Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2, and which is mathematically best (...) expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer. (shrink)

I maintain that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about a system of N particles evolving in three-dimensional space, not the wave function evolving in 3N-dimensional space.

This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism’s operation. I first consider Craver’s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie’s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their (...) various features. (shrink)

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some (...) confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies. (shrink)

Even though the evidence‐based medicine movement (EBM) labels mechanisms a low quality form of evidence, consideration of the mechanisms on which medicine relies, and the distinct roles that mechanisms might play in clinical practice, offers a number of insights into EBM itself. In this paper, I examine the connections between EBM and mechanisms from several angles. I diagnose what went wrong in two examples where mechanistic reasoning failed to generate accurate predictions for how a dysfunctional mechanism (...) would respond to intervention. I then use these examples to explain why we should expect this kind of mechanistic reasoning to fail in systematic ways, by situating these failures in terms of evolved complexity of the causal system(s) in question. I argue that there is still a different role in which mechanisms continue to figure as evidence in EBM: namely, in guiding the application of population‐level recommendations to individual patients. Thus, even though the evidence‐based movement rejects one role in which mechanistic reasoning serves as evidence, there are other evidentiary roles for mechanistic reasoning. This renders plausible the claims of some critics of evidencebased medicine who point to the ineliminable role of clinical experience. Clearly specifying the ways in which mechanisms and mechanistic reasoning can be involved in clinical practice frames the discussion about EBM and clinical experience in more fruitful terms. (shrink)

Leuridan (2011) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mech-anistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see e.g. Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan 1996; MDC 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2003; Weber 2005). In our view, (...) Leuridan misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim, that all causal claims require laws, is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation and control. (shrink)

Leuridan (2010) argued that mechanisms cannot provide a genuine alternative to laws of nature as a model of explanation in the sciences, and advocates Mitchell’s (1997) pragmatic account of laws. I first demonstrate that Leuridan gets the order of priority wrong between mechanisms, regularity, and laws, and then make some clarifying remarks about how laws and mechanisms relate to regularities. Mechanisms are not an explanatory alternative to regularities; they are an alternative to laws. The existence of (...) stable regularities in nature is necessary for either model of explanation: regularities are what laws describe and what mechanisms explain. (shrink)

Living organisms act as integrated wholes to maintain themselves. Individual actions can each be explained by characterizing the mechanisms that perform the activity. But these alone do not explain how various activities are coordinated and performed versatilely. We argue that this depends on a specific type of mechanism, a control mechanism. We develop an account of control by examining several extensively studied control mechanisms operative in the bacterium E. coli. On our analysis, what distinguishes a control mechanism from (...) other mechanisms is that it relies on measuring one or more variables, which results in setting constraints in the control mechanism that determine its action on flexible constraints in other mechanisms. In the most basic arrangement, the measurement process directly determines the action of the control mechanism, but in more complex arrangements signals mediate between measurements and effectors. This opens the possibility of multiple responses to the same measurement and responses based on multiple measurements. It also allows crosstalk, resulting in networks of control mechanisms. Such networks integrate the behaviors of the organism but also present a challenge in tailoring responses to particular measurements. We discuss how integrated activity can still result in differential, versatile, responses. (shrink)

As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge (...) levels rather than reduce them, as well as the different ways in which mechanisms are discovered. Finally, we offer a more detailed example of an important psychological phenomenon for which mechanistic explanation has provided the main source of scientific understanding. (shrink)

This is a book about philosophy, physics, and mechanics in the 18th century, and the struggle for a theory of bodies. Bodies are everywhere, or so it seems: from pebbles to planets, tigers to tables, pine trees to people; animate and inanimate, natural and artificial, they populate the world, acting and interacting with one another. And they are the subject- matter of Newton's laws of motion. At the beginning of the 18th century, physics was that branch of philosophy tasked with (...) the study of body in general. With such an account in hand, the special areas of philosophy (whether natural, moral, or political) that presuppose special kinds of bodies (such as plants, animals, and human beings) could proceed assured of the viability of their objects and the unity of their shared enquiries. For all had "bodies" in common. So: What is a body? And how can we know? This is the Problem of Bodies, and the quest for a solution animated natural philosophy throughout the Age of Reason. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess different interpretations of Bohmian mechanics that are not committed to an ontology based on the wave function being an actual physical object that inhabits configuration space. More specifically, my aim is to explore the connection between the denial of configuration space realism and another interpretive debate that is specific to Bohmian mechanics: the quantum potential versus guidance approaches. Whereas defenders of the quantum potential approach to the theory claim that Bohmian mechanics is better formulated (...) as quasi-Newtonian, via the postulation of forces proportional to acceleration; advocates of the guidance approach defend the notion that the theory is essentially first-order and incorporates some concepts akin to those of Aristotelian physics. Here I analyze whether the desideratum of an interpretation of Bohmian mechanics that is both explanatorily adequate and not committed to configuration space realism favors one of these two approaches to the theory over the other. Contrary to some recent claims in the literature, I argue that the quasi-Newtonian approach based on the idea of a quantum potential does not come out the winner. (shrink)

This article examines quantum mechanics through the lens of metamonism—an interdisciplinary processual framework based on the axiom of the prohibition of indifference. It is shown that quantum processes and models describing them are isomorphic in their set of operations (diff / fix), but radically differ in their ontological status. On this basis, the epistemological limit of fixing quantum states is formalized, and the role of metamonism as a bridge between quantum reality and its formal descriptions is substantiated.

I propose a dynamic causal approach to characterizing the notion of a mechanism. Levy and Bechtel, among others, have pointed out several critical limitations of the new mechanical philosophy, and pointed in a new direction to extend this philosophy. Nevertheless, they have not fully fleshed out what that extended philosophy would look like. Based on a closer look at neuroscientific practice, I propose that a mechanism is a dynamic causal system that involves various components interacting, typically nonlinearly, with one another (...) to produce a phenomenon of interest. (shrink)

Classical physics has historically relied on the mathematical gradient (∇f ) as its primary descriptive tool for mapping the static potentials of the universe. While this “Standard Model” provides an elegant geometry for determining forces within fixed landscapes, it remains structurally insufficient for explaining the dynamic, self-generating nature of reality. This paper argues that the classical gradient represents a framework of static isolata that functions as a map of static configuration while failing to account for the engine of generation. Through (...) a rigorous logical critique, we demonstrate that the classical model suffers from “Dyadic Insufficiency” and “Logical Necrosis,” rendering it incapable of self-validation. Crucially, we resolve the “Epistemic Gap” between ontology and mechanics by demonstrating that Gradient Mechanics is not a separate applied model, but the necessary time-derivative of Gradientology’s foundational axioms. We anchor the mechanics in the “Three-Primitive Necessity Proof” and the “Rigorous Derivation of δ = 0.1,” establishing that the functional primitives are fixed by the information-theoretic limits of field self-discrimination. We detail the transition to the Relational Gradient ( dG/dt), a computational ontology where the “Inversion Principle” transforms a static multiplicative potential (E × C × F ) into a self-regulating flux (E × C/F ). The result is a computational universe defined by the Order Parameter m ≈ 0.702, derived from the Tension Integral (T I = 0.336) and the Ising Critical Exponent (β ≈ 0.325), marking the transition from a geometry of static configurations to a physics of generative processes. (shrink)

We prove that quantum mechanics is the unique theory compatible with normalization- induced curvature on complex Hilbert space. Two rigidity theorems establish: (1) Lin- earity: continuous, reversible, scale-invariant flows necessarily have linear generators, and (2) Born rule: the assignment P (ϕ|ψ) = |⟨ϕ, ψ⟩|2 is the unique probability mea- sure compatible with cone geometry, unitary invariance, and orthogonal additivity. These are not interpretations but uniqueness results—no other mathematical struc- tures are possible given the geometric assumptions. We derive the Schr¨odinger equa- (...) tion, interference, Berry phase, and uncertainty relations as consequences of the master equation CurvC(X, Y ) = [X, Y ] − ⟨∇N,[X,Y ]⟩ ⟨∇N,x⟩ x applied to the quantum cone. The re- construction inverts standard quantum foundations: rather than postulating Hilbert space structure, we show it emerges from reversible dynamics on normalized states. (shrink)

In this chapter we examine the relation between mechanisms and laws/counterfactuals by revisiting the main notions of mechanism found in the literature. We distinguish between two different conceptions of ‘mechanism’: mechanisms-of underlie or constitute a causal process; mechanisms-for are complex systems that function so as to produce a certain behavior. According to some mechanists, a mechanism fulfills both of these roles simultaneously. The main argument of the chapter is that there is an asymmetrical dependence between both kinds (...) of mechanisms and laws/counterfactuals: while some laws and counterfactuals must be taken as primitive (non-mechanistic) facts of the world, all mechanisms depend on laws/counterfactuals. (shrink)

The concept of mechanism in biology has three distinct meanings. It may refer to a philosophical thesis about the nature of life and biology (‘mechanicism’), to the internal workings of a machine-like structure (‘machine mechanism’), or to the causal explanation of a particular phenomenon (‘causal mechanism’). In this paper I trace the conceptual evolution of ‘mechanism’ in the history of biology, and I examine how the three meanings of this term have come to be featured in the philosophy of biology, (...) situating the new ‘mechanismic program’ in this context. I argue that the leading advocates of the mechanismic program (i.e., Craver, Darden, Bechtel, etc.) inadvertently conflate the different senses of ‘mechanism’. Specifically, they all inappropriately endow causal mechanisms with the ontic status of machine mechanisms, and this invariably results in problematic accounts of the role played by mechanism-talk in scientific practice. I suggest that for effective analyses of the concept of mechanism, causal mechanisms need to be distinguished from machine mechanisms, and the new mechanismic program in the philosophy of biology needs to be demarcated from the traditional concerns of mechanistic biology. (shrink)

In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a low-entropy boundary condition to account for the temporal asymmetry. In this paper, I show that the Past Hypothesis also contains enough information to simplify the quantum ontology and define a unique initial condition in such a world. First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a fundamental density matrix that represents something objective. This stands in sharp contrast to Wave Function (...) Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a wave function that represents something objective. Second, I suggest that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a unique and simple density matrix. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the normalized projection onto the special low-dimensional Hilbert space. Third, because the initial quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for the \emph{Nomological Thesis}: the initial quantum state of the universe is on a par with laws of nature. This new package of ideas has several interesting implications, including on the harmony between statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, the dynamic unity of the universe and the subsystems, and the alleged conflict between Humean supervenience and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

A survey of the growth and structure of classical mechanics, 1638 to 1760.

The idea that technologies can change moral beliefs and practices is an old one. But how, exactly, does this happen? This paper builds on an emerging field of inquiry by developing a synoptic taxonomy of the mechanisms of techno-moral change. It argues that technology affects moral beliefs and practices in three main domains: decisional (how we make morally loaded decisions), relational (how we relate to others) and perceptual (how we perceive situations). It argues that across these three domains there (...) are six primary mechanisms of techno-moral change: (i) adding options; (ii) changing decision-making costs; (iii) enabling new relationships; (iv) changing the burdens and expectations within relationships; (v) changing the balance of power in relationships; and (vi) changing perception (information, mental models and metaphors). The paper also discusses the layered, interactive and second-order effects of these mechanisms. (shrink)

How does Newton approach the challenge of mechanizing gravity and, more broadly, natural philosophy? By adopting the simple machine tradition’s mathematical approach to a system’s co-varying parameters of change, he retains natural philosophy’s traditional goal while specifying it in a novel way as the search for impressed forces. He accordingly understands the physical world as a divinely created machine possessing intrinsically mathematical features, and mathematical methods as capable of identifying its real features. The gravitational force’s physical cause remains an outstanding (...) problem, however, as evidenced by Newton’s onetime reference to active principles as the “genuine principles of the mechanical philosophy”. (shrink)

We present a formal mechanical analysis using sweeping net methods to approximate surfacing singularities of saddle maps. By constructing densified sweeping subnets for individual vertices and integrating them, we create a comprehensive approximation of singularities. This approach utilizes geometric concepts, analytical methods, and theorems that demonstrate the robustness and stability of the nets under perturbations. Through detailed proofs and visualizations, we provide a new perspective on singularities and their approximations in analytic geometry.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITION. The need for a quantum theory Classical mechanics has been developed continuously from the time of Newton and applied to an...

The persistent interpretation problem for quantum mechanics may indicate an unwillingness to consider unpalatable assumptions that could open the way toward progress. With this in mind, I focus on the work of David Bohm, whose earlier work has been more influential than that of his later. As I’ll discuss, I believe two assumptions play a strong role in explaining the disparity: 1) that theories in physics must be grounded in mathematical structure and 2) that consciousness must supervene on material processes. (...) I’ll argue that the first assumption appears to lead us toward Everett’s many worlds interpretation, which suggests a red flag. I’ll also argue that the second assumption is suspect due to the persistent explanatory gap for consciousness. Later, I explore ways that Bohm’s later work holds some promise in providing a better fit with our world, both phenomenologically and empirically. Also, I’ll address the possible problem of realism. (shrink)

Is quantum mechanics about ‘states’? Or is it basically another kind of probability theory? It is argued that the elementary formalism of quantum mechanics operates as a well-justified alternative to ‘classical’ instantiations of a probability calculus. Its providing a general framework for prediction accounts for its distinctive traits, which one should be careful not to mistake for reflections of any strange ontology. The suggestion is also made that quantum theory unwittingly emerged, in Schrödinger’s formulation, as a ‘lossy’ by-product of a (...) quantum-mechanical variant of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As it turns out, the effectiveness of quantum theory qua predictive algorithm makes up for the computational impracticability of that master equation. (shrink)

Characterization of a form of explanation involving grounding on the model of mechanistic causal explanation.

The new mechanists and the autonomy approach both aim to account for how biological phenomena are explained. One identifies appeals to how components of a mechanism are organized so that their activities produce a phenomenon. The other directs attention towards the whole organism and focuses on how it achieves self-maintenance. This paper discusses challenges each confronts and how each could benefit from collaboration with the other: the new mechanistic framework can gain by taking into account what happens outside individual (...) class='Hi'>mechanisms, while the autonomy approach can ground itself in biological research into how the actual components constituting an autonomous system interact and contribute in different ways to realize and maintain the system. To press the case that these two traditions should be constructively integrated we describe how three recent developments in the autonomy tradition together provide a bridge between the two traditions: (1) a framework of work and constraints, (2) a conception of function grounded in the organization of an autonomous system, and (3) a focus on control. (shrink)

It has been argued that the transition from classical to quantum mechanics is an example of a Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which there is a shift from the simple, intuitive, straightforward classical paradigm, to the quantum, convoluted, counterintuitive, amazing new quantum paradigm. In this paper, after having clarified what these quantum paradigms are supposed to be, I analyze whether they constitute a radical departure from the classical paradigm. Contrary to what is commonly maintained, I argue that, in addition to radical (...) quantum paradigms, there are also legitimate ways of understanding the quantum world that do not require any substantial change to the classical paradigm. (shrink)

This paper argues that mechanism, occasionalism and finality (the acceptance of final causes) can be and were de facto integrated into a coherent system of natural philosophy by Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703). Previous scholarship has left the relation between these three elements understudied. According to Sturm, mechanism, occasionalism and finality can count as explanatorily useful elements of natural philosophy, and they might go some way to dealing with the problem of living beings. Occasionalism, in particular, serves a unifying ground: It (...) will be shown that occasionalism can account for the problems of the source and transmission of motion that mechanism faces, while at the same time explaining the finality of non-rational living beings as designed by God. (shrink)

For many old and new mechanists, Mechanism is both a metaphysical position and a thesis about scientific methodology. In this paper we discuss the relation between the metaphysics of mechanisms and the role of mechanical explanation in the practice of science, by presenting and comparing the key tenets of Old and New Mechanism. First, by focusing on the case of gravity, we show how the metaphysics of Old Mechanism constrained scientific explanation, and discuss Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism. Second, (...) we examine the current mechanistic metaphysics, arguing that it is not warranted by the use of the concept of mechanism in scientific practice, and motivate a thin conception of mechanism (the truly minimal view), according to which mechanisms are causal pathways for a certain effect or phenomenon. Finally, we draw analogies between Newton’s critique of Old Mechanism and our thesis that the metaphysical commitments of New Mechanism are not necessary in order to illuminate scientific practice. (shrink)

In this brief paper, we argue about the conceptual relationship between the role of observer in quantum mechanics and the von Neumann Chain.

What should we make of systems that behave just like conscious creatures but operate via mechanisms that are profoundly different from our own? How should we even think about mechanistic similarity and difference in this context? To answer these questions, I take a closer look at the inferential machinery that allows us to justifiably draw conclusions about consciousness in others. I argue that inferences about consciousness in others are best viewed as involving analogical inferences grounded in explanatory considerations. I (...) conclude that profound mechanistic difference severs the evidential link between behavioural evidence and subjective experience. I then draw on recent developments within the mechanistic philosophy of science to motivate a conception of mechanistic similarity that is not wedded to similarity of physical substrate and outline a strategy for resolving disputes about whether it is cognitive similarity or neural similarity that matters for inferences about consciousness. (shrink)

This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mechanism for evolution because it does not serve a function. (...) After distinguishing this sense fromsimilar explications of ‘mechanism’, I argue that it is ubiquitous in biology and has valuable epistemic benefits. (shrink)

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective integrating astrophysics, evolutionary biology, civilizational sociology, and ethics, this paper constructs a progressive empowering model of the "cosmos-planet-civilization" three-level death mechanism. It breaks through the traditional cognition that "death is opposed to civilization" and demonstrates that death is not the ultimate destiny of the universe and civilizations, but an underlying empowering system running through material circulation, biological evolution, and civilizational advancement: The death of stars and planets drives the matter-energy coupling cycle through heavy element synthesis (...) and celestial iteration, laying the material foundation for the birth of life; The death of individual terrestrial organisms maintains the low-entropy equilibrium of ecosystems, promoting the evolutionary emergence of intelligent life through species iteration; The demise of early civilizations constitutes the trial-and-error threshold of civilizational evolution, providing empirical lessons for the ethical revision of mature civilizations through costly practices. Combined with cases of ancient civilization disappearance, this paper clarifies the dialectical relationship between "the empowering nature of death mechanisms" and "the autonomy of civilizational survival" for the first time. It proposes that ethical revision is the core paradigm for civilizations to break through the trial-and-error fate and master cosmic laws. Ultimately, this research provides an interdisciplinary theoretical framework with scientific rigor and practical guidance for human civilization to achieve long-term survival through ethical adjustment, and to undertake the mission of delaying local heat death in the universe. (For the English version, please click the DOI link below.) -/- 本文立足天体物理学、演化生物学、文明社会学与伦理学的跨学科融合视角，构建“宇宙-行星-文明”三级死亡机制的递进赋能模型，系统论证死亡并非宇宙与文明的终极宿命，而是贯穿物质循环、生命演化与文明进阶的底层 赋能机制。研究表明：恒星与行星的死亡是宇宙物质-能量耦合循环的核心引擎，通过重元素合成与天体迭代，为生命诞生奠定物质基础；地球生命个体的死亡是行星生态系统维持低熵平衡的刚性环节，通过物种迭代推动智慧生 命的演化涌现；早期文明的消亡是文明演化的试错阈值，通过代价性实践为成熟文明的伦理修正提供实证镜鉴。本文结合古文明消亡的实证案例，首次明确“死亡机制的赋能性”与“文明存续的自主性”的辩证关系，提出“伦理 修正是文明突破试错宿命、驾驭宇宙规律的核心范式”。研究的创新价值在于，打破“死亡与文明对立”的传统认知，将死亡机制重构为文明演化的前置赋能系统，为人类文明通过伦理修正实现长期存续、最终承接宇宙延迟或逆 转局部热寂的使命，提供了兼具科学严谨性与实践指导性的跨学科理论框架。. (shrink)

According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term ‘mechanism’ gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept—it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this concept is importantly different from the (...) notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science. (shrink)

In this field guide, I distinguish five separate senses with which the term ‘mechanism’ is used in contemporary philosophy of science. Many of these senses have overlapping areas of application but involve distinct philosophical claims and characterize the target mechanisms in relevantly different ways. This field guide will clarify the key features of each sense and introduce some main debates, distinguishing those that transpire within a given sense from those that are best understood as concerning distinct senses. The ‘new (...) mechanisms’ sense is at the center of most of these contemporary debates and will be treated at greater length; subsequent senses of mechanism will be primarily distinguished from this one. In part I of this paper, I distinguish two senses of the term ‘mechanism’, both of which are explicitly hierarchical and nested in character, such that any given mechanism is comprised of smaller sub-mechanisms, in turn comprised of yet smaller sub-sub-mechanisms and so on. While both of the senses discussed here are anti-reductive, they differ in their focus on scientific practice versus metaphysics, in the degree of regularity they attribute to mechanisms, and in terms of their relationships to the discussions of mechanisms in the history of philosophy and science. (shrink)

This paper serves as the critical logical bridge connecting the ontological derivation of Gradient Mechanics to the operational framework of Gradient Mechanics. It traces the conceptual lineage of the “Gradient,” arguing that its modern form is the product of a century-long process of scalar extraction from a deterministic framework. We posit that the classical gradient (∇f)—a static operator for linear mapping—was systematically deconstructed by the scientific advances of the 20th century. Darwin, Einstein, Planck, Smuts, and Whitehead each extracted a key (...) scalar-invariant property from the classical view—Stochastic Directionality, Relational Geometry, Probabilistic Quantization, Irreducible Thresholds, and the Time-Derivative of Flux, respectively. This resulted in a state of “Scalar Differentiation,” where the gradient’s scalar-invariant properties were identified across distinct domains but described in isolated dialects. This paper resolves this differentiation by first deriving the necessity of these five properties from the ontological primitives of Gradientology—Existence (E), Connection (C), and Flux (F)—established in Paper 1. The historical derivations of the five thinkers are subsequently presented not as independent discoveries but as isomorphic structural confirmations of this pre-existing kinetic mechanics. This synthesis reveals the Gradient Techne—a scalar-invariant structural logic—and inverts the classical posture of calculative prediction, establishing the need for an operational syntax capable of resolving a non-linear, relational field. The coherent operational syntax that binds these properties is the subject of the next volume. (shrink)

This paper executes the final translation of the Gradient Mechanics framework, moving from the Equation of State established in the ontological treatises to an Equation of Kinetics required for temporal analysis. We demonstrate that the static definition of reality as a Multiplicative Ratio (Gstate = E×C / F ) must undergo a dimensional transformation when observed through the lens of time (t). By differentiating the ontological equation with respect to time, we derive Kinetic Gradient Mechanics not as a separate hypothesis, (...) but as the mathematical first derivative of Ontological Gradient Mechanics. We prove that the geometric “Volume of Possibility” (E ×C) transforms into the thermodynamic “Net Force” (∆ − Θ), and the regulatory “Registration” (F ) transforms into “Inverse Registration Density” (η). This derivation resolves the dimensional incoherence of the static state by providing a scalar-invariant kinetic equation: Output = (∆−Θ)×η. This equation governs the evolution of all non-equilibrium systems, from geochemical batteries to recursive computational architectures. The derivation demonstrates that kinetic mechanics is not an applied external model but the necessary time-derivative of the ontological primitives, establishing formal continuity between configuration and process. (shrink)

Papers I through XII constructed the Kinetic Engine (∆, Θ, η) and the Kinetic Stage (d = 3, τ0, σ). The stage is complete: three-dimensional clearance geometry, discrete spacetime, irreversible temporal flow, structural mechanical tolerance. This paper populates the stage by deriving the three observable artifacts of processing load strictly from the triadic primitives {E = 0.8, C = 0.7, F = 0.6} and their kinetic derivatives (∆, Θ, η, Φ). Mass (Ω) is derived as the ratio of local to (...) baseline processing demand—the Computational Density imposed when recursive complexity saturates the grid. Gravity (γ) is derived as the gradient of that density—the differential update lag that refracts the worldline. Light (c) is derived as the unimpeded propagation of the update cycle at the causality limit already established in Paper XI. Each artifact is derived twice: first as a Logical Necessity from the internal structure of G = (E × C)/F ,then as a Computational Instantiation from the algebraic values of the triad. No external theories serve as derivational premises. External frameworks appear only in Part IV as isomorphic confirmation of results already obtained. The three artifacts complete the operational dynamics of the Veldt: the stage runs, the load distributes, the signal propagates. (shrink)

This chapter will review selected aspects of the terrain of discussions about probabilities in statistical mechanics (with no pretensions to exhaustiveness, though the major issues will be touched upon), and will argue for a number of claims. None of the claims to be defended is entirely original, but all deserve emphasis. The first, and least controversial, is that probabilistic notions are needed to make sense of statistical mechanics. The reason for this is the same reason that convinced Maxwell, Gibbs, and (...) Boltzmann that probabilities would be needed, namely, that the second law of thermodynamics, which in its original formulation says that certain processes are impossible, must, on the kinetic theory, be replaced by a weaker formulation according to which what the original version deems impossible is merely improbable. Second is that we ought not take the standard measures invoked in equilibrium statistical mechanics as giving, in any sense, the correct probabilities about microstates of the system. We can settle for a much weaker claim: that the probabilities for outcomes of experiments yielded by the standard distributions are effectively the same as those yielded by any distribution that we should take as a representing probabilities over microstates. Lastly, (and most controversially): in asking about the status of probabilities in statistical mechanics, the familiar dichotomy between epistemic probabilities (credences, or degrees of belief) and ontic (physical) probabilities is insufficient; the concept of probability that is best suited to the needs of statistical mechanics is one that combines epistemic and physical considerations. (shrink)

Any scientific theory in the natural sciences is an artificial, complex, and abstract construct, consisting of many components (ingredients, constituents, structural elements). It is developed by scientists to gain and comprehend experimentally verified new knowledge about its domain of study. It is helpful to distinguish between two meanings of the term “theory”. The application domains of specific theories include particular kinds of realities. Examples include Newton’s celestial mechanics and various classical, quantum, and quantum-relativistic theories of gases, fluids, molecules, atoms, and (...) elementary particles (theory of atomic spectra, Bohr’s atomic theory, Planck’s quantum theory of black-body radiation, quantum theory of the hydrogen atom, quantum relativistic theory of black holes, etc.). The names of specific theories usually include the names of the types of realities they study. Abstract theories serve as general frameworks for a group of specific theories of the same kind (in particular, macroscopic, microscopic, or megascopic kinds). Examples of abstract theories are classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and the theories of relativity, which act as common frameworks for concrete theories from classical, quantum, and quantum-relativistic physics, respectively. The article compares concepts of complex structure and development of specific theories with notions of structure and development of automobiles. Such a comparison is more useful and heuristic than analyzing theories in terms of paradigms or interdisciplinary matrices, which, in any case, are not part of scientific theories. The work employed methods of terminological and content analysis of the original text of Newton’s Principia and the comparative method. The aim is to consider Newtonian celestial mechanics as the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) of all particular specific theories. The role of Euclidean geometry as a potential LUCA for abstract theories will be explored in another article. An analysis of Newton’s Principia showed that celestial mechanics encompasses a wider range of components than physicists and philosophers of science typically consider part of a theory. Main results. Taking this theory as a prototype for all specific theories, the article demonstrates the existence of sixteen types of components within it. Components of the same type form a specific subsystem of the theory as a polysystem. In any specific scientific theory, all these subsystems together constitute an interconnected whole that is necessary but not sufficient for generating new knowledge. Conclusions. The article is of a historical-scientific and theoretical-cognitive nature, and the results obtained can be applied in research on the history and philosophy of science, as well as in the teaching of natural science disciplines. (shrink)

Papers IV–VI derived the kinetic operators (Θ, ∆, η) from the ontological primitives (C, E, F ). This paper quantifies the scalar magnitude of the kinetic drive ∆. We calculate the Tension Integral TI = E × C × F = 0.336 and prove its alignment with the Ising critical exponent β ≈ 0.325. The primordial system exists at a structural yield point where multiplicative metastability aligns with the universality class of three-dimensional phase transitions. The kinetic drive emerges as the (...) order parameter via the power law ∆ = TIβ ≈ 0.702. The calculation involves: (1) quantifying primordial tension through the multiplicative product, (2) proving alignment with statistical mechanics universality, (3) applying the power law of symmetry breaking, (4) demonstrating the geometric origin of the amplification factor ≈ 2.09, (5) establishing scalar invariance. The magnitude ∆ ≈ 0.702 represents the velocity of becoming—the rate at which reality actualizes potential—with a perpetual latency Λ = 1 − ∆ ≈ 0.298 that sustains temporal process. (shrink)

Oulis pointed out that there is a great deal of interest in specific mechanisms relating to mental disorders and that these mechanisms should play a role in classification. Although specific mechanisms are important, more attention should be given to general theories. The following example from Salmon illustrates the difference.

The Higgs mechanism is an essential but elusive component of the Standard Model of particle physics. Without it Yang‐Mills gauge theories would have been little more than a warm‐up exercise in the attempt to quantize gravity rather than serving as the basis for the Standard Model. This article focuses on two problems related to the Higgs mechanism clearly posed in Earman’s recent papers (Earman 2003, 2004a, 2004b): what is the gauge‐invariant content of the Higgs mechanism, and what does it mean (...) to break a local gauge symmetry? (shrink)

Psychological construction represents an important new approach to psychological phenomena, one that has the promise to help us reconceptualize the mind both as a behavioral and as a biological system. It has so far been developed in the greatest detail for emotion, but it has important implications for how researchers approach other mental phenomena such as reasoning, memory, and language use. Its key contention is that phenomena that are characterized in (folk) psychological vocabulary are not themselves basic features of the (...) mind, but are constructed from more basic psychological operations. The framework of mechanistic explanation, currently under development in philosophy of science, can provide a useful perspective on the psychological construction approach. A central insight of the mechanistic account of explanation is that biological and psychological phenomena result from mechanisms in which component parts and operations do not individually exhibit the phenomena of interest but function together in an orchestrated and sometimes in a complex dynamical manner to generate it. While at times acknowledging the compatibility of the mechanist approach with constructionist approach (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), proponents of the constructionist approach have at other times pitched their approach as anti-mechanist. For example, Barrett (2009) claims that the psychological constructionist approach rejects machines as the primary metaphor for understanding the mind, instead favoring a recipe metaphor; constructionism also purportedly rejects the “mechanistic” picture of causation, which it portrays as linear or sequential in nature (see also Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). While some mechanistic accounts do fit this description, we will see that the mechanisms generating phenomena can be complex and dynamic, producing phenomena far less stereotypic and more adaptive than people often associate with machines. Our goal, however, is not just to render constructionism and mechanism compatible. Philosophers of science have been examining the nature of mechanistic explanation in biology with the goal of gaining new insights into the operation of science. We will identify some of the places where the mechanistic account can shed new light on the constructionist project. (shrink)

In this field guide, I distinguish five separate senses with which the term ‘mechanism’ is used in contemporary philosophy of science. Many of these senses have overlapping areas of application but involve distinct philosophical claims and characterize the target mechanisms in relevantly different ways. This field guide will clarify the key features of each sense and introduce some main debates, distinguishing those that transpire within a given sense from those that are best understood as concerning two distinct senses. The (...) ‘new mechanisms’ sense is the primary sense from which other senses will be distinguished. In part II of this field guide, I consider three further senses of the term that are ontologically ‘flat’ or at least not explicitly hierarchical in character: equations in structural equation models of causation, causal-physical processes, and information-theoretic constraints on states available to systems. After characterizing each sense, I clarify its ontological commitments, its methodological implications, how it figures in explanations, its implications for reduction, and the key manners in which it differs from other senses of mechanism. I conclude that there is no substantive core meaning shared by all senses, and that debates in contemporary philosophy of science can benefit from clarification regarding precisely which sense of mechanism is at stake. (shrink)

Social machines are a prominent focus of attention for those who work in the field of Web and Internet science. Although a number of online systems have been described as social machines, there is, as yet, little consensus as to the precise meaning of the term “social machine.” This presents a problem for the scientific study of social machines, especially when it comes to the provision of a theoretical framework that directs, informs, and explicates the scientific and engineering activities of (...) the social machine community. The present paper outlines an approach to understanding social machines that draws on recent work in the philosophy of science, especially work in so-called mechanical philosophy. This is what might be called a mechanistic view of social machines. According to this view, social machines are systems whose phenomena are explained via an appeal to socio-technical mechanisms. We show how this account is able to accommodate a number of existing attempts to define the social machine concept, thereby yielding an important opportunity for theoretical integration. (shrink)

Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the way animals navigate using path integration. We applied (...) curved tactile motions to the hands of human volunteers. Participants identified the location midway between the start and end points of each motion path. Their bisection judgements were systematically biased towards the integrated motion path, consistent with the characteristic inward error that occurs in navigation by path integration. We thus showed that integration of continuous sensory inputs across several tactile RFs provides an intrinsic mechanism for spatial perception. (shrink)

Mechanisms, in the prominent biological sense of the term, are historical entities. That is, whether or not something is a mechanism for something depends on its history. Put differently, while your spontaneously-generated molecule-for-molecule double has a heart, and its heart pumps blood around its body, its heart does not have a mechanism for pumping, since it does not have the right history. My argument for this claim is that mechanisms have proper functions; proper functions are historical entities; so, (...) mechanisms are historical entities, too. This thesis runs against the mainstream new mechanist way of thinking about mechanisms, where mechanisms are generally thought of in an ahistorical way. After arguing for this thesis, I draw out some consequences for philosophy of science and metaphysics. (shrink)

Unless one embraces activities as foundational, understanding activities in mechanisms requires an account of the means by which entities in biological mechanisms engage in their activities—an account that does not merely explain activities in terms of more basic entities and activities. Recent biological research on molecular motors exemplifies such an account, one that explains activities in terms of free energy and constraints. After describing the characteristic “stepping” activities of these molecules and mapping the stages of those steps onto (...) the stages of the motors’ hydrolytic cycles, researchers pieced together from images of the molecules in different hydrolyzation states accounts of how the chemical energy in ATP is transformed in the constrained environments of the motors into the characteristic activities of the motors. We argue that New Mechanism’s standard set of analytic categories—entities, activities, and organization—should be expanded to include constraints and energetics. Not only is such an expansion required descriptively to capture research on molecular motors but, more importantly from a philosophical point of view, it enables a non-regressive account of activities in mechanisms. In other words, this expansion enables a philosophical account of mechanistic explanation that avoids a regress of entities and activities “all the way down.” Rather, mechanistic explanation bottoms out in constraints and energetics. (shrink)