Applied Evolutionary Epistemology is a scientific-philosophical theory that defines evolution as the set of phenomena whereby units evolve at levels of ontological hierarchies by mechanisms and processes. This theory also provides a methodology to study evolution, namely, studying evolution involves identifying the units that evolve, the levels at which they evolve, and the mechanisms and processes whereby they evolve. Identifying units and levels of evolution in turn requires the development of ontological hierarchy theories, and examining mechanisms and processes necessitates (...) theorizing about causality. Together, hierarchy and causality theories explain how biorealities form and diversify with time. This paper analyzes how Applied EE redefines both hierarchy and causality theories in the light of the recent explosion of network approaches to causal reasoning associated with studies on reticulate and macroevolution. Causality theories have often been framed from within a rigid, ladder-like hierarchy theory where the rungs of the ladder represent the different levels, and the elements on the rungs represent the evolving units. Causality then is either defined reductionistically as an upward movement along the strands of a singular hierarchy, or holistically as a downward movement along that same hierarchy. Upward causation theories thereby analyze causal processes in time, i.e. over the course of natural history or phylogenetically, as Darwin and the founders of the Modern Synthesis intended. Downward causation theories analyze causal processes in space, ontogenetically or ecologically, as the current eco-evo-devo schools are evidencing. This work demonstrates how macroevolution and reticulate evolution theories add to the complexity by examining reticulate causal processes in space–time, and the interactional hierarchies that such studies bring forth introduce a new form of causation that is here called reticulate causation. Reticulate causation occurs between units and levels belonging to different as well as to the same ontological hierarchies. This article concludes that beyond recognizing the existence of multiple units, levels, and mechanisms or processes of evolution, also the existence of multiple kinds of evolutionary causation as well as the existence of multiple evolutionary hierarchies needs to be acknowledged. This furthermore implies that evolution is a pluralistic process divisible into different kinds. (shrink)

Contemporary evolutionary biology comprises a plural landscape of multiple co-existent conceptual frameworks and strenuous voices that disagree on the nature and scope of evolutionary theory. Since the mid-eighties, some of these conceptual frameworks have denounced the ontologies of the Modern Synthesis and of the updated Standard Theory of Evolution as unfinished or even flawed. In this paper, we analyze and compare two of those conceptual frameworks, namely Niles Eldredge’s Hierarchy Theory of Evolution (with its extended ontology of evolutionary entities) (...) and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (with its proposal of an extended ontology of evolutionary processes), in an attempt to map some epistemic bridges (e.g. compatible views of causation; niche construction) and some conceptual rifts (e.g. extra-genetic inheritance; different perspectives on macroevolution; contrasting standpoints held in the “externalism–internalism” debate) that exist between them. This paper seeks to encourage theoretical, philosophical and historiographical discussions about pluralism or the possible unification of contemporary evolutionary biology. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic (...) is to be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

The attributes of gender in the media are disputable. This can be explained by a conflict generated by culturally acquired alternative imagined hierarchies which are not compatible or may be even contradictory. This article is a philosophical enquiry that examines the representation of gender and the environment in which it is conditioned.

We introduce and study hierarchies of extensions of the propositional modal and temporal languages with pairs of new syntactic devices: point of reference-reference pointer which enable semantic references to be made within a formula. We propose three different but equivalent semantics for the extended languages, discuss and compare their expressiveness. The languages with reference pointers are shown to have great expressive power (especially when their frugal syntax is taken into account), perspicuous semantics, and simple deductive systems. For instance, Kamp's and (...) Stavi's temporal operators, as well as nominals (names, clock variables), are definable in them. Universal validity in these languages is proved undecidable. The basic modal and temporal logics with reference pointers are uniformly axiomatized and a strong completeness theorem is proved for them and extended to some classes of their extensions. (shrink)

Evidence hierarchies are widely used to assess evidence in systematic reviews of medical studies. I give several arguments against the use of evidence hierarchies. The problems with evidence hierarchies are numerous, and include methodological shortcomings, philosophical problems, and formal constraints. I argue that medical science should not employ evidence hierarchies, including even the latest and most-sophisticated of such hierarchies.

Neural systems exhibit a conserved hierarchy of oscillatory rhythms spanning delta to gamma frequencies. Although distinct functional roles have been attributed to individual frequency bands, the organizing principle underlying this multi-scale architecture remains incompletely specified. In this paper, we propose that the oscillatory hierarchy can be interpreted as progressive Negative Space Encoding (NSE): a redistribution of representational stability from local positive activations toward globally enforced temporal and spatial constraints. We introduce a quantitative toy model in which nested oscillatory (...) gating reduces accessible state space multiplicatively. Under standard assumptions of local stochastic noise, the model demonstrates exponential suppression of decoding error with increasing nesting depth. Simultaneously, spike-dependent metabolic cost decreases proportionally to the fraction of permitted activity windows. This dual scaling—nonlinear stabilization combined with energetic efficiency—provides a principled explanation for the evolutionary conservation of cross-frequency coupling. We map canonical frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, gamma) onto progressively layered constraint regimes and derive empirically testable predictions relating cross-frequency coupling strength to representational stability and energy expenditure. Importantly, we do not claim that oscillations exist solely for noise suppression or that higher-frequency bands uniquely implement negative encoding. Rather, we propose a formal hypothesis: oscillatory nesting redistributes representational load toward global constraints in a quantifiable manner. The framework generates falsifiable predictions for systems neuroscience, comparative neurobiology, and artificial neural architectures. (shrink)

The Hierarchy Problem and the Yang–Mills Mass Gap are unified and resolved through the topology of a quantized vacuum. We propose that mass is not an intrinsic property, but the geometric strain of recursive self-reference: the elastic energy required to sustain a topological defect against the vacuum's equilibrium. This framework reveals the 10³⁸ force hierarchy not as fine-tuning, but as a difference in topological scope. Gravity couples to the Bulk Capacity of the vacuum lattice (global stress), while electromagnetism (...) couples only to Unit Strain (localized defects). The observed hierarchy (m_P/m_p)² is derived from first principles as the geometric ratio of bulk volume to defect surface area, rendering new electroweak physics unnecessary. Consequently, the Mass Gap arises as a topological stability constraint. The vacuum lattice cannot support fractional geometry; sub-threshold patterns ("open twists" like isolated gluons) are invalid. Confinement is the requirement for such twists to form closed loops (hadrons) to persist. The mass gap is therefore the minimum thermodynamic cost—the Landauer limit—of maintaining a coherent boundary against the vacuum. This model predicts the absence of supersymmetry at the electroweak scale. (shrink)

Through transatlantic contact and subsequent debates, the “humanity” of Amerindians was first established for Europeans according to the dictates of philosophical anthropology and theology. This hierarchical and colonial anthropology is problematic precisely because it normalizes a singular, indigenous way of “being human” as the only correct and universal formulation of the “human being,” i.e., Man. Consequently, people that live outside this constructed definition are exposed to dispossession, dehumanization, and genocide because they are deemed outside the bounds of Mankind. Through a (...) three-part analysis, this work will examine Bartolomé de Las Casas’ categorization of Amerindians though his formulation of “barbarianism,” compare this taxonomy with Orson Scott Card’s “Hierarchy of Foreignness,” and finally argue that Indigenous traditions of thought—as seen in “grounded normativity” and “place-thought”—allow not only for the dissolution of colonial anthropologies but also permit for a teleological suspension of Man. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has (...) no ontological significance for Frege. It was just a ‘short expression’ (his term) to indicate that the customary relation between sign, sense, and reference is suspended in what he called the exception case of indirect context. Once the hierarchy is abandoned, the alleged problem of just what indirect sense is, as well as questions as to why Frege said so little about it and why he did not examine iterative indirect contexts are resolved. Of course, with no hierarchy, Davidson’s ‘unlearnability argument’ turns out to be a non-starter. Some objections to my interpretation are considered and answered. Additionally, comparisons to Dummett’s one-level view of sense, which is similar to mine are made, as well as to some two-level views (Parsons and Skiba). (shrink)

In my forthcoming book, How to Count Animals, More or Less (based on my 2016 Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics), I argue for a hierarchical approach to animal ethics according to which animals have moral standing but nonetheless have a lower moral status than people have. This essay is an overview of that book, drawing primarily from selections from its beginning and end, aiming both to give a feel for the overall project and to indicate the general shape of the (...) hierarchical position that I defend there. In this essay, I contrast the hierarchical approach with its most important rival (which holds that people and animals have the very same moral status), sketch the main idea behind one central argument for hierarchy, and briefly review three potentially troubling implications of the hierarchical view. I close with a discussion of a promising possible solution to the most worrisome of the three objections. (shrink)

Social egalitarianism holds that justice requires that people relate to one another as equals. To explain the content of this requirement, social egalitarians often appeal to the moral equality of persons. This leads to two very different interpretations of social egalitarianism. The first involves the specification of a conception of the moral equality of persons that is distinctive of the social egalitarian view. Social (or relational) egalitarianism can then claim that for people to relate as equals is for the relations (...) between them to conform to this conception of their moral equality. I will argue against this type of view. Instead, I will argue that social egalitarianism should propose a distinctive conception of social equality as a purely sociological phenomenon. I will show how this conception allows us to formulate the types of normative claims social egalitarianism should make. On this picture, social egalitarianism, instead of identifying social hierarchy as a distinctive kind of wrong, makes standard normative claims about a distinctive kind of social phenomenon. (shrink)

The notion of “hierarchy” is one of the most commonly posited organizational principles in systems neuroscience. To this date, however, it has received little philosophical analysis. This is unfortunate, because the general concept of hierarchy ranges over two approaches with distinct empirical commitments, and whose conceptual relations remain unclear. We call the first approach the “representational hierarchy” view, which posits that an anatomical hierarchy of feed-forward, feed-back, and lateral connections underlies a signal processing hierarchy of (...) input-output relations. Because the representational hierarchy view holds that unimodal sensory representations are subsequently elaborated into more categorical and rule-based ones, it is committed to an increasing degree of abstraction along the hierarchy. The second view, which we call “topological hierarchy", is not committed to different representational functions or degrees of abstraction at different levels. Topological approaches instead posit that the hierarchical level of a part of the brain depends on how central it is to the pattern of connections in the system. Based on the current evidence, we argue that three conceptual relations between the two approaches are possible: topological hierarchies could substantiate the traditional representational hierarchy, conflict with it, or contribute to a plurality of approaches needed to understand the organization of the brain. By articulating each of these possibilities, our analysis attempts to open a conceptual space in which further neuroscientific and philosophical reasoning about neural hierarchy can proceed. (shrink)

The paper examines the book Martin Buber’s Theopolitics and analyzes the conflict between the hierarchy in nature and in human society. Buber qualifies our relations to nature and to other non-living objects as darker than human relations. This creates an imbalance between the human You and the other type of You. This reflection allows us to think about the meaning of the principle of humanity in relation to personhood, and in relation to different forms of communities (natural, or inorganic (...) communities). It is an important question in the light of “conflicts” and tensions created by the environmental crisis we are facing today. The paper explains how to use the word “conflict” in this context and whether it is justified. (shrink)

This paper develops a taxonomic and phenomenological framework for meditation-induced phosphenes, internally generated luminous phenomena that occur with eyes closed during contemplative practice. Synthesizing decades of first-person practice reports with comparative sources from Buddhist, shamanic, and neuropsychological traditions, I propose a three-tier hierarchical taxonomy: (1) Basal Endogenous Visual Patterns (entoptic and early visual forms); (2) Complex Meditation-Induced Phosphenes (structured, geometric and symbol-like visions); and (3) Transpersonal Luminous Manifestations, intense, non-dual luminosities that often accompany insight and ego-dissolution. I distinguish these structured (...) inner-light experiences from pathological hallucination and migraine aura by pointing to preserved reality testing, heightened clarity of awareness, and their characteristic affective correlates (awe, insight, surrender). At the uppermost level I introduce the concept of an Ultrasubjective Hyperspace (USH), a dimensionless, radiant field of experience in which symbolic forms dissolve into unified luminosity, and I suggest how encounters in this domain map onto reports of mystical illumination. Drawing on contemporary neurophenomenology, the paper outlines plausible mechanisms (sensory attenuation, homeostatic visual plasticity, recruitment of higher visual and mnemonic networks) and reports associations with electrophysiological markers such as gamma synchrony and default-mode network attenuation. By integrating contemplative descriptions with neurobiological accounts, this taxonomy reframes inner-light visions as a systematic, investigable class of conscious events and proposes empirical pathways for future research into their phenomenology, function, and neural correlates. (shrink)

Despite a growing interest in and sympathy with Confucianism, there remains a stereotyped conception of Confucian civil order as a form of authoritarian hierarchy that is responsible for various oppressions in ancient China and is reprehensible from a modern egalitarian perspective. One central target of this modern criticism is the Confucian maxim of sangang 三綱, whose underlying idea is essential for regulating the relationship between sovereign and subject, father and son, and husband and wife in traditional Confucian society. Tu (...) Wei-ming translates sangang as the “Three Bonds” and argues that it is the “least defensible legacy of Confucian ethics” from the “modern egalitarian and liberal perspective.” For Tu.. (shrink)

-/- Perfect Hierarchy of Systems in Human Societies -/- 1. Individual Level (Micro-System) -/- The foundation of human society starts with the individual, whose well-being and decision-making influence all higher systems. -/- 1.1 Biological System 1.2 The body operates under homeostasis, requiring proper nutrition, healthcare, and an environment that supports physical well-being. -/- Balanced biological functioning ensures optimal decision-making and productivity. -/- 1.3 Cognitive System 1.4 The mind functions based on knowledge, beliefs, emotions, and rational thinking. -/- Critical thinking (...) and self-awareness prevent ignorance and misinformation from corrupting decisions. -/- 1.3 Behavioral System -/- Shaped by upbringing, education, experiences, and cultural influences. -/- The law of balance ensures responsible behavior in society, avoiding excesses of selfishness or self-sacrifice. -/- 1.5 Moral & Ethical System 1.6 Ethical responsibility is guided by an understanding of natural law and justice. -/- Actions should be aligned with fairness, accountability, and sustainability. -/- 2. Family & Community Level (Meso-System) -/- The family and local communities serve as the fundamental units of collective human behavior, shaping individual values and actions. -/- 2.1 Family System 2.2 The first school of knowledge, morality, and survival skills. -/- Balanced parenting ensures the transmission of wisdom without dogmatic control or neglect. -/- 2.3 Local Community System 2.4 A network of families cooperating for shared resources, culture, and social support. -/- Ensures mutual protection, aid, and education at the grassroots level. -/- 2.3 Economic Micro-System -/- Small businesses, local trade, and informal economies sustain livelihoods. -/- The economy should be self-sufficient, avoiding excessive reliance on external forces. -/- 2.5 Cultural & Religious System 2.6 Preserves traditions, beliefs, and values that align with natural balance. -/- Must avoid rigid dogmas that create conflict or impede progress. -/- 3. Institutional Level (Organizational Systems) -/- Institutions formalize society’s essential functions, ensuring collective stability and growth. -/- 3.1 Educational System 3.2 A holistic education that teaches the law of balance, critical thinking, and practical skills. -/- Free from misinformation, propaganda, and outdated doctrines. -/- 3.3 Healthcare System 3.4 Ensures physical and mental well-being through preventive and curative measures. -/- Should not be profit-driven but focused on collective well-being. -/- 3.3 Economic System -/- A balance between production, distribution, and consumption. -/- Avoids economic extremes such as monopolies, overconsumption, and artificial scarcity. -/- 3.5 Justice & Legal System 3.6 Laws are created and enforced based on fairness, equity, and rational governance. -/- Prevents corruption, abuse of power, and unjust punishments. -/- 3.5 Media & Information System -/- Prevents misinformation, black propaganda, and manipulation of public perception. -/- Should be structured to inform, educate, and unify societies without bias. -/- 4. National Level (Macro-System) -/- A well-balanced nation ensures peace, progress, and harmony between institutions and the people. -/- 4.1 Government System 4.2 Leadership must be based on the law of balance, ensuring holistic governance. -/- Power must be distributed to prevent dictatorship or excessive bureaucracy. -/- 4.3 National Defense & Security System 4.4 Protects from internal and external threats while ensuring peace. -/- Should focus on strategic deterrence, not unnecessary militarization. -/- 4.3 National Economic System -/- Policies must regulate wealth distribution, prevent inflation, and ensure sustainable development. -/- Should prevent over-reliance on unstable markets or exploitative labor. -/- 4.5 Environmental System 4.6 Laws that ensure the protection of natural resources and ecosystems. -/- Prevents industrial overexploitation, deforestation, and pollution. -/- 4.5 Social Welfare System -/- Provides safety nets for vulnerable populations (e.g., poor, disabled, elderly). -/- Ensures equal opportunity, reducing poverty and crime rates. -/- 5. Global Level (Meta-System) -/- Nations must cooperate to maintain balance at an international scale. -/- 5.1 International Governance System 5.2 Organizations like the UN should enforce global peace and cooperative policies. -/- Must be restructured to ensure fairness and prevent dominance by any single nation. -/- 5.3 Global Economic System 5.4 Equitable trade agreements, fair wealth distribution, and sustainable globalization. -/- Prevents exploitative capitalism and unfair economic dependency. -/- 5.3 Environmental & Ecological System -/- Global efforts to address climate change, deforestation, and biodiversity loss. -/- Shared responsibility in ensuring a sustainable planet. -/- 5.5 Artificial Intelligence & Technological System 5.6 AI must be programmed according to the law of balance, ensuring it serves humanity. -/- Should prevent misuse in warfare, surveillance, or economic control. -/- 5.5 Human Rights & Ethical System -/- Ensures universal human dignity, equality, and freedom. -/- Should be free from political bias, economic interest, and ideological extremism. -/- 6. Cosmic Level (Ultimate System) -/- Humanity must recognize its place within the greater universe and maintain balance in exploration and philosophy. -/- 6.1 Philosophical & Existential System 6.2 Scientific and spiritual integration in understanding human existence. -/- Avoiding nihilism, dogmatism, or extremist ideologies. -/- 6.3 Interplanetary & Cosmic Exploration System 6.4 Future human expansion beyond Earth must follow sustainability and ethics. -/- Avoids resource overconsumption or exploitative space colonization. -/- 6.3 Spiritual & Metaphysical System -/- Understanding human consciousness, free will, and its connection to universal balance. -/- Avoids religious conflicts by unifying metaphysical understanding under natural laws. -/- Final Principles of the Hierarchical System -/- 1. Balance at All Levels – Every system must operate within natural limits to avoid collapse. -/- 2. Mutual Feedback Mechanisms – Lower and higher levels must continuously adjust based on feedback. -/- 3. Elimination of Corruptive Influences – No system should be controlled by greed, dogma, or misinformation. -/- 4. Holistic Education – Proper education ensures that each generation understands and maintains balance. -/- 5. Global Cooperation, Not Domination – Nations and individuals must work together rather than compete destructively. -/- . (shrink)

The Hierarchy Problem in Physics and Its Resolution Through the Universal Law of Balance -/- The hierarchy problem in physics is a fundamental issue concerning the vast difference between the gravitational scale (Planck scale) and the electroweak scale. This discrepancy presents a challenge in understanding why the Higgs boson mass is so small compared to the Planck mass when quantum corrections should naturally drive it to much higher values. Various solutions have been proposed, such as supersymmetry, extra dimensions, (...) and composite Higgs models, but a definitive answer remains elusive. -/- Using the Universal Law of Balance, as formulated in my Universal Formula, the hierarchy problem can be understood as a manifestation of imbalance in the fundamental interactions governing the universe. The essence of the Universal Law of Balance is that all natural systems—whether physical, biological, or cognitive—must follow a dynamic equilibrium governed by interdependent feedback mechanisms. In this context, the extreme disparity between the fundamental forces indicates a state of disequilibrium that requires a deeper natural principle to restore balance. -/- The Universal Law of Balance and Hierarchical Scales -/- In nature, all stable systems—whether ecosystems, economies, or biological organisms—function within a balanced range of parameters. If an imbalance occurs, a natural feedback process either corrects it or results in structural instability and transformation. Applying this principle to physics, the discrepancy between the Planck scale and the electroweak scale suggests an underlying compensatory mechanism that has not yet been fully understood. -/- One possible interpretation within the Universal Formula is that the observed hierarchy reflects an inherent balance between different layers of reality, with each level influencing the other through feedback loops. The Higgs mass remains small not because of fine-tuning or accidental cancellations, but because nature inherently regulates hierarchical scales through self-balancing interactions. This could imply the presence of an as-yet-undiscovered feedback mechanism that dynamically stabilizes mass scales in a way that adheres to the universal balance principle. -/- Feedback Mechanisms in Fundamental Forces -/- In the biological and cognitive realms, decision-making and homeostasis operate under constant feedback loops. Similarly, in fundamental physics, the interactions between quantum fields must adhere to an intrinsic equilibrium. The hierarchy problem could be reinterpreted as a failure to recognize the hidden feedback process that naturally maintains the relative strength of forces. -/- This perspective aligns with theories that propose self-organized criticality, where nature fine-tunes itself dynamically rather than relying on arbitrary parameter adjustments. The universal balance principle suggests that rather than searching for a single missing component—such as a new symmetry or extra dimensions—we should look at how the interplay of known forces inherently maintains equilibrium. -/- Implications for the Future of Physics -/- If the Universal Law of Balance governs all interactions, then solutions to the hierarchy problem should focus on understanding how fundamental forces maintain equilibrium across different scales. Rather than assuming unnatural fine-tuning, physics should explore the possibility that the Higgs mass is a natural consequence of deeper balancing laws within the universe. -/- This could lead to new perspectives in high-energy physics, particularly in the search for a more unified framework that does not rely on artificial cancellations but instead follows a natural balancing principle inherent in all complex systems. The incorporation of the Universal Formula into theoretical physics could redefine how physicists approach unresolved problems, not just in the hierarchy of forces but also in the broader quest for a Theory of Everything. -/- In conclusion, the hierarchy problem is not merely a technical issue within particle physics—it reflects a deeper structural question about the balance of nature. By applying the Universal Law of Balance, we can gain a new perspective on why hierarchies exist and how they are maintained. This approach moves beyond fine-tuning paradoxes and points toward a more holistic understanding of physical reality, in which balance is the fundamental guiding principle of the universe. -/- . (shrink)

This paper seeks to resolve a fairly simple question in ethics: Why do seemingly reasonable people disagree about ethical problems? My paper seeks both to analyze this question and attempts to find a solution. My premise is that disagreement happens because of differences in hierarchical value ranking, or quite simply because some problems are more important to some people than others. Theories of choice, however, influenced by concepts such as "freedom of choice," conceal the hierarchical nature of our choices, leading (...) to confusion over the nature and degree of our ethical disagreements. I propose then that ethical disagreements can be reduced when we understand hierarchy as an essential element in moral choice theory. (shrink)

Abstract The food chain hierarchy is a fundamental organizing principle of life on Earth. It represents the structured flow of energy and matter through ecosystems and demonstrates how natural systems maintain balance and sustainability. This paper connects the hierarchy of the food chain with the three universal laws of nature: (1) the law of karma/system integrity, (2) the law of balance in nature, and (3) the universal feedback loop mechanism. By examining trophic structures through the lens of these (...) universal principles, we gain deeper insight into how ecosystems self-regulate, how free will operates within natural limits, and why imbalance leads to collapse. -/- . (shrink)

A recent book by Niko Kolodny, The Pecking Order, makes the case that societal hierarchies deserve more attention than they have been given in political philosophy hitherto, and explores the descriptive and moral implications of societal hierarchies. Though a pathbreaking work, Kolodny’s elaboration is nevertheless flawed in several key respects. First, Kolodny’s descriptive approach to societal hierarchies lacks an account of ‘structure’. In response, I theorize several levels of ‘structurality’, and argue for the existence of ‘interactional hierarchies’, ‘meso-structural hierarchies’, and (...) ‘macro-structural hierarchies.’ Second, Kolodny neglects the moral notion of a “collective inferiority complaint”. To address this, I tie together several unconnected strands of thought in Kolodny’s text that imply that natural individuals have a collective moral claim against finding themselves in macro-structural relations of inferiority. Third, Kolodny attempts to justify the State and the capitalist firm through a series of “tempering factors” that allegedly mollify the societal hierarchies that these phenomena involve. I demonstrate that Kolodny’s “secondary” tempering factors are aimed at addressing meso-structural offices, only, and that they are insufficient to render even these morally un-objectionable. Further, I show they are not robust enough to meet our collective moral complaint against macro-structural relations of inferiority. Fourth and finally, I argue that anarchism offers a better alternative to a Kolodnian account of societal hierarchies. Anarchist philosophy provides additional tempering factors that render meso-structural hierarchies morally un-objectionable, and that transform macro-structural hierarchies into something else entirely. I theorize the contrast class to societal hierarchies: ‘interactional horizontalities, ‘meso-structural horizontalities, and ‘macro-structural horizontalities.’ I conclude that anarchism is best understood as an ideology that is: skeptical of all societal hierarchies, opposed only to macro-structural hierarchies, open to all societal horizontalities, and dedicated to macro-structural horizontalities. I suggest that this understanding of anarchism not only helps to complete Kolodny’s project, but also to resolve ongoing disputes in anarchist studies. (shrink)

Is syntax an evolutionary novelty in the human lineage? This question, along with the question of how human syntax evolved, is highly debated in the field of language evolution. In this paper, I reconstruct two prominent frameworks for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call “unbounded hierarchy” (Bolhuis et al. 2018) and “compositional semantics” (Townsend et al. 2018). I argue that both frameworks face problems when it comes to explaining the evolution of human syntax. Considering these problems, (...) as well as empirical evidence of hierarchy in nonhuman animals, I provide an alternative framework for studying the evolution of human syntax, which I call “bounded hierarchy”. The bounded hierarchy framework that I propose traces the evolutionary origins of human syntax to simpler forms of bounded hierarchy that may be present in extant nonhuman animals. (shrink)

It has recently become popular to suggest that questions of ontology ought be settled by determining, first, which fundamental things exist, and second, which derivative things depend on, or are grounded by, those fundamental things. This methodology typically leads to a hierarchical view of ontology according to which there are chains of entities, each dependent on the next, all the way down to a fundamental base. In this paper we defend an alternative ontological picture according to which there is no (...) ontological hierarchy. Such a picture appears counterintuitive (at least to many), in part because in the absence of a hierarchical structure to our world, there would be no structure apt to back metaphysical explanations. There are two reasons to suppose this is so. First, there would be no structure apt to back metaphysical explanations because there would be a fatal mismatch between the formal features of metaphysical explanation, on the one hand, and the structure of the world, on the other hand. Second, in the absence of an ontological hierarchy there would be no structure apt to back metaphysical explanations because the only connections that would obtain between relevant facts are mere correlational connections. But mere correlations are not the right kinds of relations to back metaphysical explanations: explanation requires something more. This paper aims to show that neither of these is a good reason to prefer a hierarchical view of ontology. (shrink)

Bryant’s paper, "A Logic of Multiplicities: Deleuze, Immanence, and Onticology," is useful for showing how the historical legacy of hierarchy in its many philosophical forms is still present, important, and, in fact, required even by those such as Bryant who would seek to deconstruct or ignore it. The following response will discuss Bryant’s presentation of his alternative position and throughout point out: a) the straw-man versions of hierarchy that Bryant employs; b) why what Bryant claims to be inherent (...) negatively in hierarchy is not the case; c) how Bryant’s position actually relies upon hierarchy for its own explication, and finally; d) the various principles of hierarchical metaphysics that are required in order to make sense of experience and reality. These latter include the notions that i) there are many kinds of hierarchy; ii) Being and Unity are prior to Multiplicity; iii) relation without substance is incoherent; iv) hierarchy is not inherently tyrannical; v) the distinction between essentially and accidentally ordered causal series is a real and useful one; and vi) the existence of hierarchy is more self evident than is flat ontology. (shrink)

Under which conditions are social relationships hierarchical, and under which conditions are they not? This article has three main aims. First, I will explain what this question amounts to by providing a more detailed description of the general phenomenon of social hierarchy. Second, I will provide an account of what social hierarchy is. Third, I will provide some considerations in favour of this account by discussing how it improves upon three alternative ways of thinking about social hierarchy (...) that are sometimes explicitly endorsed and sometimes suggested or presupposed in writings in philosophy and elsewhere. (shrink)

In her seminal article `Proper Classes', Penelope Maddy introduced a novel theory of classes validating the naïve comprehension rules. The theory is based on a step-by-step construction of the extension and anti-extension of the membership predicate, which mirrors Kripke's construction of the extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate. Maddy's theory has been criticized by Øystein Linnebo for its 'rampant indeterminacy' and for making identity among classes too fine-grained. In this paper, I present a theory of classes which, while building (...) on Maddy's theory, avoids its rampant indeterminacy and allows for identity among classes to be suitably coarse-grained. I begin by presenting a bilateral natural deduction system for Maddy's theory, which improves on her axiomatization in several respects. I then go on to show how to avoid the rampant indeterminacy by using supervaluational schemes in the construction of the extension and anti-extension of the membership predicate and how to augment the proof theory with corresponding, motivated rules. It turns out that whilst a van Fraassen-style supervaluational scheme suffices to avoid the basic problem of rampant indeterminacy, a supervaluational scheme based on maximally consistent extensions is needed for a proper treatment of identity. (shrink)

It is the focus of this paper to tackle the topic of how consumers affect their surrounding environment and, more specifically, how they can affect animal welfare. Through comparisons with the Darwinist survivalist consumption habits and Maslow´s hierarchy, our modern society´s needs and habits are evaluated. Finally a Utilitarian approach, with the goal of the rise of the conscious consumer, is suggested for our so-called advanced societies.

This paper is about the hierarchy view: that each word has infinitely many meanings, arranged into levels, with the level n meaning serving as its semantic value when it occurs embedded to degree n in indirect or attitude reporting verbs. Departing from the famous debates over the bare tenability of the hierarchy view, I focus on whether there is any positive reason to endorse it. Philosophers have offered two such reasons. One appeals to intersubstitutability phenomena, first pointed out (...) by Benson Mates. The other appeals to Frege's theory of indirect discourse. I examine each of these and find that neither actually supports the view. Regardless of its bare tenability then, we should reject the view. (shrink)

In the early modern period the chain of being thesis was used by naturalists and philosophers to justify female subordination. My aim is to establish whether Catharine Trotter Cockburn's endorsement of this thesis entails that differences between sexes assigns differentiating places in the scale or not. I will review Locke’s formulation of the ontological scale first, because Cockburn refers to his description. Locke’s skepticism regarding our access to the real essence of substances hinders him from drawing unequivocal boundaries between species (...) and even within human species. However, he states that wives must subordinate to husbands on the basis of a higher capacity and strength naturally endowed to men. Cockburn’s understanding of the ontological scale rests on a realist conception where boundaries between species are clearly delimited because their nature is fixed and immutable. This insight into the ontological scale is employed to endorse natural equality between sexes, because if all members of a species share the same nature, they deserve equal treatment. Cockburn explains women subjection in terms of vicious notions and attitudes rooted in prejudice. (shrink)

For much of the second half of the 20th century, discussions of social justice were dominated by distributive egalitarianism. According to this approach, justice requires an equal distribution of economic and social goods among people. Distributive egalitarianism has been criticized from two directions. On the one hand, relational egalitarians argue that equality should be understood not as an equal distribution of goods, but as social relations free of discrimination and oppression. On the other hand, sufficientarians argue that distributive equality does (...) not matter as long as everyone has a minimally decent share of goods. A recent approach that synthesizes both lines of criticism is relational sufficientarianism. Its proponents, such as Justin Tosi, argue that justice requires only minimally decent social relations, but not fully egalitarian ones. The main argument for this position is that relational sufficientarianism better explains our intuitive acceptance of tolerable hierarchies. Such hierarchies lack aspects of discrimination and oppression, but they also lack instrumental value and are distinctly inegalitarian in nature. This article offers a response to Tosi’s argument from the perspective of Rawlsian relational egalitarianism. This theory can explain the acceptability of tolerable hierarchies because they limitthe requirement for egalitarian relations to the basic structure of society. The limitation of this requirement is explained by the principle of liberal neutrality, which also rules out the principle of desert as a possible justification for hierarchical relations. The article concludes that, at this stage, relational egalitarianism has significant explanatory advantages over relational sufficientarianism. (shrink)

The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is (...) no clear philosophical significance of meta-inferences above the first level. (shrink)

In both The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross maintains that any amount of the non-instrumental value of virtue outweighs any amount of the non-instrumental value of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The chapter raises two challenges to the status that Ross accords the value of virtue relative to the value of pleasure (pain). First, it argues that Ross fails to provide a good argument for thinking that virtue is always better than pleasure and that (...) it is in any case implausible to think that any amount of virtue (or avoidance of vice) is better than the avoidance of any amount of pain or suffering. Second, it argues that the inflexibility of Ross’s value theory exhibited in his claim about the relative value of virtue produces tension with and mars the attractive heterarchical structure of his theory of rightness or prima facie duties. (shrink)

Some philosophers of fiction – most famously Jerold Levinson1 - have tried to argue that fictional narrators can never be identified with real authors. This argument relies on the claim that narration involves genuine assertion (not just the pretense of assertion that lacks truthfulness) and that real authors are not in a position to assert anything about beings on the fictional plain - given that they don’t rationally believe in their existence. This debate on the status of narrators depends on (...) the idea that fictional beings and beings in the real worlds reside, as it were, at different levels. The assumption that there is a gap separating the levels of fiction and reality serves as a rationale for the claim that real authors could not possibly be en rapport with the fictional characters that they create (e.g. entertain beliefs about them, etc.). (shrink)

The paper places the work of G. Gaus into the tradition of political thought experimenting. In particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision by the heuristic device of idealized Members of the Public is presented as an iterated thought experiment, which stands in marked contrast with more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. The consequences are drawn, and issues of utopianism and realism briefly discussed.

This paper establishes the Law of Order—the principle that logic possesses inherent sequential and hierarchical structure—as the fifth fundamental law of logic, coordinate with identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason. We derive the law from the structure of primary distinction: the act by which anything determinate is differentiated from what it is not. The derivation shows that distinction necessarily exhibits sequence (from undifferentiated to differentiated) and hierarchy (the distinguished presupposes the act of distinguishing). We introduce the E/R/R Framework (...) (Elements/Roles/Rules) as the structural decomposition of any determinate system: Elements (what exists—grounded in L1), Roles (why signifficant—grounded in L4), and Rules (how structured—grounded in L5). This framework provides both a method for analyzing systems and a diagnostic tool for paradoxes. We derive the L5-Resolution Principle: when multiple elements qualify for the same role, L5 demands deterministic resolution through leftmost selection—not as arbitrary convention but as the unique order-respecting choice. This transforms a philosophical principle into a concrete computational rule. We provide a formal treatment in type theory, demonstrating that paradoxes are blocked structurally at the level of type-checking. The explanatory power of the Law of Order is shown through the E/R/R diagnosis of paradoxes: Russell's paradox, the Liar, and related constructions all involve confusing E/R/R categories—attempting to place an entity at two levels simultaneously. The framework provides a unified philosophical foundation for formal solutions including Russell's type theory, Tarski's hierarchy, and ZFC's axiom of regularity. (shrink)

This book begins with the question 'Who am I?' and immediately sets off in an astonishingly original direction. Why didn't anyone before Harding think of responding to this question like this? It's so obvious, once you see it. Harding presents a new vision of our place in the universe that uses the scientific method of looking to see what is true. It turns out that the truth about ourselves is not only true but also very good, and breathtakingly beautiful. We (...) live in a sacred, many-layered, living universe - or rather it lives in us. Though it was completed in 1950, this book is still ahead of its time. One day it will surely be widely recognised for its greatness: its all-encompassing vision, its originality and freshness, its depth of insight, its wide-ranging knowledge, the clarity and poetry of its language, its humanity. It is a world-view not dependent on local culture or religion, but on universally verifiable facts. It is also a world-view that respects our manifest differences whilst celebrating our underlying unity - the unity not just of oneself with other people but with all of life, indeed with the whole universe. Harding died in 2007 aged 97, leaving behind him an impressive body of work. He was a highly creative person who was passionate about - he was in love with - this living universe and the immortal treasure that abides at its centre - at our centre. "A work of the highest genius." C. S. Lewis. (shrink)

The Process Order Hierarchy (POH) is a descriptive framework for mapping how representational systems originate, differentiate, stabilise, distort and transcend their own models. It does not describe the non-representational substrate itself; rather, it classifies the orders of representation that emerge when a process begins to track, interpret and recursively model its own dynamics. By distinguishing the non-representational substrate (POH–0) from the successive orders of tracking, interpretation, causal modelling, ontology formation, sealed recursion and meta-ontological escape (POH–1 through POH–6), the (...) class='Hi'>hierarchy dissolves metaphysical confusions–such as treating time or causality as intrinsic features of reality–and provides a neutral bridge between physics, cognition and phenomenology. This paper presents a concise taxonomy of the POH, situates it within the broader process–ontological programme described in Grude (2025a), and outlines its relationship to the quantitative metrics developed in Process Consciousness Theory (PCT) (Grude, 2025b). (shrink)

Philosophical disagreements often persist not because of factual errors or logical inconsistencies, but due to implicit confusions regarding the epistemic status and rational legitimacy of the assumptions involved. This paper proposes a hierarchical framework of supposition levels, intended as a meta-philosophical tool for the evaluation and interpretation of philosophical, scientific, and religious systems. Rather than offering a new doctrine about the world, the framework aims to clarify what kinds of justification can legitimately be demanded at different stages of rational inquiry. (...) Five levels of supposition are distinguished. The first concerns the normative conditions of rationality, including logic and formal structures. The second consists in the immediate constation of experience, understood as metaperceptive awareness. The third introduces pragmatic-constitutive suppositions that organize experience into a shared and intelligible world, such as external reality, causal order, sufficient regularity, and intersubjective accessibility, from which both scientific method and ethical responsibility arise. The fourth level comprises global interpretative systems—philosophical, metaphysical, scientific, or religious—which are rationally constructed but not deductively fixed by the preceding levels. Finally, a fifth level accounts for prudential or existential commitments that guide concrete action without claiming universal validity. The framework emphasizes the asymmetric dependence between levels and identifies typical errors arising from their confusion, including inflation, erosion, and category mistakes. It is applied to major philosophical positions and to broader domains such as science, religion, and metaphysics, showing how pluralism at the level of comprehensive worldviews can coexist with a non-relativistic conception of truth. The absence of coercive rational criteria at higher levels is argued not to preclude rational debate or argumentation, but rather to restrict appeals to the most fundamental levels to cases of genuine transgression. (shrink)

Quine’s way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes (Ways of Paradox, pp. 9-10) is criticized. The criticism is based on three premises: (1) no learnable language has infinitely many semantical primitives; (2) any language of which Quine’s theory is true has infinitely many semantical primitives; (3) English is a learnable language. The conclusion drawn is that Quine’s theory is not true of English.

Human ecology, it is argued, even when embracing recent developments in the natural sciences and granting a place to culture, tends to justify excessively pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for creating a sustainable world order. This is illustrated through a study of the work and assumptions of Richard Newbold Adams and Stephen Bunker. It is argued that embracing hierarchy theory as this has been proposed and elaborated by Herbert Simon, Howard Pattee, T.F.H. Allen and others enables human ecology to (...) conceive humans both as part of nature and as cultural beings in a way that gives due regard to the ethical development of humanity. That is, ethical constraints need no longer be conceived of as 'unnatural'. Characterizing the nature of such constraints, conceived of as emerging from the Hegelian 'struggle for recognition', this argument is shown to justify some optimism about the future, and to give some idea of how society should be organized if ethical constraints, able to constrain humanity’s relationship to the rest of nature, are to prevail. (shrink)

A probabilistic Chomsky–Schützenberger hierarchy of grammars is introduced and studied, with the aim of understanding the expressive power of generative models. We offer characterizations of the distributions definable at each level of the hierarchy, including probabilistic regular, context-free, (linear) indexed, context-sensitive, and unrestricted grammars, each corresponding to familiar probabilistic machine classes. Special attention is given to distributions on (unary notations for) positive integers. Unlike in the classical case where the "semi-linear" languages all collapse into the regular languages, using (...) analytic tools adapted from the classical setting we show there is no collapse in the probabilistic hierarchy: more distributions become definable at each level. We also address related issues such as closure under probabilistic conditioning. (shrink)

Implicatures are described as particular forms reasoning from best explanation, in which the para-digm of possible explanations consists of the possible semantic interpretations of a sentence or a word. The need for explanation will be shown to be triggered by conflicts between presumptions, namely hearer’s dialogical expectations and the presumptive sentence meaning. What counts as the best explanation can be established on the grounds of hierarchies of presumptions, dependent on dialogue types and interlocutors’ culture.

Kim Sterelny's book The Pleistocene social contract provides an exceptionally well-informed and credible narrative explanation of the origins of inequality and hierarchy. In this essay review, we reflect on the role of rational choice theory in Sterelny's project, before turning to Sterelny's reasons for doubting the importance of cultural group selection. In the final section, we compare Sterelny's big picture with an alternative from David Wengrow and David Graeber.

This article explores Thomas Aquinas’ concept of causality, as well as his rejection of Democritus’ materialist view — which proposes a linear and mechanical chain of events. Aquinas’ proposal of a hierarchical causality, where all secondary causes depend on the First Cause or God, is also exposed. For Aquinas, causality is not a blind sequence of events, but a dynamic network of ordered interactions. Each being acts within an ontological hierarchy, where there is a first cause that continually sustains (...) the order and existence of the universe. Aquinas distinguishes various degrees of causal autonomy among beings. A stone, with purely passive causality, responds to external forces according to the laws of physics, while an animal, such as a cat, exhibits greater autonomy, guided by its soul that gives it a center of action. The cat’s behavior is more unpredictable than that of the stone, since it is determined by its intrinsic nature. At the top of this hierarchy is the human being. Endowed with reason and will, the human being represents the highest expression of causal autonomy among composite beings. Humans do not act solely by instinct, but have the capacity to deliberate on good and evil and shape their lives based on freely chosen values. This freedom is not absolute, since the human, as a secondary cause, also acts under the design of the First Cause and consciously collaborates with the divine purpose. Causality in Thomas Aquinas is therefore more than a natural explanation of events; it is an ontological relationship that unites all beings with the divine order, with God as the First Cause and source of all being and movement. Humans uniquely integrate matter and spirit in the cosmos and possess a rational and moral capacity that distinguishes them from other living beings. This autonomy allows them to consciously participate in the divine plan and transcend material causality, a view that can be enriched by quantum superposition, which suggests that a being's potential (or capacity to be) is actualized by form, analogous to the actualization process that occurs in the universe according to divine order. Finally, Thomistic philosophy differs from pantheism in asserting that the universe, although unified, does not have an intrinsic self- sufficient purpose, since it depends on the creative will of God. There is an ontological distinction between Creator and creation. (shrink)

This article explores Thomas Aquinas’ concept of causality, as well as his rejection of Democritus’ materialist view — which proposes a linear and mechanical chain of events. Aquinas’ proposal of a hierarchical causality, where all secondary causes depend on the First Cause or God, is also exposed. For Aquinas, causality is not a blind sequence of events, but a dynamic network of ordered interactions. Each being acts within an ontological hierarchy, where there is a first cause that continually sustains (...) the order and existence of the universe. Aquinas distinguishes various degrees of causal autonomy among beings. A stone, with purely passive causality, responds to external forces according to the laws of physics, while an animal, such as a cat, exhibits greater autonomy, guided by its soul that gives it a center of action. The cat’s behavior is more unpredictable than that of the stone, since it is determined by its intrinsic nature. At the top of this hierarchy is the human being. Endowed with reason and will, the human being represents the highest expression of causal autonomy among composite beings. Humans do not act solely by instinct, but have the capacity to deliberate on good and evil and shape their lives based on freely chosen values. This freedom is not absolute, since the human, as a secondary cause, also acts under the design of the First Cause and consciously collaborates with the divine purpose. Causality in Thomas Aquinas is therefore more than a natural explanation of events; it is an ontological relationship that unites all beings with the divine order, with God as the First Cause and source of all being and movement. Humans uniquely integrate matter and spirit in the cosmos and possess a rational and moral capacity that distinguishes them from other living beings. This autonomy allows them to consciously participate in the divine plan and transcend material causality, a view that can be enriched by quantum superposition, which suggests that a being's potential (or capacity to be) is actualized by form, analogous to the actualization process that occurs in the universe according to divine order. Finally, Thomistic philosophy differs from pantheism in asserting that the universe, although unified, does not have an intrinsic self-sufficient purpose, since it depends on the creative will of God. There is an ontological distinction between Creator and creation. (shrink)

Both mindreading and stereotyping are forms of social cognition that play a pervasive role in our everyday lives, yet too little attention has been paid to the question of how these two processes are related. This paper offers a theory of the influence of stereotyping on mental-state attribution that draws on hierarchical predictive coding accounts of action prediction. It is argued that the key to understanding the relation between stereotyping and mindreading lies in the fact that stereotypes centrally involve character-trait (...) attributions, which play a systematic role in the action–prediction hierarchy. On this view, when we apply a stereotype to an individual, we rapidly attribute to her a cluster of generic character traits on the basis of her perceived social group membership. These traits are then used to make inferences about that individual’s likely beliefs and desires, which in turn inform inferences about her behavior. (shrink)

While this article aims to explore the connections between citizenship and ‘race’, it is the first study to use fictional tools as a sociological resource in exemplifying the deviation between citizenship in principle and practice in an Austrian context. The study involves interviews with 73 Austrians from three ethnic/racial groups, which were subjected to a directed approach to qualitative content analysis and coded based on sentences from George Orwell’s fictional book, ‘Animal Farm’. By using fiction as a conceptual and analytical (...) device, this article goes beyond the orthodox particulars of citizenship to expose the compressed entitlements of some racial/ethnic minorities. In particular, data analysis revealed two related and intertwined central themes: (a) “all animals are not equal or comrades”; and (b) “some animals are more equal than others”. All ‘animals’ may be equal in principle, whereas, in practice, their ‘race’ serves as a critical source of social (dis)advantage in the ‘animal kingdom’. Thus, since citizenship is a precondition for possessing certain rights that non-citizens are not granted, I argue that citizenship cannot only be judged by whom it, in theory, excludes (i.e., non-citizens), but also by how it treats the included (i.e., citizens) on the basis of their ‘race’. I conclude that skin colour is a specific aspect of the hierarchy of citizenship in Austria, which reinforces that ‘some animals are more equal than others’. (shrink)