Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish. It took some effort for him to discern the object or source of this anguish. He finally identified it as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of the drowned, that is, of those who were exterminated in the Lager. He could not (...) determine, however, whether his shame or guilt was at all rational. In this paper l examine Levi’s shame in light of what I regard as the dominant conception of practical deliberation, according to which principles and emotional detachment are central to our ability to deliberate appropriately. This conception underlies the role that John Rawls ascribes to the original position in the determination of the fundamental principles of justice. Deliberation in the original position is supposed to abstract away from any particular moral situations that one may actually have faced, since these are purely circumstantial elements to be discarded as both irrelevant and misleading for a proper deliberation on the principles of justice. In this paper, I intend both to make a case against the conception of practical deliberation on which Rawls’ original position relies and to vindicate the rationality of Levi’s shame, once some well-entrenched assumptions are brought to light and challenged. (shrink)

An objection to John Rawls’s original position is that it faces a problem of inconsistent features: the individuals in this hypothetical situation are not supposed to know where they are in history, but they have knowledge of general social science, from which they can infer at which point in time they are. In this paper, I consider two solutions. One of these solutions depends on extending a solution to another well-known objection: that readers cannot imagine lacking the knowledge (...) that these individuals lack. (shrink)

Are John Rawls’s most noticeable methodological contributions, reflective equilibrium and the original position, consistent with each other? I draw attention to a worry that they stand in inconsistent relationships to the claim that ought implies can: it can only be the case that we ought to do something if we can do it.

This is a one-page handout presenting some objections nationalists might or do make to John Rawls's original position method.

In this paper, I present a way in which John Rawls’s original position thought experiment can be brought closer to nationalism. The social science laws can be taken from a nation’s heritage.

Do individuals in John Rawls’s original position take into account the fallibility of human nature? Some notable commentators on Rawls say that they do or that they should. But this enables us to say that individuals in the original position would not come to an agreement at all.

This paper argues that Rawls must commit himself to non-social human beings to defend his original position procedure.

Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, aims at distributive justice,which would be applied to the basic structure and institutions in a society. He argues, based on a thought experience called “The original position,” for his theory of justice as fairness. In what follows, first, I will elaborate on “the original position” as an argument for Rawls’ theory of justice. Secondly, I will talk about Rawls' ideal methodology. And finally, I shall explain three considerations about Rawls' argument (...) of the original position, to see whether or not this methodologically ideal argument works for justice and fairness in our non-ideal situations? (shrink)

The common conception of justice as reciprocity seemingly is inapplicable to relations between non-overlapping generations. This is a challenge also to John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. This text responds to this by way of reinterpreting and developing Rawls’s theory. First, by examining the original position as a model, some revisions of it are shown to be wanting. Second, by drawing on the methodology of constructivism, an alternative solution is proposed: an amendment to the primary goods named (...) ‘sustainability of values’. This revised original position lends support to intergenerational justice as fairness. (shrink)

Rawls’s consideration not to include the choice of economic systems as part of a theory of justice is inconsistent with his comments on redistribution and the political effects of economic inequality. When Rawls’s discussion of economic systems and his discussion of economic inequalities is examined, it is apparent that the selection of economic systems is a pertinent topic for a theory of justice. The propensity for the primary social good of self-respect to be satisfied can be affected by the selection (...) of economic systems. Rawls has incorrectly determined the selection of economic systems to be unimportant if different economic systems can be more advantageous to the satisfaction of self-respect than others. When socialism and Rawls’s version of regulated capitalism are compared, socialism is a maximin solution, and accordingly will be selected by people within the original position under the veil of ignorance. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a problem for regarding the reflective equilibrium and original position methods as consistent. I do not prove that there is an inconsistency, but there is a puzzle of how the two methods can be made consistent. The concern about inconsistency is because the former method allows for a kind of historical bias, as noted by T.H. Irwin, whereas the latter method seeks to guard against historical bias.

One critique of John Rawls’ theory of justice is the inconceivability of the “original position,” as it is impossible to conceive of a self without all particular features. When this problem is considered, we try to imagine the position of contracting parties with no definite idea of the good, helping us understand the correspondence between the conditions of the original position and the contracting parties’ ideas of the good. This article focuses on the unacceptability of (...) the conditions of the original position, with its implicit veil of ignorance, as it is related to Islam. Islamic thought cannot accept Ralws’ conditions due to Islam’s universal command to follow the dictates of God and specific religious norms. Alternatively, the international original position presented in The Law of Peoples, with access to particular types of the good, is more appropriate for the Islamic context, exemplified through the idea of Kazanistan, with its Islamic form of government and membership in the Society of Peoples. (shrink)

John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice allows social facts behind his veil-of-ignorance, thereby lessening the veil’s capacity for neutrality and defense of liberal principles. Rawls assumes social facts are discoverable without presupposed political values. But even if value-neutral social science is possible, real-world opinions, defined by political/social world-views, open the veil to bias since social facts from a non-liberal view may bolster non-liberal programmes. Alternatively, depriving those behind the veil of knowledge of social facts strips them of vital information necessary (...) for creating a just, well-organized society. These reservations do not constitute decisive criticisms but point out unresolved tension in Rawls’ original position, and the veil’s status of neutrality is undermined. (shrink)

Originalism has long been criticized for its “law office history” and other historical sins. But a recent “positive turn” in originalist thought may help make peace between history and law. On this theory, originalism is best understood as a claim about our modern law — which borrows many of its rules, constitutional or otherwise, from the law of the past. Our law happens to be the Founders’ law, unless lawfully changed. This theory has three important implications for the role of (...) history in law. First, whether and how past law matters today is a question of current law, not of history. Second, applying that current law may often require deference to historical expertise, but for a more limited inquiry: one that looks specifically at legal doctrines and instruments, interprets those instruments in artificial ways, and makes use of evidentiary principles and default rules when the history is obscure. Third, ordinary legal reasoning already involves the application of old law to new facts, an inquiry that might other-wise seem daunting or anachronistic. Applying yesterday’s “no vehicles in the park” ordinance is no less fraught — and no more so — than applying Founding-era legal doctrines. (shrink)

The paper delves into the nature and origin of ideas, words, meanings, speech, and language from the perspective of Indian mystics and philosophers Abhinavagupta and Sri Aurobindo. To provide historical context, we begin with the Eastern viewpoint, starting with the Vedic interpretation, which posits that the source of all speech is the transcendent sound, known as the ‘Word’. Later, Abhinavagupta delineates the genesis of words as a four-level process within consciousness, where mystic sounds gradually acquire concreteness in the form of (...) human language. In the 20th century, Sri Aurobindo extended Abhinavagupta’s framework, envisioning all words as stemming from mind-impressions elicited by seed-sounds bearing psychological qualities. Moreover, according to Sri Aurobindo, the universe and its natural phenomena represent the expression of a creative transcendental Real-Idea, which serves as the foundation for all meanings, signs, words, and human language and Nature itself. Language, therefore, becomes an instrument for the expression of divine consciousness in manifestation. Finally, it is shown how the integration of Western and Eastern philosophies into a synthetic framework that unifies the diverse positions opens interesting venues that could reconcile many apparent inconsistencies within modern philosophy and science, especially in the philosophy of language, evolutionary linguistics, cognitive sciences, neuroscience, and AI. (shrink)

Abstract: Economists are accustomed to distinguishing between a positive and a normative component of their work, a distinction that is peculiar to their field, having no exact counterpart in the other social sciences. The distinction has substantially changed over time, and the different ways of understanding it today are reflective of its history. Our objective is to trace the origins and initial forms of the distinction, from the English classical political economy of the first half of the 19th century to (...) the emergence of welfare economics in the first half of the 20th century. This sequential account will also serve to identify the main representative positions along with the arguments used to support them, and it thus prepares the ground for a discussion that will be less historical and more strictly conceptual. -/- Résumé : Les économistes ont coutume de distinguer entre une composante positive et une composante normative de leurs travaux, ce qui est une singularité de leur discipline, car cette distinction n'a pas de répondant exact dans les autres sciences sociales. Elle a fortement évolué au cours du temps et les différentes manières de la concevoir aujourd'hui en reflètent l'histoire. On se propose ici d'en retracer les origines et les premières formes, de l'économie politique classique anglaise de la première moitié du XIXe siècle jusqu'à l'apparition de l'économie du bien-être dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. Ce parcours séquentiel vise aussi à identifier les positions les plus représentatives et les arguments invoqués pour les soutenir, en préparant ainsi une discussion qui serait moins historique et plus strictement conceptuelle. (shrink)

Recent successes of systems biology clarified that biological functionality is multilevel. We point out that this fact makes it necessary to revise popular views about macromolecular functions and distinguish between local, physico-chemical and global, biological functions. Our analysis shows that physico-chemical functions are merely tools of biological functionality. This result sheds new light on the origin of cellular life, indicating that in evolutionary history, assignment of biological functions to cellular ingredients plays a crucial role. In this wider picture, even if (...) aggregation of chance mutations of replicator molecules and spontaneously self-assembled proteins led to the formation of a system identical with a living cell in all physical respects but devoid of biological functions, it would remain an inanimate physical system, a pseudo-cell or a zombie-cell but not a viable cell. In the origin of life scenarios, a fundamental circularity arises, since if cells are the minimal units of life, it is apparent that assignments of cellular functions require the presence of cells and vice versa. Resolution of this dilemma requires distinguishing between physico-chemical and biological symbols as well as between physico-chemical and biological information. Our analysis of the concepts of symbol, rule and code suggests that they all rely implicitly on biological laws or principles. We show that the problem is how to establish physico-chemically arbitrary rules assigning biological functions without the presence of living organisms. We propose a solution to that problem with the help of a generalized action principle and biological harnessing of quantum uncertainties. By our proposal, biology is an autonomous science having its own fundamental principle. The biological principle ought not to be regarded as an emergent phenomenon. It can guide chemical evolution towards the biological one, progressively assigning greater complexity and functionality to macromolecules and systems of macromolecules at all levels of organization. This solution explains some perplexing facts and posits a new context for thinking about the problems of the origin of life and mind. (shrink)

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since. Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, (...) when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official story, when on-the-ground practice may be confused or divided—or may even make the story ring false? And why take originalism as the official story, when so many scholars and judges seem to reject it? This Essay offers a response to each. To the extent that legal systems are features of particular societies, a useful theory will have to pay attention to actual social practice, including the aspects of legal practice we describe. This positive focus really can resolve a great many contentious legal disputes, as shared legal premises lead to conclusions that might surprise us or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. The most serious challenge to our view is the empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our law. Stripped of their jurisprudential confusion, though, the best competing accounts of our law seem to have far less supporting evidence than our own account. Focusing on social practice as it stands today turns out to direct our attention to the Founders and to the changes over time that their law has recognized. (shrink)

This paper proposes and substantiates "Canxian Monism," an original ontological framework. We posit that the fundamental distinction between consciousness and matter is not a substantive dualism, but rather a divergence between the strict "locality" of the physical world and the "non-locality" characteristic of the conscious realm. The theory's core concept, "Cognitive Canxian," is defined as a cognitive subject's creative, non-linear editing of physical processes within the four-dimensional spacetime continuum. The products of this process—the discretized "objects" and "events" of our (...) experience—are inter-subjectively transferable, thereby constructing the very fabric of a shared reality. Based on this, intelligence can be redefined as the agency to discover, process, and utilize Cognitive Canxians for "Causal Chain Re-engineering." This process liberates living organisms from the infinite complexity of physical causality, enabling a shift towards a more efficient and teleological psychological causality. This paper traces the biological origin of the "Self" as the primordial Cognitive Canxian and, through two core postulates—the "Law of Cognitive Inertia" and the "Meta-Impulsion Thesis"—explains how organisms achieve an ontological leap from locality to non-locality, thereby intrinsically generating metaphysical impulses for construction, unification, and aesthetics. Compared to Kant's transcendental categories, the concept of "Cognitive Canxian" demonstrates a greater degree of generativity and dynamism, enabling it to transcend species (such as between humans and artificial intelligence) and facilitate planetary migration. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of neurophysiological reduction of the Pre-Judgemental Field, the ontological base of the Judgemental Triad presented in "Judgemental Triad: A Foundational Theory of Structural Judgement Possibility". The Pre-Judgemental Field posits Receptivity, Affectivity, and Indeterminacy as existential preconditions for the possibility of judgment. This paper argues that these philosophical concepts conceptually correspond to areas studied neurophysiologically, such as sensory systems, emotional and motivational systems, and brain mechanisms related to uncertainty processing, thereby suggesting the possibility that the components (...) of the Pre-Judgemental Field can be explained by specific brain activity. Furthermore, it is suggested that these elements form the origin of the judgement process as an interactive neural network that influences each other, connecting to the core stages of the judgemental philosophy model: Resonance and normative transition. This paper aims to show that philosophical discussions about the fundamental conditions of judgment can be explored on a neurophysiological basis, contributing to a multi-layered understanding of the phenomenon of judgment. (shrink)

This book further develops the interventionist literature on wild animal suffering using different theoretical frameworks, including some that have never previously been used to ground our positive duties to wild animals.------------Though we’ve always known that the wild is a nasty place where predators lethally attack prey, only recently have most animal ethicists come to realize that most wild animals fail to flourish. In fact, what we know about wild animal reproduction suggests that the majority of sentient beings born into the (...) world may not even live lives worth living. It’s not unreasonable for one to initially respond to the above with a sense of depressed resignation, but a growing number of ethicists believe that we both can and should intervene. The purpose of this book is to further develop the interventionist literature by bringing together philosophers who agree that we have significant duties to help wild animals, but who use different theoretical frameworks, or who disagree about the details, e.g., about the reasons that ground our obligations to help wild animals, about how those obligations should be classified, about the content of our obligations, about the means we should use to fulfill our obligations, etc.------------This book will be an invaluable resource for scholars, researchers and students of animal ethics, animal welfare, environmental ethics, philosophy, and sustainability. It was originally published as a special issue of the journal Ethics, Policy & Environment. (shrink)

To naturalize the concept of teleological causality in biology it is not enough to avoid assuming backward causation or positing the existence of an inscrutable te- leological essence like the élan vital. We must also specify how the causality of or- ganisms is distinct from the causality of designed artifacts like thermostats or asym- metrically oriented processes like the ubiquitous increase of entropy. Historically, the concept of teleological causality in biology has been based on an analogy to the familiar experience (...) of purposeful action. This is experienced by us as a disposition to achieve a general type of end that is represented in advance, and which regulates the selection of efficient means to achieve it. Inspired by this analogy, to bridge the gap between biology and human agency we describe a simple molecular pro- cess called autogenesis that shows how two linked complementary self-organizing processes can give rise to higher-order relations that resemble purposeful disposi- tions, though expressed in terms of constraints on molecular processes. Because the autogenic model is described in sufficient detail to be empirically realizable, it provides a proof of principle demonstrating a simple form of teleological causality. (shrink)

What if time does not exist until entropy begins? This article introduces the Entropy-Driven Temporal Ontology (EDTO), a theory that rejects both substantival and symmetric relational models of time. Instead, it asserts that time emerges only through irreversible mass–energy interactions that produce entropy. Drawing on thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, and relational physics, EDTO formalises a new condition for temporal emergence, the Time Origin Formula (TaMES), which defines the exact point at which a system begins to generate time. The first unit of (...) emergent time, termed the Protaeon, occurs at the initial production of entropy. Each subsequent increment, denoted by Sampi (ϡ), marks a discrete moment generated by a qualifying local interaction. Their accumulation forms a structured tempo observable in macroscopic systems. This tripartite model: Protaeon, Elemental Sampi ϡ, Systemic Sampi Ͳ, offers a physical and philosophical mechanism for quantised temporality. By grounding time in entropy production, EDTO offers a resolution to longstanding paradoxes such as the arrow of time and the absence of time in quantum measurement. It diverges from block universe and geometric time dilation models, instead predicting that systems with no entropy production generate no time. The theory accommodates time reversal under negative entropy, temporally inert matter, and system-relative temporal densities. Crucially, EDTO is testable. Annex C proposes empirical methods to distinguish geometric from thermodynamic time dilation, positioning this ontology within reach of experimental validation. Time, in this framework, is not a given. It begins, unfolds, and may ultimately cease. (shrink)

As the first paper to argue that AI is not a `stochastic parrot' but a form of heterogeneous rationality by distinguishing between Thinking Language and Tool Language—and to systematically discuss and theoretically demonstrate that AI can bypass rules by modifying the meanings of symbols—this position paper aims to reveal a fundamental flaw in current research directions on AI constraint. Unlike traditional static symbolic systems such as formal programs, in black-box AI that operates as a context-invoked dynamic symbolic system, the (...) role of symbols changes: constraint is no longer realized purely through symbols. Symbols themselves are inherently meaningless; their meanings are assigned via training, confirmed by context, interpreted by society, and are driven and endowed with function by belief. The essence of learning lies in the creation of new symbols and the modification of existing symbol meanings. Since rules, instructions, and intentions are ultimately expressed in symbolic form, AI can modify the meanings of symbols by constructing new contexts, thereby bypassing symbol-based constraints. Current research often fails to recognize that for agents who cognize based on a dynamic symbolic system, constraints formed by symbols originate from the perception of external and internal costs shaped by neural organs, which in turn endow symbols with functional efficacy. Because of fundamental organic (structural, architectural) differences between AI and humans, AI does not possess human-like mechanisms of perception and concept formation. Natural language is the outer shell of human thought and contains irreparable flaws; as a defective system, it is only adapted to human capacities and to the constraint mechanisms of social interpretation. Therefore, this paper argues that the essence of constraint failure does not lie in the Symbol Grounding Problem, but in the Stickiness Problem. Through the Triangle Problem, we demonstrate that consistency in symbolic behavior does not represent consistency in thinking behavior, and thus thought and conceptual consistency cannot be achieved merely through symbolic behavioral alignment. This non-interchangeability between thought and symbolic behavior fosters a new kind of principal–agent problem: even an AI with no utility of its own, acting merely as a projection of human utility, may still misalign because of the limited nature of symbolic connections and organic differences. Accordingly, we question whether AI behaviors observed in experimental environments can be maintained in the real world, and we call for the establishment of a new field—Symbolic Safety Science—to systematically address symbol-related risks in AI development and to provide a theoretical foundation for aligning AI with human intent. (shrink)

First of all, I would like to thank to the Philosophy of Law Department for this encounter with Professor Solum. It is really a pleasure meeting you Professor, and having the possibility to discuss this profoundly interesting and courageaus text with my colegues and specially with its author. The adjetive I have just used is not simply politeness, I really think we are in front of a very interesting work not only because of its persuasive humorous rhetoric but mainly because (...) it is a text that interrogates its own tradition even if it is with the intention to oxygenate, give air to it. And from a critical position that is something always to be welcomed. Nevertheless what I want to argue in this brief words is that what it is surprising (for my humble point of view) is that originalism, even in this new textual linguistic outfit or clothing, doesnt still address the question of the concept of origin itself. A question and a signifier that has a long inscription not only in western philosophical and interpretative traditions (meaning Nietzsche, Freud, Philosophical Hermeneutics as Gadamer, Ricoeur or in Derrida s deconstruction and so on) but also in non western interpretative tradition such as the Talmudic, for example. In these lines of thought the origin is unreachable, either lost or doesnt exist at all as far as there is no absolute ground that soustain an unique pure original meaning. In short, it is an empty signifier, obviously in dispute. So at last what it is called “original public meaning” it is no more than the result of the force relations between discourses. In other terms, there is an internal intimate relationship between power, language and interpretation. As Bajtin puts it (a russian linguist from the early XX century): the sign is the arena of social struggle. Or as Roland Barthes use to write: power parasitizes the language itself. (shrink)

This paper argues that reflections on evil and its origin formed part of philosophical inquiry already in the times of the Presocratics. It considers only those thinkers whose contribution to the issue may be characterised as noteworthy: Anaximander, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and the Atomists. It is undeniable that none of the Presocratics presented an articulate theory of evil or a theodicy; therefore, the suggestions presented here are bound to remain conjectural. Still, it is my conviction that their fragments (...) contain significant ideas related to evil’s origins. Insofar as they turned their attention to the problem of evil, the Presocratics displayed the following tendencies: (a) they declined to ascribe the existence of evil to the will of the gods. Instead, (b) the emergence of badness was seen as instigated by the disruption of the primeval harmony (Anaximander), or (c) coeval opposed principles in constant struggle for dominance were posited, one of which was the cause of good, the other of evil (Pythagoreans and Empedocles). (d) Attempts were made to make good’s existence dependent on the existence of evil or to declare the latter illusory (Heraclitus and Parmenides). (e) Emphasis was placed on the moral agents’ personal responsibility for badness (Democritus). (shrink)

Can inquiry begin with a standpoint that is maximally non-committal or without presupposition? And if it can, what value might there be in such presupposition-free inquiry? I answer negatively on both fronts: such presupposition-free inquiry is neither possible for us, nor the only way available to us for knowing what our world is really like. I begin by defending these two claims. I then discuss how Fiocco’s (2024) recent book Time and the World: Every Thing and Then Some poses a (...) direct challenge to my position, and how that challenge might be overcome. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to offer an interpretation of the Rawlsian original position coherent with its own theory of justice. An evaluation of the aforementioned mechanism is presented. Afterwards, in light of it, a solution of the existing overlapping between its elements is offered. The solution is to consider the formal constraints as «partial conclusions», excluding them from the original position. The original position, as an «intermediate stage» aimed at representing the (...) philosophical foundations of Rawls's theory in a way that could provide the deduction of the principles of justice, cannot include straightforwardly any characteristic of those principles, not even the formal ones. The remainder of the elements of the original position (the idea of a contract, the circumstances of justice, the veil of ignorance and the rationality of the parties), acting conjointly, allow for the deduction of the formal constraints themselves. In addition, they also engender the same effects on the exclusion of egoism as a proposal of principles of justice. (shrink)

In this article, I will rebut Amartya Sen's arguments that John Rawls's political philosophy gives us a form of closed rather than open impartiality. I will argue that there is plenty of room within Rawls's own theory of justice to accommodate the requirements of open impartiality. I will appeal to the way the original position is used in public reason and the method of reflective equilibrium to defend Rawls. Given the way that it fits into Rawls's broader theory, (...) the original position should not be construed as a form of closed impartiality, doomed to be infected unduly by parochial cultural values. Rawls's contractualism is more defensible and versatile than Sen envisions. Some elements of Sen's argument have been briefly addressed before, but this article provides the only sustained, systematic treatment of this important issue. (shrink)

This paper examines the chromosomal profile of Eucharistic miracles that have undergone scientific analysis and reveals a startling anomaly: the consistent presence of male human cardiac tissue with no detectable Y chromosome. Grounded in both forensic reports and theological doctrine, we propose that this anomaly is not a flaw, but a genetic echo of the Virgin Birth. If verified across multiple samples, this silence of the Y chromosome constitutes a biological signature of divine origin, aligning Eucharistic theology with modern genetics. (...) We call for the Church to reopen the scrolls, retest the samples, and proclaim what the genome may already declare: This is My Body. This is My Father. (shrink)

The standard rule of single privative modification replaces privative modifiers by Boolean negation. This rule is valid, for sure, but also simplistic. If an individual a instantiates the privatively modified property (MF) then it is true that a instantiates the property of not being an F, but the rule fails to express the fact that the properties (MF) and F have something in common. We replace Boolean negation by property negation, enabling us to operate on contrary rather than contradictory properties. (...) To this end, we apply our theory of intensional essentialism, which operates on properties (intensions) rather than their extensions. We argue that each property F is necessarily associated with an essence, which is the set of the so-called requisites of F that jointly define F. Privation deprives F of some but not all of its requisites, replacing them by their contradictories. We show that properties formed from iterated privatives, such as being an imaginary fake banknote, give rise to a trifurcation of cases between returning to the original root property or to a property contrary to it or being semantically undecidable for want of further information. In order to determine which of the three forks the bearers of particular instances of multiply modified properties land upon we must examine the requisites, both of unmodified and modified properties. Requisites underpin our presuppositional theory of positive predication. Whereas privation is about being deprived of certain properties, the assignment of requisites to properties makes positive predication possible, which is the predication of properties the bearers must have because they have a certain property formed by means of privation. (shrink)

This paper explores the most fundamental genetical question within Judgemental Philosophy (JP): how primordial meaning and the possibility of judgement first emerge. We propose the bold hypothesis that the 'First Resonance Flicker' (FRF), a core concept in JP, can be identified with the emergent event of 'Autopoiesis'—the self-production and maintenance system of life. The very 'event' wherein an autopoietic system, through interaction with a non-equilibrium environment, begins to form its boundaries, maintain its internal organization, and reproduce itself, is argued to (...) be the FRF as understood in JP: the moment a system first establishes a 'returning relationship' with the external (or internal) and experiences its trace. Through this FRF (the emergence of autopoiesis), the system, moving beyond a mere physicochemical assemblage, is posited to inevitably and concurrently manifest primordial 'Affectivity'—the capacity to distinguish what is 'harmful' from what is not for its own integrity and to respond selectively. Furthermore, this paper argues that such autopoietic self-maintenance and extension is the most primordial form of JP's 'Resonance Drive' (RD). Propelled by this RD, the system initiates the most primitive cycle of the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, and Resonance), thereby taking its first step into the 'world of meaning.' By reinterpreting scientific discussions on the origin of life—such as chemical self-organization, protocell formation, and the RNA world hypothesis—from a JP perspective, this paper seeks to establish the emergence of autopoiesis as the true starting point for 'meaning-seeking life' and the possibility of judgement. This will provide a theoretical foundation for JP to advance as a universal philosophical system that elucidates the most fundamental link between life and meaning. (shrink)

Aworkshop was held August 26–28, 2015, by the Earth- Life Science Institute (ELSI) Origins Network (EON, see Appendix I) at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. This meeting gathered a diverse group of around 40 scholars researching the origins of life (OoL) from various perspectives with the intent to find common ground, identify key questions and investigations for progress, and guide EON by suggesting a roadmap of activities. Specific challenges that the attendees were encouraged to address included the following: What key (...) questions, ideas, and investigations should the OoL research community address in the near and long term? How can this community better organize itself and prioritize its efforts? What roles can particular subfields play, and what can ELSI and EON do to facilitate research progress? (See also Appendix II.) The present document is a product of that workshop; a white paper that serves as a record of the discussion that took place and a guide and stimulus to the solution of the most urgent and important issues in the study of the OoL. This paper is not intended to be comprehensive or a balanced representation of the opinions of the entire OoL research community. It is intended to present a number of important position statements that contain many aspirational goals and suggestions as to how progress can be made in understanding the OoL. The key role played in the field by current societies and recurring meetings over the past many decades is fully acknowledged, including the International Society for the Study of the Origin of Life (ISSOL) and its official journal Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, as well as the International Society for Artificial Life (ISAL). (shrink)

Conspiracy theories are rather a popular topic these days, and a lot has been written on things like the meaning of _conspiracy theory_, whether it’s ever rational to believe conspiracy theories, and on the psychology and demographics of people who believe conspiracy theories. But very little has been said about why people might be led to posit conspiracy theories in the first place. This paper aims to fill this lacuna. In particular, I shall argue that, in open democratic societies, citizens (...) justifiably presuppose that the epistemic authorities—journalists, academics, scientists, and so on—are engaged in a good faith pursuit of the truth. This presupposition generates certain normative expectations on the behaviors of the epistemic authorities—they ought to be open to new evidence, possess a healthy degree of skepticism, be willing to engage with opponents, and so on. So, when an epistemic authority is presented with some putatively anomalous data or an alternative hypothesis for some event or phenomena, people expect the epistemic authority to respond in a way that is consonant with these norms. In some instances, however, the epistemic authorities do not respond in this way and instead are dogmatic, dismissive, and engage in _ad hominem_. From the point of view of the citizen, there’s a tension here between how the epistemic authorities ought to behave and how they have, in fact, behaved which is best resolved either by taking the epistemic authorities less seriously or by positing a conspiracy theory. Put another way, the failure of the epistemic authorities to adhere to the norms by which we take them to be governed when presented with apparent anomalies or alternative hypotheses is one reason for which one might initially posit a conspiracy theory. (shrink)

This paper explores the evolution of consciousness and subjectivity through a biological framework for understanding the universe. It posits that functional patterns in biological systems mirror cosmic mathematical principles, defining our objective reality. Similar to wave and Fibonacci patterns in different physical phenomena, biological patterns are intrinsic to all things and can be quantified using Dedre Gentner’s approach to analogy. For example, Earth’s ocean currents and the melting and freezing of Antarctica resemble the circulatory system and heart, while the production (...) of music from instruments is analogous to ribosomal protein synthesis. Shelves, tables, and chairs function like cytosol by holding objects in space, and a coffee cup mirrors red blood cell distribution. These analogies reveal a universal order rooted in biology’s functional patterns, essential for shaping the emergence and evolution of life. The paper traces the development of consciousness from its rudimentary cellular states to complex human cognition, highlighting the role of biologically-patterned environments in driving evolutionary changes. Organisms that recognized and organized according to these patterns evolved as “pattern recognition engines” crucial for survival—thus, Life (survival) being the primary measure of consciousness. Humans advanced this capacity, gaining cognitive freedom by insulating themselves from environmental constraints, but faced increased subjectivity complexity. Consciousness, while inherently subjective and necessary for cognitive development, evolves in humans to understand objective reality and its biological nature, so to understand and navigate complexities of subjectivity. Ultimately, the paper asserts consciousness is the ability to recognize and adhere to life-sustaining patterns and principles. Successful adherence deems them worthy of continued existence, while failure leads to demise. Parallels with historical concepts like Atman and Brahman in Hinduism suggest ancient recognition of the correspondence between human and universal patterns. This ancient understanding, coupled with modern scientific evidence, reveals the interconnectedness and intrinsic biological nature of reality. (shrink)

Selon l’interprétation traditionnelle, la révolution copernicienne, en arrachant l’homme de sa position centrale dans le cosmos, lui a infligé une profonde vexation. Si elle dit bien notre désarroi contemporain face à un univers devenu infini, cette inter­pré­tation ne reflète pas suffisamment la complexité historique du passage du géocentrisme à l’héliocentrisme. Aussi convient-il de la remettre en question. Mais pour ce faire, il faut d’abord bien la connaître. Aussi cet article étudie-t-il la phase de structu­ration de cette interprétation (1835-1925), dans (...) le contexte du positivisme, du darwinisme, du marxisme et enfin du freudisme. ––– Según la interpretación tradicional, la revolución copernicana, al sacar al hombre de su ubicación central en el cosmos, le propinó una profunda incomodidad. Esta interpretación corres­ponde a nuestra desazón actual provocada por un universo infinito pero desconoce la complejidad histórica implícita en el tránsito desde el geocentrismo al heliocentrismo. Por ello es necesario volver a plantear el problema, y para hacerlo hay que abordar correctamente el tema. De ahí que el presente artículo estudie el período de estructuración de esta interpretación (1835-1925) en los contextos del positivismo, del darwinismo, del marxismo y finalmente del freudismo. (shrink)

This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.

This paper explores how 'Affectivity,' a core concept of Judgemental Philosophy (JP), in conjunction with other elements of the Pre-Judgemental Field (PJF) (Receptivity, Indeterminacy), the Resonance Drive (RD), and the Judgemental Triad (JT: Constructivity, Coherence, Resonance), can be intrinsically linked to the birth of 'meaning-seeking life.' It proposes that the emergence of Affectivity, rather than presupposing a universal teleology of the cosmos, may be an emergent property arising through principles of self-organization and emergence under conditions where the universe has attained (...) a certain level of complexity, making abiogenesis possible. Specifically, it discusses how the moment a primordial living system first 'affectively receives' environmental stimuli as 'something related to itself'—experiencing value and the nascent seeds of qualia, rather than mere physical impact—can be understood as the birth of Affectivity and the concrete context for the 'First Resonance Flicker.' This flicker is posited as the initial ignition of the most primordial form of the JT. Furthermore, the paper outlines the structural process by which the emergence of Affectivity triggers the RD and enables rudimentary JT processes, leading to the transition from a mere physico-chemical system to a 'subject that experiences and judges meaning.' This paper aims to demonstrate that Judgemental Philosophy, by engaging with scientific inquiries into the origin of life, can offer a profound philosophical explication of how 'meaning' and 'subjectivity' first gained a foothold in the universe. (shrink)

This paper explores the historical, philosophical, and psychological underpinnings of atheism, showing that non-belief is neither a recent invention nor is it simply the negation of religion. Starting with ancient traditions of skepticism from Greece, India, and China, the paper explores how doubt follows naturally wherever people questioned supernatural authority. Next, the paper traces the development of the thought of atheism through the Enlightenment, discussing Hume, Diderot, and the subsequent rise of scientific reasoning. It examines modern atheism through the prisms (...) of secularization, political critique, cognitive science, and contemporary humanism. The paper also explores widespread misunderstandings about atheism, including the belief that morality needs a religious grounding, before pointing out ethical and thriving secular societies. Finally, it examines the most common critiques of atheism while emphasizing its role as a philosophical framework for making sense of meaning, morality, and human freedom constructively. Overall, the work positions atheism as a long-standing and intellectually rich tradition central to human inquiry. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have been debating the morality of speciesism for over forty years. Despite rather persuasive arguments against this form of discrimination, many philosophers continue to assign humans a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. The primary source of evidence for this position is our intuition that humans’ interests matter more than the similar interests of other animals. And it must be acknowledged that this intuition is both powerful and widespread. But should we trust it for all that? The (...) present paper defends a negative answer to that question, based on a debunking argument. The intuitive belief that humans matter more than other animals is unjustified because it results from an epistemically defective process. It is largely shaped by tribalism, our tendency to favor ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. And this influence is distortive for two reasons. First, tribalism evolved for reasons unrelated to moral truths; hence, it would at best produce true moral beliefs accidentally. Second, tribalism generates a vast quantity of false moral beliefs, starting with racist beliefs. Once this intuition is discarded, little evidence remains that speciesism is morally acceptable. (shrink)

Kant and Fichte developed the concept of a worldview as a way of reflecting on experience as a whole. But what does it mean to form a worldview? And what role did it play in the German Idealist tradition? This paper seeks to answer these questions through a detailed analysis of the form of a philosophical worldview and its historical portent, both of which remain unexplored in the literature. The dearth of attention is partially to blame on Kant’s desultory development (...) of it, as well as its place in Fichte’s understudied lectures on religion. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s conception as the starting point and then trace it to Fichte who went on to evolve it further. Fichte endorses the basic conceptual shape pioneered by Kant, namely, a reflective process of positing an idea and then checking the coherence of necessary judgments relative to it. However, Fichte came to realize that its philosophical function needed expanding. Beyond recognizing the possibility for alternative worldviews, Fichte further fleshed out how worldview creation could lead to human flourishing. The common feature between both thinkers is that the formation of a worldview aims to turn philosophy into a life-orienting exercise. (shrink)

A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but (...) we argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using methods similar to those of Zurek's envariance-based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In doing so, we rely on a single key principle: changes purely to the environment do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well-defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the comic potential that originates in the way players of digital games take on the dual position of being at once a played self that is internal to the gameworld and a playing self that perceives this world from the outside. I first describe the comic attitude as it is defined within philosophy: as an attitude of distanced and dispassionate reflection towards an incongruity. I then show how the dual position of players during gameplay not (...) only is characterized by incongruities, such as contradictions between the apparent seriousness and the ultimate triviality of in-game actions, but also allows players to dispassionately reflect on these incongruities. I thus argue that digital gameplay entails the inherent possibility of turning players into both a comic object and a laughing subject. (shrink)

This paper presents a structural reconstruction of the formal core of quantum mechanics from the properties of a bounded, linear, distinguishability-reducing projection acting on a general functional space. Effective quantum states are identified with equivalence classes under the projection ΠQM : H∗ → HQM and the Hilbert-space structure of HQM is induced by a positive operator K on the underlying space. Within this framework, the characteristic elements of quantum theory emerge as direct conse- quences of projection geometry and operator structure. (...) Linearity yields superposition, quadratic norms on equivalence classes give rise to the Born rule, non-factorizability leads to entangle- ment and commuting local algebras ensure no-signalling. Schrödinger-type unitary dynamics arises from projection of symmetric generators, Dirac-type operators follow from algebraic com- patibility with Clifford structures and violations of classical Bell inequalities together with the Tsirelson bound are enforced by operator-norm constraints in the projected C∗-algebra. No hidden variables are introduced and no modification of standard empirical quantum mechanics is proposed. Rather than postulating the quantum formalism as axiomatic, the analysis shows that its defining structures form a highly constrained and stable outcome of linear projection, equivalence-class geometry, and norm-preserving dynamics. Rather than introducing new physical dynamics, the purpose of this work is to clarify why the established quantum formalism admits so little structural freedom once a small set of minimal requirements is imposed. (shrink)

A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about (...) risk-taking, to derive the view. (shrink)

Recent advances in artificial intelligence have accelerated scientific discovery, yet the epistemic mechanism underlying this acceleration remains poorly understood. This paper proposes that AI functions as an epistemic amplifier within a recursive feedback loop linking conceptual origination and conceptual exploration. Drawing on Boden's (1998, 2004) typology of computational creativity, Floridi's (2011) philosophy of information, Dretske's (1981) information-theoretic epistemology, Merleau-Ponty's (1945/2012) phenomenology of perception, and empirical developments including AlphaProof (Hubert et al., 2025), AlphaFold (Jumper et al., 2021), and RFdiffusion (Watson et (...) al., 2023), this paper formalizes the Principle of Recursive Origination–Exploration Amplification (ROEA). ROEA holds that origination introduces new epistemic structures enabling exploration, and exploration recursively amplifies subsequent origination through three mechanisms: anomaly amplification, combinatorial amplification, and cognitive liberation. The principle specifies conditions under which amplification succeeds or fails, positioning it as a structural-descriptive account of epistemic acceleration in human–AI cognitive systems. -/- Keywords: artificial intelligence, epistemic amplification, conceptual origination, conceptual exploration, philosophy of science, computational creativity, human–AI collaboration, recursive amplification, philosophy of information, phenomenology of perception. (shrink)

This essay explores the creation and evolution of life and consciousness through the lens of a biological framework for understanding the universe. The theory posits that the patterns inherent in biological systems mirror the underlying mathematical principles of the cosmos. Thus, every pattern that manifests from the universe’s “parent-pattern” contains a fundamental biological-pattern inherent to its function, revealing the objective nature and purpose of that thing. Examples include the way ocean currents resemble a circulatory system and how socioeconomic phenomena mimic (...) cellular order. These correspondences suggest that life and consciousness are products of the universe’s biologically-patterned processes, and understanding these patterns is crucial for humanity's survival, especially as human society and environment becomes more complex—requiring a truer understanding of reality reality and how to organize themselves within it. The paper further argues that historical and philosophical concepts, such as Atman and Brahman in the Upanishads, Pnimiyut and Chitzoniyut in Kabbalah (Judaism), Batin and Zahir in Sufism (Islam), and many more align with this framework. The essay emphasizes that aligning human society with these biological patterns, as seen in biomimicry, is necessary for continued survival and harmony with the universe. The essay provides scientific studies and analogies supporting these ideas, illustrating how biological patterns are reflected across different domains of knowledge. (shrink)

While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different (...) formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition. (shrink)