational context between AI and humans. (shrink)