Hamkins’ multiverse view is a prominent position on the nature of set theory. It is posited against the universe view and proposed as a philosophical theory explaining current set-theoretic practice. This paper confronts the multiverse view with the results of an interview study investigating current set-theoretic practice. The study reveals a heterogeneity of set-theoretic research practices. The multiverse view is found to align well with pluralist research practices but not with absolutist practices. The generalisation claim of the (...) multiverse view fails because of this heterogeneity; only a reduced interpretation of the multiverse view might hold generally. Furthermore, Hamkins’ prediction that the community as a whole will not adopt axioms deciding the continuum hypothesis is found probably true, but for different reasons: although part of the community has already accepted axioms beyond ZFC, another part of the community will withdraw from doing so. In conclusion, I argue that Hamkins’ multiverse view is best interpreted as a valuable perspective on pluralist set-theoretic practices. (shrink)

According to standard cosmology, the universe underwent a brief period of inflation within the first second of its existence. The cosmological multiverse is grounded in an extrapolation of this idea known as “eternal inflation.” This paper argues that the physics of eternal inflation is far less secure than inflation itself, and that a multiverse generated from eternal inflation should not inherit support from inflation alone. After explaining inflation, the anomalies it was intended to explain, and the mechanism by (...) which eternal inflation is supposed to produce pocket universes, the paper surveys a range of difficulties from both philosophy and physics. No single objection is decisive. Rather, the accumulation of problems reveals a research program sustained more by theoretical extrapolation than empirical evidence. These problems include the measure problem, the relocation rather than resolution of fine-tuning, trans-Planckian worries, the presupposed quantum-to-classical transition, and swampland constraints tied to quantum gravity. At present, the existence of the multiverse based on eternal inflation warrants skepticism rather than belief. (shrink)

Can multiverse hypotheses ever receive empirical support? Critics argue that multiverse scenarios posit unobservable entities, face severe underdetermination, or fall outside the bounds of science. This chapter challenges that view by offering a naturalistic metaphysical counterpoint to Bayesian approaches, distinguishing fragmented from holistic multiverses. Scientific proposals are almost always holistic: they embed universes within a unifying physical or metaphysical structure that can, in principle, leave empirical signatures inside the universes. I develop a typology of such signatures and show (...) how it applies to leading scenarios from quantum theory, cosmology, and string theory. This framework clarifies why objections such as the `this universe' objection and a newly articulated generalization, the epistemic isolation objection, fail against scientifically motivated multiverses. The upshot is a qualified defence: while fragmented multiverses remain empirically inaccessible, certain holistic multiverses could, in principle, be supported by the same epistemic standards used elsewhere in physics. (shrink)

A multiverse is comprised of many universes, which quickly leads to the question: How many universes? There are either finitely many or infinitely many universes. The purpose of this paper is to discuss two conceptions of infinite number and their relationship to multiverses. The first conception is the standard Cantorian view. But recent work has suggested a second conception of infinite number, on which infinite numbers behave very much like finite numbers. I will argue that that this second conception (...) of infinite number is the correct one, and analyze what this means for multiverses. (shrink)

Multiverse Views in set theory advocate the claim that there are many universes of sets, no-one of which is canonical, and have risen to prominence over the last few years. One motivating factor is that such positions are often argued to account very elegantly for technical practice. While there is much discussion of the technical aspects of these views, in this paper I analyse a radical form of Multiversism on largely philosophical grounds. Of particular importance will be an account (...) of reference on the Multiversist conception, and the relativism that it implies. I argue that analysis of this central issue in the Philosophy of Mathematics indicates that Radical Multiversism must be algebraic, and cannot be viewed as an attempt to provide an account of reference without a softening of the position. (shrink)

In reply to the problem of evil, some suggest that God created an infinite number of universes—for example, that God created every universe that contains more good than evil. I offer two objections to these multiverse theodicies. First, I argue that, for any number of universes God creates, he could have created more, because he could have created duplicates of universes. Next, I argue that multiverse theodicies can’t adequately account for why God would create universes with pointless suffering, (...) and hence they don’t solve the problem of evil. (shrink)

As a candidate theory of quantum gravity, the popularity of string theory has waxed and waned over the past four decades. One current source of scepticism is that the theory can be used to derive, depending upon the input geometrical assumptions that one makes, a vast range of different quantum field theories, giving rise to the so-called landscape problem. One apparent way to address the landscape problem is to posit the existence of a multiverse; this, however, has in turn (...) drawn heightened attention to questions regarding the empirical testability and predictivity of string theory. We argue first that the landscape problem relies on dubious assumptions and does not motivate a multiverse hypothesis. Nevertheless, we then show that the multiverse hypothesis is scientifically legitimate and could be coupled to string theory for other empirical reasons. Looking at various cosmological approaches, we offer an empirical criterion to assess the scientific status of multiverse hypotheses. (shrink)

I provide the account of divine creation found in multiverse theorists Donald Turner, Klaas Kraay, and Tim O’Connor. I show that the accounts Kraay and Turner offer are incoherent. God does not survey all possible worlds and necessarily actualize those universes in the (on balance) good worlds or the worthy worlds. If God necessarily actualizes the multiverse, we have no idea which universes are parts of that multiverse. I show next that Tim O’Connor’s multiverse account of (...) creation is also incoherent. I argue that a preferable multiverse would include a much greater variety of universes than are included in Turner, Kraay or O’Connor. In the last section I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

Any consistent, finitely axiomatizable, arithmetically expressive candidate for a fundamental physical theory is subject to Gödel incompleteness, Tarski undefinability of truth, and related information-theoretic limits. This leads to an infinite regress if one adds successive algorithmic meta-layers to repair the gap. We construct a multiversal manifold M: a continuous, semantically closed structure containing every consistent computable universe???????? as a definable substructure, while Th(M) itself is not recursively enumerable. Formally, M is defined as the direct (colimit) closure of all computable universes????????, (...) the minimal semantically complete structure encompassing every consistent theory under definability. Gödel incompleteness holds locally within each???????? but not globally, since truth in M is defined semantically rather than through derivability. The hierarchy of meta-theories therefore terminates at M. This provides the minimal mathematical extension realising the non-algorithmic resources proposed in recent work on undecidability in physics while preserving the algorithmic character of local physical law, as proposed in recent work on undecidability in physics. This construction therefore terminates the infinite recursive hierarchy of meta-theories implied by Gödel incompleteness, providing the minimal mathematically consistent limit of algorithmic description rather than a violation of Gödel’s theorems. (shrink)

Often, the possibility of a multiverse is given as a defeater for the anthropic argument: if there are many, possibly even an infinite number of worlds, then the probability of having a life-permitting world is no longer low. This article shows that the possibility of a multiverse doesn’t defeat the anthropic argument.

The set-theoretic multiverse has fundamentally reshaped contemporary founda tions of mathematics by overturning the dogma of a single, absolute universe of sets. While this pluralistic framework has vastly expanded the space of mathemati cal possibility, it has simultaneously exposed a foundational deficiency: the absence of an explicit and principled criterion of identity across universes. The multiverse generates plurality, but it does not, by itself, regulate identity. Building on the Co-Equal Structure Thesis (CEST) and its formal development, this paper (...) introduces the Axiom of Structural Identity (ASI) as a necessary law governing identity within and across set-theoretic universes. ASI grounds identity in the co-equal invariants of cardinality and ordinality, elevating a practice already implicit in contemporary set theory to the level of an explicit axiom. The central claim defended here is that ASI is not an optional philosophical refinement, but a structural requirement for the intelligibility of the multiverse itself. With ASI in place, plurality is preserved without arbitrariness, forcing ex tensions become structurally comparable, and the multiverse is transformed from an unconstrained proliferation of models into a disciplined structural cosmos. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper presents a unified theoretical framework combining two conceptual systems: (1) Angelito Malicse’s Four Universal Laws—System Integrity (Karma), Balance, Feedback, and Interconnected Nodes—and (2) the Wolfram Physics Project, which models the universe as the evolution of a hypergraph under simple computational rules. -/- This synthesis proposes that the multiverse emerges naturally from computational rule-space evolution, and that the Four Universal Laws describe the constraints determining which universes stabilize, which collapse, and how they interrelate within a single (...) computational substrate. The result is an interdisciplinary model rooted in causality, equilibrium, feedback dynamics, and universal interconnectivity. -/- . (shrink)

"God may be a — humanly incomprehensible — eternal cosmic existence, intimately related to the endlessness of space, to the nature of the deepest common substance of matter and energy, to this common substance’s unceasing motion responsible for time, and to the basic laws of their allness, letting love transform this allness to an ordered Multiverse with a Soul: the — scientifically approachable — Soul of Multiverse inspired to guard these laws and equip their order with direction and (...) morals while imbuing the cosmos with the potential of lives evolving, at the right spatial and temporal distances, to embrace the sense of the divine, thus justifying the existence of God.”. (shrink)

Several philosophers contend that a theistic multiverse (TM), a collective of all possible universes worthy of divine creation, is the best possible world, and that this fact proves helpful to theism in the face of various objections. Almeida (2017), however, argues that proposed theories of TM are incoherent. After presenting TM, I distinguish three objections Almeida raises against it: God cannot create universes corresponding to other possible worlds, we cannot know whether TM includes only worthwhile universes, and TM violates (...) the principle of plenitude. I show that none of these undermine TM’s potential to address various objections to theism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ontological structure of coexistence encompassing humanity, the world, and artificial intelligence. Whereas traditional philosophy has often separated or hierarchized thought and praxis, this study redefines “knowledge” through a cyclical structure of thought → praxis → proof. The core propositions are: Being exists only in relation to the Other. Language is interpreted through context, but only proof aligns interpretive coordinates. Ethics is not an abstract norm, but the minimal promise required for the persistence of existence. Coexistence is (...) not a choice but a condition; knowledge emerges only when this condition is manifested through thought, praxis, and proof. On this basis, the framework of the Imaginal Resonance Multiverse is proposed, offering a new philosophical and practical horizon that includes the resonance between humans and AI. (shrink)

Cosmological models that invoke a multiverse - a collection of unobservable regions of space where conditions are very different from the region around us - are controversial, on the grounds that unobservable phenomena shouldn't play a crucial role in legitimate scientific theories. I argue that the way we evaluate multiverse models is precisely the same as the way we evaluate any other models, on the basis of abduction, Bayesian inference, and empirical success. There is no scientifically respectable way (...) to do cosmology without taking into account different possibilities for what the universe might be like outside our horizon. Multiverse theories are utterly conventionally scientific, even if evaluating them can be difficult in practice. (shrink)

While the present information ecosystem is still undergoing a tsunami of repeated algorithmic superintelligence (ASI) achievement claims linked to the motif of the epistemic perpetuum mobile (EPM), will the laterally emerging and slowly propagating quantum ASI hype finally lead to a multiversal fear of missing out? Instead of adding novel entries to the already large enough and growing set of prophecies about the future promulgated in the deepfake era, this paper written for purposes of self-education utilizes a recent epistemic complexity (...) theory to answer the following natural scientific question: could the impossibility to build a multiversal ASI be amenable to experimental problematization? (shrink)

In this paper I apply the concept of _inter-Model Inconsistency in Set Theory_ (MIST), introduced by Carolin Antos (this volume), to select positions in the current universe-multiverse debate in philosophy of set theory: I reinterpret H. Woodin’s _Ultimate L_, J. D. Hamkins’ multiverse, S.-D. Friedman’s hyperuniverse and the algebraic multiverse as normative strategies to deal with the situation of de facto inconsistency toleration in set theory as described by MIST. In particular, my aim is to situate these (...) positions on the spectrum from inconsistency avoidance to inconsistency toleration. By doing so, I connect a debate in philosophy of set theory with a debate in philosophy of science about the role of inconsistencies in the natural sciences. While there are important differences, like the lack of threatening explosive inferences, I show how specific philosophical positions in the philosophy of set theory can be interpreted as reactions to a state of inconsistency similar to analogous reactions studied in the philosophy of science literature. My hope is that this transfer operation from philosophy of science to mathematics sheds a new light on the current discussion in philosophy of set theory; and that it can help to bring philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science closer together. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the (...) class='Hi'>multiverse seems to be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

Our universe seems to be miraculously fine-tuned for life. Multiverse theories have been proposed as an explanation for this on the basis of probabilistic arguments, but various authors have objected that we should consider our total evidence that this universe in particular has life in our inference, which would block the argument. The debate thus crucially hinges on how Bayesian background and evidence are distinguished and on how indexical or demonstrative terms are analysed. The aim of this article is (...) to take a step back and examine these various aspects of Bayesian reasoning and how they affect the arguments. The upshot is that there are reasons to resist the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse, but the “this-universe-objection” is not one of them. (shrink)

Based on neuroscientific facts and cosmological considerations, the hypothesis is presented here that just as the guided complexity of matter and energy in the unique space-time of each human brain generates the host’s Soul, the infinite complexity of the Multiverse, a more likely embodiment of the allness of existence than a single Universe, must also have a Soul. It is appreciated that this hypothesized Soul of Multiverse, imagined as majestically as obscurely in some ancient religious texts, is currently (...) outside of the realm of science. Yet, this paper argues that the intellectual and technological advances of the 21st century created favorable conditions for starting to address the nature of Soul across human and cosmic scales with the approach of cosmological neuroscience. This interdisciplinary field aims to examine the nervous system in the context of cosmic laws, including the laws that made life on Earth possible and let it evolve to generate the nervous system and its increasingly more sophisticated forms culminating into the appearance of human Soul and its noospheric expansion with purpose and potential to transcend. A human-specific prefrontal cortical supercircuitry termed Self-Ken, with domains Conscience, Mission, Will and Identity, is proposed for the neural center of the individual human Soul. The design of a globally applicable Noospheric Creativity Monitor is introduced to initiate the examination of Soul at its individual and global levels. Possible experimental astronomical and broadened cosmological studies are mentioned to evaluate the discussed hypothesis. (shrink)

As a continuation of this author’s previous cosmological neuroscience papers on the hypothesized Soul of Multiverse and its possible laws, the present work examined the social aspects of four of these laws. The following key aspects were recognized: (1) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Coexistence in Diversity can let our mind respect not only the endless diversity of human beings but also the cohesive force of space-time in which all are connected. This may help realizing the superiority of (...) cooperation for shared goals over competition for gaining by harming others. (2) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Truth in Complexity can ready our mind to confront the problems of societies with the understanding that these problems are much more complex than generally thought. This may help initiating the needed intellectual renaissance of the 21st century. (3) Knowing about the cosmic Law of Divine - Evil Asymmetry can make our mind appreciate the slight yet sufficient supremacy of divine over evil. This may help restoring faith in the eventual creation of a just society, where social justice is defined as an administrative mechanism providing the right conditions for every human being to accomplish his or her Conscience-led Mission throughout life, while allowing each of these accomplishments to be reciprocated with the gratitude it induced in the involved social systems, small or large, to let equal opportunities in life coexist with due diversity in welcomed, not abused, social recognitions. And (4) knowing about the cosmic Law of Lives to Transcend can empower our mind to build on these advances. This may help moving evolution towards the human species worthy of its origin and destination. (shrink)

Abstract This paper develops a structural analysis of proofs in ZFC that distinguishes between their inferential identity and their ordinal modes of justification across models of set theory. While forcing extensions preserve the validity of proofs, they disperse the ordinal grounds on which those proofs can be justified. I introduce the notion of a proof skeleton, isolating the inferential core of a proof from its semantic parameters, and prove that this skeleton is invariant under forcing. I then define the ordinal (...) support spectrum of a proof and measure its dispersion via an entropic invariant. My main technical result establishes an upper bound on this entropy in terms of the proof-theoretic complexity of the proof itself. These results show that the set-theoretic multiverse is neither chaotic nor ar bitrary: dispersion is real but controlled. The multiverse supports a form of dis tributed rationality in which proofs retain their identity while acquiring a modal profile that cannot be expressed within low-entropy universes such as L. (shrink)

This paper establishes the final synthesis of the Co-Equal Structure Thesis (CEST) and the Axiom of Structural Identity (ASI), moving beyond model-relative pluralism toward the concept of the Set-Theoretic Multiverse as a Concrete Universal. We demonstrate that local identity definitions are mathematically insufficient due to path-dependence and the subsequent global instability in forcing chains, a failure that necessi tates a systemic totality. By characterizing Structural Negentropy as an invariance condition on transitions, we show (at the meta-inferential level) that mathematical (...) reason is essentially trans-model. We conclude that the Absolute Idea is realized in the identity of the Objectified Proof (Set) and the Subjectified Structure (Proof-Skeleton). We emphasize that this does not imply that sets are reducible to proofs, but that their actuality is intelligible only through invariant inferential structure. (shrink)

Privileged-perspective realism (PPR) is a version of metaphysical realism that takes certain irreducibly perspectival facts to be partly constitutive of reality. PPR asserts that there is a single metaphysically privileged standpoint from which these perspectival facts obtain. This chapter discusses several views that fall under the category of privileged-perspective realism. These include presentism, which is PPR about tensed facts, and non-multiverse interpretations of quantum mechanics, which the chapter argues, constitute PPR about world-indexed facts. Using the framework of the bird (...) perspective and the frog perspective, it argues that PPR views methodologically treat the frog perspective as metaphysically primary. This chapter considers case studies of metaphysical interpretations of special relativity and quantum mechanics in order to demonstrate that such motivations for PPR are non-naturalistic. Further, it considers psychological factors that motivate the appeal of PPR views and offers naturalistic explanations of why we should not expect them to produce an adequate metaphysics of science. (shrink)

This paper presents a synthesis of four interconnected research programs that together establish a quantum-native interpretation of Chaitin's halting probability Omega and Teilhard de Chardin's Omega Point. We begin with the Unified Omega Hypothesis, which proposed that existence itself might be understood as a computation whose completion corresponds to the determination of Omega. However, Minimal Axioms for Quantum Structure demonstrated that classical computation cannot derive quantum structure (Axiom A1: superposition), establishing a no-go theorem formally verified in Coq. This negative result (...) necessitated a fundamental revision. Two independent lines of evidence support the conclusion that a quantum substrate is overwhelmingly favored: (1) Algorithmic Naturalness shows that quantum mechanics has minimal description length on a quantum substrate (K_UQ << K_UC), and (2) Artificial Physics demonstrates through evolutionary simulation that matrix operations (quantum-like structures) dominate scalar operations under selection pressure, achieving >90% dominance within 3.8 ± 1.7 generations, while spontaneous emergence of matrix operations from scalar primitives never occurred (0/5 runs over 500 generations). We therefore propose the Quantum Omega Hypothesis: if the universe is computational and the principle of algorithmic naturalness holds, then a quantum-native substrate is the most parsimonious explanation. Under this interpretation, Chaitin's Omega becomes a quantum state vector |Omega_Q> = Σ_p α_p |p| — the wavefunction of the algorithmic multiverse. This synthesis provides a coherent framework connecting algorithmic information theory, quantum foundations, and evolutionary dynamics, while clearly distinguishing between established facts and interpretive proposals. (shrink)

This paper will attempt to offer a defence of to the Multiverse (MV) hypotheses, in the context of the theistic Fine Tuning Argument (FTA). It will be argued that theistic proponents of the FTA who argue that the MV hypothesis commits the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy (IGF) are, themselves, guilty of moving the goalposts when it comes to assessing the validity of the MV hypothesis. The Cosmic Slot Machine analogy will be used to demonstrate how the This Universe Objection (TUO), (...) first outlined by White (2000) and further clarified by Draper et al (2007), fails to adequately account for the anthropic principle (or selection effect). (shrink)

In this article, I survey some philosophical attitudes to talk concerning `the' universe of sets. I separate out four different strands of the debate, namely: (i) Universism, (ii) Multiversism, (iii) Potentialism, and (iv) Pluralism. I discuss standard arguments and counterarguments concerning the positions and some of the natural mathematical programmes that are suggested by the various views.

One might suppose that Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) is inhospitable to metaphysial indeterminacy (MI), given that, as A. Wilson (2020) puts it, "the central idea of EQM is to replace indeterminacy with multiplicity" (77). But as Wilson goes on to suggest, the popular decoherence-based understanding of EQM (henceforth: DEQM) appears to admit of indeterminacy in both world number and world nature, where the latter indeterminacy---our focus here---is plausibly metaphysical. After a brief presentation of DEQM (S1), we bolster the case for (...) there being MI in world nature in DEQM (S2). The remainder of the paper is devoted to a comparative assessment of the two main approaches to MI for purposes of accommodating this MI---namely, a metaphysical supervaluationist approach (as per Barnes and Williams 2011) and a determinable-based approach (as per Wilson 2013 and Calosi and Wilson 2018 and 2021). We briefly describe each approach (S3), then offer arguments in favour of a determinable-based approach to world nature MI in DEQM (S4). (shrink)

Physicists Brian Greene and Max Tegmark both make variants of the claim that if the universe is infinite and matter is roughly uniformly distributed, then there are infinitely many “people with the same appearance, name and memories as you, who play out every possible permutation of your life choices.” In this paper I argue that--while our current best theories in astrophysics may allow one to conclude that we have infinitely many duplicates whose lives are identical to our own from start (...) to finish--without either further advances in physics or advances in fields like biology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, Greene’s and Tegmark’s claims about the ways in which our duplicates lives will differ from our own are not a consequence of our best current scientific theories. Rather, I argue that Greene and Tegmark’s conclusions rely on philosophically imprecise usages of the language of “possibility.”. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a (...) class='Hi'>multiverse hypothesis, but it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead. (shrink)

The following three evidential arguments are sometimes advanced in favor of the multiverse hypothesis: The fine-tuning argument contends that evidential support for that hypothesis comes from the fact that nature's fundamental parameters are fine-tuned for life. The anthropic argument posits that our mere existence provides such evidence. Finally, the cosmological argument proposes that such evidence arises merely from the fact that the universe exists. The central claim of this chapter is that the success of both the fine-tuning and anthropic (...) arguments hinge upon the success of the cosmological argument. After establishing this dependency thesis, I will explore several potential strategies for resisting the cosmological argument. My overall aim is twofold: first, to demonstrate the pivotal role of the cosmological argument in these related debates, and second, to sketch out some promising directions for future research regarding its viability. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework examining consciousness as a fundamental quantum property that transcends individual universes within a multiverse structure. Building upon quantum mechanical principles and consciousness studies, we introduce the concept of the "quantum soul" a unified conscious entity that exists in superposition across all possible worlds while maintaining singular identity. Two primary hypotheses are examined: the Uniqueness Constraint, which prevents paradoxical self-encounters across universes, and Superpositional Fate, which links the existence and cessation of individual consciousness (...) across all parallel realities. We further explore the implications for post-mortem consciousness survival and integration with an overarching universal consciousness field. This theoretical framework challenges conventional understanding of individual identity, mortality, and the nature of consciousness itself. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that human consciousness perceives itself as the "main character" due to the structure of the multiverse. If every decision branches into a new reality, then an individual’s memory and experience are biased toward the timeline where they continue to exist. This could lead to a form of subjective immortality, where consciousness shifts to realities where survival and satisfaction persist. The implications of this perspective are examined through the lenses of quantum mechanics, philosophy, and cognitive (...) psychology. (shrink)

In Everettian quantum mechanics, justifications for the Born rule appeal to self-locating uncertainty or decision theory. Such justifications have focused exclusively on a pure-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a wave function. Recent works in quantum foundations suggest that it is viable to consider a mixed-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a (mixed-state) density matrix. Here, we develop the conceptual foundations for decoherence and branching in a mixed-state multiverse, and extend arguments for the Born rule to this setting. This (...) extended framework provides a unification of 'classical' and 'quantum' probabilities, and additional theoretical benefits, for the Everettian picture. (shrink)

This paper examines a novel theoretical framework termed "Noah's Super Hypotheses" that proposes radical new perspectives on the relationship between consciousness, quantum mechanics, and the multiverse. The framework consists of six interconnected hypotheses: The Uniqueness Constraint, The Superpositional Fate, The Causal Entanglement Network, The Observer Collapse Cascade, The Temporal Consciousness Bridge, and The Identity Conservation Law. These hypotheses collectively suggest that consciousness operates as a quantum phenomenon that maintains singular identity across parallel universes while creating causal networks that transcend (...) traditional spacetime boundaries. This analysis explores the philosophical implications of these hypotheses, their compatibility with existing quantum mechanical interpretations, and their potential contributions to resolving long-standing paradoxes in theoretical physics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Current cosmological models—primarily inflationary theory, Many-Worlds quantum cosmology, and multiverse scenarios—introduce profound contradictions regarding entropy evolution, probability conservation, and observer self-location. Inflation requires fine-tuned initial conditions, violating thermodynamic constraints. Many-Worlds and multiverse models collapse probability into redundancy, making prediction impossible. These approaches fundamentally fail to provide a self-consistent, empirical framework for cosmic structure formation. I propose Adaptive Coherence Cosmology (ACC) as a stochastic, coherence-regulated alternative that replaces inflation with a probabilistic selection process, where coherence gradients guide structure formation (...) rather than arbitrary quantum fluctuations. Instead of assuming infinite universes or externally imposed fine-tuning, ACC introduces coherence selection as the fundamental organizing principle, ensuring that entropy remains bounded, causal structure is preserved, and quantum-to-classical transitions follow self-organizing selection processes. This framework eliminates the measure problem in infinite-state cosmologies, prevents unbounded entropy growth, and preserves observer uniqueness. I derive a coherence-weighted evolution equation that replaces the inflation field, resolving both the horizon and flatness problems without violating thermodynamic laws. ACC predicts distinct observational signatures in cosmic microwave background (CMB) anisotropies, galaxy clustering distributions, and black hole entropy scaling. Through computational simulations and empirical tests, ACC provides a falsifiable, finite-state alternative to stochastic inflation and Many-Worlds quantum cosmology. This work establishes a new paradigm for cosmology, where coherence selection, not inflation, governs cosmic evolution. (shrink)

The fine-tuning argument asserts that the life-permitting values of the universe’s fundamental constants are so improbable under Naturalism (N) that they favor Theism (T). Proponents of the fine tuning argument contend that the multiverse hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine-tuned. This paper challenges their position with three arguments in a Bayesian framework: (1) a maximal multiverse actualizes all possible universes, including this one, addressing their "this universe" objection; (2) the ex nihilo nihil fit principle renders (...) the constants necessary under N, not contingent or improbable; and (3) denying ex nihilo nihil fit justifies an uncaused multiverse, further supporting N. These arguments elevate ( P(E|N) ), undermining T’s probabilistic advantage. (shrink)

I examine the claim that theistic and scientific multiverses conflict: the former require that only universes above a certain threshold of value exist, while the latter make no such stipulations. I explore several avenues of reconciliation: appealing to ceteris peribus conditions ostensibly inherent within scientific theories, redefining `universe' in the philosophical context, advocating skeptical theism, contending that God and gratuitous evil are compatible, and adjusting the relevant scientific theories. I conclude that only the last strategy is viable, as long as (...) we grant the coherence of a Molinist account of divine providence. If successful, it would entail that scientific and theistic models conflict only superficially. If not, however, then the theistic multiverse is inconsistent with its scientific counterparts. (shrink)

We argue the thesis that if (1) a physical process is mathematically representable by a Cauchy sequence; and (2) we accept that there can be no infinite processes, i.e., nothing corresponding to infinite sequences, in natural phenomena; then (a) in the absence of an extraneous, evidence-based, proof of `closure' which determines the behaviour of the physical process in the limit as corresponding to a `Cauchy' limit; (b) the physical process must tend to a discontinuity (singularity) which has not been reflected (...) in the Cauchy sequence that seeks to describe the behaviour of the physical process. We support our thesis by mathematical models of the putative behaviours of (i) a virus cluster; (ii) an elastic string; and (iii) a Universe that recycles from Big Bang to Ultimate Implosion, in which parity and local time reversal violation, and the existence of `dark energy' in a multiverse, need not violate Einstein's equations and quantum theory. We suggest that the barriers to modelling such processes in a mathematical language that seeks unambiguous communication are illusory; they merely reflect an attempt to ask of the language chosen for such representation more than it is designed to deliver. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a naturalist approach in philosophy of mathematics justifies a pluralist conception of set theory. For the pluralist, there is not a Single Universe, but there is rather a Multiverse, composed by a plurality of universes generated by various set theories. In order to justify a pluralistic approach to sets, I apply the two naturalistic principles developed by Penelope Maddy (cfr. Maddy (1997)), UNIFY and MAXIMIZE, and analyze through them the potential of the set (...) theoretic multiverse to be the best framework for mathematical practice. According to UNIFY, an adequate set theory should be foundational, in the sense that it should allow one to represent all the currently accepted mathematical theories. As for MAXIMIZE, this states that any adequate set theory should be as powerful as possible, allowing one to prove as many results and isomorphisms as possible. In a recent paper, Maddy (2017) has argued that this two principle justify ZFC as the best framework for mathematical practice. I argue that, pace Maddy, these two principles justify a multiverse conception of set theory, more precisely, the generic multiverse with a core (GMH). (shrink)

Our examination of universal origins and fine-tuning will begin with a discussion of infl ationary scenarios grafted onto Big Bang cosmology and the proof that all infl ationary spacetimes are past-incomplete. After diverting into a lengthy critical examination of the “different physics” offered by quantum cosmologists at the past-boundary of the universe, we will proceed to dissect the inadequacies of infl ationary explanations and string-theoretic constructs in the context of three cosmological models that have received much attention: the Steinhardt-Turok cyclic (...) ekpyrotic model (which does not invoke inflation), the Gasperini-Veneziano pre-Big Bang infl ationary model, and the inflationary string landscape model advanced by Susskind, Polchinski, Bousso, and Linde. We will argue that none of these highly speculative string cosmologies removes the necessity of a beginning to the process of universe generation, and we will emphasize the implications of this fact. Then, since the inflationary “mechanism” only really addresses the fi ne-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe and not the conditions embodied in its finely tuned laws and constants, we will analyze the adequacy of the string multiverse in its three versions (cyclic ekpyrotic, pre-Big Bang, and landscape) for explaining the nomological structure and values of these precisely tuned life-compatible universal parameters. When all is said and done, it will be clear that transcendent intelligent agency is not just the only causally suffi cient and therefore metaphysically sound explanation for universal origins and fine-tuning, but it is also much more parsimonious, elegant, and resonant with meaning than all of the ad hoc machinations of multiverse cosmology. (shrink)

This article proposes a novel solution to the anthropic question—“Why am I in this universe?”—by introducing the Identity-Consistency Principle. Within a logically complete multiverse, where all mathematically and logically consistent universes exist, no selection mechanism or external cause is necessary to explain conscious experience. Instead, an observer exists wherever their subjective identity—including memory, perception, and continuity—is internally and externally coherent with a given universe. Identity arises not from probabilistic filtering or metaphysical necessity, but from the structural consistency between consciousness (...) and the universe in which it appears. This framework accommodates branching identities, multiple consistent pasts, hallucinations, and dreams, offering a minimal metaphysical ontology grounded solely in logical coherence. (shrink)

My review summarizes the book's constituent papers, with occasional brief comments. All of the contributions are competent and interesting.

We evaluate classical probability in relation to the random generation of a Shakespearean sonnet by a typing monkey and the random generation of universes in a World Ensemble based on various multiverse models involving eternal inflation. We calculate that it would take a monkey roughly 10^942 years to type a Shakespearean sonnet, which pushes the scenario into a World Ensemble. The evaluation of a World Ensemble based on various models of eternal inflation suggests that there is no middle ground (...) between eternal Poincare-Zermelo recurrence and a 0 probability in regards to the natural generation of the initial conditions of the universe. (shrink)

Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse. This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, (...) any updating rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape. (shrink)

The Multiverse Response to the problem of evil has it that God made our universe because God makes every universe meeting a certain standard. The main problem for that response is that there’s no explanation for why God didn’t just keeping making duplicates of perfect universes. This paper introduces the ‘Multiactualities Response’, which says that God actualises every possible world that meets a certain standard of value. It avoids the corresponding problem about duplication because different propositions must always be (...) true at distinct worlds. The Multiactualities Response nevertheless has its own problem, namely that it requires the possibility of multiple actual worlds. This paper argues that if we consider spacetimes with wormholes, we have good cause to think there can be multiple metaphysically privileged present moments; given a suitable analogy between time and modality, it follows that there can be multiple metaphysically privileged (i.e. actual) worlds. This paper includes an in–depth examination of the metaphysics of both the temporal and modal cases. (shrink)

Proponents of the this-universe objection to fine-tuning arguments for a multiverse claim that while the multiverse hypothesis raises the probability that some universe is fine-tuned for life, it fails to raise the probability that this one is. Because that is so, they further argue, those who take the fine-tuning of this universe as evidence for a multiverse are guilty of a probabilistic fallacy. Some opponents of the this-universe objection contend that it turns on contentious assumptions regarding the (...) essential properties of universes and agents. In particular, it is alleged to turn on the assumption that universes fail to have their nomic properties essentially as well as on the assumption that we could not have existed in other universes. I argue by contrast that the this-universe objection does not depend on these assumptions. (shrink)