Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

Must the structure of thought mirror the structure of language? Actives and passives are a test case. An active sentence such as ’Annabel loves Piper’ and its passive counterpart ’Piper is loved by Annabel’ are paradigm cases of sentences that differ in grammatical structure but have the same content. The passive therefore motivates approaches to semantic composition that differentiate the structure of the proposition from the grammatical structure of the sentence. Yet, a tradition in linguistics and philosophy says that active (...) sentences and their passive counterparts—despite appearances—have the same grammatical structure. I argue that this tradition is mistaken. Standard syntactic theories posit a difference between an active and its passive counterpart. Therefore, the semantic theory should allow the structure of a sentence to differ from the structure of a proposition that it expresses. (shrink)

This paper is a critical review of the most relevant studies about the Levinasian concept of passivity. The purpose is to follow the way in which Levinas’s scholars have dealt with the following aspects: the relation between ethical passivity and the possibility of effective ethical agency, the origin of passivity, and the validity of ethical passivity in the public sphere. As a starting point for future research, I finally argue that the best way to read Levinas’s (...) passive ethics is through the dynamism between maximums and minimums present within it. This means that without sacrificing the omni comprehensive view of divine revelation and Jewish tradition, Levinas presents ethics as rationally understandable by everyone and philosophically defensible. Despite being biblically based, Levinas does not appeal to authority in supporting his view, he is confident in arguing rationally. This account could place Levinas in the way of public ethics, which consists in an ethos shared by all members of democratic societies. These minimums of justice could be the way to universalize Levinas’s ethics. (shrink)

“Passive fear” denotes a certain type of response to a perceived threat; what is distinctive about the state of passive fear is that its behavioral outlook appears to qualify the emotional experience. I distinguish between two cases of passive fear: one is that of freezing in fear; the other is that of fear-involved tonic immobility. I reconstruct the explanatory strategy that is commonly employed in the field of emotion science, and argue that it leaves certain questions about the nature of (...) passive fear unanswered. I subsequently propose an account of passive fear that builds upon a phenomenological theory of emotions, placing emphasis on the interpretation of current research into human tonic immobility. (shrink)

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...) if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity. (shrink)

The science of mind wandering has rapidly expanded over the past 20 years. During this boom, mind wandering researchers have relied on self-report methods, where participants rate whether their minds were wandering. This is not an historical quirk. Rather, we argue that self-report is indispensable for researchers who study passive phenomena like mind wandering. We consider purportedly “objective” methods that measure mind wandering with eye tracking and machine learning. These measures are validated in terms of how well they predict self-reports, (...) which means that purportedly objective measures of mind wandering retain a subjective core. Mind wandering science cannot break from the cycle of self-report. Skeptics about self-report might conclude that mind wandering science has methodological foundations of sand. We take a rather more optimistic view. We present empirical and philosophical reasons to be confident in self-reports about mind wandering. Empirically, these self-reports are remarkably consistent in their contents and behavioral and neural correlates. Philosophically, self-reports are consistent with our best theories about the function of mind wandering. We argue that this triangulation gives us reason to trust both theory and method. (shrink)

Many philosophers maintain that there is a distinction between acts that the agent plays an active role in producing, and acts that issue from the agent in a more passive fashion. According to the standard account, we can make sense of this distinction by maintaining that reflective or deliberative acts are paradigmatic cases of an agent’s playing an active role in the production of action. This chapter argues that this standard account is mistaken. Reflective or deliberative actions will seem to (...) be active only if we conflate three claims: that choice causes action, that motives do not determine choice, and that reflection suspends the effects of motives. The chapter argues that while and are true, is false. Further, is needed to support the claim that reflective acts are active. Given the falsity of, the chapter shows that reflective acts are not necessarily more active than unreflective ones. The chapter closes by suggesting a new model of agential activity. (shrink)

This chapter takes a fresh look at 3d2 of Spinoza’s Ethics, an absolutely pivotal definition for the ethical theory that ensues. According to it, “we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause,” whereas we are passive “when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.” The definition of activity has puzzled scholars: how can we be an adequate, i.e. complete, cause of (...) an effect outside us (which clearly involves other causal factors as well)? However, the definition of passivity is hardly unproblematic either: how can something follow from the patient’s nature so that the patient can nevertheless be considered only a partial cause? I begin by outlining 3d2 and situating it in the historical context formed by Descartes, Hobbes, and the Aristotelian tradition. Then I show that the existing interpretations do not solve the problem of activity and argue that unraveling the problem requires taking properly into account the distinction between immanent and transeunt causality. In relation to the definition of passivity, I argue that Spinoza’s geometry-inspired theory of essence constitution offers the key to understanding the nature of passions. (shrink)

In a society shaped by deep inequalities, where healthcare and legal systems often reinforce class, caste, religion, and gender hierarchies, this book offers a powerful examination of patienthood in India. Through its critical approach, it seeks to disrupt binaries—such as universalistic and particularistic values and data versus theory—while decentering normative discourses by foregrounding lived experiences within the context. It offers philosophical and conceptual insights that extend far beyond local variations and contexts, challenging dominant narratives in global discourses on medical decision-making (...) and concepts such as informed consent, autonomy, and respect. This book critiques the archetype of the “passive patient” entrenched in both medicine and law in India — an image that undermines agency, diminishes self-respect, and sustains a culture of disrespect. Chapters of the book unpacks the intersections of power, social categories, and patienthood, exposing how marginalized communities face everyday indignities in healthcare and law. It explores law and medicine’s role in maintaining presumed 'passive patient' archetype, especially through legal judgements and healthcare encounters. This book advocates for reimagining patienthood as centered on self-respect, recognition, and agency, arguing that the “passive patient” is not an isolated phenomenon but an outcome of broader, oppressive structures. Contributing to robust debates in medical sociology, bioethics, and social justice, this book is essential reading for those interested in the intersections of these fields, along with applied ethics, health services research, and law. (shrink)

Newton published his deduction of universal gravity in Principia (first ed., 1687). To establish the universality (the particle-to-particle nature) of gravity, Newton must establish the additivity of mass. I call ‘additivity’ the property a body's quantity of matter has just in case, if gravitational force is proportional to that quantity, the force can be taken to be the sum of forces proportional to each particle's quantity of matter. Newton's argument for additivity is obscure. I analyze and assess manuscript versions of (...) Newton's initial argument within his initial deduction, dating from early 1685. Newton's strategy depends on distinguishing two quantities of matter, which I call ‘active’ and ‘passive’, by how they are measured. These measurement procedures frame conditions on the additivity of each quantity so measured. While Newton has direct evidence for the additivity of passive quantity of matter, he does not for that of the active quantity. Instead, he tries to infer the latter from the former via conceptual analyses of the third law of motion grounded largely on analogies to magnetic attractions. The conditions needed to establish passive additivity frustrate Newton's attempted inference to active additivity. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Current large language models (LLMs) operate as passive interpreters of semantic patterns rather than active reasoners over symbolic constraints. This passivity arises from their static representational geometry: during inference, the model’s internal eigenstructure—governing dominant modes of meaning—is fixed. Consequently, LLMs excel at statistical continuation but fail at self-consistent problem-solving under closed-system constraints (e.g., solving (n) equations with (n) unknowns). We propose that endowing LLMs with eigenvalue plasticity—the capacity to dynamically reconfigure their spectral representation space in response to logical or (...) algebraic inconsistency—can transform them from passive readers into active solvers. We formalize this transition using tools from linear algebra, dynamical systems theory, and active inference, showing that such adaptive eigenstructure enables proto-agency: a minimal form of goal-directed computation grounded in internal consistency rather than external reward. This framework bridges symbolic AI and connectionism without requiring explicit symbolic machinery, offering a new pathway toward robust reasoning in neural architectures. (shrink)

There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...) the first factor (1 above) into two factors: how abnormal experience can give rise to a delusional ‘proto-hypothesis’ and how a ‘proto-hypothesis’ in consort with normal experiences and background information, can be developed into a delusional hypothesis. In particular I will argue that a schizophrenic is faced with the unusual requirement of having to identify an introspectively accessible thought as one's own, and that this requirement of identification is the central experiential abnormality of thought insertion, auditory verbal hallucination, and alien control (i.e. passivity symptoms). Additionally, I will consider non-experiential factors which are required for the formation of a delusional hypothesis. (shrink)

It is an intimate experience for us to think, to understand and to perceive things as being identical to themselves, and to suppose, consequently, that things are truly “what” they are. Something is always conceived as itself. The given is given full of itself in all its modifications. For instance, I can think or perceive partially some lips, I can see them almost in their whole or in some of their aspects, or just see them disappear. But it does not (...) seem to be possible to think or to perceive a given as almost itself, as an aspect or as part of itself. It is the aim of this work to study the assumptions and conditions for the original position of sameness in experience, just as it occurs in the synthesis of the datum singular and distinct. The polarization of single tone (einstimmig) intentional rays in an αvτó already contains the aporiae peculiar to the experience of the identical, whose revelation shall lead us, on the one hand, to one of the nuclei of the analysis of passive synthesis, and, on the other hand, to point up how critical revision of the numerical or extensional model of self-identity is for the unity of meaning. Then, it will be a question of pointing out the reasons why in a phenomenology of identity, the renunciation of the phenomenological legitimacy of the αvτó as a guarantee for the different positions of identity must be observed. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_13 . (shrink)

Both Schelling and Husserl reveal that any attempt to ground objective cognition in subjectivity would encounter the problem of constitution of original experience. They also endorse similar solutions to this very problem. The constitution of original experience is depicted as passive synthesis, i. e., it is the pre-conscious activity of the original ‘I’ (Ur-Ich). However, unlike Schelling’s interpretation of passive synthesis, understood as a theory of quasi-conscious willing (Wollen), Husserl relocates passive synthesis in the transition from instinct to habituality. The (...) constitution of original experience, as well as the activity of the original ‘I’, uncovers the dynamic structure of Being. Owing to this, transcendental philosophy must become a transcendental ontology. (shrink)

Since the inception of the euthanasia debate, the differentiation be-tween active and passive euthanasia – distinguishing between “let-ting die” and “actively killing” – has emerged as a central point of contention. In this paper, we will contend that: a) the boundary be-tween active and passive euthanasia is inherently nebulous, b) there exists no morally substantive disparity between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if such a disparity could be admitted, it would probably favor active euthanasia over passive. We will seek (...) support for this final claim of ours in the three principal traditions of norma-tive ethics, namely deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. (shrink)

Our examination explicates not only how Leibniz’s emphasis on force or power squares well with (and most probably largely stems from) his endorsement of certain central Aristotelian tenets, but also how the concept of force is incorporated into his mature idealist metaphysics. That metaphysics, in turn, generates some thorny problems with regard to the concept of passivity; and so we shall also ask whether and how Leibniz’s monadology, emphasizing the activity as much as it does, is able to encompass (...) the passivity of created substances. (shrink)

This essay analyses two kinds of harmony as exemplified in Confucianism and Daoism and examines their relation with domination and freedom.

Set aside fanciful doomsday speculations about AI. Even lower-level AIs, while otherwise friendly and providing us a universal basic income, would be able to do all our jobs. Also, we would over-rely upon AI assistants even in our personal lives. Thus, John Danaher argues that a human crisis of moral passivity would result However, I argue firstly that if AIs are posited to lack the potential to become unfriendly, they may not be intelligent enough to replace us in all (...) our jobs. If instead they are intelligent enough to replace us, the risk they become unfriendly increases, given that they would not need us and humans would just compete for valuable resources. Their hostility will not promote our moral passivity. Secondly, the use of AI assistants in our personal lives will become a problem only if we rely on them for almost all our decision-making and motivation. But such a (maximally) pervasive level of dependence raises the question of whether humans would accept it, and consequently whether the crisis of passivity will arise. (shrink)

Research on psychopathy among incarcerated, Caucasian males has consistently demonstrated deficits in emotion processing and response inhibition. Using the PCL-R to classify participants as psychopathic or non-psychopathic, this study examined the performance of incarcerated, Caucasian females on two laboratory tasks: A lexical decision task used to assess emotion processing and a passive avoidance task used to assess response inhibition. Contrary to prediction, deficits in performance typically exhibited by psychopathic males were not exhibited by psychopathic females in this sample. Implications of (...) these findings are discussed and an interpretation of the results in the context of the Response Modulation Hypothesis is presented. (shrink)

Escapism is often viewed in only one sense: a negative act used to run away from problems or stressors. This essay transforms escapism into an activity, neither positive nor negative, and attempts a more detailed interpretation that does not focus on the intentions or motivations behind escapism; it instead seeks to show the consequences of escapism and how it arises from creativity. There are two main currents of escapism: one active, the other passive. What makes them active is based on (...) the quality of creativity, along with the magnitude of their actions. A new interpretation of escapism is needed to suit the ever-changing world, and this interpretation seeks to ‘open up’ the subject instead of narrowing it. (shrink)

Current literature on cultural evolution is often polarized between Darwinian selection (Memetics) and Lamarckian guided variation. This paper proposes the Ontogenetic Principle of Cultural Dynamics (OPCD) as a unifying theoretical framework to bridge this divide. I argue that these two models are not mutually exclusive but operate sequentially based on the cognitive maturity of the agent. The hypothesis posits that cultural transmission in childhood functionally resembles “Passive Memetic Replication” (High-Fidelity), whereas adulthood shifts towards “Lamarckian-like Knowledge Evolution” (Reconstructive). Furthermore, this study (...) clarifies the terminology: while aligned with the concept of Guided Variation, we retain the term “Functionally Lamarckian” to emphasize the computational shift from ‘read-only’ access to ‘write-access’ regarding cultural information streams. The framework is supported by a stochastic hybrid model and computational illustration detailed in the Appendix. (shrink)

In a series of works Hubert Dreyfus argues that phenomenological considerations can show the falsity of John McDowell’s claim that ours actions are permeated with rationality. Dreyfus changes the details of his objections several times in this debate, but I shall argue that there is an implicit false assumption lurking in his thinking throughout his exchanges with McDowell. Originally Dreyfus proposed a distinction between “detached rule-following” and “situation-specific way of coping,” and later he replaces it with the distinction between “subjectivity” (...) and “absorbed coping.” He then uses this framework to interpret some examples, attempting to show that they cannot be accommodated by McDowell’s position. I shall argue that in doing so Dreyfus presupposes too narrow conceptions of “rationality” and “mindedness,” and if these notions are understood appropriately, we can see that phenomenological considerations can be good supplements, rather than objections, to McDowell’s claim that our mindedness is pervasive in actions. (shrink)

While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy (...) of a minimal conception of ‘belief’ was motivated by ethical concerns: avoiding any sort of commitment, he attempted to preserve his peace of mind. In this article, I argue for a Cartesian model of rational guidance that, in line with some current versions of an agential virtue epistemology, does involve judgment and risk, and thus which is true both to our rational constitution and to our finite and fallible nature. Insofar as epistemic humility is a virtue of rational agents that recognise the limits of their judgments, Pyrrhonian scepticism, and a fortiori any variety of naturalism, is unable to accommodate this virtue. This means that, in contrast to the Cartesian model, the Pyrrhonist does not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of cognitive disintegration. The Pyrrhonist thus becomes a social rebel, one that violates the norm of serious personal assent that enables the flourishing of a collaborative and social species which depends on agents that, however fallible, are accountable for their actions and judgments. (shrink)

FEEL FREE TO CITE - IGNORE IN-PDF REQUEST -/- Husserl defines affection in the Analyses1 as "the allure given to consciousness, the particular pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego."2 That something becomes prominent for the ego implies that the object exerts a kind of 'pull' upon the ego, a demanding of egoic attention. This affective pull is relative in force, such that the same object can be experienced in varying modes of prominence and affective relief (...) depending upon bodily comportment, egoic attentiveness, etc. The phenomenon of affection allows Husserl to describe the genesis of association in terms of the lawful, regular exertions of affection upon the ego, prompting (for example) the reproduction of remembered pasts in retention on a purely passive level. Affection thus provides Husserl a non-Humean mechanism for the lawful phenomenon of association. In this light, we can see that affection plays a crucial role in the passive phenomenon of association and thereby in the constitution of sense. The precise role played by affection, however, remains quite problematic in the Analyses. Husserl is rather unclear on this point, and two of the leading commentators on the Analyses, Anthony Steinbock and Bruce Bégout, offer opposing viewpoints. Is affection the precondition for the constitution of any sense unity, as Steinbock suggests, or is it the.. (shrink)

This paper provides a descriptive, non-operational analysis of interpretive and incentive-based mechanisms that may produce bounded hesitation or restraint during read-only encounters with artificial systems. It makes no claims of enforcement, prevention, alignment, detection, or control, and does not substitute for human oversight or safeguards.

Der Beitrag widmet sich einer Erkundung des schöpferischen Eigen- potenzials von Ausdrucksgeschehen, dem entlang von Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phänomenologie der Expressivität nachgespürt wird. Expressivität zeigt sich hier als ein Übergangsphänomen, das in seinem Entstehen und seiner Prozessua- lität nachvollzogen wird. Indem Ausdrucksgeschehen in seiner Ereignishaftigkeit erkundet wird, rekurriert der Beitrag auf eine Form der Medialität, die einem reinen Tätigsein sowie einer starren Passivität bereits vorgelagert ist. Das Ar- gument kulminiert in der Theorie eines relationalen Gefüges von Subjektivität, Sinn, sozio-kultureller Welt und (...) Expressivität. (shrink)

Is mindfulness just "sedation" for the masses? *The Power of Perception* challenges the critique that meditation makes you "passive" or "compliant." Dr. Dion Fryson (ASU) argues for "Active Mastery," distinguishing true "Perceptual Power" from the "learned helplessness" of corporate mindfulness programs. This is the manifesto for the Agent, not the Patient. -/- I wrote *The Power of Perception* because I was angry. I saw "mindfulness" being sold as a way to make people better employees, better consumers, and more compliant citizens. (...) It was being used to sedate people rather than liberate them. I wrote this book to reclaim the revolutionary power of perception. True mindfulness is not about accepting things as they are; it is about seeing them so clearly that you can change them. This book is for the person who wants to be a "Conscious Agent," not a "Happy Cog." It pushes beyond the "passive mastery" of acceptance into the "active mastery" of creation. The "Trap of Compliance" addresses the cynical feeling that mindfulness is just a tool to keep people quiet and working. "Constructing Your World" empowers the reader to use these tools for their own "Sovereign" ends. (shrink)

This volume introduces into contemporary Romanian social work literature an integrative, multi-level, complex, and multidisciplinary perspective on the theory, practice, and policy of social work. It highlights a diversity of models—grouped into three main categories: scientific, philosophical, and humanist—within the subsequences of social theory, practice, and policy.

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper I compare McDowell′s conceptualism to Husserl′s later philosophy. I aim to argue against the picture provided by recent phenomenologists according to which both agree on the conceptual nature of experience. I start by discussing McDowell′s reading of Kant and some of the recent Kantian and phenomenological non-conceptualist criticisms thereof. By separating two kinds of conceptualism, I argue that these criticisms largely fail to trouble McDowell. I then move to Husserl’s later phenomenological analyses of types and of passive (...) synthesis. Although Husserl appropriates McDowell’s idea of conceptually ‘saddled’ intuitions as a ‘secondary passivity’, I argue that he also provides a strong case for non-conceptual synthesis. (shrink)

Since Husserl, the task of developing an account of intentionality and constitution has been central to the phenomenological enterprise. Some of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of ‘the flesh’ suggest that he gives up on this task, or, more strongly, that the flesh is in principle incompatible with intentionality or constitution. I show that these remarks, as in Merleau-Ponty's earlier writings, refer to the classical, early Husserlian interpretations of these concepts, and argue that the concept of the flesh can plausibly be understood to (...) advance a refined account of intentionality and constitution. Instead of a first-personal, unidirectional act or embodied motor project, intentionality is a latent openness to things, where the roles of subject and object are reversible. Whereas the view of constitution as meaning-bestowal is untenable, the flesh has a constitutive role, which is supported by a ‘constitutional passivity’ from the subject. On this reading, Merleau-Ponty's later work aims to develop basic tenets of his earlier thought, albeit at a critical distance, an attempt he thought was continuous with the central problems that Husserl claimed a phenomenological philosophy must grapple with, even if Merleau-Ponty's answers to these problems are not Husserl's. (shrink)

Rational decision-making often depends on coordinating sequences of mental actions, each with a distinctive phenomenology. Feelings of effort and fluency are central to many theoretical accounts of cognitive control. In the present study (N = 308), we examined how different mental actions—focusing, inhibiting, deciding, visualizing, visualizing alternatives, seeing, believing, and remembering—and their associated phenomenology relate to one another and to varying levels of control. Self-reported mental effort was positively associated with self-reported mental control, with this relationship stronger under higher than (...) lower cognitive-load conditions. Effort was also positively related to control across all eight mental actions, with no clear division between more passive and more active forms. By contrast, the way effort and control combined to produce feelings of successful performance depended on the type of mental action, reflecting a passive–active distinction. This suggests that control and effort have a nuanced relationship to each other and with eliciting targeted mental actions. (shrink)

What does Husserlian phenomenology have to offer feminist theory? More specifically, can we find resources within Husserl’s account of the living body ( Leib ) for the critical feminist project of rethinking embodiment beyond the dichotomies not only of mind/body but also of subject/object and activity/passivity? This essay begins by explicating the reasons for feminist hesitation with respect to Husserlian phenomenology. I then explore the resources that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch and his account of sensings hold for feminist theory. (...) My reading of Husserl proceeds by means of a comparison between his description of touch in Ideas II and Merleau-Ponty’s early appropriation of this account in the Phenomenology of Perception, as well as through an unlikely rapprochement between Husserl and Irigaray on the question of touch. Moreover, by revisiting the limitations in Husserl’s approach to the body—limitations of which any feminist appropriation must remain cognizant—I attempt to take Husserl’s phenomenology of touch beyond its initial methodologically solipsistic frame and to ask whether and how it can contribute to thinking gendered and racialized bodies. The phenomenology of touch, I argue, can allow us to understand the interplay between subjective, felt embodiment and social-historical context. In opening up Husserl’s account of touch to other dimensions—intersubjective and affective—sociality is revealed as residing within, and structuring of, touch. Such touch can allow us to think embodiment anew. (shrink)

In this article, I summarise the ontological theory of informational privacy (an approach based on information ethics) and then discuss four types of interesting challenges confronting any theory of informational privacy: (1) parochial ontologies and non-Western approaches to informational privacy; (2) individualism and the anthropology of informational privacy; (3) the scope and limits of informational privacy; and (4) public, passive and active informational privacy. I argue that the ontological theory of informational privacy can cope with such challenges fairly successfully. In (...) the conclusion, I discuss some of the work that lies ahead. (shrink)

This thesis addresses a fundamental question in moral philosophy: What is the philosophical distinction between surrender and laziness in a universe where stability is illusory and change is inevitable? Drawing upon recent developments in ontological instability theory, fluctuational metaphysics, and fluctuational epistemology, this work develops a novel theoretical framework called "Fluctuational Ethics" that provides the first systematic philosophical distinction between surrender and laziness adequate to the reality of an unstable universe. The thesis argues that traditional ethical frameworks, grounded in assumptions (...) of stable being and fixed moral categories, cannot adequately distinguish between surrender and laziness because both appear as forms of "non-action" from the perspective of substance metaphysics. Through rigorous theoretical development, mathematical formalization, and empirical validation, this work demonstrates that surrender and laziness represent fundamentally different ontological, temporal, and ethical orientations toward instability. The framework reveals surrender as "active receptivity" involving infinite ethical responsibility and creative engagement with flux, while laziness emerges as "pseudo-passivity" characterized by denial of instability and abandonment of ethical responsibility. This distinction has profound implications for moral philosophy, existential authenticity, and political theory in an age of ontological instability. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Husserl has been understood along a spectrum running from outright repudiation to deep appreciation. The aim of this paper is to clarify a significant and heretofore largely neglected unifying thread connecting Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, while also demonstrating its general philosophical import for phenomenological philosophy. On this account, the details of a programmatic philosophical continuity between these two phenomenologists can be structured around the concept of motivation. Merleau-Ponty sees in Husserl’s concept of motivation a necessary and innovative concept (...) that we must formulate in order to properly theorize the anonymous and passive functioning of “operative intentionality.” Motivation is the principle that bridges this domain with the egoic life of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty’s focus on anonymity, bodily habit, and other facets of operative intentionality are thus not a repudiation of Husserl’s analyses of intentionality, but rather a deepening of the notion of consciousness. I conclude by showing how Merleau-Ponty’s early work on motivation lays the conceptual groundwork for his later rethinking of intentionality in terms of institution, and thus mature ontology of the flesh. (shrink)

Recent developments in immersive media have exposed a taxonomic gap between cinema, virtual reality (VR), and interactive digital narratives. This paper identifies and defines a nascent class of audiovisual works—Embodied POV Cinema (EPC)—as a sovereign narrative medium. Characterized by a sustained first-person perspective, sensorimotor coherence, and a fixed, non-interactive narrative structure, EPC systematically dissociates the spectator’s sense of ownership over a virtual body from their sense of agency. This paper argues that EPC is irreducible to either traditional cinema, which maintains (...) an external camera and spectator position, or interactive VR and gaming, which are defined by ergodic agency. Through a phenomenological analysis, we demonstrate how EPC’s core aesthetic principle is passive presence, enabling a unique form of narrative power: the authorial choreography of embodied experience. Recognizing EPC as a distinct category is essential for developing its specific aesthetics and understanding its potential for somatic empathy and narrative inhabitation. (shrink)

It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...) integrates personal and sub-personal components, psychological and neural processes. I then proceed to show how this model can be applied to explain the action-related passivity experiences of persons suffering from schizophrenia. I argue that a distinctive phenomenological mark of these experiences is that they are vividly felt, unlike ordinary actions (those taken to belong to self), and I seek to explain these heightened sensory experiences from within the proposed framework. I also propose hypotheses concerning such phenomena as thought insertion and anarchic hand syndrome that are motivated by this framework. Finally, I argue that the proposed model and view of self-experiences is consistent with several aspects of and theories of consciousness, especially theories which indicate that consciousness is more likely to be engaged when we are dealing with novelty or error—e.g. when self seems to have gone missing. I conclude by recommending that if we wish to learn about self, we would be well advised to attend closely to those times when it seems absent. (shrink)

Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it seems to (...) favor active instead of passive euthanasia. Therefore, while the distinction between active and passive euthanasia might be meaningful in terms of description, if it is considered to be endowed with moral weight and used on purpose of justifying one type of euthanasia instead of the other, it becomes morally problematic and misleading. (shrink)

Language and politics go hand in hand and learning and comprehending political genre is to learn a language created for codifying, extending and transmitting political discourse in any text/talk. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of Fairclough’s CDA and Rhetoric, the current study aims at investigating Donald Trump’s First Speech, from the point of frequency and functions of some rhetorical strategies (Parallelism, Anaphora and the Power of Three, Antithesis and Expletive, etc.), Nominalization, Passivization, We-groups and Modality as well as Lexical and (...) Textual Analysis, presented to the UN delivered on Sep. 19, 2017. Specifically, the study seeks to determine: (1) how President Trump succeeded in conveying his notions and assumptions to his intended audience, and in convincing and negotiating, (2) how he attempted to explicitly and implicitly pass his attitudes on his targets, and (3) how those orientations, intended notions and assumptions were seamlessly presented to his addressees in discoursal and lexico-grammatical levels; (4) and finally in this underlying trend how he achieved his own ends. The results of the study hope to enhance reading comprehension and writing in academic registers for EFL/ESL students. (shrink)

There can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for Spinoza, completely passive. In this essay I argue argues that there is in the Ethics an elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain a definite active component. This argument (...) for activity in sense perception consists of two main parts: first, that ideas we form through sense perception have something adequate in them; second, that the adequate component is actively brought about. Discerning this line of thought connects to—and sheds some new light on—Spinoza’s general way of understanding ideas as entities involving activity. (shrink)

By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. When thus (...) juxtaposed with Hobbes, Berkeley can be understood as endorsing a theologically inflected version of deontological ethics in which moral laws are linked directly to the constitution of the self. (shrink)