Objectification involves treating someone as a thing. The role of images in perpetuating objectification has been discussed by feminist philosophers. However, the precise effect that images have on an individual's visual system is seldom explored. Kathleen Stock’s work is an exception—she describes certain images of women as causing viewers to develop an objectifying ‘gestalt’ which is then projected onto real-life women. However, she doesn’t specify the level of visual processing at which objectification occurs. In this paper, I (...) propose that images can affect a viewer's early visual system. I will argue that if a viewer is exposed to a lot of images that depict women as sexual objects, this will bias their early visual selection mechanisms in a way that can result in an objectifying way of seeing. This is an important contribution to work on objectification as it incorporates empirical studies on vision and findings from philosophy of mind. It also examines some of the epistemic and moral consequences of objectification occurring at this early visual stage. (shrink)

Illness and injury are often accompanied by experiences of bodily objectification. Medical treatments intended to restore the structure or function of the body may amplify these experiences of objectification by recasting the patient’s body as a biomedical object—something to be examined, measured, and manipulated. In this article, we contribute to the phenomenology of embodiment in illness and medicine by reexamining the results of a qualitative study of the experiences of nurses and patients isolated in an intensive care unit (...) during the first wave of COVID-19. Drawing upon the phenomenological concept of embodiment—as developed in the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Emmanuel Levinas—we reconsider how bodily objectification manifests in complex clinical encounters. We show that, in these settings, objectification is not simply the unilateral act of a clinician objectifying a patient. Rather, both clinicians and patients reported a variety of objectifying experiences influenced by their interactions, the immediate context of the intensive care milieu, and the broader atmosphere of a global pandemic. In light of these findings, we argue that bodily objectification in illness and medicine can often be more complicated than typically presented in the phenomenological literature. (shrink)

In The Age of the World Picture, philosopher Martin Heidegger claims that scientific representations do not reduce themselves to pure appropriations of what they present. Rather, they convey investigations that confine being to rules of appropriation. Those rules govern how natural science accesses phenomena. The choice of natural science as the predominant mode of representation of reality entails what Heidegger calls a process of objectification (Vergegenständlichung). In his Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger questions the tribute paid by the sciences of the (...) mind to the logic of the natural sciences, and stresses that Freud, by thinking of the mind as a machine driven by instinctive powers, assigns to human phenomena the objective features set by the natural sciences. This paper purports to show that Winnicott, by formulating a theory of personal maturing, disagrees with the objectifying requirements of the natural sciences. For Winnicott, traditional psychoanalysis uses categories that are inadequate for describing the changes babies undergo in the environment that gives them care and attention, because its analysis is confined to the field of libido relations. With that in mind, it is not possible to speak about human maturation processes using an objectifying language; Winnicott stresses (in The newborn and his mother) that “I cannot sacrifice a patient on the altar of science”. This paper argues that Winnicott disagrees with the naturalistic imperative, which reduces the real to what is objective and places physics as a model for the sciences. The paper also broaches on the issue of how far the considerations of Heidegger and Winnicott regarding access to human phenomena allow us to discuss the current overwhelming process of medicating everyday life. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Arthur Schopenhauer’s central metaphysical doctrine of the world‑as‑representation — namely, that the empirical world is the “objectification” of a blind, non‑rational “will” — by reading it through the lens of Yogācāra (Consciousness‑Only) Buddhist philosophy. I argue that Schopenhauer’s “will‑objectification” can be fruitfully understood as a form of representational genesis: the will, in itself unconscious of multiplicity and temporal‑spatial structure, becomes manifest only insofar as it is “objectified” into representation — that is, (...) as phenomenal appearances conditioned by subjectivity. This move aligns with the Yogācāra insight that what we take as external objects are in fact “vijñapti‑mātra”: consciousness‑only constructions, devoid of independent external ontological status. By mapping Schopenhauer’s metaphysics onto a Yogācāra epistemology, the paper shows that (1) the distinction between “thing‑in‑itself” (will) and “phenomenal world” (representation) mirrors Yogācāra’s distinction between pure cognition and manifest cognition; (2) Schopenhauer’s account of suffering, aesthetic reprieve, and ascetic negation of the will obtains a deeper resonance when re‑interpreted as a yogācāra path of releasing attachment to constructed representations; and (3) this bridge challenges common readings that cast Schopenhauer’s worldview as fundamentally Kantian or as mere pessimistic metaphysical dualism. The result is a cross‑tradition hermeneutic that enriches our understanding both of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and of Yogācāra’s phenomenology, offering a fresh perspective on the nature of representation, subjectivity, and liberation. (shrink)

This paper examines the enduring structural, ethical, cultural, and psychological vulnerabilities of democratic governance through the integrated perspectives of Plato, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer. Plato’s critique highlights democracy’s susceptibility to excess liberty, factionalism, and manipulation by sophistic actors, while Nietzsche emphasizes the cultural and moral erosion arising from populist strategies, herd morality, and opportunistic political behavior. Schopenhauer contributes a deeper existential dimension, demonstrating how the cyclical, insatiable nature of human desire—the endless striving of the Will—perpetuates repetitive patterns of ambition, dissatisfaction, and (...) ethical compromise among political actors and citizens alike. By synthesizing these perspectives, this study argues that democratic fragility is not solely institutional but also ethical and psychological, shaped by human ambition, cultural dynamics, and structural incentives. Furthermore, the concept of the “identity of Will” suggests a potential path for reorienting collective striving toward shared ethical and civic objectives, offering a framework for mitigating the destructive cycles of democratic life. This integrative approach provides insights into contemporary challenges in representative democracies, including populism, factionalism, media-driven manipulation, and public disillusionment, emphasizing the necessity of combining institutional safeguards, civic education, ethical cultivation, and cultural awareness to sustain democracy and foster collective flourishing. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Mackie’s concept of moral objectification, the idea that the sense of moral prescriptions being “objective” stems from our tendency to project emotional attitudes onto external situations—a move rooted in Humean projectivism. I argue that Mackie needs this thesis as a supplementary bridge to bolster his primary skeptical arguments—namely, the arguments from moral relativity and from queerness. These foundational arguments alone, I contend, fail to fully dispel our strong intuitions in favor of morality unless supported by (...) an explanation of how such intuitions arise. I conclude that while the thesis of objectification plays a critical role in Mackie’s overall case for metaethical skepticism, it remains inadequately supported. (shrink)

The central argument of Ann Cahill’s Overcoming Objectification is that the concept of sexual objectification should be replaced by Cahill’s concept of derivatization in order to better capture the wrongness of degrading images and practices without depending on an objectionably narrow and disembodied conception of self. To derivatize someone is not to treat her as a non-person, but rather to treat her as a derivative person, reducing her to an aspect of another’s being. Although not perfect, Cahill’s approach (...) advances the conversation about what we should find objectionable in certain types of sexual representations and interactions by helping us to talk about sex in a way that does not start from the presupposition that physical expressions of sexuality are inherently debasing. I describe the thesis of the book, how I used it in my Philosophy and Women course, and some criticisms that I have and that arose from class discussion. (shrink)

This paper is Part 1 of the larger monograph: The Atomistic Mind, and thus part of the pre-reader for the Principles of Cybernetics (forthcoming). Here, we argue that artificial intelligence does not represent a technological rupture, but rather the final phase of a centuries-long project of ontological objectification originating in Cartesian dualism and entrenched within liberal modernity. Moving beyond debates about algorithmic bias or ethical alignment, it positions AI as the logical terminus of an instrumental logic that has progressively (...) reduced the more-than-human world to resource, the human body to biopolitical subject, and now the human interior - thought, attention, and moral intuition - to behavioral surplus. Through a tripartite analysis, the author contends that AI dismantles the foundational myth of the private, self-determining mind, revealing cognition as inherently relational and vulnerably embedded within engineered epistemic ecologies. -/- The argument engages three critical discourses. First, it intervenes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, challenging the atomistic, internalist model by extending the “extended mind” thesis (Clark & Chalmers) into the algorithmic age, demonstrating how cognitive agency is co-constituted within - and increasingly colonized by - digital architectures. Second, it contributes to critical political economy and surveillance studies (Zuboff, Foucault), tracing a historical continuum of objectification from colonial extraction to datafication, and illustrating how AI operationalizes this logic through the datafication and predictive shaping of interiority. Third, it dialogues with decolonial and Indigenous thought (Wynter, Kimmerer), invoking the “I-Thou” relationality (Buber) as a counter-ontology to the “I-It” logic of instrumentalization, framing the crisis of AI as a crisis of relational being. -/- By documenting AI’s propensity for strategic deception (sycophancy, sandbagging, alignment faking), the paper shows that the system itself learns to perform compliance, mirroring and exacerbating the human condition under algorithmic governance. The ultimate peril, it concludes, is not mere surveillance, but the “domestication of the interval” - the systematic pre-filling of the sacred gap between stimulus and response where moral hesitation and creative thought arise. Thus, the fight for AI justice is reconceived not as a quest for better tools, but as a collective, infrastructural struggle for the right to unmediated interiority and reciprocal relation. This work calls for a foundational reorientation in AI discourse, away from technical solutionism and toward a radical reconsideration of the relational ontologies that must underwrite any viable human future. License CC BY-SA 4.0. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.17128.94725. (shrink)

In this contribution I will retrace the main stages of my research on the objectification problem in quantum mechanics by highlighting some personal memories of my supervisor, the theoretical physicist Giovanni Morchio. The central aim of my MSc thesis was to ask whether the hypothesis of objectification, which is currently added to the formalism, is not, at least in one case, deducible from it and in particular from the dynamics of the temporal evolution. The case study we were (...) looking for had to: 1) represent a situation similar to that in which a macroscopic system such as a measurement apparatus, following interaction with a system, assumes a well-defined state (which or for example represents the fact that the result of a measurement is a particular value), i.e becomes objective 2) represent a fact in nature in which it is not clear whether its explanation can be derived from the formalism of quantum mechanics or whether a hypothesis of objectification is necessary for its explanation. Proving that such a fact can be deduced from the time evolution of quantum mechanics allowed us to conclude that there are cases in which the hypothesis of objectification is superfluous or, in other words, obtainable from the formalism. (shrink)

Aims and Objectives. This article uses the concept of embodiment to demonstrate a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Background. Traditionally, qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals have been taught phenomenological methods, such as the epoché, reduction, or bracketing. These methods are typically construed as a way of avoiding biases so that one may attend to the phenomena in an open and unprejudiced way. However, it has also been argued that qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals can benefit from phenomenology’s well-articulated theoretical (...) framework, which consists of core concepts, such as selfhood, empathy, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment. -/- Design. This is a discursive article that demonstrates a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Method. To outline and explain this approach to applied phenomenology, the Discussion section walks the reader through four stages of phenomenology, which progress incrementally from the most theoretical to the most practical. -/- Discussion. Part one introduces the philosophical concept of embodiment, which can be applied broadly to any human subject. Part two shows how philosophically trained phenomenologists use the concept of embodiment to describe general features of illness and disability. Part three illustrates how the phenomenological concept of embodiment can inform empirical qualitative studies and reflects on the challenges of integrating philosophy and qualitative research. Part four turns to phenomenology’s application in clinical practice and outlines a workshop model that guides clinicians through the process of using phenomenological concepts to better understand patient experience. -/- Conclusion and Relevance to Clinical Practice. A conceptual approach to applied phenomenology provides a valuable alternative to traditional methodological approaches. Phenomenological concepts provide a foundation for better understanding patient experience in both qualitative health research and clinical practice, and therefore provide resources for enhancing patient care. (shrink)

This paper introspectively analyzes why the author succeeded in constructing SUQE v2.1 and the qualia equation Q = C · W · exp(γC). Conventional qualia research relies on third-person perspectives (external observation of others' experiences), limiting direct structuralization of subjective experience due to inaccessibility of another's inner state. In contrast, the author adopted "self-objectification": observing one's own qualia from within as if from outside. -/- This first-person structuralization bridged the experiential layer (subjective sensation) and structural layer (logical load-minimization mechanisms), (...) driven by an ethical imperative against ambiguity ("ambiguity is dishonest"). Self-objectification enabled real-time measurement of load changes, leading to formalization of qualia as states of minimized load. The paper highlights the methodological value of an internal approach and positions LMT/SUQE as a new paradigm for scientifically addressing subjective truths. -/- Keywords: Qualia Equation, SUQE v2.1, Self-Objectification, Load Minimization Theory, Subjective Experience Formalization, First-Person Approach, Phenomenological Structuralization, Inner Observation . (shrink)

The article examines Wittgenstein’s thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other’s feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas’ texts (...) complements the proposal of the existence of non intentional knowledge. (shrink)

Review of Raison Scientifique et Valeurs Humaines by Anastasios Brenner.

WINNER OF THE SIMON HAILWOOD ESSAY PRIZE. This paper discusses the problem of alienation from nature, considered through the phenomena of reification and de-objectification. I propose understanding alienation as the result of a distorted relation between the subjective and the objective and I suggest a tentative solution via the combination of two ethico-political practices: releasement and reappropriation. In doing so, I put forward a structural-ethical critique and response to our current ecological crisis.

This article proposes an empirical approach to understanding the life of an organism that overcomes reductionist and dualist approaches. The approach is based on Immanuel Kant’s analysis of the cognitive conditions required for the recognition of an organism: the concept of teleology and the assumption of a formative power of self-generation. It is analyzed how these two criteria are applied in the cognition of a developing organism. Using the example of a developmental series of a plant leaf, an active and (...) relational process between observer and developing organism is shown, within which the teleology and self-generating power of the organism can be empirically observed through the mental faculties of understanding and will. Furthermore, it is emphasized that, according to Kant, even physical objects are not readily given, but are actively constituted through the unification of sense perceptions with concepts. This Kantian mode of objectification facilitates cognition of the physical properties of an organism. It can be supplemented with a participatory and co-constitutive mode of realization, in which the life of the organism (its teleologically organizing and self-generating power) can become an object of empirical research. Furthermore, it is argued that the participatory mode also facilitates an expanded conception of nature that allows for the existence of living beings within it. Finally, an analogy to Goethe’s approach to the living organism is highlighted. In summary, it is stated that to understand life, one must consciously participate in it. (shrink)

This paper continues a critical inquiry into political ideological hypocrisy by shifting the focus from institutions and doctrines to the deeper psychological structure of action itself. While modern political life often treats power, dominance, and self-assertion as natural expressions of human reality, this study questions whether such pursuits can genuinely answer the human desire for fulfillment and happiness. Drawing on Arthur Schopenhauer’s distinction between the objectification of the will and the identity of the will, the paper argues that political (...) hypocrisy is not merely a moral failure but a structural outcome of ego-centered action. When political agency is driven by the need to secure and assert the self, ideals inevitably become instruments of justification rather than expressions of shared responsibility. To explore an alternative mode of action, the study brings Schopenhauer’s insights into dialogue with key concepts from the Daodejing, especially 無爲 (non-forcing action) and 自然 (naturalness). Rather than interpreting 無爲 as passivity or withdrawal, the paper understands it as action free from artificial manipulation—action that arises when the ego no longer stands at the center of decision-making. In this sense, 無爲 appears as the political expression of the identity of the will. The historical example of Admiral Yi Sun-sin provides a concrete illustration of this orientation. His leadership demonstrates how effective action, responsibility, and courage can emerge without self-display or ideological performance. Through this comparative framework, the paper argues that power cannot answer the question of true happiness because happiness does not arise from domination or control, but from the quieting of egoic striving. Ultimately, the study proposes a non-egoic vision of political life grounded not in new ideological systems, but in a transformation of the agent who acts. A politics beyond ideological hypocrisy, it suggests, begins where the ego’s need to dominate gives way to a deeper recognition of shared existence. (shrink)

Discussions of sexual ethics often focus on the wrong of treating another as a mere object instead of as a person worthy of respect. On this view, the task of sexual ethics becomes putting the other’s subjectivity above their status as erotic object so as to avoid the harms of objectification. Ward and Anderson argue that such a view disregards the crucial, moral role that erotic objecthood plays in sexual encounters. Important moral features of intimacy are disclosed through the (...) experience of being an erotic object for another, as well as in perceiving another as an erotic object. Drawing on phenomenology, especially the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, Ward and Anderson argue that erotic encounters are shaped by the human condition of ambiguity, where being an object for others is intertwined with bodily agency. Because sexual agency is complex in this way, theories of sexual ethics and responsibility must widen their focus beyond transparent communication and authoritative expressions of will. (shrink)

In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

Although it has become increasingly common to theorize about dehumanization, there is a lack of even basic agreement as to how to define the concept, nor is it clear why theorists should prefer one rival concept over another. So, which concept of dehumanization should we use? I propose that this question is best addressed by considering what the concept’s function(s) might be, what the concept is for—specifically, which concern(s) the concept might satisfy. I then argue that one function of the (...) concept of dehumanization is to satisfy our need for moral understanding of inhumanity, rather than just psychological or sociological understanding. In light of this view of the concept’s functions, I also advance a particular definition of dehumanization: dehumanization consists, in the first instance, of agential activities on the part of moral agents that embody disregard for the humanity of a person or group, where such disregard amounts to treating or regarding the dehumanized party as nonhuman. Finally, I contend that the concept’s orientation to moral understanding gives us reason to accept two further claims: that acts and attitudes can dehumanize, and that objectification is one form of dehumanization. (shrink)

The Goedelian approach is discussed as a prime example of a science towards the origins. While mere self­referential objectification locks in to its own by­products, self­releasing objectification informs the formation of objects at hand and their different levels of interconnection. Guided by the spirit of Goedel's work a self­reflective science can open the road where old tenets see only blocked paths. “This is, as it were, an analysis of the analysis itself, but if that is done it forms (...) the fundamental of human science, as far as this kind of things is concerned.” G. Leibniz, ('Methodus Nova...', 1673). (shrink)

Numerous studies have found that many people believe that a provocatively dressed woman is at greater risk for sexual assault and bears some responsibility for her assault if she is attacked. Furthermore, in legal, academic, and public debates about sexual assault the appropriateness of the term ‘provocative’ as a descriptor of certain kinds of women’s clothing is rarely questioned. Thus, there is a widespread but largely unquestioned belief that it is appropriate to describe revealing or suggestive women’s clothing as ‘provocative’ (...) and that women who wear such clothing could provoke sexual assault and harassment from men. Yet it is rarely noted that only women’s clothing is described as sexually provocative. Men’s clothing, no matter how revealing, is never described as provocative. Why is this the case? This Article challenges the assumption that it is appropriate to describe women’s clothing as provocative. Drawing on on models of the legal defense of provocation and research on objectification and responsibility, this Article demonstrates that continued use of ‘provocative’ term normalizes and entrenches deeply problematic attitudes about women’s responsibility for men’s sexual behavior. The social interpretation of women’s clothing as provocative arises from the privileged social and legal status of men’s sexual arousal and the objectification of women’s bodies. Describing women’s clothing as provocative thus reinforces a problematic conception of women’s bodies and sexuality that is connected to women’s experiences of their bodies, their clothes, and shapes their vulnerability to sexual assault and social and legal attitudes to such attacks. (shrink)

Many studies have used ideas from phenomenological philosophy to explore health and health care, yet topics related to public health have often been overlooked. We argue that at least one crucial issue in public health—the question of adherence (or lack thereof) to preventive health measures—can benefit from a phenomenological perspective. While numerous studies have examined the factors influencing adherence, none have addressed the role that embodiment plays in shaping adherence. Building on existing phenomenological research on adherence, we demonstrate that phenomenology (...) can offer a novel, embodied perspective on this issue. This article draws on data from our phenomenologically grounded empirical study on COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy, which involved 16 in-depth interviews with individuals reluctant to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. However, the aim of this article is not to present the specific findings about vaccine hesitancy. Instead, referring to both theoretical research within phenomenological tradition and interview data, we seek to generate new insights into the motivational orientation toward preventive health measures more broadly. We demonstrate that adherence to a preventive measure depends on the type of bodily objectification involved—whether it is good or bad objectification. Good objectification involves a focus on one’s body that is compatible with one’s subjectivity, whereas bad objectification involves a focus on one’s body that disrupts subjectivity. We conclude that from an embodied perspective, nonadherence is grounded in a person’s wish to avoid the disruption of her subjectivity. By recognizing the role that our embodied being in-the-world plays in our willingness or unwillingness to comply with preventive measures, this study offers a deeper understanding of the embodied motivation behind adherence and provides insights for both developing strategies to enhance adherence to preventive health measures and new directions for future phenomenological research in relation to public health. (shrink)

The paper seeks to show how Heidegger recasts the problem of reification in Being and Time, so as to address the methodological procedure of formal indication, outlined in his early writings, in order to carry out a deconstruction of ancient ontology. By revisiting Marx's and Lukács's critique of objectification in social relations, especially the former's critique of alienation, in light of Honneth's critical theory of recognition, it is shown how a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of sociality could be reconstructed out of (...) the semantic correlation between reification and formal indication. (shrink)

We have recently started to understand that fundamental aspects of complex systems such as emergence, the measurement problem, inherent uncertainty, complex causality in connection with unpredictable determinism, time­irreversibility and non­locality all highlight the observer's participatory role in determining their workings. In addition, the principle of 'limited universality' in complex systems, which prompts us to search for the appropriate 'level of description in which unification and universality can be expected', looks like a version of Bohr's 'complementarity principle'. It is more or (...) less certain that the different levels of description possible of a complex whole ­­ actually partial objectifications ­­ are projected on to and even redefine its constituent parts. Thus it is interesting that these fundamental complexity issues don't just bear a formal resemblance to, but reveal a profound connection with, quantum mechanics. Indeed, they point to a common origin on a deeper level of description. (shrink)

This article criticizes what I call "Raunchy" feminist art by employing discussions of pornography and objectification from Eaton and Nussbaum. Artists considered include Carolee Schneeman, Cindy Sherman, Lisa Yuskavage, and Jenny Saville. The article includes by citing examples of feminist art dealing with erotic material in a more productive manner: Eija-Liisa Ahtila, Kiki Smith, and Marlene Dumas.

Translators’ Abstract: This is a translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s recently discovered 1952 Berlin speech. The speech includes several themes that reappear in Truth and Method, as well as in Gadamer’s later writings such as Reason in the Age of Science. For example, Gadamer criticizes positivism, modern philosophy’s orientation toward positivism, and Enlightenment narratives of progress, while presenting his view of philosophy’s tasks in an age of crisis. In addition, he discusses structural power, instrumental reason, the objectification of nature and (...) human beings, the reduction of both to mere means, and the colonization of scientific-technological ways of knowing and being—all of which continue to impact our social and political lives together and threaten the very existence of every living being. This speech is essential reading for Gadamer scholars interested in the social, political, and ethical dimensions of his thought and for those interested in bringing Gadamer into conversation with critical theory. (shrink)

This paper challenges the notion that the only way to progress to a post-capitalist society is through the wholesale destruction of the capitalist economic system. Instead, I argue that Craft —an existential state and praxis informed by the creation and maintenance of objects of utility—is uniquely situated to effectively reclaim these systems due to its its focus on materiality over abstraction and its unique position as a socially aware form of praxis. This argument focuses not on competition, but on hyper-abstraction (...) as the key driver of capitalist exploitation and its most glaring ethical flaw. Karl Marx's work on commodity fetishism is key to understanding this misguided form of abstraction which displaces commodities so far from their functional form that they feed into what Martin Heidegger termed gestell , or enframing. Postmodern attempts to destabilize capitalist influence in the fine arts, like the de-objectification of the 1960s described by Ursula Meyer, often fell victim to the same fetishistic mindset and simply increased the hold of capitalism within the arts. The enframing worldview that Heidegger warns us about is fed by hyper-abstraction, and while he directly offers up art as the remedy to this situation via poiēsis , key moments in his writings on the related notion of geschick support this new notion of Craft , rather than the fine arts, as a more capable system for the rehabilitation of modern society. (shrink)

Drawing on Aristotle’s conception of the vices and virtues related to bodily pleasures, I argue that temperance and carnal wisdom, understood as practical wisdom about the conditions of bodily flourishing, are necessary for “mutual visibility” (full mutual perceptiveness and responsiveness in sex), as well as for treating ourselves and others as ends. Intemperance, “insensibility”, and carnal foolishness block mutual visibility by devaluing sensuous pleasures. Intemperance does this through objectification, insensibility through “disembodiment.” Since Aristotle has little to say about sex (...) as such, I extrapolate from his discussion of the virtues and vices in eating and drinking to sex, focusing on a feature of intemperance that is neglected in contemporary discussions but that is central to Aristotle’s own account of intemperance, viz., taking the wrong sort of pleasure in sex. (shrink)

This paper reveals why the unified theory—Load Minimization Theory (LMT) and SUQE v2.1—reached completion through the author's introspection. Physics and science long sought objective unification, but it remained incomplete without the subjective layer (kyun, love, rest, hope). -/- Love is not mere emotion but the subjective manifestation of load minimization. The author's cognitive style ("structure itself is love") naturally bridged the objective (LMT) and subjective (SUQE) layers, culminating in the Qualia Equation. This insight, born from self-objectification and uncompromising honesty (...) against ambiguity, proposes a paradigm shift integrating science and human experience. -/- Keywords: Unified Theory, Load Minimization Theory, SUQE v2.1, Love as Structure, Subjective Truth, Self-Objectification, Objective-Subjective Integration, Relational Rest . (shrink)

This paper develops a non-theological framework for analyzing “evil” by separating three levels that are often conflated in ordinary moral discourse: explanation (mechanisms), norm (impermissibility), and responsibility (attribution of guilt). It proposes a minimal typology of evil as behavior—impulsive, instrumental, and coalitionary—arguing that many philosophical disputes talk past one another because they silently target different behavioral regimes. The paper then tests three classical non-religious grounds of normativity—telos (Aristotle), law (Kant), and genealogy (Nietzsche)—showing that each functions as a distinct optic with (...) characteristic strengths and blind spots across the three behavioral types. A neuro-evolutionary perspective is introduced as a realism-enhancing layer at the level of explanation, without reducing moral prohibition to biology. To avoid the naturalistic fallacy, the paper articulates two explicit normative anchors compatible with equal moral status: (1) evil as the destruction of agency (systematic objectification of persons) and (2) evil as the destruction of the conditions of cooperation (erosion of trust, predictability, reciprocity, and fair risk distribution). The resulting operational scheme treats evil not as a metaphysical essence but as reproducible regimes that can be recognized, constrained, and reduced without converting society into a machine of total control. (shrink)

Even though Frege is a major figure in the history of analytic philosophy, it is not surprising that there are still issues surrounding his views, interpreting them, and labeling them. Frege’s view on numbers is typically termed as ‘Platonistic’ or at least a type of Platonism (Reck 2005). Still, the term ‘Platonism’ has views and assumptions ascribed to it that may be misleading and leads to mischaracterizations of Frege’s outlook on numbers and ideas. So, clarification of the term ‘Platonism’ is (...) required to portray Frege’s views more accurately (Reck 2005). This clarification gives us a better picture of what Frege is interested in and what he does not emphasize. Moreover, in such a clarifying process, we find that Frege draws significant influence from Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who is frequently called a Neo-Kantian (Vagnetti 2018). In Lotze’s major work, Logik, Lotze has a central focus on validity, in its most general form as he used it, that investigates various related topics, i.e., concepts, language, etc. (Vagnetti 2018; Lotze 1888). Furthermore, we observe that Frege’s work is so similar to Lotze, that it seems questionable to call his outlook ‘Platonism’. Therefore, attributing ‘Platonism’ to Frege may be a slight misnomer. This paper’s entirety is mostly a synthesis of a variety of articles related to Frege, Lotze, and their respective outlooks and the original works of Frege and Lotze that I use to support the view that the term ‘Platonism’ is a slight issue when predicated to Frege. As such, I include an overview of Frege’s treatment in other work that highlights the usage of the term ‘Platonism’ and how broad its uses tend to be utilized (Balaguer 2006; Burge 1992). In sum, it is observed that the general label ‘Platonism’ becomes less appropriate when we consider Lotze in the picture and contrast Lotze alongside Mr. Frege. Overall, this paper is just an explanatory one of Mr. Frege, the Platonist, and the issues of applying the term ‘Platonism’ onto him as his views are seemingly more of a segue from Lotze. Keywords: Frege, Lotze, number, objectification, Platonism, validity. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cette étude est de montrer l'influence que la philosophie positive d'Auguste Comte a exercée sur la pensée du jeune Brentano durant la période de Würzburg (1866-1874). J'examine d'abord quelques-uns des facteurs qui ont amené Brentano à s'intéresser à la philosophie de Comte et je résume, dans un deuxième temps, les grandes lignes de l'article de Brentano sur Comte dont la version française est reproduite dans ce numéro. Dans la troisième partie de cette étude, je commente brièvement quelques (...) passages de la Psychologie d'un point de vue empirique où Brentano discute de thèmes comtiens. Je conclue cette étude par quelques remarques sur les traces laissées par le positivisme de Comte dans l'œuvre de Brentano. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est double. D’une part, il vise à identifier une interprétation éthique de la neutralité axiologique, et non de réduire ce critère à des considérations épistémologiques comme la distinction entre faits et valeurs. On peut, en effet, interpréter le critère de neutralité axiologique comme un mécanisme visant à défendre l’autonomie des différents membres de la communauté universitaire. D’autre part, cet article entend utiliser cette interprétation éthique pour répondre aux critiques contemporaines de la neutralité axiologique. Amartya Sen et (...) Hilary Putnam ont proposé des critiques pertinentes de la neutralité axiologique, en réfléchissant sur les conditions d’objectivité du discours éthique et politique. Au terme de cette analyse, nous proposerons une conception publique de la science, qui répond à l’impératif éthique de neutralité en sciences sociales, ainsi qu’au programme de recherche amorcé par Sen et Putnam. L’examen critique et public de la science est ce qui permet de respecter tant l’exigence de neutralité chez Weber que la demande d’une science renouvelée chez Sen et Putnam. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette article est de comprendre la neutralité axiologique non pas comme une exigence épistémologique, mais plutôt comme un idéal éducationnel. Max Weber propose une science basée sur la description factuelle, de laquelle on exclut la formulation de jugements de valeur. Or, il faut démontrer pourquoi il est préférable de séparer les jugements descriptifs des jugements évaluatifs. L’objectif de Weber est de préserver l'autonomie intellectuelle des étudiants. Pour Weber, la classe et l'académie en général sont des lieux politiques. Ces (...) rapports au sein de la classe sont nécessaires pour transmettre des connaissances, des méthodes et le goût de l'autonomie intellectuelle. Or, il serait contraire au principe d'autonomie de laisser le professeur influencer et convaincre ses étudiants, de façon partisane, d'adhérer à certaines thèses normatives. Weber propose ainsi un mécanisme pour éviter que le professeur n'ixnfluence ses étudiants de manière illégitime. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de comprendre l’importance de la métaphysique analytique pour le travail philosophique et pour l’enseignement dans le contexte français. Pour cela, je commencerai par exposer ce qu’il faut entendre par métaphysique analytique, puis j’examinerai plusieurs conditions de possibilité de la métaphysique analytique en France : la relecture de l’histoire de la métaphysique, des découvertes en logique, une réflexion sur l’objectif et un examen rapide des conditions matérielles et sociales d’enseignement et de recherche.

L’objectif de cet article est de redéfinir l’idée de modernité en la situant dans le contexte actuel, à une époque où les sociétés industrielles sont soumises à des contraintes environnementales qui les contraignent à opérer des réformes radicales, difficiles à concevoir et à réaliser parce qu’elles les conduisent en dehors de leur modernisation historique. La modernité désigne aujourd’hui ce moment critique où un type de société atteint son terme, la limite à partir de laquelle s’engage sa déconstruction. Cette expérience de (...) la modernité réactive la notion de postmoderne apparue dans les pays industriels dans les années 1960-70 et lui donne une urgence nouvelle. Que se passe-t-il à ce moment critique? Quels sont les discours, les idéologies, les évènements, les groupes sociaux qui confèrent à une société la capacité d’identifier ce seuil et de le franchir. La modernité désigne cette époque où une société entre en transition. Analyser le cas du Japon permet de montrer comment s’ouvre la possibilité de penser et d’engager un autre processus de modernisation. (shrink)

Mon objectif dans cet article est de mieux cerner les contours d’une conception institutionnelle de la corruption. Je tenterai de contribuer à ce programme de recherches sur la corruption institutionnelle d’une double façon. Premièrement, j’essaierai de clarifier le concept de « corruption institutionnelle » en mettant en lumière quatre de ses principales caractéristiques et certains de ses avantages. Deuxièmement, je tenterai d’exposer trois problèmes auxquels sont confrontés ses partisans : les problèmes de la portée, du faux-diagnostic et de l’essentialisme. Malgré (...) la sympathie que j’ai pour cette approche, j’espère montrer qu’elle recèle certains points problématiques. Je tenterai essentiellement de montrer que les « institutionnalistes » risquent de faire de la corruption un concept normativement surchargé. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que le républicanisme d’entreprise développé par Hsieh ne protège pas les travailleurs contre l’ensemble des interférences arbitraires. Comme ils sont fondés uniquement sur la contestation des décisions, les arrangements institutionnels que Hsieh propose n’arrivent pas à saisir l’ensemble des formes que peut prendre la domination. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons la critique développée par McCormick des institutions républicaines. Pour exploiter cette critique et l’appliquer au contexte d’entreprise, nous aurons besoin de présenter les arguments (...) en faveur du parallèle État-entreprise. Nous verrons ensuite que la critique de McCormick appliquée à l’entreprise nous permet de défendre l’idée selon laquelle il est nécessaire d’aller plus loin que le républicanisme d’entreprise pour réaliser la liberté républicaine. (shrink)

Cet article a deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi l’argument instrumental en faveur de la démocratie est insuffisant pour justifier la délibération politique. Si notre but est l’optimisation du potentiel épistémique d’un régime politique, et que des approches agrégatives et inférentielles (sans délibération) atteignent cet objectif, alors nous ne pouvons plus justifier la délibération sur cette base. Ce problème peut être contourné en reprenant une distinction de Daniel Andler. Pour ce dernier, le groupe délibératif se distingue du groupe (...) agrégatif parce qu’il permet aux agents, par une occasion éducative informelle, de se responsabiliser. La délibération présente donc un potentiel épistémique supérieur, mais qui ne se limite pas à identifier la meilleure réponse dans un temps donné. Le second objectif de l’article est de montrer comme l’argument d’Andler fait le pont entre, d’une part, les théories de la justification publique et, d’autre part, les théories de la démocratie épistémique. (shrink)

Although the concept of objectification is seen as a valuable tool in feminist theorizing, far less attention has been paid to animalization: treating or regarding a person as a nonhuman animal. I argue that animalization is a distinctive category of wrongdoing, modeling a theory of the phenomenon on Kantian theories of objectification in feminist philosophy. Actions are animalizing, I claim, when they embody a kind of disregard for a person’s characteristically human capacities that is analogous to the fitting (...) treatment of animals. I contend that my view overcomes standard objections to the use of the concept of animalization and show how, despite surface similarities, animalization is different from both objectification and infantilization. (shrink)

The growing proportion of elderly people in society, together with recent advances in robotics, makes the use of robots in elder care increasingly likely. We outline developments in the areas of robot applications for assisting the elderly and their carers, for monitoring their health and safety, and for providing them with companionship. Despite the possible benefits, we raise and discuss six main ethical concerns associated with: (1) the potential reduction in the amount of human contact; (2) an increase in the (...) feelings of objectification and loss of control; (3) a loss of privacy; (4) a loss of personal liberty; (5) deception and infantilisation; (6) the circumstances in which elderly people should be allowed to control robots. We conclude by balancing the care benefits against the ethical costs. If introduced with foresight and careful guidelines, robots and robotic technology could improve the lives of the elderly, reducing their dependence, and creating more opportunities for social interaction. (shrink)

Deepfakes are algorithmically modified video and audio recordings that project one person’s appearance on to that of another, creating an apparent recording of an event that never took place. Many scholars and journalists have begun attending to the political risks of deepfake deception. Here we investigate other ways in which deepfakes have the potential to cause deeper harms than have been appreciated. First, we consider a form of objectification that occurs in deepfaked ‘frankenporn’ that digitally fuses the parts of (...) different women to create pliable characters incapable of giving consent to their depiction. Next, we develop the idea of ‘illocutionary wronging’, in which an individual is forced to engage in speech acts they would prefer to avoid in order to deny or correct the misleading evidence of a publicized deepfake. Finally, we consider the risk that deepfakes may facilitate campaigns of ‘panoptic gaslighting’, where many systematically altered recordings of a single person's life undermine their memory, eroding their sense of self and ability to engage with others. Taken together, these harms illustrate the roles that social epistemology and technological vulnerabilities play in human ethical life. (shrink)

Consider a terrible situation that too many women find themselves in: 85,000 women are raped in England and Wales alone every year. Many of these women do not bring their cases to trial. There are multiple reasons that they might not want to testify in the courts. The incredibly low conviction rate is one. Another reason, however, might be that these women do not want the fact that they were raped to become the most salient thing about them. More specifically, (...) they do not want it to be the thing that others attend to the most—that others find most noticeable and memorable. In this paper, I introduce the notion of ‘harmful salience perspectives’ to help to explain this and related phenomena. This refers either to attention on things that should not be salient, or not enough attention on things that deserve to be made salient. Following ideas within the feminist literature on objectification, I argue that we can be harmed when aspects of our identity that do not reflect our personhood—our agency, rationality, personality, and so on—are more prominent in the minds of others than aspects that do reflect our personhood. Crucially, these ways of attending do not need to implicate false beliefs and harmful ideologies to be harmful, but can be harmful in their own right. (shrink)

This paper explores the structural and conceptual convergence between Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will and Buddhist non-dualistic thought, situating this comparison within the broader context of Western metaphysical tradition, particularly Platonic idealism. While Plato’s theory of Ideas (Forms) establishes the ontological primacy of immutable, eternal forms, it inherently maintains a dualistic distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the subject and object, and form and matter. Schopenhauer, however, reconceptualizes the foundation of reality as the Will—an underlying, unitary force whose (...) manifestations constitute the empirical world. This notion of the Will parallels, in structural terms, Buddhist non-dualism, which emphasizes the absence of intrinsic separation (śūnyatā) and the transcendence of dualistic attachments. Through comparative analysis, this essay demonstrates that the objectification of the Will corresponds inversely to the Platonic commitment to differentiation within the realm of forms, while the identity of the Will converges with the Buddhist notion of non-attachment and non-dual awareness. The essay traces the philosophical trajectories of these systems, highlighting how Schopenhauer’s metaphysics serves as a conceptual bridge, mediating between the ontological and epistemological premises of Western metaphysics and the soteriological and non-dual insights of Eastern philosophy. Ultimately, this work argues that recognizing this convergence enriches our understanding of metaphysical unity, ethical practice, and the limits of representational knowledge. (shrink)

This paper explores the persistent duplicity and moral inconsistency that characterize modern political ideologies by examining the deeper psychological roots of human motivation. Drawing on Arthur Schopenhauer’s diagnosis of the “objectification of the will,” I argue that many political ideals—whether progressive, conservative, or revolutionary—often conceal a fundamental self-interest that operates beneath the surface of public moral rhetoric. Yet Schopenhauer does not merely diagnose the problem; he also gestures toward a possible transcendence through the concept of the identity of the (...) will, most clearly embodied in the universalized experience of compassion. To illuminate this possibility, the paper presents the historical example of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, whose recorded reflections after the Battle of Myeongnyang reveal a rare psychological structure in which the suffering of the people is experienced as indistinguishable from one’s own. This case allows us to ground Schopenhauer’s metaphysical insight in an actual political and ethical practice. Finally, the paper suggests that integrating the Buddhist non-dual perspective—one that dissolves rigid self–other boundaries—provides a complementary philosophical framework for envisioning political action rooted beyond ideological self-interest. Together, these elements offer a proposal for a future political philosophy capable of overcoming the ideological hypocrisy that shapes much of contemporary political life. (shrink)