It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...

Preregistration has been proposed as a useful method for making a publicly verifiable distinction between confirmatory hypothesis tests, which involve planned tests of ante hoc hypotheses, and exploratory hypothesis tests, which involve unplanned tests of post hoc hypotheses. This distinction is thought to be important because it has been proposed that confirmatory hypothesis tests provide more compelling results (less uncertain, less tentative, less open to bias) than exploratory hypothesis tests. In this article, we challenge this proposition (...) and argue that there are several advantages of exploratory hypothesis tests that can make their results more compelling than those of confirmatory hypothesis tests. We also consider some potential disadvantages of exploratory hypothesis tests and conclude that their advantages can outweigh the disadvantages. We conclude that exploratory hypothesis tests avoid researcher commitment and researcher prophecy biases, reduce the probability of data fraud, are more appropriate in the context of unplanned deviations, facilitate inference to the best explanation, and allow peer reviewers to make additional contributions at the data analysis stage. In contrast, confirmatory hypothesis tests may lead to an inappropriate level of confidence in research conclusions, less appropriate analyses in the context of unplanned deviations, and greater bias and errors in theoretical inferences. (shrink)

There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of (...) having one’s inquiry be guided by a doxastic attitude, which I call hypothesis, that’s governed by the following norm: One’s hypothesis that p is rational just in case it is a manifestation of the best feasible way to form a doxastic attitude regarding p that promotes the best feasible ways to advance towards settling the question of p’s (or of any other suitably related proposition’s) truth-value. (shrink)

If the Past Hypothesis underlies the arrows of time, what is the status of the Past Hypothesis? In this paper, I examine the role of the Past Hypothesis in the Boltzmannian account and defend the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature. Such a view is known to be compatible with Humeanism about laws, but as I argue it is also supported by a minimal non-Humean "governing'' view. Some worries arise from (...) the non-dynamical and time-dependent character of the Past Hypothesis as a boundary condition, the intrinsic vagueness in its specification, and the nature of the initial probability distribution. I show that these worries do not have much force, and in any case they become less relevant in a new quantum framework for analyzing time's arrows---the Wentaculus. Hence, the view that the Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law should be more widely accepted than it is now. (shrink)

This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- (...) which looks more like an embedded view -- and if the criterion is rejected, bloat follows) and as a problem for extended views more generally -develops a dilemma critical of Clark and Chalmers's "explanatory kinds" argument for extended mind and cognition (arguing that their reasoning faces serious problems regardless of whether one individuates the kinds in question in a fine-grained or a coarse-grained way) -argues that an appeal to functionalism doesn't resolve the issue -argues for the priority, in debates about extended cognition, of the identification of cognitive systems (e.g., because a functionalist approach can't be applied unless we already know what count as inputs and outputs, which requires having already identified the boundaries of the cognitive system). (shrink)

This paper proposes the ET Hypothesis, a philosophical and probabilistic framework for assessing the potential threat posed by extraterrestrial civilizations. By considering evolutionary and technological constraints, the hypothesis argues that if either of two broad categories of extraterrestrial civilizations exists — highly advanced or nascent but aggressive — neither possesses the motivation, means, or logical pathway to harm humanity. This model addresses both public fears and conspiracy-oriented narratives regarding hidden or infiltrated civilizations, providing a logically grounded explanation for (...) the apparent absence of destructive contact. (shrink)

Discussion of the extraterrestrial hypothesis (ETH), the hypothesis that an extraterrestrial civilization (ETC) is active on Earth today, is taboo in academia, but the assumptions behind this taboo are faulty. Advances in biology have rendered the notion that complex life is rare in our Galaxy improbable. The objection that no ETC would come to Earth to hide from us does not consider all possible alien motives or means. For an advanced ETC, the convergent instrumental goals of all rational (...) agents – self-preservation and the acquisition of resources – would support the objectives of removing existential threats and gathering strategic and non-strategic information. It could advance these objectives by proactively gathering information about and from inhabited planets, concealing itself while doing so, and terminating potential rivals before they become too dangerous. Other hypotheses of ETC behavior, including the zoo/interdict hypothesis and the dark forest hypothesis, also undercut the objection that the ETH is highly improbable. The ETH does not require support from extraordinary evidence because the presence of an ETC on Earth is not highly unlikely and would overturn none of our well-tested scientific knowledge. The fact that most reports of unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) have natural or human explanations does not count against it. Inference to the best explanation offers a way to find evidence for this hypothesis, and some evidence for it exists, some of it taking the form of reliable witness reports. The most plausible alternative explanation for some UAP reports declines in probability over time. A hypothesis that is not highly improbable, does not contradict any well-established facts or theories, and explains otherwise unexplained evidence is a rational hypothesis. Since the ETH is a rational hypothesis, investigation of it should not be taboo. (shrink)

Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...) concept is defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. I demonstrate that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I argue that no unwanted consequences result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown. (shrink)

According to one theory, the brain is a sophisticated hypothesis tester: perception is Bayesian unconscious inference where the brain actively uses predictions to test, and then refine, models about what the causes of its sensory input might be. The brain’s task is simply continually to minimise prediction error. This theory, which is getting increasingly popular, holds great explanatory promise for a number of central areas of research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. I show how the theory (...) can help us understand striking phenomena at three cognitive levels: vision, sensory integration, and belief. First, I illustrate central aspects of the theory by showing how it provides a nice explanation of why binocular rivalry occurs. Then I suggest how the theory may explain the role of the unified sense of self in rubber hand and full body illusions driven by visuotactile conflict. Finally, I show how it provides an approach to delusion formation that is consistent with one-deficit accounts of monothematic delusions. (shrink)

This paper presents and defends an argument that the continuum hypothesis is false, based on considerations about objective chance and an old theorem due to Banach and Kuratowski. More specifically, I argue that the probabilistic inductive methods standardly used in science presuppose that every proposition about the outcome of a chancy process has a certain chance between 0 and 1. I also argue in favour of the standard view that chances are countably additive. Since it is possible to randomly (...) pick out a point on a continuum, for instance using a roulette wheel or by flipping a countable infinity of fair coins, it follows, given the axioms of ZFC, that there are many different cardinalities between countable infinity and the cardinality of the continuum. (shrink)

Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioural claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioural claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people's tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My (...) evidence consists in results from several behavioural experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and I propose some general methodological lessons. (shrink)

The singularity hypothesis is a hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on undersupported growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis fail to (...) overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical and policy implications of this discussion. (shrink)

The Continuum Hypothesis featured top of Hilbert's list of 23 problems in 1900. Today, we still consider the question, with various programmes pulling in different directions. This conceptual diversity raises a puzzle: In what sense do we disagree when we talk about it? A standard assumption takes it that the content of our thought about classes and the Continuum Hypothesis has not changed. Assuming a moderate view of how content is determined, I reject this assumption but also argue (...) that whilst the Continuum Hypothesis can have different content for different agents, it can also be determinate for certain programmes. In particular, I suggest that there is a fault line between those who think there are uncountable sets and recent countabilist programmes. (shrink)

The language of thought hypothesis is a thesis about the structure of mental representations. It is an example of the computational–representational theory of mind, according to which much of cognition consists in formal computations over mental representations. What distinguishes the language of thought hypothesis from other such theories is the idea that mental representations share core features with formal languages. The language of thought hypothesis states that thinking is the transformation of mental representations in a language of (...) thought, in which most of what we call “thinking” is in fact inferences performed over sentences in the language. The language of thought is not a natural language, such as Spanish or Haitian Creole. It is a formal language, comparable to the machine language of a computer or formal languages of logic. The language of thought is often claimed to be innate, universal, and pivotal in learning, and it is implicated in processes such as natural language acquisition. However, it is also compatible with learning and reasoning in nonlinguistic creatures as well as in mental processes seemingly unconnected to language such as perception and motor control. (shrink)

This hypothesis proposes that the universe evolves not only in structural complexity but also toward a progressive emergence of consciousness, potentially culminating in a phase of suprauniversal generativity. Through nine non-linear phases, it integrates cosmology, evolutionary biology, information theory, and speculative philosophy. Grounded in theories of emergence and panpsychism, it suggests epistemological, ethical (e.g., non-anthropocentric ethics), and ontological implications, including consciousness-driven creation of ontological realities. Though exploratory, it invites interdisciplinary dialogue in philosophy of science and cosmology.

This paper presents a synthesis of four interconnected research programs that together establish a quantum-native interpretation of Chaitin's halting probability Omega and Teilhard de Chardin's Omega Point. We begin with the Unified Omega Hypothesis, which proposed that existence itself might be understood as a computation whose completion corresponds to the determination of Omega. However, Minimal Axioms for Quantum Structure demonstrated that classical computation cannot derive quantum structure (Axiom A1: superposition), establishing a no-go theorem formally verified in Coq. This negative (...) result necessitated a fundamental revision. Two independent lines of evidence support the conclusion that a quantum substrate is overwhelmingly favored: (1) Algorithmic Naturalness shows that quantum mechanics has minimal description length on a quantum substrate (K_UQ << K_UC), and (2) Artificial Physics demonstrates through evolutionary simulation that matrix operations (quantum-like structures) dominate scalar operations under selection pressure, achieving >90% dominance within 3.8 ± 1.7 generations, while spontaneous emergence of matrix operations from scalar primitives never occurred (0/5 runs over 500 generations). We therefore propose the Quantum Omega Hypothesis: if the universe is computational and the principle of algorithmic naturalness holds, then a quantum-native substrate is the most parsimonious explanation. Under this interpretation, Chaitin's Omega becomes a quantum state vector |Omega_Q> = Σ_p α_p |p| — the wavefunction of the algorithmic multiverse. This synthesis provides a coherent framework connecting algorithmic information theory, quantum foundations, and evolutionary dynamics, while clearly distinguishing between established facts and interpretive proposals. (shrink)

“Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices, partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed (...) by practicing experimentalists. (shrink)

According to the conventionalist doctrine of space elaborated by the French philosopher-scientist Henri Poincaré in the 1890s, the geometry of physical space is a matter of definition, not of fact. Poincaré’s Hertz-inspired view of the role of hypothesis in science guided his interpretation of the theory of relativity (1905), which he found to be in violation of the axiom of free mobility of invariable solids. In a quixotic effort to save the Euclidean geometry that relied on this axiom, Poincaré (...) extended the purview of his doctrine of space to cover both space and time. The centerpiece of this new doctrine is what he called the ‘‘principle of physical relativity,’’ which holds the laws of mechanics to be covariant with respect to a certain group of transformations. For Poincaré, the invariance group of classical mechanics defined physical space and time (Galilei spacetime), but he admitted that one could also define physical space and time in virtue of the invariance group of relativistic mechanics (Minkowski spacetime). Either way, physical space and time are the result of a convention. (shrink)

This essay explores the quantum nature of life through the Time-Imprint Hypothesis, which proposes that every event in the universe leaves an informational trace imprinted upon photons. The study resolves several paradoxes concerning the nature of life and the cosmos, while suggesting experimental directions for verification.

This paper examines the second geometrical problem in the Meno. Its purpose is to explore the implication of Cook Wilson’s interpretation, which has been most widely accepted by scholars, in relation to the nature of hypothesis. I argue that (a) the geometrical hypothesis in question is a tentative answer to a more basic problem, which could not be solved by available methods at that time, and that (b) despite the temporary nature of a hypothesis, there is a (...) rational process for formulating it. The paper also contains discussion of the method of analysis, problem reduction and a diorism, which have often been ambiguously explained in relation to the geometrical problem in question. (shrink)

According to the AI ensoulment hypothesis, some future AI systems will be endowed with immaterial souls. I argue that we should have at least a middling credence in the AI ensoulment hypothesis, conditional on our eventual creation of AGI and the truth of substance dualism in the human case. I offer two arguments. The first relies on an analogy between aliens and AI. The second rests on the conjecture that ensoulment occurs whenever a physical system is “fit to (...) possess” a soul, where very roughly this amounts to being physically structured in such a way that the system can meaningfully cooperate with the operations of the soul. (shrink)

Developments that suggest the universe is full of life make the Fermi paradox increasingly pressing, but our search for an extraterrestrial technological civilization (“ETC”) is handicapped by our ignorance of its probable nature and behavior. This paper offers a way around this problem by drawing on information theoretical concepts, including game theory and Bayesian probability. It argues that, whatever its ultimate goals, an ETC would have the same instrumental goals as other intelligent agents. Generically, these are self-preservation and the acquisition (...) of resources. For an advanced ETC, these generic goals imply the objectives of removing existential threats and acquiring strategic and non-strategic information. Since the most problematic existential threats for any ETC would be from other civilizations and planets hosting such civilizations would also be copious sources of information, these objectives would lead it to gather information from these locations and to protect itself against them. This dual-goals hypothesis resolves the Fermi paradox, redirects the search for extraterrestrial intelligence and makes testable predictions regarding ETC’s behavior on Earth if it is here. (shrink)

Each day people are presented with circumstances that may require speculation. Scientists may ponder questions such as why a star is born or how rainbows are made, psychologists may ask social questions such as why people are prejudiced, and military strategists may imagine what the consequences of their actions might be. Speculations may lead to the generation of putative explanations called hypotheses. But it is by checking if hypotheses accurately reflect the encountered facts that lead to sensible behaviour demonstrating a (...) true understanding. If evidence shows a hypothesis to be false, then people should rationally abandon it, especially if there are negative consequences. The aim of this thesis is to examine how effectively people search for evidence in their hypothesis testing to test whether or not their hypotheses are true or false in competitive games. Research findings from six studies of hypothesis testing behaviour in competitive deductive tasks are explored. Chapter by chapter the thesis tests how everyday people, and master chess players, tackle hypothesis testing in mathematical tasks, such as how to solve sequential number sequence puzzles when thinking about an opponent, or how to solve chess problems in a variety of contexts. The implications of the results are discussed in light of aspects of general cognition: such as reasoning, social hypothesis testing and planning. (shrink)

David. J. Chalmers examines eleven possible solutions to the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.’ The present paper argues that Chalmers overlooks an explanation that he has otherwise taken seriously, and which a number of philosophers, physicists, and computer scientists have taken seriously as well: the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation. This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at (...) least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything’, the problem of explaining why our world has the quantum-mechanical, relativistic, and philosophical features it does. (shrink)

Pierre-Sylvain Régis’s Cartesianism is quite singular in seventeenth-century French philosophy. Though, can we speak of a form of experimental science in Régis’s work? After exploring his notions of ‘system’ and ‘hypothesis’, I will define his position in relation to Claude Perrault, Jacques Rohault, and the Royal Society. I argue, first, that the contrasts which traverse French science are not so much about the use of experiments but about whether or not observational data can be traced back to hypotheses and (...) to a coherent system. Secondly, that we can detect a significant similarity between Boyle’s positions and the views expressed by Perrault and also by Régis. Lastly, that French science, even in its Cartesian version, is much more probabilistic than English experimental philosophy. (shrink)

The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is classically formulated as an analytic statement concerning the location of the nontrivial zeros of the Riemann zeta function. In this paper, we develop a spectral–dynamical framework in which RH arises as a necessary stability condition rather than an isolated conjecture. We introduce an axiomatic notion of a Riemann operator, a linear operator encoding the arithmetic of prime numbers through spectral and trace structures. We show that any operator satisfying natural requirements of trace compatibility, scale (...) invariance, entropy stability, and spectral completeness is necessarily essentially self-adjoint. As a consequence, its spectrum is purely real and admits only stable oscillatory modes. A central result of this work is that the stability conditions required for the existence of such an operator are not independent assumptions. In particular, the exclusion of exponentially unstable arithmetic modes is shown to follow from standard results in analytic number theory, including the Prime Number Theorem, within ZFC. This yields an intrinsic existence theorem for a stable arithmetic spectral operator, independent of the explicit formula. Within this framework, nontrivial zeros of the Riemann zeta function are canonically iden- tified with spectral parameters ρ= 1 2 + iγ. Zeros off the critical line correspond to unstable or non-self-adjoint modes and are excluded by structural necessity. The critical line ℜ(s) = 1 2 therefore emerges as the unique configuration compatible with global arithmetic stability. This analysis completes the Hilbert–P´olya program at the level of structural necessity: the Riemann Hypothesis follows as a direct corollary of the existence of a stable arithmetic spectral operator. Rather than providing a classical analytic proof, the present approach explains why any coherent, globally consistent spectral theory of primes must enforce RH. (shrink)

According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns factually: I show (...) that gaining specific new phenomenal knowledge is required for acquiring abilities of the relevant kind. Phenomenal knowledge being basic to abilities, and not vice versa, it is left an open question whether someone who acquires such abilities also learns something factual. The answer depends on whether the new phenomenal knowledge involved is factual. But this is the same question we wanted to settle when first considering the knowledge argument. The ability hypothesis, therefore, has offered us no dialectical progress with the knowledge argument, and is best forgotten. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis has always depended on a certain asymmetry of confidence. Physics is still groping toward a final account of reality, while speculative philosophy confidently announces that reality is “probably” a computer program. As long as physics appears incomplete, the simulation hypothesis can parasitize that uncertainty. What has begun to change in the last few years is that the direction of pressure is reversing. The closer physics gets to a genuine theory of everything, the less room there (...) is for the simulation hypothesis to occupy. My earlier paper argued that once you take adaptive emergence, thermodynamic constraints, and recursive irreducibility seriously, the hypothesis is either physically impossible or logically meaningless. The undecidability work by Faizal, Krauss, and collaborators reaches the same destination from a different starting point. If our ultimate physics necessarily includes non-algorithmic structure, then no Turing-equivalent device can ever host a complete copy of our universe. They frame this as a consequence of Gödel, Tarski, and Chaitin. I agree with their core result, but I think the implications are stronger than they themselves are willing to draw. Once you integrate their undecidability constraints with the ontological, thermodynamic, and epistemic problems I previously outlined, the simulation hypothesis is not merely an unbuildable technology. It is not a coherent description of any possible world. (shrink)

Complex constraints like conditionals ('If A, then B') and probabilistic constraints ('The probability that A is p') pose problems for Bayesian theories of learning. Since these propositions do not express constraints on outcomes, agents cannot simply conditionalize on the new information. Furthermore, a natural extension of conditionalization, relative information minimization, leads to many counterintuitive predictions, evidenced by the sundowners problem and the Judy Benjamin problem. Building on the notion of a `paradigm shift' and empirical research in psychology and economics, I (...) argue that the model of hypothesis testing can explain how people learn complex, theory-laden propositions like conditionals and probability constraints. Theories are formalized as probability distributions over a set of possible outcomes and theory change is triggered by a constraint which is incompatible with the initial theory. This leads agents to consult a higher order probability function, or a 'prior over priors,' to choose the most likely alternative theory which satisfies the constraint. The hypothesis testing model is applied to three examples: learning a simple probabilistic constraint involving coin bias, the sundowners problem for conditional learning, and the Judy Benjamin problem for learning conditional probability constraints. (shrink)

The hypothesis that God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead is argued by William Lane Craig to be the best explanation for the empty tomb and postmortem appearances of Jesus because it satisfies seven criteria of adequacy better than rival naturalistic hypotheses. We identify problems with Craig’s criteria-based approach and show, most significantly, that the Resurrection hypothesis fails to fulfill any but the first of his criteria—especially explanatory scope and plausibility.

In his [1937, 1938], Paul Dirac proposed his “Large Number Hypothesis” (LNH), as a speculative law, based upon what we will call the “Large Number Coincidences” (LNC’s), which are essentially “coincidences” in the ratios of about six large dimensionless numbers in physics. Dirac’s LNH postulates that these numerical coincidences reflect a deeper set of law-like relations, pointing to a revolutionary theory of cosmology. This led to substantial work, including the development of Dirac’s later [1969/74] cosmology, and other alternative cosmologies, (...) such as the Brans-Dicke modification of GTR, and to extensive empirical tests. We may refer to the generic hypothesis of “Large Number Relations” (LNR’s), as the proposal that there are lawlike relations of some kind between the dimensionless numbers, not necessarily those proposed in Dirac’s early LNH. Such relations would have a profound effect on our concepts of physics, but they remain shrouded in mystery. Although Dirac’s specific proposals for LNR theories have been largely rejected, the subject retains interest, especially among cosmologists seeking to test possible variations in fundamental constants, and to explain dark energy or the cosmological constant. In the first two sections here we briefly summarize the basic concepts of LNR’s. We then introduce an alternative LNR theory, using a systematic formalism to express variable transformations between conventional measurement variables and the true variables of the theory. We demonstrate some consistency results and review the evidence for changes in the gravitational constant G. The theory adopted in the strongest tests of Ġ/G, by the Lunar Laser Ranging (LLR) experiments, assumes: Ġ/G = 3(dr/dt)/r – 2(dP/dt)/P – (dm/dt)/m, as a fundamental relationship. Experimental measurements show the RHS to be close to zero, so it is inferred that significant changes in G are ruled out. However when the relation is derived in our alternative theory it gives: Ġ/G = 3(dr/dt)/r – 2(dP/dt)/P – (dm/dt)/m – (dR/dt)/R. The extra final term (which is the Hubble constant) is not taken into account in conventional derivations. This means the LLR experiments are consistent with our LNR theory (and others), and they do not really test for a changing value of G at all. This failure to transform predictions of LNR theories correctly is a serious conceptual flaw in current experiment and theory. (shrink)

The primary sense of the word ‘hypothesis’ in modern colloquial English includes “proposition not yet settled” or “open question”. Its opposite is ‘fact’ in the sense of “proposition widely known to be true”. People are amazed that Plato [1, p. 1684] and Aristotle [Post. An. I.2 72a14–24, quoted below] used the Greek form of the word for indemonstrable first principles [sc. axioms] in general or for certain kinds of axioms. These two facts create the paradoxical situation that in many (...) cases it is impossible to translate the Greek form of the word using the English form: the primary sense of the word ‘hypothesis’ in modern colloquial English is diametrically opposed to one sense used by Plato and by his most accomplished student Given current colloquial English usage it is impossible to get the word hypothesis to carry the connotation of “settled truth” much less “axiomatic truth”. The ‘hypo-’ [under] in the Plato-Aristotle use of ‘hypothesis’ might carry the sense of “basis” or “foundational” as opposed to “less than usual or normal”. This paradox parallels the one pointed out by Robin Smith: it is impossible for the English word ‘syllogism’ to carry the meaning of its Greek form Aristotle intended. There are other cases as well: it is impossible for the English biological term ‘genus’ to carry the meaning of its Greek form the Greek genos refers to family as in our ‘genealogy’, not to “higher species” as in our ‘generic’. (shrink)

We show that the Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is independent of ZFC, Pi1 sound and true in the standard model of arithmetic and prove RH in ZFC + minimal axiomatic extensions. -/- Independence of ZFC is established using the Lambda Irreducibility Principle, a foundational framework introduced and developed in this work. The Lambda principle detects intrinsic semantic obstruction arising from round-trip translation between inequivalent representational paradigms. We formalize two paradigms intrinsic to number theory: a linear arithmetic paradigm, governing first-order arithmetical (...) definability and computation, and a curved analytic--spectral paradigm, encoding the global analytic and spectral structure of the Riemann zeta function. We prove that RH is $\Lambda$-irreducible with respect to these paradigms. As a consequence, RH admits no faithful uniform representation within any single formal system internal to ZFC, and is therefore undecidable in ZFC. -/- We then establish the truth of RH in the standard model of natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$. Exploiting the $\Pi^0_1$ character of RH together with its ZFC-independence, we show that any hypothetical counterexample would constitute a finite arithmetical witness, and hence would be detectable within ZFC itself. The absence of such a witness implies that RH already holds in $\mathbb{N}$. This yields a proof of the Riemann Hypothesis in natural arithmetic, derived from semantic reflection rather than from additional axiomatic strength. -/- Next we present the Large Cardinal Theorem of Analytic Completeness, under which the $\Lambda$-obstruction collapses and RH becomes provable in an extension of ZFC. Taken together, these results establish that RH is independent of ZFC yet true in the standard model of arithmetic, with its truth established in the standard model of arithmetic and in ZFC + LCAC (Large Cardinal Analytic Completeness). -/- We finally present a third geometric proof of RH in extended foundational settings based on global phase rigidity of the Riemann phase bundle. Interpreting zeros of the completed $\xi$–function as localized holonomy defects of a natural logarithmic connection, we show that sufficient analytic rigidity excludes such defects and forces all nontrivial zeros onto the critical line. This argument clarifies why spectral and Hilbert–Pólya–type approaches require additional foundational strength, and provides a geometric realization of the analytic obstruction identified by the Lambda Irreducibility Principle. -/- Together these proofs successfully resolve the Clay-Millenium problem of proving the Riemann hypothesis. (shrink)

In Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues, among other things, that: if we are living in a full-scale simulation, we would still enjoy broad swathes of knowledge about non-psychological entities, such as atoms and shrubs; and, our lives might still be deeply meaningful. Chalmers views these claims as at least weakly connected: The former claim helps forestall a concern that if objects in the simulation are not genuine (and so not knowable), then life in the (...) simulation is illusory and therefore, not as valuable as a non-simulated life. Taking up these questions, I argue that in general, the value of social knowledge for a meaningful life dramatically swamps the value of non-social knowledge for a meaningful life. Along the way, I propose a non-additive model of the meaningfulness of life, according to which the overall effect of some potential contributor of value to a life depends in part on what is already in a life. One upshot is that the vindication of non-social knowledge, absent a correlative vindication of social knowledge, contributes either not at all or scarcely at all to the claim that our lives in the simulation might be deeply meaningful. This is so even though the vindication of non-social knowledge does forestall the concern that in the simulation, our lives might be wholly meaningless. (shrink)

This paper examines how accepting the simulation hypothesis as a serious philosophical proposition forces a fundamental reconsideration of epistemological certainty. While previous work has focused on the probability of living in a simulation or the nature of consciousness within simulations, we demonstrate that the mere possibility of simulated reality creates a unique crisis for knowledge hierarchies that differs fundamentally from traditional sceptical arguments. Unlike Cartesian doubt, which preserves the notion of an objective reality while questioning our access to it, (...) the simulation hypothesis suggests reality itself might be programmatically mutable. We argue this undermines traditional distinctions between scientific and religious epistemology, creates an insoluble verification paradox for scientific methodology, and requires a radical reimagining of knowledge and truth. While we suggest that complete epistemological scepticism might be avoided through appeal to necessary logical primitives, we conclude that accepting the possibility of simulated reality requires a fundamental reconstruction of how we understand knowledge, scientific practice, and the relationship between competing explanatory frameworks. (shrink)

A traditional problem with the performative hypothesis is that it cannot assign proper truth-conditions to a declarative sentence. This paper shows that the problem is solved by adopting a multidimensional semantics on which sentences have more than just truth-conditions. This is good news for those who want to at least partially revive the hypothesis. The solution also brings into focus a lesson about what issues to consider when drawing the semantics/pragmatics boundary.

What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning of adhocness, and (...) calls attention to the way in which the context of a theoretical move bears on the charge of adhocness. We also discuss the role of motivations implicit in the concept of adhocness, and the way ad hoc moves draw on theory-internal rationalizations. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists (...) in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity, systematicity of thought and thinking. (shrink)

According to the Donohue-Levitt hypothesis, the legalization of abor- tion in the United States in the 1970s explains some of the decrease in crime in the 1990s. In this paper, I challenge this hypothesis. First, I argue against the intermediate mechanisms whereby abortion in the 1970s is supposed to cause a decrease in crime in the 1990s. Second, I argue against the correlations that sup- port this causal relationship.

The Temporal Cascade Hypothesis (TCH) is a falsifiable, non-standalone extension within Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT). TCH formalizes how recursive symbolic systems can degrade when symbolic pressure exceeds containment capacity over recursive intervals (not linear clock time). The model introduces rigorously defined variables for recursive pressure, symbolic entropy, containment dynamics, hysteresis, and memory effects. Eight collapse classes are specified with causal criteria, detection rules, and explicit falsification routes. The work avoids metaphysical claims and does not attempt to explain consciousness; it (...) focuses solely on structural conditions under which what might resemble “recursive coherence” becomes unsustainable. All simulations are reproducible with LaTeX-native figures, Language is kept strictly neural, assumptions are transparent, and every proposed mechanism can be contradicted by testable evidence. (shrink)

In this paper, we prove that: if κ is supercompact and the HOD Hypothesis holds, then there is a proper class of regular cardinals in Vκ which are measurable in HOD. Woodin also proved this result independently [11]. As a corollary, we prove Woodin’s Local Universality Theorem. This work shows that under the assumption of the HOD Hypothesis and supercompact cardinals, large cardinals in V are reflected to be large cardinals in HOD in a local way, and reveals (...) the huge difference between HOD-supercompact cardinals and supercompact cardinals under the HOD Hypothesis. (shrink)

This work proposes that time is not a fundamental cause but an emergent consequence of matter’s self-organization. At the deepest level, matter and spacetime possess complete temporal symmetry, allowing bidirectional time. As matter becomes increasingly complex — from particles to macroscopic structures and living systems — this symmetry progressively breaks. The breaking of temporal symmetry gives rise to irreversibility, memory, decoherence, the arrow of time, and the emergence of classical reality. Within this framework, classical matter represents only a tiny, chiral, (...) asymmetrical fraction of a deeper racemic quantum domain existing in dual time. The visible universe arises as a projection — a “shadow” — of this temporally symmetric metastructure. From this perspective, relativity may be interpreted as a special, effectively classical case of quantum mechanics, emerging from higher-order organizational processes. Temporal self-organization thus provides a unified conceptual pathway linking quantum mechanics, relativity, matter–antimatter asymmetry, and the cosmological constant. Although this work does not claim to provide a complete unified theory, it offers a conceptual reorientation: a shift that replaces numerous disconnected explanatory “epicycles” with a simpler underlying principle based on temporal self-organization. Within this perspective, several seemingly independent phenomena — including the arrow of time, matter–antimatter asymmetry, decoherence, and the small positive cosmological constant — may be understood as different manifestations of a single fundamental process: the breaking of an underlying bidirectional temporal symmetry. (shrink)

Recent discourse on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) has increasingly considered unconventional terrestrial explanations, including the cryptoterrestrial hypothesis (CTH), which posits non-human intelligences (NHI) concealed on or near Earth—potentially underground, underwater, lunar, or integrated among humans—as a plausible alternative to extraterrestrial visitation (Lomas et al., 2024). This paper introduces the Cryptoterrestrial Faction Hypothesis (CFH) as a novel refinement of CTH. CFH proposes that indigenous NHI lineages, evolved in parallel or predating humanity, fractured into rival factions due to resource competition (...) and domain divergences. These factions engaged in historical multi-domain shadow conflicts over refugia (hidden enclaves), with patterns in global mythology interpreted as echoes of proxy wars or direct interventions (e.g., thunderbolts as directed-energy weapons, transmedium aerial/serpentine entities). Key elements include targeted containment resets (e.g., flood-like events), a post-conflict "long truce" of observation with strict rules of engagement, and contemporary UAP behaviors potentially signaling responses to modern red-line triggers (e.g., nuclear activity, human encroachment). CFH synthesizes cross-cultural mythic parallels, UAP performance data (transmedium capabilities, non-interference), geological/archaeological hints of refugia, and declassified/whistleblower accounts. Presented speculatively and not as an established fact, CFH is offered as a framework that fits select patterns better than monolithic CTH or extraterrestrial hypotheses in certain cases, warranting interdisciplinary inquiry with epistemic humility. Keywords: Cryptoterrestrial Faction Hypothesis, UAP, non-human intelligence, mythology reinterpretation, refugia, epistemic humility. (shrink)

This manuscript is about how to start from relying on science to be more certain about Christianity. This is because science is so pervasive in our everyday life that we expect that it works almost every time. However, when it comes to Christianity, we need to have faith because most of the time God does not appear to respond to us. Therefore, we feel uncertain about beliefs in Christianity. Instead of being uncertain, this manuscript tries to find a way so (...) that we are more certain about our beliefs in Christianity. We borrow our method to be certain from science. Science faces a similar situation as in believing in Christianity because its knowledge is fallible. Scientists themselves cannot be certain that the scientific knowledge is true all the time. So, they rely on a method called hypothesis testing to make their decisions to believe or not in scientific knowledge. We borrow this method to believe in Christianity. Therefore, we need evidence to make our decision of belief. We mention some evidence from past miracles to help us to make decisions. These include Eucharistic miracles, Marian apparitions, incorruptible corpses, etc. After we decide to believe in Christianity, we work out a theory of Christianity based on the salvation plan of God. We try to substantiate the principles in the theory by referencing testimonies from the Bible and from evidence of miracles that happened. We show that these principles are related to models and experiments that we formulate based on our beliefs in Christianity. Having obtained an understanding of Christianity like a (historical) science, we formulate our practice as a Christian. (shrink)

Cognitive modules are internal mental structures. Some theorists and empirical researchers hypothesise that the human mind is either partially or massively comprised of structures that are modular in nature. Is the massive modularity of mind hypothesis a cogent view about the ontological nature of human mind or is it, rather, an effective/ineffective adaptationist discovery heuristic for generating predictively successful hypotheses about both heretofore unknown psychological traits and unknown properties of already identified psychological traits? Considering the inadequacies of the case (...) in favour of massive modularity as an ontological hypothesis, I suggest approaching and valuing massive modularity as an adaptationist discovery heuristic. (shrink)

Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work—the 'trade-off hypothesis'—which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and (...) argue that, given the number of variables at play, any parsimonious account of the relevant data is implausible. (shrink)

This paper presents a formal articulation of the Hypothesis of Inevitable Consciousness, which holds that in an infinite universe unbounded in space and/or time where the laws of physics allow a vast but constrained set of material configurations, every possible configuration of matter will occur, and consequently, every possible conscious experience that can emerge from such configurations will inevitably be instantiated. The hypothesis does not invoke metaphysical entities such as souls, reincarnation, or trans-temporal memory. Instead, it derives its (...) conclusions from three widely discussed premises in contemporary thought: cosmological infinitude, finite or effectively bounded local state spaces, and a naturalistic account of consciousness as a physical process. Particular emphasis is placed on clarifying how this hypothesis differs fundamentally from classical doctrines such as the Eternal Return. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (...) (or ‘designer’). If this is correct, then the fine-tuning argument is a weak argument for the existence of God. (shrink)

The simulation hypothesis, popularized by philosopher Nick Bostrom in 2003, has remained one of the most intriguing yet unresolved questions in contemporary philosophy and theoretical physics. This thesis presents a novel theoretical framework—the Quantum-Holographic Consciousness Criterion (QHCC)—that provides a definitive resolution to whether we are living in a computer simulation. By integrating cutting-edge research from quantum consciousness studies, holographic physics, integrated information theory, and computational complexity theory, the QHCC demonstrates that classical computer simulations cannot support genuine consciousness due to (...) fundamental quantum mechanical requirements. The framework establishes that consciousness serves as an intrinsic reality detector, making classical simulation impossible while rendering quantum simulation extremely unlikely due to computational resource constraints. Through rigorous mathematical formulation and empirical testability, this work concludes that we are not living in a classical computer simulation, fundamentally transforming our understanding of the relationship between consciousness, computation, and reality. (shrink)

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology (...) have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness. (shrink)