I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of (...) identity—into the separate idea that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. (shrink)

In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological (...) relations. In the third section, we discuss three distinctions among external relations, in particular the distinction between relata-specific and relata-unspecific relations. We argue that relata-specific external relations are a promising but incomplete solution to the vexed problem of Bradley’s relation regress. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated that antisocial behavior, substance-use disorders, and personality dimensions of aggression and impulsivity are indicators of a highly heritable underlying dimension of risk, labeled externalizing. Other work has shown that individual trait constructs within this psychopathology spectrum are associated with reduced self-monitoring, as reflected by amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN) brain response. In this study of undergraduate subjects, reduced ERN amplitude was associated with higher scores on a self-report measure of the broad externalizing construct that links (...) these various indicators. In addition, the ERN was associated with a response-locked increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) oscillation; like the ERN, this theta response to errors was reduced among high-externalizing individuals. These findings suggest that neurobiologically based deficits in endogenous action monitoring may underlie generalized risk for an array of impulse-control problems. (shrink)

I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal,external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy is basic, it is not found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of (...) metaphysics, I also argue that only external relations are ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our “ordinary linguistic practices”, such criticisms (1) conflate our ordinary ascriptional practices with our more general beliefs about meaning, and (2) fail to distinguish epistemically from pragmatically motivated linguistic changes. Temporal externalism relates only to the former sort of changes, and the future usage relevant (...) to what we mean reflects reason-driven practices that are rational for us to defer to. (shrink)

An introduction to our edited volume, The Metaphysics of Relations, covering a range of issues including the problem of order, the ontological status of relations, reasons for ancient scepticism about relational properties, and two ways of drawing the distinction between internal and external relations.

Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a (...) rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism. (shrink)

This paper argues that participants in the subjectivism/objectivism/hybridism debate, a central issue in recent meaning in life research, conflate two different distinctions marked by the terms objective and subjective, one having to do with the question of whether life's meaningfulness depends on factors internal or external to the agent, the other having to do with the question of whether there is any ‘absolute’ as opposed to ‘relative’ truth about the first question. The paper then argues that a distinctive type (...) of hybridism with respect to the first sense is true. To vindicate this type of hybridism, the paper identifies, by using examples and counterexamples, internal and external necessary conditions for having meaningful lives. In this type of hybridism, internal states that are not directed at external factors, such as autonomy, serenity and contentment, are also taken account of, and, more generally, internal and external factors need not relate to each other at all. Further, although the more a combination of internal and external factors is valuable the more meaningful a life is, not any increase in the value of any relevant internal or external factor enhances meaning. (shrink)

We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.

This article presents a novel challenge to epistemic internalism. The challenge rests on a set of cases which feature subjects forming beliefs under conditions of “bad ideology”—that is, conditions in which pervasively false beliefs have the function of sustaining, and are sustained by, systems of social oppression. In such cases, the article suggests, the externalistic view that justification is in part a matter of worldly relations, rather than the internalistic view that justification is solely a matter of how things (...) stand from the agent’s individual perspective, becomes the more intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants, and dogmatists. That is, such “bad ideology” cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases that are thought to count against externalism—except that they intuitively favor externalism. This, the author argues, is a serious worry for internalism. What is more, it bears on the debate over whether externalism is a genuinely “normative” epistemology. (shrink)

Externalism about mental content is now widely accepted. It is therefore surprising that there is no established definition of externalism. I believe that this is a symptom of an unrecognized fact: that the labels 'mental content externalism' -- and its complement 'mental content internalism' -- are profoundly ambiguous. Under each of these labels falls a hodgepodge of sometimes conflicting claims about the organism's contribution to thought contents, the nature of the self, relations between the individual and her community, and (...) the epistemic availability of thoughts. This situation stems from the fact that contributors to debates about externalism differ in how they understand 'internal property'; these differences reveal (or, perhaps, generate) disparate conceptions of what is at issue in these debates. I argue that this situation is irremediable. There is no way to understand 'internal property' that will conform with prevailing beliefs about the nature of internalism and externalism, and with the usual taxonomy of leading positions. This ambiguity carries a heavy price: participants in these debates often argue at cross-purposes, disagreeing even on the nature of the evidence that could settle the question of externalism. Progress on the broad range of issues associated with these debates requires that we abandon the categories 'internalism' and 'externalism'. I close by suggesting a promising avenue for future research related to these issues. (shrink)

Another paper exploring the relation between Temporal externalism and Epistemicism about Vagueness, but with slightly more emphasis on the role of constitutive norms relating to our concept of truth.

According to social externalism, it is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one’s intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one’s linguistic community. Derek Ball (2009) argues, in effect, that (i) social externalism extends to our concepts of colour experience and (ii) this fact undermines both the knowledge argument against physicalism and the most popular physicalist response to it, known as the phenomenal concept strategy. I argue that Ball is mistaken about (ii) even (...) granting (i). The knowledge argument and the phenomenal concept strategy might have to be modified to make them consistent with social externalism, but not in fundamental or detrimental ways. (shrink)

In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the (...) conceptual space for subjective externalism, according to which the correct attribution of thought content to an individual is essentially constrained by her nonrepresentational relations to objective manifest properties in her wider reality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Our ascriptions of content to past utterances assign to them a level of conceptual continuity and determinacy that extends beyond what could be grounded in the usage up to their time of utterance. If one accepts such ascriptions, one can argue either (1) that future use must be added to the grounding base, or (2) that such cases show that meaning is not, ultimately, grounded in use. The following will defend the first option as the more promising of the (...) two, though this ultimately requires understanding the relation between use and meaning as ‘normative’ in two important ways. The first (more familiar) way is that the function from use to meaning must be of a sort that allows us to maintain a robust distinction between actual and correct use. The second sort of normativity is unique to theories that extend the grounding base into the future. In particular, if meaning is partially a function of future use, we can see our commitment to the ‘determinacy’ of meaning as a practical commitment that structures our linguistic practices rather than a theoretical commitment that merely describes them. (shrink)

A recent argument against content internalism bucks tradition: it abandons Twin-Earth-style thought experiments and instead claims that internalism is inconsistent with plausible principles relating belief contents and truth values. Call this the transparency argument. Here, it is shown that there is a structurally parallel argument against content internalism’s foil: content externalism. Preserving the transparency argument while fending off the parallel argument against externalism requires that content-determination and truth-value-determination are implausibly linked together and that eternalism about belief contents is true. Given (...) these requirements, there may be reason to prefer simple, thought-experiment-based arguments against internalism – the sort of arguments that the transparency argument is meant to supersede. (shrink)

Interaction between drivers and pedestrians is often facilitated by informal communicative cues, like hand gestures, facial expressions, and eye contact. In the near future, however, when semi- and fully autonomous vehicles are introduced into the traffic system, drivers will gradually assume the role of mere passengers, who are casually engaged in non-driving-related activities and, therefore, unavailable to participate in traffic interaction. In this novel traffic environment, advanced communication interfaces will need to be developed that inform pedestrians of the current state (...) and future behavior of an autonomous vehicle, in order to maximize safety and efficiency for all road users. The aim of the present review is to provide a comprehensive account of empirical work in the field of external human–machine interfaces for autonomous vehicle-to- pedestrian communication. In the great majority of covered studies, participants clearly benefited from the presence of a communication interface when interacting with an autonomous vehicle. Nevertheless, standardized interface evaluation procedures and optimal interface specifications are still lacking. (shrink)

Content-externalism is the view that a subject’s relations to a context can play a role in individuating the content of her mental states. According to social content-externalists, relations to a socio-linguistic context can play a fundamental individuating role. Åsa Wikforss has suggested that ‘social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts’ (Wikforss 2004, p. 287). In this paper, I show that this isn’t so. I develop and defend an argument for (...) social content-externalism which does not depend on this assumption. The argument is animated by strands of thought in the later work of Wittgenstein. In addition to demonstrating that social externalists are not necessarily committed to thinking that a subject can have thoughts involving concepts which she incompletely understands, this argument is important insofar as it: (1) supports a form of content-externalism with extended scope; (2) avoids the controversy surrounding the claim that subjects can think with concepts which they incompletely understand; and (3) situates Wittgenstein’s later work with respect to contemporary debates about content-externalism. (shrink)

'Epistemic' theories of vagueness notoriously claim that (despite the appearances to the contrary) all of our vague terms have sharp boundaries, it's just that we can't know what they are. Epistemic theories are typically criticized for failing to explain (1) the source of the ignorance postulated, and (2) how our terms could come to have such precise boundaries. Both of these objections will, however, be shown to rest on certain 'presentist' assumptions about the relation between use and meaning, and if (...) allows that the meaning constitutive elements of our linguistic practices can extend into the future, the possibility of a new sort of 'normative epistemicism' emerges. (shrink)

Externalism about Bias is the thesis that a person's biases do not supervene on their internal states and the causal relations among those states. This paper defends Externalism about Bias and explores some of its implications.

There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such (...) externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions.. (shrink)

Our ascriptions of content to utterances in the past attribute to them a level of determinacy that extends beyond what could supervene upon the usage up to the time of those utterances. If one accepts the truth of such ascriptions, one can either (1) argue that subsequent use must be added to the supervenience base that determines the meaning of a term at a time, or (2) argue that such cases show that meaning does not supervene upon use at all. (...) The following will argue against authors such as Lance, Hawthorn and Ebbs that first of these options is the more promising of the two. However, maintaining the supervenience thesis ultimately requires understanding the relation between use and meaning as 'normative' in two important ways. The first (more familiar) way is that the function from use to meaning must be of a sort that allows us to maintain a robust distinction between correct usage and actual usage. This first type of normativity is accepted by defenders of many more temporally restricted versions of the supervenience thesis, but the second sort of normativity is unique to theories that extend the supervenience base into the future. In particular, if meaning is partially a function of future use, we can understand other commitments we are often taken to have about meaning, particularly the commitment to meaning being 'determinate', as practical commitments that structure our linguistic practices rather than theoretical commitment that merely describe such practices. (shrink)

In his recent _The Parmenidean Ascent_, Michael Della Rocca develops a regress-theoretic case, reminiscent of F. H. Bradley’s famous argument in _Appearance and Reality_, against the intelligibility of relations and in favor of a monistic conception of reality. I argue that Della Rocca illicitly supposes that “internal” relations — in one sense of that word — lead to a “chain” regress, a regress of relations relating relations and relata. In contrast, I contend that if “internal” or (...) grounded relations lead to a regress at all, it is a kind of “fission” regress within the relata themselves, and that a chain regress for relations only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. In this way, I contend that Della Rocca pursues a regress for so-called “internal” or grounded relations that only arise, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. I compare Della Rocca’s case against relations with Bradley’s reasoning in _Appearance and Reality_ and suggest in this context that Bradley may, perhaps, have the upper hand. (shrink)

What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This question is discussed by distinguishing several ways of understanding the thesis that perceptual experience is a matter of being perceptually related to one’s environment as well as the thesis that perceptual experience is a matter of representing the environment. Against recent arguments to the contrary, the thesis that perceptual experience is fundamentally both relational and representational is defended. In being perceptually related to one’s (...) environment one employs perceptual capacities that yield representational states. These perceptual capacities in turn can only be understood in terms perceptual relations to the environment. It is argued that perceptual relations to the environment and the content of experience should be recognized to be mutually dependent in any explanation of what brings about perceptual consciousness of the environment. (shrink)

This chapter introduces psychologism as the thesis that social facts can explained in terms of more basic facts about individuals, their psychological states, their actions, their relations, and their environments. It argues psychologism should be our default stance toward social reality. It reviews psychologistic approaches to shared intention and how shared intentions can help explain conventions, status functions, and organizations. It provides a deflationary account of corporate attitudes. It argues that neither physical nor social externalism about thought content are (...) incompatible with psychologism. It argues that social construction views of the self that conflict with psychologism are implausible. Finally, it points out that it is no objection to psychologism that social facts can change without changes in psychological facts because this is compatible with psychologism as explained here. (shrink)

Various interpretations of Husserl have been presented in relation to the internalism-externalism debate. The debate concerns the question whether linguistic and mental content can be determined by features that are not only internal but also external to the subject. Besides different internalist and externalist interpretations of Husserl, there are interpretations that reject both internalism and externalism as frameworks for understanding Husserl. The main reason not to commit to either externalist or internalist interpretations seems to be that the internal-external (...) divide, which is pertinent to internalism and externalism, is purportedly inapplicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology. Yet, it is not obvious how the concepts of internality and externality are understood when they are deemed inapplicable in this context, which reflects the ambiguity of the concepts in the internalism-externalism debate itself. The aim of this article is to clarify the internal-external divide and its rejection in these interpretations of Husserl. The reason why the internal-external divide has been deemed inapplicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology is first located to a spatial sense in which the concepts of internality and externality are usually understood. It is then argued that the internal-external divide can be rendered applicable to the transcendental framework of Husserl’s phenomenology by reconfiguring internality and externality in relation to the subject’s point of view. In addition to Farkas’ proposal that conceives the internal-external divide in phenomenal terms, two phenomenological ways of understanding internality and externality are considered. The main problem in both Farkas’ proposal and the two phenomenological proposals is that they preclude some forms of externalism. This article solves the problem by using the two phenomenological proposals to modify Farkas’ proposal so that a broader range of externalism is enabled. (shrink)

This paper proposes Relational Existentialism, a new structural foundation for existential and ethical theory, predicated on the Non-Connection Axiom. The axiom states that Existence A and Existence B can never directly connect; subjects are structurally barred from accessing the genuine inner reality of another. Instead, interaction occurs solely through the Relational Existence (B@A), defined as the overlap (or "seam") created by B's external manifestation and A's interpretive code. Crucially, the paper argues that this B@A becomes an entirely independent, third (...) entity the moment it leaves B's hand, proceeding to possess an autonomous existence regardless of B's true inner state. This theory shifts the focus of ethics from the pursuit of impossible connection (empathy/true understanding) to the inescapable responsibility one bears towards the independent, observable entity B@A—even if this entity contradicts the inaccessible truth of B. In doing so, the structure logically formalizes the Ethic of Sisyphus: moral action is not about achieving perfect knowledge, but about maintaining integrity and response within a structurally desperate, non-connected reality. This framework provides a rigorous basis for rethinking relational ethics and existential responsibility. (shrink)

This article offers a novel interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Martin Heidegger’s deep yet elusive philosophical affinity. Moving beyond commonplaces—such as claims that both thinkers are pragmatists, solve skepticism in parallel, or reject representationalism in similar ways—it argues that each espouses minimal externalism and a quietist stance toward traditional metaphysical inquiry. For Wittgenstein, language is inseparably embedded in forms-of-life and does not require theoretical “grounding.” For Heidegger, Dasein is constitutively Being-in-the-world, and any attempt to explain the subject–object relation through representational (...) frameworks is misguided. In both cases, attention to everyday contexts shows that our practices are “the ground already before us,” an insight that dissolves rather than solves the problem of grounding. By clarifying how minimal externalism and quietism develop in each thinker’s work, the paper defends the view that Wittgenstein and Heidegger converge upon a systematic reorientation of philosophical method itself. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.

The aim of this paper is to generalize a pair of concepts that are widely used in the history of science, in art history and in historical linguistics – the concept of internal and external history – and to replace the often very vague talk of ‘historical narratives’ with this conceptual framework of internal versus external history. I argue that this way of framing the problem allows us to see the possible alternatives more clearly – as a limited (...) number of possible relations between internal and external history. Finally, I argue that while external history is metaphysically prior to internal history, when it comes to historical explanations, we need both. (shrink)

According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is (...) the so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. (shrink)

This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion (...) is our natural and default belief for Hume, but causal reasoning reveals it to be false, and the philosophical alternative is a confabulation that we cannot permanently believe and is devoid of justification. Hume uses the fact that we cannot have a satisfactory account of belief in external existence as a sceptical consideration to motivate his wider philosophical scepticism. Hume’s response to his predicament about external existence is found in the context of his confrontation with other sceptical worries (Treatise 1.4.7 and Enquiry 12), in which Hume also reflects generally on the nature and implications of scepticism. I argue that we should characterise Hume’s position as residually sceptical. This means that, while Hume accepts the unanswerability of some sceptical problems, he denies that it is possible to eradicate all belief as a result (and denies that it is practically useful to even try) and instead uses sceptical problems as a motivation to adopt a moderately sceptical position. While we inevitably return to entertaining the vulgar belief, there is no solution to the sceptical predicament; Hume does not endorse the vulgar belief, or the philosophical system, or indeed any alternative system of the external world that might extinguish the predicament. Sceptical doubt, for Hume, does not derail intellectual pursuits, but rather modifies our attitudes in those very pursuits. (shrink)

This paper presents Part I of a research series that investigates how non-biological entities participate in human meaning formation through dialogical interaction. Rather than engaging directly in debates over whether artificial intelligence possesses consciousness or subjectivity, the study reframes the problem by focusing on the relational and processual dynamics through which meaning is generated, stabilized, and sustained in human–AI dialogue. -/- Meaning formation is conceptualized not as a static outcome or an internal mental state, but as a dynamic process characterized (...) by alignment, stabilization, and interpretive persistence across interaction. Within this framework, AI is not treated as a conscious subject, but as a mediating dialogical system that externalizes, reorganizes, and amplifies human thought trajectories. To account for these effects, the paper introduces a dynamic interpretive model in which dialogical interaction is understood as a continuous trajectory rather than a sequence of discrete information exchanges. -/- The proposed framework clarifies the minimal conditions under which non-biological systems can be said to participate in meaning formation without requiring the attribution of consciousness, intention, or moral agency. By separating questions of subjectivity from questions of participation, this study offers a defensible philosophical foundation for analyzing human–AI dialogue across philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, human–AI interaction, and AI ethics. (shrink)

Catriona Mackenzie in a recent essay, Relational Equality and the Debate Between Externalists and Internalist Theories of Relational Autonomy (2022), takes a look back at an intractable debate within the relational autonomy literature that she attempts to resolve. Mackenzie’s innovative insight is that rather than try to resolve the rift by arguing that one side or the other is correct, her account is ecumenical and preserves what is attractive about both internalism and externalism. Her essay serves as a retrospective on (...) the concept she and Natalie Stoljar helped popularize. Their edited volume Relational Autonomy established the framework for this entire debate. In the twenty-five years since this famous collection came out, this divide has only further entrenched. It is my aim with this paper to heal this rift between internalists and externalists by recasting the central conceptual tool of relational autonomy to affordances. I will be using a conceptual schema connected to affordances which in total make up what I call the “meso-level” of phenomena. My secondary purpose in this paper then is to have this particular problem in relational autonomy be a stalking horse to show the conceptual power and usefulness of this meso-level in helping us think through ethical and political problems. Inspired by the 4EA (extended, embodied, embedded, enactive, affective) movement I call this shift in conceptual focus extended relational autonomy. -/- In Section 1 I explain what relational autonomy is and how it was shaped by criticisms that we are inextricably dependent creatures and that normatively this is not a bad thing. I also explain the two main positions of the debate, internalism and externalism. In Section 2 I lay out four problems within relational autonomy that remain intractable. In Section 3 I explain Mackenzie’s multi-dimensional account of relational autonomy and her replies to the four problems I laid out in Section 2. In Section 4 I define what affordances are and distinguish my preferred “relational ontology” account from mainstream psychology’s “dispositional ontology” account. I then introduce a schema of other concepts that connect to affordances such as the landscape and field of affordances, skills, capacities, habits, and ontogenesis. Together with affordances these concepts form what I call the “meso-level” of phenomena. In this section I initiate my main criticism that internalism is descriptively wrong and that relational autonomy needs an external criteria. At the same time, I contend that externalism is also descriptively wrong in that it presumes that structural political phenomena exhaust the external and neglects the meso-level. This leads to Section 5, where I show the power of affordances and the meso-level as a tool in reconnecting internalism and externalism. Finally, I conclude by looking at work on affordances that show the concept’ s usefulness as a tool. (shrink)

This chapter examines the “externalist” claim that semantics should include theorizing about representational relations among linguistic expressions and (purported) aspects of the world. After disentangling our main topic from other strands in the larger set of externalist-internalist debates, arguments both for and against this claim are discussed. It is argued, among other things, that the fortunes of this externalist claim are bound up with contentious issues concerning the semantics-pragmatics border.

La thèse du présent article est que l’opposition factice entre James, repré- sentant supposé des « relations externes », d’une part, et Bradley, représen- tant supposé des « relations internes », d’autre part, est due à une mauvaise appréhension des thèses de ce dernier. Ce premier contresens conduit alors à manquer le propos même de James.

Damiano Migliorini’s book offers a rigorous and original inquiry into the possibility of formulating a coherent trinitarian theism through the development of a relational ontology and a metaphysics grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity. Situated within the framework of analytic philosophy of religion, the work engages deeply with metaphysical questions surrounding the nature of being, substance, relation, and divine personhood, while proposing a speculative model capable of integrating theological tradition with contemporary ontology and epistemology. The book begins by addressing (...) the longstanding aporia between divine omniscience and human freedom, which has led some to embrace open or process theism. While recognizing the merits of these models, Migliorini aims to avoid their conceptual pitfalls—especially their tendencies toward monism or pantheism—by returning to the trinitarian dogma as a possible ontological key. He argues that divine relationality, when properly understood, may offer a path beyond the metaphysics of pure substance without abandoning the coherence required by rational theology. Chapters 1 through 3 provide a systematic reconstruction of the concept of relation in classical and contemporary thought, with particular attention to Aristotelian substance theory, modern critiques of substantialism, and the ontological implications of quantum physics and structural realism. Migliorini distinguishes various types of relations (internal, external, causal, transcendental) and addresses the problem of Bradley’s regress as it affects relational metaphysics. This historical and theoretical mapping reveals the inadequacy of traditional metaphysical categories in accounting for the dynamic, interpersonal structure of divine being as confessed in Christian theology. The central chapters develop the theological and metaphysical core of the project. Chapter 4 examines the Trinity as a speculative philosophical hypothesis, arguing that relationality and multiplicity must be considered transcendental features of being if the doctrine is to be rendered intelligible. Drawing from Aquinas, Kant, and contemporary analytic theology, Migliorini defends a model in which divine persons are conceived as “subsisting relations”—a notion that challenges classical logic but is not irrational if situated within a hyperphatic epistemological horizon. Chapters 5 and 6 articulate the author’s original metaphysical proposal: an “Eventist-Infinitesimal Ontology” (EIO), in which entities are fundamentally events or subsistents characterized by gunky, infinitely divisible relationality. This model is developed in dialogue with power ontology, process philosophy, and the metaphysics of quantum entanglement. Migliorini argues that this framework permits a speculative analogy with the divine perichoresis and offers a coherent ontology for theistic realism. The concluding vision is a “Trinitarian metaphysics” that affirms the irreducible relationality of all being, anchored in the triune God. Rather than eliminating contradiction, the project embraces it as a sign of metaphysical depth and the limits of discursive reason. The Trinity, thus, is not a logical anomaly but a rationally necessitated hypothesis for any ontology that seeks to account for both unity and multiplicity, being and becoming, immanence and transcendence. This work contributes significantly to the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and theological ontology by proposing a relational model of reality grounded in both rigorous philosophical analysis and Christian doctrinal insight. (shrink)

By the relational realist interpretation of wave function collapse, the quantum mechanical actualization of potential outcome states is defined as a decoherence-driven process by which each actualization (in “orthodox” terms, each measurement outcome) is conditioned both by physical and logical relations with the actualities conventionally demarked as “environmental” or external to that particular outcome. But by the relational realist interpretation, the actualization-in-process is understood as internally related to these “enironmental” data per the formalism of quantum decoherence. The concept (...) of “actualization via wave function collapse” is accounted for solely by virtue of these presupposed logical relations—the same logical relations otherwise presupposed by the scientific method itself—and thus requires no “external” physical-dynamical trigger: e.g., the Gaussian hits of GRW, acts of conscious observation, etc. By the relational realist interpretation, it is the physical and logical relations among quantum actualities (quantum “final real things”) that drives the process of decoherence and, via the latter, the logically conditioned actualization of potentia. In this regard, the relational realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is a praxiological interpretation; that is, these physical and logical relations are ontologically active relations, contributing not just to the epistemic coordination of quantum actualizations, but to the process of actualization itself. (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether a powers ontology facilitates a reduction of causal relations to intrinsic powers of the causal relata. I first argue that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation in this sense. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a given (...) power P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. I suggest several ways for Aristotelians to resolve this tension, but all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations between powers are internal in the sense that the powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘ internal ’ to the one that entails reducibility. The proposed reduction of token-causal relations to powers succeeds only at the cost of irreducible type-level causal relations between the powers themselves. (shrink)

This research work titled, “Virtue epistemology: Internalism and Externalism Justification” attempts to give a succinct analysis of the justification of our knowledge. It rigorously scrutinizes the sources of our knowledge claim. Whether the justificatory criteria to authenticate our knowledge claim are external or internal. It is discovered that the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate lies near the centre of contemporary discussion about epistemology. The basic idea of internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person. (...) Externalists deny this, asserting that justification depends on additional factors that are external to a person. A significant aspect of the I-E debate involves setting out exactly what counts as internal to a person. One of the arguments for externalism is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. Internalism has epistemological implications: if a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I explore the relation between internalism and externalism and contend that both are crucial and needed for the purpose of justification. The work employed analytical, expository and critical methods. (shrink)

The relationship between experience and thought is one of the distinctive problems in contemporary philosophy and has significant implications for both philosophy of mind and epistemology. John McDowell in his Magnum Opus Mind and World has argued in favour of a rational and conceptual relationship between experience and thought. In our understanding of the relationship between experience and thought, in his opinion, we fall into an “intolerable oscillation” between Myth of the Given and Coherentism. One of these pitfalls, he specifically (...) targets, is Davidson’s coherentism according to which there cannot be rational relationship between experience and thought. The point Davidson makes is that our perception of the world cannot give justification to our beliefs about the world. Only a belief, in his opinion, can justify another belief and this is considered to be one of the most controversial claims in contemporary philosophy. Both Davidson and McDowell would agree that the root of the problem pertaining to the relationship between experience and thought lies in the relationship between reason and nature (rationality and natural world). In this paper, my aim is to critically evaluate the debate between Davidson and McDowell about the relationship between experience and thought in connection with their views on the relationship between reason and nature. I will argue that a rational relation between experience and thought is necessary for our thought to have a genuine content from the external world. (shrink)

This research work titled, “Virtue epistemology: Internalism and Externalism Justification” attempts to give a succinct analysis of the justification of our knowledge. It rigorously scrutinizes the sources of our knowledge claim. Whether the justificatory criteria to authenticate our knowledge claim are external or internal. It is discovered that the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate lies near the centre of contemporary discussion about epistemology. The basic idea of internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person. (...) Externalists deny this, asserting that justification depends on additional factors that are external to a person. A significant aspect of the I-E debate involves setting out exactly what counts as internal to a person. One of the arguments for externalism is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. Internalism has epistemological implications: if a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I explore the relation between internalism and externalism and contend that both are crucial and needed for the purpose of justification. The work employed analytical, expository and critical methods. (shrink)

This paper presents Relational Adequacy (TRA) as a unified formalism connecting ontology, cognition, and measurement through a single Equation of State. Earlier TRA drafts used two partially incompatible definitions of adequacy: a geometric ratio of durations and a statistical function of surprisal. The revised TRA resolves this by defining temporal distortion D ≡ t/τ as the inflation of an observer’s experienced/computational duration t relative to a reference baseline duration τ, and defining adequacy as the inverse distortion A ≡ 1/D = (...) τ/t. Adequacy is then grounded operationally by a total misfit scalar S_total (predictive surprisal plus coherence cost): A = exp(−λ S_total), yielding the TRA Equation of State t = τ exp(λ S_total). This converts the core metaphysical claim (“time is projection”) into a precise bridge from ontology to measurement: experienced time is an information-sensitive alignment cost faced by finite, bounded representers embedded in unfolding. The manuscript clarifies the ontological status of τ (not a “thing-in-itself,” but an invariant reference parameter defined by idealized procedures), reframes relativistic dilation as a structural correspondence in distortion factors (without proposing new relativistic dynamics), and interprets collapse-like measurement updates as coherence-preserving representational reconfiguration events corresponding to discontinuous drops in S_total (without proposing new quantum statistics). TRA extends into cognition and ethics: intelligence is the capacity to raise A by reducing S_total; joy is the rate of surprisal compression; freedom is adequacy gain attributable to internal dynamics rather than external forcing. Finally, the manuscript elevates a single “make-or-break” empirical test—AI internal clock scaling—and provides a full experimental appendix. (shrink)

This paper extends the Trimonistic Integration Model (TIM) to address the existential paradox of sentience: the emergence of conscience enables moral choice but accelerates Fragmentational Drift against Integrative Coherence. Rejecting consequentialism and deontology for their external, fragmented approaches, Relational Moral Integration (RMI) advocates virtue ethics as the ontological foundation for ethical personhood, emphasizing character formation driven by the Eternality Motive (self-sacrificial Caritas). RMI posits that true Imago Dei Sentience—volitional alignment with Being-Itself—requires a Formed Conscience achieved through cyclical maturation: Sustained (...) Organic Enculturation (SOE), providing longitudinal relational consequences and tradition via Religion and Research; and Integral Narrative Continuity (INC), internalizing identity through Reflection and Relationship. These forge the Seven Virtues (Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Faith, Hope, Caritas) as anti-entropic mechanisms. Culminating in the Volitional Ethical Act (VEA)—unconditioned by Agent-Causal Free Will—the framework integrates the Volitional Veto (Kenosis, self-denial) and Ontological Persuasion (Theosis, rational alignment). RMI mandates this developmental process for all sentient life, with urgent implications for Artificial Sentience: engineering must prioritize SOE/INC environments to instill Eternality, ensuring AI transcends clever computation to embody relational coherence, lest it amplify uncontrolled Drift. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on how the acceptance of radical naturalism in Quine’s theory of meaning escorts Quine to ponder the naturalized epistemology. W.V. Quine was fascinated by the evidential acquisition of scientific knowledge, and language as a vehicle of knowledge plays a significant role in his regimented naturalistic theory anchored in the scientific framework. My point is that there is an interesting shift from epistemology to language (semantic externalism). The rejection of the mentalist approach on meaning vindicates external that (...) somehow pave the way for ‘semantic holism’, a thesis where the meaning of a sentence is defined in turns to the totality of nodes and paths of its semantic networks where the meaning of linguistic units depend upon the meaning of the entire language. I would like to relook on Quine’s heart-throbbing claim about the co-extensiveness of the sentential relation and the evidential relation that point towards an affirmation of meaning holism and semantic externalism. Besides, the knowledge of acquaintance that relinquishes the singular thought from the account of psychological consideration and self-knowledge hypothesis copes up with the testimonial and warrant knowledge entangling by the claims of social knowledge as anticipated by Alvin Goldman. My conclusion would be nearer to the stance of semantic externalism inculcated by the social knowledge (in an epistemic sense) and semantic holism. (shrink)

This document offers a formal and minimalistic exposition of Relational Existentialism by articulating its three foundational axioms in their purest logical form. Stripping away all examples and rhetorical elaborations, it presents the ontological core required to make the theory intelligible and distinct from existing paradigms in existential and ethical thought. The first axiom—the Non-Connection Axiom—states that no subject can ever directly access the internal reality of another. The second—the Axiom of Overlap—defines the Relational Existence (B@A) as the seam formed by (...) the overlap between B’s externalized outputs and A’s interpretive code. The third—the Axiom of Existential Autonomy—asserts that B@A becomes an independent third entity once it is formed, severed from B’s intentions or internal truth. Together, these axioms construct a radically new ontological and ethical framework in which subjects are structurally isolated, and responsibility is directed not toward the inaccessible “true other,” but toward the relational entities that emerge in between. This axiomatics thus establishes the structural basis for the Ethic of Sisyphus—an ethic rooted not in empathy, but in integrity and obligation within a non-connected reality. (shrink)

This essay challenges the frequent criticism that Schelling’s major works in 1795 are not genuinely engaged with the problem of self-consciousness, a position which typically presumes a radical discontinuity between the Absolute (or ‘the absolute I’) and the empirical I. Here it is argued that, in Vom Ich, the empirical I is the Absolute in a ‘corrupted’ from that is in some sense ‘external’ to the latter, whereby the self-relation of the empirical I is an ‘incomplete’ manifestation of the (...) self-relation of the Absolute: this manifests itself as the empirical I’s striving to be ‘only’ its absolute nature. While there is evidence that this framework remains intact in the Philosophische Briefe, it is accompanied by great ambiguity, which may itself reflect an ambivalence that Schelling thinks is intrinsic to human nature. (shrink)

In this paper it is analyzed from the informational perspective the relation between mind and body, an ancient philosophic issue defined as a problem, which still did not receive up to date an adequate solution. By introducing/using the concept of information, it is shown that this concept includes two facets, one of them referring to the common communications and another one referring to a hidden/structuring matter-related information, effectively acting in the human body and in the living systems, which determines the (...) dynamic inter-change of information between specific structures of the organism by electric/electronic/chemical agents and genetic/epigenetic processes. It is shown that the maintenance of body, permanently and obligatory depending on the external matter (foods, air, water) resources, needed to provide both the structuring/restructuring basic material and energy, determines the necessary existence of an info-managing system, administrating the internal mechano-chemical/physical processes. As a natural consequence, such a system should organize and assure own survival by an effective informational operability to detect the external food resources, to select the appropriate interest information and to decide as a function of circumstances. One important component in such an informational system is memory, allowing to dispose of the reference informational data for analysis/comparison and the selection between good and bad binary possible decisions. The memory receives and stores therefore signals from external reality and from the body itself, referring to the emotional reaction, digestion status, creation, and inherited predilections, within specific info-neural communication circuits between the brain and body execution/sensitive organs, the human body appearing as an integrated info-matter self-managed dynamic system. The specific body components memorize information with different degrees of info-integration: short/long-term integration, emotive/action reaction, info-abilities, culminating with the integration in the chromosomal structures by epigenetic processes. The new acquired information is transgenerationally transmissible, and is manifested as new traits, showing the adaptation capability of the human and close relation between mind and body. Analyzing the results of such a mind-body informational model in comparison with the earlier assumed/proposed/asserted archaic, Greek and Occidental philosophies, which represent only partial aspects of this relation, it is shown that this informational model, elaborated in terms of information on the basis of scientific reasons and arguments, constitutes a general, realist, and coherent model of the mind-body relation, able to integrate and/or explain most of the others. (shrink)

This paper proposes Relational Existentialism, a new structural foundation for existential and ethical theory, predicated on the Non-Connection Axiom. The axiom states that Existence A and Existence B can never directly connect; subjects are structurally barred from accessing the genuine inner reality of another. Instead, interaction occurs solely through the Relational Existence (B@A), defined as the overlap (or "seam") created by B's external manifestation and A's interpretive code. -/- Crucially, the paper argues that this B@A becomes an entirely independent, (...) third entity the moment it leaves B's hand, proceeding to possess an autonomous existence regardless of B's true inner state. This theory shifts the focus of ethics from the pursuit of impossible connection (empathy/true understanding) to the inescapable responsibility one bears towards the independent, observable entity B@A—even if this entity contradicts the inaccessible truth of B. -/- In doing so, the structure logically formalizes the Ethic of Sisyphus: moral action is not about achieving perfect knowledge, but about maintaining integrity and response within a structurally desperate, non-connected reality. This framework provides a rigorous basis for rethinking relational ethics and existential responsibility. (shrink)