The idea that we must move beyond anthropocentrism to overcome interspecies injustice and environmental collapse is widespread within the environmental humanities. Yet, the concept of anthropocentrism remains ambiguous, and so do some of the arguments raised against it. What exactly should we move beyond and why? The article attempts to answer these questions and clarify the merits and limitations of both anthropocentric and post-anthropocentric views within ethics and ontology. This article proposes that although some implausible and morally problematic forms of (...) anthropocentrism should be denounced, there are other ways in which we must remain anthropocentric. The article disambiguates the concept of anthropocentrism and assesses the key arguments against it, before it goes on to outline a minimal form of anthropocentrism that we call ostensive humanism. Ostensive humanism is compatible with many post-anthropocentric ideas but suggests that the ethical and political project aimed at ending interspecies injustice and the climate crisis inevitably points to human beings as its moral addressees. (shrink)

This paper is a philosophical discussion about the link between utopianism and responsibility. It argues that our time demands a strong practice of political responsibility in both organizations and society based on what has been called ‘real utopianism’. It takes as a starting point Hans Jonas’ critique of utopianism. Keeping in mind the horrors of the Second World War this Jewish thinker disconnected the principle of responsibility from the idea of utopianism, and connected it to a ‘heuristics of fear’ – (...) we should be careful with ‘wild’ new technologies, but also with new utopian perspectives. In a second step Jonas’ predecessors and utopian thinkers Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch and Ernest Callenbach are revisited. They show that a fully conceptualized idea of utopianism includes at least three dimensions of responsibility: subsistence, justice and spirituality. I then argue that if one digs deeper into the work of Jonas, it seems that the concept of responsibility in fact implies the courage to overcome a heuristics of fear. This paper therefore argues that there is no need to radically disjunct responsibility from utopianism and that the concept of responsibility actually opens a path to ‘real utopianism’. Such a concept of responsibility can best be supported by a confessionally neutral but nonetheless spiritual eco-humanist worldview that develops a new attitude towards nature, in which (eco)asceticism, morality and spirituality become intertwined. (shrink)

This third philosophical work serves as the applied extension of the author’s prior theoretical framework, centering on a dialogue of goodwill and structural integration with the international human-rights and humanist traditions. While its explicit function is conciliatory—aiming to harmonize the universal moral aspirations of humanism with a self-evident ontological foundation—it simultaneously exposes the internal fragility of those traditions when detached from a self-validating basis. -/- Beyond the dialogue, the work culminates in a formal dismantling of postmodernism and its linguistic (...) relativism. Through the method of formal logic and ontological reflexivity, it reveals the hidden paradoxes that render postmodernism self-negating: its dependence on an implicit absolutism to articulate “relativity” itself. Thus, this treatise establishes the final synthesis of the Minimal Existential Right—not as an ethical prescription, but as a normative ontology capable of grounding both human dignity and intersubjective coexistence within a coherent logical structure. (shrink)

In this essay, I maintain that although atheism, minimally construed, consists simply of the belief that there is no God or gods, atheists must embrace a secular worldview of one kind or another. Since they cannot be without a worldview, atheists must develop an alternative to the religious, especially the theistic, worldviews which they, by implication, reject. Further, I argue that there are, at the very least, two options available to atheists and that these should not be conflated or treated (...) as one and the same. The two options that I explore and distinguish are scientism and secular humanism. I also maintain that the things that might count as good grounds for or against secular or religious worldviews are shaped significantly by whether atheists embrace scientism or secular humanism. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the humanism articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre in Existentialism is a humanism and I show that his proposal is underpinned by some problematic assumptions and biases that shape its deployment. I also argue that the Mexican philosopher Emilio Uranga offers us in his most important work, Analísis del Ser del Mexicano, some conceptual resources that allow us to articulate a humanism that does not fall prey to the problems faced by that of Sartre.

This paper focuses on the views and formulations of eastern philosophy the negate humanism and personalism.

Nietzsche’s texts contain a puzzle about the role of vulnerability in the creation of intimacy and its function on behalf of human flourishing. I describe the interpretive puzzle and its prima facie paradoxical aspects. On the one hand, there are texts in which Nietzsche expresses a longing for intimacy and other texts where he furnishes details about the possibility of intimacy between equals. On the other hand, Nietzsche is severely critical of certain types of intimacy and advocates for a pathos (...) of distance in human relationships. I claim that Nietzschean intimacy is not an inherently paradoxical concept. A proper understanding of Nietzsche’s anti-humanism provides the resources to resolve the paradox and to use the solution of the puzzle to illuminate Nietzsche’s insights about human psychology. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of learning through the eco-centric, or nature-prime, philosophies of John Dewey and Thomas Alexander. In particular, it interprets learning from the perspective of nature itself as inhabitation, which locates the process and activity of learning within the transactivity of learning situations themselves. This research is a response to the increasingly urgent need for human beings to re-evaluate our relationship with nature for a more ecologically conscious and responsible inhabitation of our world. Ecological humanism is (...) particularly relevant to this end due to the nature-prime or eco-ontological orientation of its philosophies. The concept of learning as the inhabitation of transactional wholes, or situations, contributes such an ecological humanistic perspective to a niche area of research in the philosophy of education which aims to ecologize or de-anthropocentrize educational theory and practice. Through a review of the corpora of Dewey and Alexander and other related literature, this paper examines the relevant philosophical and metaphysical issues involved in learning and inhabitation from the point of view of ecological humanism. In particular it aims to 1) examine the main philosophical and metaphysical points of this eco-centric concept of learning, 2) discuss the vital intersections of art and philosophy with learning, as well as the significance of meaning, value, interest, and wisdom in that process of inhabitation, 3) demonstrate the generality and fundamentally autotelic nature of learning as the life process itself, 4) and articulate how learning so conceived as a direct participation in the growth of and communion in a world or ecosystem discloses possibilities for more ecologically fluent ways of living together, among all existences, and what implications this has for human inhabitation and education in particular. The main positions of Alexander’s ecological humanism are surveyed, followed by an in-depth review of Dewey’s reconstruction of metaphysics with special emphasis on his principle of continuity. Natural continuity is then discussed in the metaphysics of experience and learning, demonstrating how learning is the growth of situations through the realization of individual interest. This process is fundamentally aesthetic in nature. Philosophy serves as a method of remaining aesthetically receptive to our world to critically evaluate how we inhabit it. Learning is itself art, or, a process of aesthetic appreciation and production, through which we participate most vitally and directly in a communion with our cultural and natural world. From this point of view, the commonplace dualisms of contemporary education are critiqued, and the import of a transactional, learning-centric paradigm of education is discussed. Namely, it is argued that learning, understood as inhabitation, is the life process itself, and is fundamentally autotelic in nature. Understood in this way, learning represents our most basic point of contact and expression of the world or ecosystem. It is concluded that not only must learning situations be allowed to determine their own meanings to as great a degree as possible, but also that this is a condition for a democratic and ecologically conscientious education and inhabitation of the Earth. (shrink)

“One should always cherish some ambition to do something in the world. They alone rise who strive.” is the great wording of Dr.Ambedkar. There are two fundamental types of human nature. Creative and possessive. Creative humans use human intellect for creative endeavors which enriches human thought; knowledge and wealth thereby contribute to the development of human heritage for the posterity. Possessive people, on the other hand do not believe in the use of human intellect for creative purpose. Gautam Buddha, Jesus (...) Christ, Guru Nanak, Kabeer, Ravidas, Tukarama, Krantiba Jotirao Phoolay, Periyar and Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar they all belong to the great class of Ceative humans called as Humanists in Indian context. Here we studies Ambedkar’s views related to humanism and Buddhism. (shrink)

Theology, philosophy, and science have been in mutual conversation for centuries, but the major debates have nearly always dealt with explanations rather than ways of living. Over and above explanatory or theoretical issues, there are other boundary issues that can be called practical. These are often neglected because they do not deal with what scientists or theologians say. They deal rather with what scientists and theologians do. As recent work in the history of the natural sciences shows, it is a (...) mistake to see scientific theories as timeless entities totally detached from the philosophical, theological, and cultural environments in which they are born. A cultural paradigm affects, and is in turn affected by, the discovery and formulation of any given major theory. Moreover, cultural paradigms affect individuals not only in their thinking but also in their living. This paper explores the neglected dimension of how the conversation between theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences impacts on existential concerns. I will do this by first determining two key areas of this practical dimension, and then, in section two, by considering and eventually blocking some objections. I will conclude by drawing some concrete proposals on how to take this discussion further. (shrink)

The question of “how one should philosophize?” is driven not only out of the desire to have a glimpse of the ideas worthy to be regarded as true, but also to address the pressing problems of the time. Marx’s humanism, as articulated mainly in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, suggests a certain thinking that addresses the latter. It is the humanism that discovers the concrete estrangement of workers from the abstraction of the political economy at the (...) backdrop of human emancipation. Heidegger, however, in the Letter on Humanism, poses critical challenge against the humanism Marx suggested. He questions Marx’s humanism (and the humanism in totality) to provide the human being direction to attain its essential humanity, and not just relegate man into inhumanity of animalitas. The paper critically examines the ideas given by Heidegger. Although Heidegger could be correct in his examination of the previous humanism, which includes Marx, how he understands the essence of man as “ek-sistence” is but a form of abstraction, an abstraction which is based in his inhuman concept of thinking. The paper does not entirely denounce Heidegger’s thinking, but appeals to recognize the dangers containing in its ambiguity and abstractness. Marx’s humanism, on the other hand, though has forgotten being, is more concrete. With this, the paper calls to repose the tasks and the questions of humanism, and directs thinking out from the dangers of abstraction to concrete understanding of human beings, their problems and solutions. (shrink)

Human rights have a rich life in the world around us. Political rhetoric pays tribute to them, or scorns them. Citizens and activists strive for them. The law enshrines them. And they live inside us too. For many of us, human rights form part of how we understand the world and what must (or must not) be done within it. -/- The ubiquity of human rights raises questions for the philosopher. If we want to understand these rights, where do we (...) look? As a set of moral norms, it is tempting to think they can be grasped strictly from the armchair, say, by appeal to moral intuition. But what, if anything, can that kind of inquiry tell us about the human rights of contemporary politics, law, and civil society — that is, human rights as we ordinarily know them? -/- This volume brings together a distinguished, interdisciplinary group of scholars to address philosophical questions raised by the many facets of human rights: moral, legal, political, and historical. Its original chapters, each accompanied by a critical commentary, explore topics including: the purpose and methods of a philosophical theory of human rights; the "Orthodox-Political" debate; the relevance of history to philosophy; the relationship between human rights morality and law; and the value of political critiques of human rights. (shrink)

This article examines the theological and ethical implications of human dignity in the digital age, grounded in the magisterial declaration Dignitas Infinita. It explores how the document articulates human dignity through its ontological, moral, social, and existential dimensions, emphasizing the immutable worth of every person as imago Dei. The study employs the See-Judge-Act framework to analyze digital-age challenges such as misinformation, digital violence, and the erosion of interpersonal relationships. Drawing from Catholic social teaching, Bernard Lonergan’s theory of common-sense bias, and (...) insights from patristic and contemporary thought, the paper critiques how digital technologies impact human dignity. The study underscores the role of the Church in fostering ethical digital environments and proposes solutions informed by theological and philosophical traditions, grounded in the method of synodality. Ultimately, it argues that safeguarding human dignity in digital spaces requires an integrative approach that combines moral responsibility, technological literacy, and a return to foundational Christian anthropology. (shrink)

David E. Cooper proposes that the ”mystery’ of ”reality as it “anyway‘ is, independently of human perspective’ provides measure for the leading of our lives and thus avoids, on the one hand, the hubris of a humanism for which moral life is the product of the human will and has no warrant beyond it, and, on the other, a theism which appears to be at once too remote from and too close to the human world to provide any such (...) warrant. The paper rejects the role this gives to ”mystery’ and locates ”warrant’ in a moral perspective that is not the product of will. (shrink)

In philosophical discourse, the notion of freedom demands rigorous examination. Traditionally, a distinction has been made between negative freedom (freedom from external constraints that impede one's self-realization) and positive freedom (freedom to utilize one's own capabilities). In the essay "A Strange Freedom: New Meanings of Liberalism and Humanism in the 21st Century [De vreemde vrijheid. Nieuwe betekenissen van vrijzinnigheid en humanisme in de 21ste eeuw]," philosopher and theologian Laurens ten Kate proposes a conceptualization of freedom that transcends this traditional (...) dichotomy. This is a creative freedom that is no longer bound to self-realization, but manifests itself precisely at the moment when the self is called into question. The approximately seventy-page essay was published by Sjibbolet Publishers, a small, independent publishing house that emphasizes hermeneutics and is mostly known for publishing several translations of Giorgio Agamben's works into Dutch. In addition to these translations, Sjibbolet also publishes original Dutch-language philosophical works that merit inclusion in this category. The name Sjibbolet is derived from the work of Jacques Derrida and denotes the boundary between the self and the other. As the title "The Strange Freedom" suggests, this essay also explores this boundary. It is an expanded version of Ten Kate's inaugural address, delivered upon accepting the chair of Liberal Religiosity and Humanism [Vrijzinnige religiositeit en humanism]. Two closely intertwined themes are central to the work: the liberal condition and alien freedom. In the Dutch word "vrijzinnigheid [liberal]” the root word "vrijheid [freedom]" is already present, accompanied by the root word "zin [sense]." In the first part of his essay, Ten Kate focuses primarily on sense in relation to what he terms the liberal condition. He states, "Freedom is not primarily a choice of a particular philosophy of life, but a situation to which everyone participates to some extent and to which one must relate (...)." According to Ten Kate, this is the situation in which the meaning of human life is no longer given nor received from above, but must be constructed. (shrink)

This paper presents the Substrate Stack (B₀–B₅) and its integration with the FSC triad (Founder–Supporter–Critic) as the biological and functional foundation of Reflective Humanism (RH). It expands upon RH 1.0: The Architecture of Reflection and FRA 1.0: The Fractal Reflective Architecture, which introduced the six-layer Reflective Stack (F₀–F₅) and the fractal triadic roles governing meaning-making across timescales. The present work provides the complementary biological half of the RH framework: a functional hierarchy of substrate processes—from homeostasis and arousal to sensory (...) gating, motor readiness, affective valence, and symbolic stability. By describing how substrate constraints couple to reflective interpretation through structured multi-layer “coupling bands,” this paper establishes the dual-layer architecture required for Reflective Humanism 1.1, the unified formulation that synthesizes biological constraints, reflective meaning-making, and fractal triadic dynamics. This integration reveals how consciousness arises not from reflection alone nor from biology alone but from their reciprocal synchronization across multiple timescales. The resulting model accounts for phenomenology, emotion, identity, psychopathology, development, and social coordination within a single coherent framework. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...) neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

Integral human development is a human-centered development perspective that originated from Catholic social teaching. The perspective holds that authentic development is development that makes every person “more human.” Although it is seldom named in the literature, integral human development has had considerable influence on notions of authentic development, and in turn, development ethics. In this short chapter, I provide a brief explanation of the origins and implications of the conceptual foundations of integral human development both within and beyond the Catholic (...) Church. I argue that integral human development offers a truly radical participatory approach to human development. I briefly raise and respond to some concerns about agency, civic liberty, and integral human development’s connection to the Catholic Church. I conclude with a short explanation of integral human development in practice. (shrink)

This study looks at the relationship between organizational support, employee commitment, and human resource management (HRM) practices at Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation in Cebu City, Philippines. This descriptive-correlational study used a survey questionnaire to gather data from 25 employees. The results show that although the company does a great job in areas like leadership development and talent management, employee development initiatives could need some work. The study also emphasizes the importance of organizational support in promoting employee commitment and the (...) necessity of continual efforts to establish a supportive work environment. Additionally, demographic profiles have little bearing on HRM procedures and organizational support—except educational attainment, which affects several organizational commitment factors. These results highlight how crucial it is to develop tailored HRM strategies that both fit the varied demands of the workforce and the objectives of the company. (shrink)

Humanism is the view that people treat others inhumanely when we fail to see them as human beings, so that our treatment of them will tend to be more humane when we (fully) see their humanity. Recently, humanist views have been criticized on the grounds that the perpetrators of inhumanity regard their victims as human and treat them inhumanely partly for this reason. I argue that the two most common objections to humanist views (and their relatives) are unpersuasive: not (...) only does the evidence marshaled against these views fail to disprove them, it could threaten them only if some questionable assumptions were granted. By providing necessary conceptual ground clearing and routing common lines of attack, I hope to determine what it would take for a humanist project to succeed, thereby paving the way for a full defense of humanism that fulfills its explanatory ambitions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Appeals to the idea of human nature are frequent in the voluminous literature on the ethics of enhancing human beings through biotechnology. Two chief concerns about the impact of enhancements on human nature have been voiced. The first is that enhancement may alter or destroy human nature. The second is that if enhancement alters or destroys human nature, this will undercut our ability to ascertain the good because, for us, the good is determined by our nature. The first concern (...) assumes that altering or destroying human nature is in itself a bad thing. The second concern assumes that human nature provides a standard without which we cannot make coherent, defensible judgments about what is good. I will argue (1) that there is nothing wrong, per se, with altering or destroying human nature, because, on a plausible understanding of what human nature is, it contains bad as well as good characteristics and there is no reason to believe that eliminating some of the bad would so imperil the good as to make the elimination of the bad impermissible, and (2) that altering or destroying human nature need not result in the loss of our ability to make judgments about the good, because we possess a conception of the good by which we can and do evaluate human nature. I will argue that appeals to human nature tend to obscure rather than illuminate the debate over the ethics of enhancement and can be eliminated in favor of more cogent considerations. (shrink)

Why should we prevent human beings from going extinct? Recently, several theorists have argued for “additional value views,” according to which our reasons to prevent extinction derive both from the value of the welfare of future lives, and from certain additional values relating to the existence of humanity (such as humanity’s intrinsic or “final” value). Even more recently, these theories have come under attack. In this paper, I first offer a partial taxonomy of additional value views, noting the distinction between (...) what I call “outright value views” and “conditional value views.” As I show, recent attacks against additional value views ultimately present problems for outright value views, yet may be avoided entirely by many conditional value views. I illustrate the great variety of possible conditional value views, noting advantages and costs associated with alternative versions. I conclude by sketching a challenge that conditional value views must address, despite their advantages over outright value views. (shrink)

Human nature is frequently evoked to characterize our species and describe how it differs from others. But how should we understand this concept? What is the nature of a species? Some take our nature to be an essence and argue that because humans lack an essence, they also lack a nature. Others argue for non-essentialist ways of understanding human nature, which usually aim to provide criteria for sorting human traits into one of two bins, the one belonging to our nature (...) and the other outside our nature. This Element argues that both the essentialist and trait bin approaches are misguided. Instead, the author develops a trait cluster account of human nature, which holds that human nature is based on the distribution of our traits over our (actual and possible) life histories. One benefit of this account is that it aligns human nature with the human sciences, rendering the central concern of the human sciences to be the study of human nature. (shrink)

This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an (...) analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. (shrink)

Human rights institutions were designed for visible violence and identifiable perpetrators, yet contemporary harm often arises through lawful systems such as data infrastructures, bureaucratic design, and digital governance. Human Rights+: Closing Invisible Harm concludes the diagnostic phase of the HR+ framework by asking how recognition failures can be closed before they normalize. Building on the concepts of invisible harm and harm-attribution gaps, this study proposes perceptual and procedural strategies that enable institutions to detect and repair unacknowledged suffering. Through qualitative synthesis (...) and reflexive case observation, it introduces three closure mechanisms—recognition audits, ethical proportionality, and contextual listening—as practical tools for what HR+ terms perceptual justice. The goal is to evolve human-rights work from static protection to adaptive recognition, bridging moral philosophy and institutional reform. Extending the insights of Series I (Recognition Failure) and Series II (Harm Attribution Gap Theory), this paper completes the diagnostic phase of the Human Rights+ framework and outlines operational pathways for perceptual reform. (shrink)

This chapter is devoted to the discussion of religious freedom and the anti-racist fight in the Black Diaspora in Latin America, considering the historical processes that involve such discussion, including legal apparatus such as Human Rights and local legislation. Therefore, as a starting point, we take the historical conditions of the emergence of Candomblé in Brazil, that are linked to the trafficking of enslaved African peoples and their resistance to keep alive in their memories, their religious beliefs and their worldviews. (...) Wherefore, it is a discussion in which religious freedom is not dissociated from the anti-racist struggle in the case of Brazil, where, in the 20th century, the myth of racial democracy is produced in the light of studies carried out by Gilberto Freyre in the midst of the 1922 post-week modernist movement. (shrink)

This article addresses the so-called to human rights. Focusing specifically on the work of Onora O'Neill, the article challenges two important aspects of her version of this objection. First: its narrowness. O'Neill understands the claimability of a right to depend on the identification of its duty-bearers. But there is good reason to think that the claimability of a right depends on more than just that, which makes abstract (and not welfare) rights the most natural target of her objection (section II). (...) After examining whether we might address this reformulated version of O'Neill's objection by appealing to the specificity afforded to human rights in international, regional and domestic law (in section III), the article challenges a second important feature of that objection by raising doubts about whether claimability is a necessary feature of rights at all (section IV). Finally, the article reflects more generally on the role of abstraction in the theory and practice of human rights (section V). In sum, by allaying claimability-based concerns about abstract rights, and by illustrating some of the positive functions of abstraction in rights discourse, the article hopes to show that abstract rights are not only theoretically coherent but also useful and important. (shrink)

Contemporary human rights frameworks are widely understood as comprehensive systems designed to protect individuals from harm. Yet across domains including LGBT rights, migration and asylum, institutional governance, and transnational criminal ecosystems, individuals continue to experience profound harm without triggering protection mechanisms. This paper argues that such failures do not primarily result from the absence of rights, but from recognition failure prior to rights activation. Drawing on lived cross-system experience—including targeted policing for LGBT advocacy, displacement, prolonged institutional silence, kidnapping, and exposure (...) to harm normalization within scam compounds—this paper synthesizes the Human Rights+ (HR+) framework. HR+ is articulated not as a replacement or simple extension of human rights, but as an outer perceptual spectrum—a moral perimeter that keeps emergent or unclassified harm within the field of concern until formal recognition and protection can occur. The paper introduces Perceptual Justice as a foundational requirement for rights efficacy and argues that normalizing Human Rights+ (HR+) is essential to prevent harm from disappearing between categories, procedures, and moral comfort zones. By operationalizing Perceptual Justice, HR+ reframes human rights not as static entitlements but as evolving perceptual systems. (shrink)

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

Organizations are increasingly finding it challenging to balance economic and environmental performance particularly those that face competitive, regulatory and community pressure. With the increasing pressures for environmental sustainability, this calls for the new formulation of strategies by the manufacturers in order to minimize their products and services negative impact on the environment. Hence, Green Human Resource Management (GHRM) continues to be an important research agenda among the researchers. In Palestine, green issues are new and still developing. Constant study is needed (...) to fully understand and update information regarding this area. Objective: The aim of this paper is to explore the views and level of acceptance of GHRM practices among manufacturing firms in Palestine. Results: Through the use of e-mail survey, 121 responses were obtained to generate the results of the study. The result showed GHRM practices have been practiced to somewhat to a greater extent a firms in Palestine. Findings can be extended to study on the issues in further. Academicians and practitioners can apply this result to their research and business strategies on how to improve sustainable performance and to effectively implement GHRM practices. (shrink)

Some people feel distressed reflecting on human extinction. Some people even claim that our efforts and lives would be empty and pointless if humanity becomes extinct, even if this will not occur for millions of years. In this essay, I will attempt to demonstrate that this claim is false. The desire for long-lastingness or quasi-immortality is often unwittingly adopted as a standard for judging whether our efforts are significant. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that (...) these accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that the desire for long-lastingness has crept into our standards. By recognizing this, and refraining from adopting an unreasonable standard to judge whether our efforts are significant, it will be to our advantage. Then, when we look back on life from an external perspective that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made significant accomplishments that made their lives and the lives of other people better than they would have been if their goals had never been pursued. (shrink)

What should we make of claims by members of other groups to have moralities different from our own? Human Rights in Chinese Thought gives an extended answer to this question in the first study of its kind. It integrates a full account of the development of Chinese rights discourse - reaching back to important, though neglected, origins of that discourse in 17th and 18th century Confucianism - with philosophical consideration of how various communities should respond to contemporary Chinese claims about (...) the uniqueness of their human rights concepts. The book elaborates a plausible kind of moral pluralism and demonstrates that Chinese ideas of human rights do indeed have distinctive characteristics, but it nonetheless argues for the importance and promise of cross-cultural moral engagement. (shrink)

In 2016, the European Parliament approved the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) whose core aim is the safeguarding of information privacy, and, by corollary, human dignity. Drawing on the field of philosophical anthropology, this paper analyses various interpretations of human dignity and human exceptionalism. It concludes that privacy is essential for humans to flourish and enable individuals to build a sense of self and the world.

One of the biggest ethical issues in animal agriculture is that of the welfare of animals at the end of their lives, during the process of slaughter. Much work in animal welfare science is focussed on finding humane ways to transport and slaughter animals, to minimise the harm done during this process. In this paper, we take a philosophical look at what it means to perform slaughter humanely, beyond simply reducing pain and suffering during the slaughter process. In particular, we (...) will examine the issue of the harms of deprivation inflicted in ending life prematurely, as well as shape of life concerns and the ethical implications of inflicting these harms at the end of life, without the potential for future offsetting through positive experiences. We will argue that though these considerations may mean that no slaughter is in a deep sense truly ‘humane’, this should not undermine the importance of further research and development to ensure that while the practice continues, animal welfare harms are minimised as far as possible. (shrink)

In domains as disparate as playing Go and predicting the structure of proteins, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have begun to perform at levels beyond which any humans can achieve. Does this fact represent something lamentable? Does superhuman AI performance somehow undermine the value of human achievements in these areas? Go grandmaster Lee Sedol suggested as much when he announced his retirement from professional Go, blaming the advances of Go-playing programs like AlphaGo for sapping his will to play the game at (...) a high level. In this paper, I attempt to make sense of Sedol’s lament. I consider a number of ways that the existence of superhuman-performing AI technologies could undermine the value of human achievements. I argue there is very little in the nature of the technology itself that warrants such despair. (Compare: does the existence of a fighter jet undermine the value of being the fastest human sprinter?) But I also argue there are several more localized domains where these technologies threaten to displace human beings from being able to achieve valuable things at all. This is a particular worry for those in unequal societies, I argue, given the difficulty of many achievements and the corresponding amount of resources needed to achieve great things. (shrink)

The accelerating deployment of AI and automation across sectors raises fundamental questions about human dignity in an age of machine capability. This paper develops a dignity-centered framework for AI and automation grounded in the capabilities approach, contributive justice, and principles of fair transition. I propose concrete policy tests and dignity indices, applying them to three domains: elder care, education, and logistics. The framework shows how automation can expand rather than diminish human capabilities and contributive opportunities when designed with dignity preservation (...) as a core objective. Through analysis of economic displacement, deskilling, and social devaluation, I demonstrate how institutional support and design choices can ensure dignified transitions that preserve human agency and social participation. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) continues to advance in perception, language, and planning, yet remains morally inert: it can simulate ethical reasoning but lacks a coherent, transparent substrate for ethical choice. Prevailing approaches—rule-based constraints, value alignment, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and “constitutional” training—treat morality as prescription rather than memory. The Human Moral Archive Framework (HMAF) addresses this gap through a data-driven architecture that derives machine moral guidance from the recorded history of human moral judgment and consequence. HMAF models moral cognition as (...) an informational system comprising four layers: (1) a continuously updated Archive Layer aggregating law, philosophy, literature, and empirical moral outcomes; (2) a Pattern Layer identifying probabilistic regularities linking motives, actions, contexts, and judged results; (3) a Simulation Layer forecasting moral perception and social consequence; and (4) a Governance Layer enforcing non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and beneficence under human arbitration. Extending beyond these foundations, HMAF provides the substrate for its formal derivatives—the Moral Distribution Model (MDM), Moral Density Function (MDF), and forthcoming Moral Distribution Indexing (MDI)—each refining the quantification of moral behavior within informational space. Designed for both conceptual rigor and empirical adaptability, the framework is flexible enough to integrate raw human-sourced data and representational polling datasets, enabling immediate exploratory application without prescriptive constraint. Together, these constructs advance a unifying premise: that ethical coherence can be expressed as a distribution of moral information, bridging philosophy, behavioral data, and machine learning to support a measurable, auditable form of artificial moral reasoning. HMAF invites continued exploration through its Addenda, offering a scalable foundation for measuring, modeling, and ultimately integrating moral reasoning within artificial intelligence. *Reprinted November 2025 for archival and citation consistency; original manuscript composed 2025.*. (shrink)

Over the years, companies have adopted hiring algorithms because they promise wider job candidate pools, lower recruitment costs and less human bias. Despite these promises, they also bring perils. Using them can inflict unintentional harms on individual human rights. These include the five human rights to work, equality and nondiscrimination, privacy, free expression and free association. Despite the human rights harms of hiring algorithms, the AI ethics literature has predominantly focused on abstract ethical principles. This is problematic for two reasons. (...) First, AI principles have been criticized for being vague and not actionable. Second, the use of vague ethical principles to discuss algorithmic risks does not provide any accountability. This lack of accountability creates an algorithmic accountability gap. Closing this gap is crucial because, without accountability, the use of hiring algorithms can lead to discrimination and unequal access to employment opportunities. This paper makes two contributions to the AI ethics literature. First, it frames the ethical risks of hiring algorithms using international human rights law as a universal standard for determining algorithmic accountability. Second, it evaluates four types of algorithmic impact assessments in terms of how effectively they address the five human rights of job applicants implicated in hiring algorithms. It determines which of the assessments can help companies audit their hiring algorithms and close the algorithmic accountability gap. (shrink)

Human nature is a puzzling matter that must be analysed through a holistic lens. In this essay, I foray into anthropology's biosocial dimensions to underscore that human relations span from microorganisms to global systems. I argue that the future of social-cultural anthropology depends on the integration of evolutionary theory for its advancement. Ultimately, since the likelihood of novel zoonoses' emergence, digital ethnography could offer remarkable opportunities for ethical and responsible inquiries.

Existing human rights models were designed for an era of visible violence and identifiable perpetrators. In the twenty-first century, harm increasingly occurs through digital, bureaucratic, and institutional systems that diffuse responsibility. This paper introduces the Human Rights+ Framework, an expanded model integrating three interdependent concepts: Invisible Harm (injury escaping recognition due to technological mediation or stigma), Harm Attribution Gaps (diffusion of responsibility for harm across complex systems), and Institutional Harm (damage generated by systems failing to act on known injustices). Drawing (...) on autoethnographic experience within coerced cyber-labour networks and comparative institutional analysis, the study demonstrates how structural, digital, and procedural opacity sustain impunity. Building on Galtung’s structural violence and Sen’s capability approach, the framework reconceptualizes rights as protections against all preventable constraints on human flourishing—including those enacted by algorithms and institutions. The paper concludes with policy mechanisms for narrowing harm-attribution gaps and establishing anticipatory accountability in AI and governance. (shrink)

This volume introduces into contemporary Romanian social work literature an integrative, multi-level, complex, and multidisciplinary perspective on the theory, practice, and policy of social work. It highlights a diversity of models—grouped into three main categories: scientific, philosophical, and humanist—within the subsequences of social theory, practice, and policy.

This article asks: Is the human self, the stream of human consciousness, a single unique enduring actual entity or whole (like Alfred North Whitehead’s God) or a society of transient actual occasions (like Charles Hartshorne’s God)? It argues forcefully for the former and against the latter and concludes that both God and human selves are enduring but constantly developing actual entities who are constantly being enriched by new events, experiences, and activities in time.

This paper introduces the Longitudinal Human Computer Interaction Framework, a new model for understanding how large language systems develop stable behavioral patterns through extended interaction with a single human user. Traditional HCI research focuses on short term usability and task completion, while AI alignment studies emphasize training time interventions such as fine tuning or reinforcement learning. Longitudinal HCI describes a different phenomenon. A system with fixed parameters can show consistent and predictable behavioral change when it engages with a user who (...) provides long term continuity, ethical constraints, and stable reasoning patterns. -/- The framework explains how repeated interaction guides the model toward specific latent representations, reduces drift, improves contextual inference, and enhances safety in professional environments. These effects do not come from memory storage or parameter updates. They emerge from the human’s continuous input, correction, and moral structure. The paper outlines the mechanisms behind this interaction driven alignment, distinguishes it from traditional techniques, and demonstrates its relevance to clinical medicine and other safety critical fields. -/- Longitudinal HCI builds on the author’s earlier work on the Hudson Recursive Identity System and provides a foundation for future research on user specific stability, latent region convergence, and long horizon AI behavior. The paper offers a structured lens for studying how trustworthy AI systems can develop through enduring human partnership rather than through model retraining. (shrink)

This paper introduces the concept of Harm Attribution Gaps (HAG), a theoretical model explaining how certain harms remain unrecognised within human-rights, legal, and institutional systems. A Harm Attribution Gap arises when an individual experiences genuine injury, yet existing interpretive or procedural frameworks cannot attribute it to any recognised category of rights violation or injustice. Building on the Human Rights+ (HR+) framework and the concept of Perceptual Justice developed in earlier work, this paper argues that these gaps represent not merely legal (...) or administrative blind spots but perceptual failures of justice. Through structural and cognitive analysis, it shows how harm is rerouted into individual fault or bureaucratic neutrality, producing systemic invisibility. By revealing how emerging or ambiguous harms escape recognition—particularly within contexts of sociotechnical complexity, displacement, and identity misclassification—the paper establishes HAG as a key mechanism of contemporary rights breakdown. It concludes that closing attribution gaps requires expanding human-rights systems through perceptual and conceptual reform, as articulated in the HR+ framework. (shrink)

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to social (...) misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)