Contemporary physics posits a universal speed limit while simultaneously accommodating rest, variable process rates, and relativistic time dilation. This paper argues that the relevant universal constant should be understood not as a physical speed, but as a universal norm of realization, an ontological invariant governing the transfer of distinguishability. -/- Three independent arguments establish that realization requires an invariant norm: (1) variable norms introduce non-functional ontological structure incompatible with parsimony; (2) interobjective comparison and temporal ordering presuppose a common measure; (3) (...) stable objecthood, understood as closed cycles of realization, demands reparameterization-invariant circulation. -/- On this basis, motion is reinterpreted as redistribution of realization, rest as maximal internal realization, time as a derived count, and fields as stabilized derivative structures. The framework introduces no new physical postulates but clarifies the ontological conditions under which relativistic theories are possible. The main contribution is to show that the universality of the invariant norm is not a contingent physical fact but a structural necessity for any coherent ontology of objects, processes, and time. (shrink)

What happens to the ontological status of Spinoza's finite modes between his Short Treatise and Ethics?

On an influential view, Newton's mechanics is built into Kant's very theory of exact knowledge. However, Newtonian dynamics had serious explanatory limits already known by 1750. Thus, we might worry that Kant's Analytic is too narrow to ground enough exact knowledge. In this paper, I draw on Enlightenment dynamics to show that Kant's notion of determinate objecthood is sufficiently broad, non-trivial, and still relevant to the present.

_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of (...) reconstructions suggested by Frege’s writings, and drawing on contemporary work, the author illustrates that no plausible reconstruction is forthcoming. In essence, it is altogether unclear how to simultaneously substantiate, on the one hand, the claim that unsaturated entities must be recognized in order to account for unity and, on the other, the claim that unsaturatedness is incompatible with objecthood. (shrink)

Contemporary physical theories exhibit an increasing reliance on external assumptions, imposed structures, and procedural fixes in order to achieve empirical adequacy. While such practices are often justified pragmatically, they raise a more fundamental question: under what conditions does a theoretical construction qualify as a well-defined object rather than as a contingent modeling procedure? -/- This work proposes a non-arbitrary criterion of existence based on the notion of internal closure. A system is said to exist as an object only if its (...) defining structures, interactions, and stability conditions are generated internally, without recourse to externally imposed operators, symmetries, tuning procedures, or interpretative supplements. Lack of closure implies non-uniqueness, path dependence, or representational ambiguity, all of which undermine objecthood independently of empirical success. -/- The criterion is formulated at an abstract level and then examined through its conceptual projections in quantum mechanics, quantum field theory, spacetime structure, and biological systems. In each domain, it is shown that many successful frameworks function as effective descriptions while failing to satisfy minimal conditions of ontological closure. The analysis does not propose an alternative dynamical theory, but rather a restriction on admissibility: only closed constructions can meaningfully support claims of fundamental existence. -/- By separating existence from performance, the paper aims to clarify the ontological status of theoretical models and to provide a domain-independent benchmark for foundational analysis in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Notions of objecthood have traditionally been cast in visuocentric terminology. As a result, theories of auditory and cross-modal perception have focused more on the differences between modalities than on the similarities. In this paper we re-examine the concept of an object in a way that overcomes the limitations of the traditional perspective. We propose a new, cross-modal conception of objecthood which focuses on the similarities between modalities instead of the differences. Further, we propose that the auditory system might (...) consist of two parallel streams of processing (the `what' and `where' subsystems) in a manner analogous to current conceptions of the visual system. We suggest that the `what' subsystems in each modality are concerned with objecthood. Finally, we present evidence for—and elaborate on—the hypothesis that the auditory `where' subsystem is in the service of the visual-motor `where' subsystem. (shrink)

Discussions of sexual ethics often focus on the wrong of treating another as a mere object instead of as a person worthy of respect. On this view, the task of sexual ethics becomes putting the other’s subjectivity above their status as erotic object so as to avoid the harms of objectification. Ward and Anderson argue that such a view disregards the crucial, moral role that erotic objecthood plays in sexual encounters. Important moral features of intimacy are disclosed through the (...) experience of being an erotic object for another, as well as in perceiving another as an erotic object. Drawing on phenomenology, especially the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, Ward and Anderson argue that erotic encounters are shaped by the human condition of ambiguity, where being an object for others is intertwined with bodily agency. Because sexual agency is complex in this way, theories of sexual ethics and responsibility must widen their focus beyond transparent communication and authoritative expressions of will. (shrink)

Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) holds that structure is ontologically fundamental, yet it lacks a precise metaphysical account of structure. Returning to the insight that originally motivated structural realism, I develop a new basis for OSR grounded in the metaphysical foundations of mathematics. This approach draws on the principles of ante rem structuralism and their formal axiomatizations to define Structure Theory (ST), the view that structures exist sui generis and constitute the subject matter of mathematics. ST compels OSR to confront its (...) “collapse problem” of distinguishing physical from mathematical structure. I argue for embracing the collapse by adopting the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH), which identifies our physical universe as an ante rem structure. This yields the Universal Theory of Structure (UTS), providing a fundamental ontology of structures for both mathematical and physical reality. The theory refines OSR’s fundamentality thesis from the vague “physical reality is structural” to the metaphysically substantive “physical reality is an ante rem structure,” thereby strengthening responses to criticisms concerning representation, objecthood, and causation. The UTS also illuminates important foundational problems regarding the applicability of mathematics, the particular form of our universe, and the nature of existence. I conclude that the theory’s unifying and explanatory virtues support an inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

While there is considerable disagreement on the precise nature of material objecthood, it is standardly assumed that material objects must be spatial. In this paper, I provide two arguments against this assumption. The first argument is made from largely a priori considerations about modal plenitude. The possibility of non-spatial material objects follows from commitment to certain plausible principles governing material objecthood and plausible principles regarding modal plenitude. The second argument draws from current philosophical discussions regarding theories of quantum (...) gravity and the emergence of spacetime. When it is appreciated what possible worlds these current theories commit us to, the possibility of non-spatial material objects will follow. Thus, either route will lead us to the possibility of non-spatial material objects. The significance of this result is that we need to revise our accounts of material objecthood to both accommodate these possibilities and the theories that lead to them. (shrink)

This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories (...) of intentionality. I argue ultimately that, given the relevant disambiguations, the answers to all three questions will likely be positive. These results both support what has become known as the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, and make clearer the price the conceptualist must pay to sustain her position. (shrink)

All too often women are considered sexy in accordance with an externally dictated and unduly narrow conception of sexiness – one that excludes large portions of the female population from being considered sexy. In response to this, some feminists have suggested that we should give up on sexiness altogether. Since the agency, subjectivity, and autonomy of a woman being judged sexy is generally ignored, they argue, we have, in effect, an equation of sexiness with objecthood. In a recent essay (...) entitled “Sex Objects and Sexy Subjects” Sheila Lintott and Sherri Irvin object to this strategy because they see sexuality as a crucial element of selfhood – something that one cannot simply ‘give up on’. Instead, they propose to reclaim and redefine sexiness in such a way that makes room for women as sexy subjects desiring and pursuing authentic pleasure. In this short paper, I will investigate the merits and shortcomings of their proposal and present an alternative account. (shrink)

Beginning with the work of Olafur Eliasson, with particular reference to the recent exhibition “Trembling Horizons” but not limited to it, a number of works representative of an artistic vision that might be called eco-logical are analyzed. Not only by explicitly thematizing the issue of the environmental crisis, Eliasson's works seem to materially express the demands of theorists who question how art can actively respond to the need for a shift in outlook that characterizes current events. Starting from the idea (...) of art as praxis, which allows the viewer to regard himself or herself and to place himself or herself in relation to what surrounds us – human and non-human – Eliasson's works act on the intrinsic objecthood of the work itself by creating a relationship with otherness and datity. They generate, therefore, a feeling of proximity, which concretizes a meaning of creativity in a transformative and site-specific sense; they promote an eco-logic that has its basis in a nomadic and depotentiated vision of subjectivity, engendering a feeling of interconnectedness and care. It will be argued in this paper the need to rethink art in these terms by hypothesizing a particular efficacy of some works that actively work in public space: places where the split between nature and culture has taken place, urban and public space are privileged contexts to actively promote the overcoming of this fracture and generate ethically responsible, already intrinsically ecological subjects. (shrink)

What happens to artist and to viewer when painting or sculpture emancipates itself from all physical mediums? What happens to art-world experts and to museum goers and amateurs when the piece of art turns immaterial, becoming indiscernible within its surrounding empty space and within the parergonal apparatus of the exposition site? What type of verbal depiction, of critical understanding and specific knowledge is attempted under these programmed and fabricated conditions? What kind of aesthetic experience–namely embodied and sensitive–is expected when a (...) performative utterance of the artist about his art takes the place of a real piece of artwork seen or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived? For Andy Warhol, «wasted space is any space that has art in it.» In the spring of 1958, in Paris, an artist already well-known among the neo-avantgardes and accredited by the international art-world, shows up empty-handed and presents himself as a painter without paintings in a empty space. In a singular never-wasted space, Yves Klein displays himself as a snob, with an extraordinary showbiz glamour and literally sine-nobilitate, without the traditional marks of artistic manual skills. Against the modernist issues, he writes: «Credit was given to me. The gesture alone was enough. The public had accepted the abstract intention.» What’s the matter with this powerful prestige and its influence on the critic and public? How to understand the public trust in the artist as a producer of an institutional “make-believe” without any objecthood, devoid of any individual artwork presented to the sight or to any other sense? For Modernism and Minimalism, the work of art seems to have an internal coherence, whether formal or expressive, and is thus autonomous from the surrounding world, existing with only the clear opposition to the living space and set as a specialized and situated objection to the enclosing field. Instead, now the object melts into the air and becomes undetectable, confused with the atmosphere of the theory of art and with the stylish and snobbish life of the artist. What type of interpretation is put on regarding this unclassifiable and ambiguous field, simultaneously an-aesthetic and existential, theoretical and sensitive, charismatic and motionless, at same time without a specialized position in the world made by the artist himself? And what kind of embodied experience is performed by the spectatorship? What type of phenomenology and pragmatics of aesthetic relationship is necessary to describe how the body of the beholder absorbs this vacated and boring space via a direct and immediate perception-assimilation? What kind of artistic rhetoric, what kind ontology of art? Until this day, after more than 50 years, Yves Klein’s The Void has not ceased asking these and other questions on aesthetics, philosophy and the history of art. (shrink)

Absential Aesthetics Theory: On Ghosts, Absence, and the Afterlife of Art A Complete Theoretical Framework -/- A Complete Theoretical Framework by Dorian Vale -/- What happens to a work of art after it disappears — and why does it linger? -/- In this seminal treatise, Dorian Vale unveils the full theoretical scaffolding of Absential Aesthetics, a core pillar of the Post-Interpretive Movement. This framework reconceives absence not as a void to be filled, but as a residue that haunts, instructs, and (...) remains. -/- -/- Drawing from metaphysical inquiry, trauma studies, and post-structural aesthetics, Vale argues that absence is not the opposite of presence — it is a continuation of it. From lost artifacts and sealed objects to erased histories and unspeakable memories, this theory reframes absence as aesthetic substance. The missing becomes legible through its consequences, not its form. -/- -/- Across three theoretical movements — Erasure, Afterlife, and Hauntmark — Vale introduces critical constructs such as The Aesthetic Ghost, Negative Presence, and Lingering Witness. These ideas challenge visual primacy, proposing that what art does after it vanishes may be more ethically potent than what it does when it is seen. -/- -/- Absential Aesthetics Theory is not a speculative musing — it is a structured philosophy of art’s most elusive force: what remains after it is no longer there. A vital contribution to contemporary art theory, this treatise opens a door for curators, critics, and philosophers who seek to engage art not just through its objecthood, but through its departure. -/- -/- Absential Aesthetics, Dorian Vale, Post-Interpretive Criticism, theory of absence in art, aesthetic ghosts, art afterlife, disappearance in art, witness and erasure, trauma and aesthetics, art and memory, aesthetic haunting, art as residue, invisibility in art theory, negative presence, art criticism and absence, disappearance as ontology, art of the unseen, sacred erasure, ethics of loss in art, non-object based aesthetics, hauntmark theory, afterlife of the artwork Dorian Vale (Q136309187) is the founder of Post-Interpretive Criticism (Q136308909), published via Museum of One (Q136309180). -/- . (shrink)

Currently, in both scientific and philosophical disciplines, many consider the visual and auditory senses as the “higher senses," viewing them as objective faculties, particularly in humans. Conversely, the tactile, gustatory, and olfactory senses are regarded as the "lower senses," primarily subjective. The approach to such differentiation involves comparing and analyzing them based on an insufficient conceptual understanding of objective knowledge. We argue against it, finding it unnatural, biased, and non-synthetic. Towards a change in conception, a more effective strategy could be (...) to consider overall cognition as the interplay between the senses and cognitive processes. When viewed through this lens, three essential elements of this interplay emerge, which we identify as its salient features as follows: 1. Functional aspect - the senses inform of the pattern-based macro world rather than its micro constituents. 2. Objecthood aspect - all five senses put the organism in direct touch with the objective world without exception. We have comprehensively redefined objecthood to encompass both the object and stuff (its material composition, such as woody, watery, metallic, etc.). 3. Abstract or representational aspect - information through the senses is further manipulated by high-level cognitive processing. We term it the “cognitive sense.” In this article, we elaborate on these features and propose a normative theory. We believe this can serve as a framework for both scientific and philosophical exploration of the theory of the senses, informed by a comprehensive literature review conducted across both disciplines. Our study examines the roles of the chemosenses (smell, taste, etc.) and the tactile sense, which we term the vital senses, in grounding the organism in its biological basis of life. In contrast, the highly acclaimed distal senses of vision and audition can mislead the organism about reality and objecthood because of their connection to abstract cognition, thereby challenging the contemporary perspective. (shrink)

This essay provides an interpretation of the potential and limits of Michael Fried's difficult claims in his essay "Art and Objecthood" (1967) that cinema by its nature escapes the problems of modernism and also escapes the problems of theater. By focusing on Stanley Cavell's account of how cinema as an automatic medium escapes problems associated with variability across performances, I try to render a version of Fried's claim about cinema and theater that can ground a figurative version of his (...) claim about cinema and modernism, where film at least provides us a symbol of relief from concerns about medium specificity. In the second part of the essay I argue that something close to Cavell's and Fried's thoughts (about using the figure of theater to remind us of cinema's specificity, but also of cinema in its character as a symbol of relief from medium-specific concerns) takes on a certain urgency in questions about what cinema is in the digital age, manifested in representations of theater in the digitally photographed "Shakespeariadas" series by the contemporary Argentine filmmaker Matías Piñeiro. (shrink)

This thesis is intended to scrutinize Kant‘s empirical realism along with his rejection of empirical idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central idea of the thesis is that Kant‘s empirical realism is robust or genuine and this is essential to his divorce from Humean skeptical empiricism, Cartesian skeptical idealism, and Berkeleian phenomenalism, all of which are forms of empirical idealism. In this context, I first deal with Kant‘s transcendental idealism and the ―Transcendental Aesthetic‖ via the epistemological two aspect (...) view. Second, I reconstruct the ―Transcendental Deduction‖ and particularly focus on apperception, constitution of objecthood, and figurative synthesis. Here, I argue that Kant is anti Humean, in that he shows a priori concepts are necessary for experience. Third, I examine the ―Refutation of Idealism,‖ suggesting that Kant ruptures from Cartesian epistemology and its representationalism. So, although the Kantian appearances are mind dependent in the epistemological sense, they are mind independent in the ontological sense. To elaborate further, on the reading I suggest, Kant holds the view that empirical objects are public and immediately cognized; in contrast, Cartesian epistemology claims that the cognition of empirical objects is mediate and private, viz., cognized via and derived from mental content. Finally, I advocate that Kant‘s idealism is not like Berkeleian phenomenalism and provide several reasons for this. Thus, I suggest that reading Kant‘s account as phenomenalism is misleading. (shrink)

This paper proposes a hypothesis of "Trinary Cognitive Primitives," a foundational structure underlying human and non-human cognition. The hypothesis suggests that all mental representations—whether linguistic or non-linguistic—are constructed through three elemental cognitive categories: Noun (objecthood), Verb (action/change), and Adjective (quality/state). This tripartite framework is posited to be evolutionarily embedded in mammalian and possibly reptilian brains, functioning as a pre-linguistic grammar of thought. Drawing from philosophy of language, cognitive science, and probabilistic models of grammar, the paper explores the implications of (...) this structure for understanding consciousness, language acquisition, and artificial intelligence. The model further proposes that this trinary structure is probabilistically activated based on contextual salience and cognitive economy, offering a bridge between symbolic and sub-symbolic processing. By providing a formalized framework for primitive cognitive categorization, the theory opens new avenues for cross-disciplinary dialogue between linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, and machine learning. (shrink)