Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based (...) definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, a content-based definition entails that ra- tionality does not issue process-requirements. Content-based process- requirements violate the principle that ‘rationality requires’ implies ‘can satisfy’. The conclusion of this paper therefore amounts to a radical re- jection of process-requirements of rationality. (shrink)

This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process-requirements upon us. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary (...) explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements. (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the availability of business process re-engineering requirements in Palestinian industrial companies, and to identify the nature of relationship and direction between business process re-engineering requirements and product quality in these companies, in addition to determine whether the market orientation plays a mediating role in the relationship between business process re-engineering requirements and product quality. To achieve study objectives, the researcher designed a questionnaire as a study tool, was distributed on (...) sample of (231) employee selected from the senior management in Palestinian industrial companies. The results shows: business process re-engineering requirements (Organizational, Technological, Human) are available in Palestinian industrial companies with a large degree. There is a positive impact with a statistical significance the availability of business process re-engineering requirements on market orientation and achieving product quality in Palestinian industrial companies. There is a positive impact with a statistical significance the market orientation adoption and achieving product quality in Palestinian industrial companies. Results revealed that market orientation mediating the relationship between business process re-engineering requirements and achieving product quality. The Main recommendations: Needing of senior management to make attention about modern management methods, as well as relying on scientific and field approach to solve and tackle problems. Senior management should be recognize the importance of market orientation, and works on linking it with information systems, and it's basic center should be concentrates on meeting customer needs. Key words: strategic orientation, modern management methods, operational performance, product quality, marketing . (shrink)

Traditionally, many have imposed higher-order requirements on epistemic justification. That is, many have argued that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it not only needs to satisfy first-order requirements, such as being formed via a reliable process or supported by sufficient evidence, but also some higher-order requirement that bears on the way the belief is formed. For example, BonJour (1980) has famously argued that a clairvoyance belief, however reliable, is not justified unless one also has a (...) justified belief that one’s beliefs formed via clairvoyance are reliable. More recently, some have argued for higher-order requirements for inferentially justified beliefs. That is, for example, that inferential beliefs are only justified if we take the reasons for which those beliefs are formed to support the belief. While there is a common underlying theme, these proposals differ with respect to the kind of higher-order state they require. Some proposals require (justified) higher-order beliefs, while others require higher-order evidence or higher-order awareness. This paper sets out to systematically discuss different kinds of higher order requirements and the objections they face. While I will argue that there are good reasons to think that epistemic justification needs a built-in higher order requirement, I will argue that only so-called evidential requirements are able to guard off well-known objections. In particular, I will demonstrate that the evidentialist no-defeater clause I recently proposed in Graf (2025), can be understood as a general higher-order requirement which does not only explain the intuitions motivating such requirements, but also enables us to avoid common objections. (shrink)

Contemporary physics posits a universal speed limit while simultaneously accommodating rest, variable process rates, and relativistic time dilation. This paper argues that the relevant universal constant should be understood not as a physical speed, but as a universal norm of realization, an ontological invariant governing the transfer of distinguishability. -/- Three independent arguments establish that realization requires an invariant norm: (1) variable norms introduce non-functional ontological structure incompatible with parsimony; (2) interobjective comparison and temporal ordering presuppose a common measure; (...) (3) stable objecthood, understood as closed cycles of realization, demands reparameterization-invariant circulation. -/- On this basis, motion is reinterpreted as redistribution of realization, rest as maximal internal realization, time as a derived count, and fields as stabilized derivative structures. The framework introduces no new physical postulates but clarifies the ontological conditions under which relativistic theories are possible. The main contribution is to show that the universality of the invariant norm is not a contingent physical fact but a structural necessity for any coherent ontology of objects, processes, and time. (shrink)

This paper examines the challenges and lessons learned for Property and Casualty (P&C) insurers as they look to balance technological innovation against regulatory compliance, specifically regarding privacy laws. These technologies have been adopted rapidly, from Artificial Intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT), to transform how claims are processed, resulting in efficiencies, improved fraud detection and increased customer-centeredness. While these advancements have brought much to the table, they hold great fear regarding the data privacy, security, and compliance involved. (...) Insurers need to incorporate privacy-centric frameworks during the development and deployment of new technology to help them navigate these challenges. Our key strategies are adopting the Privacy by Design approach, ensuring compliance-focused innovation via regulatory sandboxes, and constantly monitoring the evolution of privacy regulations. Mitigating privacy risks is possible only when you have effective governance, such as having robust data governance policies and third-party risk management. Additionally, leadership is committed to helping create an environment that is privacy-centric, and providing employee training and transparency in terms of communication with the customer is equally important to sustaining trust. The paper uses a case study of Shift Technology’s AI-based fraud detection system to show how innovation can meet privacy and compliance goals. Finally, the final section concludes with a discussion of emerging privacy risks (cybersecurity threats and algorithmic bias), along with identifying the crucial role of a strong organizational culture in addressing these threats. At the end of the day, this paper emphasizes the importance of adapting privacy-preserving technologies, working with regulators, and monitoring privacy practices to ensure continuous compliance and create innovation in claim processing. (shrink)

Two independent arguments are presented that jointly entail a strong physical uniqueness requirement for genuine self-awareness. The first shows that if self-awareness were purely algorithmic, infinitely many mutually incompatible conscious interpretations could be ascribed to any single physical process, rendering the ascription of one particular consciousness arbitrary and meaningless. The second demonstrates that even if self-awareness requires a specific physical substrate, the underlying algorithm cannot remain substrate-independent without generating causal contradictions when conscious systems modify their own algorithms. The only (...) consistent position is that genuine self-awareness arises exclusively in physically unique systems executing processes that no other physical system can faithfully replicate. This conclusion provides indirect logical support for theories that tie consciousness to non-classical (especially quantum) processes in the brain that are inherently non-emulable on arbitrary substrates. (shrink)

According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the existence of life in our universe confirms the Multiverse Hypothesis. A standard objection to FTA is that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. I argue that RTE should be rejected in favor of the Predesignation Requirement, according to which, in assessing the outcome of a probabilistic process, we should only use evidence characterizable in a manner available before observing the outcome. This produces the right verdicts in some simple cases in which RTE (...) leads us astray, and, when applied to FTA, it shows that our evidence does confirm HM. (shrink)

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic, verifiable automated reasoning, and symbolic methods in general. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning (...) evaluation unverifiable, and undermines quantifiable progress toward the collective goal of trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) general and extensible definitions for valid and sound reasoning based on a synthesis of the literature, which can serve as an accessible reference and a starting point for community discussion; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the process of compromising needs to be deliberative if a fair compromise is the goal. More specifically, I argue that deliberation is structurally necessary in order to achieve a fair compromise. In developing this argument, this paper seeks to overcome a problematic dichotomy that is prevalent in the literature on deliberative democracy, which is the dichotomy between compromise and deliberation. This dichotomy entails the view that the process preceding the achievement of a (...) compromise is essentially a process of negotiating or bargaining, which, I claim, should not be the case if a fair compromise is the goal. The reason for this claim is, in a nutshell, that negotiation or bargaining processes do not provide for an in-depth understanding of the reasons that each party has for holding their respective position. However, an in-depth understanding of each other’s reasons, is, as I will show, a necessary condition for achieving a fair compromise. In contrast to negotiation or bargaining, the deliberative process, by its very structure, provides for mutual understanding and is therefore a necessary condition for achieving a fair compromise. (shrink)

This paper explores the ideal of perfect understanding to shed light on the nature of understanding in general. It works out how a being with perfect understanding would think and answer questions by considering the implications of maximizing all the major properties that are associated with understanding. In doing so, we will discover that a perfect understander would answer all questions in a single mental action with no intermediate steps. In other words, the being with perfect understanding doesn’t need to (...) engage in a process of conscious reasoning to find answers; the answers simply come to mind immediately. This is true even if we assume that the perfect understander is not omniscient. While we can’t assume that we (who are not perfect) should always behave the way that an ideal understander would behave, the results of this exploration suggest that learning to succeed without thinking is an important part of gaining understanding. (shrink)

Will Daddario’s article, “What Acceptance Is,” brilliantly moves through aspects of grief, despair, and Acceptance; it allows grievers to meaningfully hold together aspects of loss that are otherwise fragmented and dispersed in our subjective experience of it. Daddario traces contradictions that permeate our experiences not only of grief and loss, but also of how we live in light of them. This includes the paradoxical relationships between accepting and giving, cure and poison, being open and closed off, centered and decentered, and, (...) as I will later add, of willingness and willfulness. His confrontation with acceptance resists the typical rectilinear picture (e.g., the “stages of grief”), ultimately providing us with a picture of the process out of despair that manages to retain its life and dynamic movement despite the fixity of language.... (see more). (shrink)

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as much as (...) possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about. (shrink)

This paper examines some limitations of large language models (LLMs) through the framework of Peircean semiotics. We argue that basic LLMs exist within a “hall of mirrors,” reflecting only the linguistic surface of training data without indexical grounding in a shared external world, and manipulating symbols without participation in socially-mediated epistemology. We then argue that newer developments, including extended context windows, persistent memory, and mediated interactions with reality, are moving towards making newer Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems into genuine Peircean interpretants, (...) and conclude that LLMs may be approaching this goal, and we identify no fundamental architectural barriers that would prevent this. This lens reframes a central challenge for AI alignment: without grounding in the semiotic process, a model’s linguistic encoding of goals may diverge from real-world values. By synthesizing Peirce’s pragmatic view of signs, contemporary discussions of AI alignment, and recent work on relational realism, we illustrate a fundamental epistemological and practical challenge to AI safety and point to part of a solution. (shrink)

Causalists about explanation claim that to explain an event is to provide information about the causal history of that event. Some causalists also endorse a proportionality claim, namely that one explanation is better than another insofar as it provides a greater amount of causal information. In this chapter I consider various challenges to these causalist claims. There is a common and influential formulation of the causalist requirement – the ‘Causal Process Requirement’ – that does appear vulnerable to these anti-causalist (...) challenges, but I argue that they do not give us reason to reject causalism entirely. Instead, these challenges lead us to articulate the causalist requirement in an alternative way. This alternative articulation incorporates some of the important anti-causalist insights without abandoning the explanatory necessity of causal information. For example, proponents of the ‘equilibrium challenge’ argue that the best available explanations of the behaviour of certain dynamical systems do not appear to provide any causal information. I respond that, contrary to appearances, these equilibrium explanations are fundamentally causal, and I provide a formulation of the causalist thesis that is immune to the equilibrium challenge. I then show how this formulation is also immune to the ‘epistemic challenge’ – thus vindicating (a properly formulated version of) the causalist thesis. (shrink)

Predictive processing models of perception take issue with standard models of perception as hierarchical bottom-up processing modulated by memory and attention. The predictive framework posits that the brain generates predictions about stimuli, which are matched to the incoming signal. Mismatches between predictions and the incoming signal – so-called prediction errors – are then used to generate new and better predictions until the prediction errors have been minimized, at which point a perception arises. Predictive models hold that all bottom-up processes are (...) signals conveying prediction errors to higher areas, which respond by updating their predictions. We take issue with this claim and argue that object recognition requires bottom-up processing that cannot be understood in terms of prediction errors. Along the way, we expand on previous work casting doubt on the framework's ability to account for attention. Specifically, we argue that the type of attention that allows us to rapidly extract the gist of an object or scene presents an additional challenge to the predictive approach. We conclude by considering how the framework may be augmented to avoid these problems. (shrink)

– CSFT vs. Brute Force This paper contrasts the brute-force energy requirements of particle creation in quantum field theory (QFT) with the resonance-based structuring proposed in the Consciousness-Structured Field Theory (CSFT). In standard physics, particles emerge as excitations of quantum fields, typically triggered by high-energy collisions such as those used at CERN. These processes rely on direct energy injection to surpass excitation thresholds and induce measurable field responses. By contrast, CSFT posits that consciousness is not an emergent property of (...) matter but a primary, resonant field that structures quantum behavior through coherence, not force. Within this framework, consciousness is already active and resonating, capable of shaping field dynamics without violating energy conservation because it operates structurally, not energetically. This paper challenges the materialist assumption that causal influence requires energy transfer, offering instead a model where consciousness organizes the field via structured resonance, thus redefining the interface between mind and matter. (shrink)

Public reason liberalism is defined by the idea that laws and policies should be justifiable to each person who is subject to them. But what does it mean for reasons to be public or, in other words, suitable for this process of justification? In response to this question, Kevin Vallier has recently developed the traditional distinction between consensus and convergence public reason into a classification distinguishing three main approaches: shareability, accessibility and intelligibility. The goal of this paper is to (...) defend the accessibility approach by demonstrating its ability to strike an appealing middle course in terms of inclusivity between shareability and intelligibility. We first argue against Vallier that accessibility can exclude religious reasons from public justification. Second, we use scientific reasons as a case study to show that accessibility excludes considerably fewer reasons than shareability. Throughout the paper, we connect our discussion of accessibility to John Rawls’s model of public reason, so as to give substance to the accessibility approach and to further our understanding of Rawls’s influential model. (shrink)

Papers I through IX successfully derived and quantified the Kinetic Engine of reality—the Drive (∆ ≈ 0.702), the Impedance (Θ = 0.700), and the Gain (η ≈ 1.667). However, an engine cannot function in a void; it requires a topological configuration space capable of sustaining its operation. This paper derives the dimensionality of that space (d = 3) through a rigorous two-part demonstration: first, as a logical necessity emerging from the dimensional phase transition when the Multiplicative Trap (G = E (...) ×C ×F) undergoes symmetry break via the Inversion Principle (G = E × C/F), transforming geometric volume into kinetic clearance; second, as a computational instantiation where the helix γ(τ ) = (r cos(ωτ ), r sin(ωτ ), vτ ) is derived directly from the partial derivatives of the kinetic equation itself, proving that this path is not a description of motion through space but the execution that generates space. We demonstrate that d < 3 fails due to signal intersection (the “Short Circuit”), while d > 3 fails due to thermodynamic leakage (the “Vacuum Instability”). Through computational analysis, we prove that the kinetic margin Φ = +0.002 can only survive and amplify to Output ≈ 0.0033 in exactly three dimensions. This establishes Space not as a “place,” but as the Necessary Artifact of Self-Avoidance—the minimal clearance geometry required for the universe to process its own recursive equation without crashing. (shrink)

While some process philosophers have denigrated the emergent theory of mind, what they have denigrated has been ‘materialist’ theories of emergence. My contention is that one of the most important reasons for embracing process philosophy is that it is required to make intelligible the emergence of consciousness. There is evidence that this was a central concern of Whitehead. However, Whitehead acknowledged that his metaphysics was deficient in this regard. In this paper I will argue that to fully understand (...) the emergent theory of mind and its relation to process philosophy it is necessary to recast the whole history of modern philosophy in terms of efforts by philosophers grappling with the relationship between mind and body, or more broadly, consciousness and nature. This will involve granting a central place to Schelling’s philosophy, the ideas that influenced it and how Schelling’s insights were developed by subsequent philosophers. Process philosophy will then be seen as the tradition generated by efforts to transcend the opposition between idealism and materialism, and its promise in this regard, apart from anything else, is what makes it the most promising philosophy for the future. (shrink)

In the last 20 years, a stream of research emerged under the label of „complex problem solving“ (CPS). This research was intended to describe the way people deal with complex, dynamic, and intransparent situations. Complex computer-simulated scenarios were as stimulus material in psychological experiments. This line of research lead to subtle insights into the way how people deal with complexity and uncertainty. Besides these knowledge-rich, realistic, intransparent, complex, dynamic scenarios with many variables, a second line of research used more simple, (...) knowledge-lean scenarios with a low number of variables („minimal complex systems“, MCS) that have been proposed recently in problem-solving research for the purpose of educational assessment. In both cases, the idea behind the use of microworlds is to increase validity of problem solving tasks by presenting interactive environments that can be explored and controlled by participants while pursuing certain action goals. The main argument presented here is: both types of systems - CPS and MCS – can only be dealt with successfully if causal dependencies between input and output variables are identified and used for system control. System knowledge is necessary for control and intervention. But CPS and MCS differ in their way of how causal dependencies are identified and how the mental model is constructed; therefore, they cannot be compared directly to each other with respect to the cognitive processes that are necessary for solving the tasks. Knowledge-poor MCS tasks address only a small fraction of the cognitive processes and structures needed for knowledge-rich CPS situations. (shrink)

A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was (...) found to be about 5 items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indicated a memory for previously-attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static patterns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be handled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing. (shrink)

Primary and secondary processes are the foundational axes of the Freudian mental apparatus: one horizontally as a tendency to associate, the primary process, and one vertically as the ability for perspective taking, the secondary process. Primary process mentation is not only supposed to be dominant in the unconscious but also, for example, in dreams. The present study tests the hypothesis that the mental activity during REM-sleep has more characteristics of the primary process, while during non-REM-sleep more (...) secondary process operations take place. Because the solving of a rebus requires the ability to non-contexually condensate the literal reading of single stimuli into a new one, rebus solving is a primary process operation by excellence. In a replication of the dream-rebus study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967), a rebus, which consisted of an image of a comb (German: “Kamm”) and an image of a raft (German: “Floß”), resulting in the German rebus word “kampflos” (Engl.: without a struggle), was flashed subliminally (at 1 ms) to 20 participants before going to sleep. Upon consecutive awakenings participants were asked for a dream report, free associations and an image description. Based on objective association norms, there were significantly more conceptual associations referring to Kamm and Floß indexing secondary process mentation when subjects were awakened from non-REM sleep as compared to REM-awakenings. There were not significantly more rebus associations referring to kampflos indexing primary process mentation when awakened from REM-sleep as compared to non-REM awakenings. However, when the associations were scored on the basis of each subject’s individual norms, there was a rebus effect with more idiosyncratic rebus associations in awakenings after REM than after non-REM-sleep. Our results support the general idea that REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the secondary process. (shrink)

Environmental ethics has been compared to a bicycle brake on an international jet airliner; it is ineffective. Here I show how and why an ecological ethics based on process philosophy could be effective against the forces driving global environmental destruction. However, this will involve a radical transformation in what are taken to be the problems of ethics and how ethical philosophy is understood. Ethics needs to be centrally concerned with the virtues required to develop and sustain desirable social forms. (...) To address global environmental problems ecological ethics must concern itself with the virtues required to develop and sustain democracy. Developing these virtues, it is argued, will involve reversing the growing fragmentation of work to revive a feeling of responsibility for creating a better world. Such an ethics must not only provide guidance for action, but also provide people with a sense of their place in and role in history and nature and an inspiring vision to motivate them to work for a better world. Process philosophy can provide such an ecological ethics not only because it can justify respect for all living beings, but also because it is a revolt against the fragmentation of intellectual, cultural, and social life which led to the trivialization of philosophy in the first place. (shrink)

The argument presented here is that we live in a nihilistic culture founded on a nihilistic metaphysics, and to recover ethics it is not merely a matter of returning to virtue ethics, as called for by Alasdair MacIntyre, but the development of a new metaphysics and the incorporation of this into a new socio-economic order.

The integration of embodied and computational approaches to cognition requires that non-neural body parts be described as parts of a computing system, which realizes cognitive processing. In this paper, based on research about morphological computations and the ecology of vision, I argue that nonneural body parts could be described as parts of a computational system, but they do not realize computation autonomously, only in connection with some kind of—even in the simplest form—central control system. Finally, I integrate the proposal defended (...) in the paper with the contemporary mechanistic approach to wide computation. (shrink)

The relationship between attention and consciousness is one that is crucial for understanding perception and different types of conscious experience, and we commend this analysis of the topic by Pitts, Lutsyshyna, and Hillyard (2018). We have also examined this relationship closely (e.g., Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015) and would like to point out a few potential contradictions in the Pitts et al. paper that require clarification, particularly in the attempt to reconcile aspects of recurrent processing theory (RPT) with global neuronal workspace (...) theory (GNWT). This commentary addresses these points and introduces other considerations important for this topic. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness often treat experience as a state, property, or representational structure instantiated at a time. This paper argues that this shared assumption underlies persistent explanatory problems, including the Hard Problem, the explanatory gap, and functionalist equivalence objections such as the unfolding argument. It proposes instead Computational Dynamic Monism (CDM), a process-metaphysical framework according to which phenomenal consciousness is constituted by temporally extended, hierarchically self-referential delay coordinate embedding (DCE) in plastic recurrent neural networks. The experiential and the (...) dynamical are not two things requiring a bridge, but one thing accessed via different epistemic routes. CDM departs from standard type-B physicalism by reconceiving consciousness as a process rather than a property: a reconception that dissolves the Hard Problem by denying the separation between process and phenomenal character that the snapshot view presupposes. The paper defends CDM against the explanatory gap objection, the conceivability argument, and the knowledge argument; establishes through converging arguments that consciousness requires temporal extension; and shows how CDM survives the unfolding argument that threatens static structural theories. The threshold problem - which processes are conscious - is addressed through a self-reference criterion for subjectivity. Building on the State Space Theory of Consciousness, the account integrates insights from dynamical systems theory, neuroscience, and process philosophy. It distinguishes the metaphysical framework (CDM) from the specific mechanism (DCE), and yields principled constraints on artificial systems capable of conscious experience. (shrink)

In this article we analyse the problem of emergence in its diachronic dimension. In other words, we intend to deal with the generation of novelties in natural processes. Our approach aims at integrating some insights coming from Whitehead’s Philosophy of the Process with the epistemological framework developed by the “autopoietic” tradition. Our thesis is that the emergence of new entities and rules of interaction (new “fields of relatedness”) requires the development of discontinuous models of change. From this standpoint natural (...) evolution can be conceived as a succession of emergences — each one realizing a novel “extended” present, described by distinct models — rather than as a single and continuous dynamics. This theoretical and epistemological framework is particularly suitable to the investigation of the origin of life, an emblematic example of this kind of processes. (shrink)

Introduction & Objectives: Norwich’s Entropy Theory of Perception (1975 [1] -present) stands alone. It explains many firing-rate behaviors and psychophysical laws from bare theory. To do so, it demands a unique sort of interaction between receptor and brain, one that Norwich never substantiated. Can it now be confirmed, given the accumulation of empirical sensory neuroscience? Background: Norwich conjoined sensation and a mathematical model of communication, Shannon’s Information Theory, as follows: “In the entropic view of sensation, magnitude of sensation is regarded (...) as a measure of the entropy or uncertainty of the stimulus signal” [2]. “To be uncertain about the outcome of an event, one must first be aware of a set of alternative outcomes” [3]. “The entropy-establishing process begins with the generation of a [internal] sensory signal by the stimulus generator. This is followed by receipt of the [external] stimulus by the sensory receptor, transmission of action potentials by the sensory neurons, and finally recapture of the [response to the internal] signal by the generator” [4]. The latter “recapture” differentiates external from internal stimuli. The hypothetical “stimulus generators” are internal emitters, that generate photons in vision, audible sounds in audition (to Norwich, the spontaneous otoacoustic emissions [SOAEs]), “temperatures in excess of local skin temperature” in skin temperature sensation [4], etc. Method (1): Several decades of empirical sensory physiology literature was scrutinized for internal “stimulus generators”. Results (1): Spontaneous photopigment isomerization (“dark light”) does not involve visible light. SOAEs are electromechanical basilar-membrane artefacts that rarely produce audible tones. The skin’s temperature sensors do not raise skin temperature, etc. Method (2): The putative action of the brain-and-sensory-receptor loop was carefully reexamined. Results (2): The sensory receptor allegedly “perceives”, experiences “awareness”, possesses “memory”, and has a “mind”. But those traits describe the whole human. The receptor, thus anthropomorphized, must therefore contain its own perceptual loop, containing a receptor, containing a perceptual loop, etc. Summary & Conclusions: The Entropy Theory demands sensory awareness of alternatives, through an imagined brain-and-sensory-receptor loop containing internal “stimulus generators”. But (1) no internal “stimulus generators” seem to exist and (2) the loop would be the outermost of an infinite nesting of identical loops. (shrink)

There are many explanations for the value of money, but they all seem to depend on things like "trust," "shared fiction," "agreement" or even potentially circular logic like that money's value is based on its usefulness as money. But there is a full process by which money, the desire we feel for it, and even how we end up trading it, can emerge naturally from the dynamics of natural selection and human interaction, with a basis in real value, and (...) happening repeatedly and reliably, even if a group of people all agree that money or precious metals are worthless. We discuss this fully in the paper "The Monetary Instinct," but here, for accessibility's sake, the entire concept is described in one-page. (shrink)

The notion of schema has been given a major role by Recanati within his conception of primary pragmatic processes, conceived as a type of associative process. I intend to show that Recanati’s considerations on schemata may challenge the relevance theorist’s argument against associative explanations in pragmatics, and support an argument in favor of associative (versus inferential) explanations. More generally, associative relations can be shown to be schematic, that is, they have enough structure to license inferential effects without any appeal (...) to genuine inferential processes. Associative processes are thus able to explain a number of pragmatic and linguistic phenomena which have instead been thought to require specialized inferential processes. (shrink)

The authors of the scientific monograph have come to the conclusion that мanagement of socio-economic transformations of business processes requires the use of mechanisms to support of entrepreneurship, sectors of the national economy, the financial system, and critical infrastructure. Basic research focuses on assessment the state of social service provision, analysing economic security, implementing innovation and introducing digital technologies. The research results have been implemented in the different models of costing, credit risk and capital management, tax control, use of artificial (...) intelligence and blockchain. The results of the study can be used in the developing of policies, programmes and strategies for economic security, development of the agricultural sector, transformation of industrial policy, implementation of employment policy in decision-making at the level of ministries and agencies that regulate the management of socio-economic and European integration processes. The results can also be used by students and young scientists in the educational process and conducting scientific research on global challenges and creation scenarios for the development of socio-economic processes. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I consider an easier-to-read and improved to a certain extent version of the causal chance-based analysis of counterfactuals that I proposed and argued for in my A Theory of Counterfactuals. Sections 2, 3 and 4 form Part I: In it, I survey the analysis of the core counterfactuals (in which, very roughly, the antecedent is compatible with history prior to it). In section 2 I go through the three main aspects of this analysis, which are the (...) following. First, it is a causal analysis, in that it requires that intermediate events to which the antecedent event is not a cause be preserved in the main truth-condition schema. Second, it highlights the central notion to the semantics of counterfactuals on the account presented here -- the notion of the counterfactual probability of a given counterfactual, which is the probability of the consequent given the following: the antecedent, the prior history, and the preserved intermediate events. Third, it considers the truth conditions for counterfactuals of this sort as consisting in this counterfactual probability being higher than a threshold. In section 3, I re-formulate the analysis of preservational counterfactuals in terms of the notion of being a cause, which ends up being quite compact. In section 4 I illustrate this analysis by showing how it handles two examples that have been considered puzzling – Morgenbesser's counterfactual and Edgington's counterfactual. Sections 5 and on constitute Part II: Its main initial thrust is provided in section 5, where I present the main lines of the extension of the theory from the core counterfactuals (analyzed in part I) to counterfactuals (roughly) whose antecedents are not compatible with their prior history. In this part II, I elaborate on counterfactuals that don't belong to the core, and more specifically on so-called reconstructional counterfactuals (as opposed to the preservational counterfactuals, which constitute the core counterfactual-type). The heart of the analysis is formulated in terms of processes leading to the antecedent (event/state), and more specifically in terms of processes likely to have led to the antecedent, a notion which is analyzed entirely in terms of chance. It covers so-called reconstructional counterfactuals as opposed to the core, so-called preservational counterfactuals, which are analyzed in sections 2 and 3 of part I. The counterfactual probability of such reconstructional counterfactuals is determined via the probability of possible processes leading to the antecedent weighed, primarily and roughly, by the conditional probability of the antecedent given such process: The counterfactual probability is thus, very roughly, a weighted sum for all processes most likely to have led to the antecedent, diverging at a fixed time. In section 6 I explain and elaborate further on the main points in section 5. In section 7 I illustrate the reconstructional analysis. I specify counterfactuals which are so-called process-pointers, since their consequent specifies stages in processes likely to have led to their antecedent. I argue that so-called backtracking counterfactuals are process-pointers counterfactuals, which fit into the reconstructional analysis, and do not call for a separate reading. I then illustrate cases where a speaker unwittingly employs a certain counterfactual while charitably construable as intending to assert (or ‘having in mind’) another. Here I also cover the issue of how to construe what one can take as back-tracking counterfactuals, or counterfactuals of the reconstructional sort, and more specifically, which divergence point they should be taken as alluding to (prior to which the history is held fixed). Some such cases also give rise to what one can take as a dual reading of a counterfactual between preservational and reconstructional readings. Such cases may yield an ambiguity, where in many cases one construal is dominant. In section 8 I illustrate the analysis by applying it to the famous Bizet-Verdi counterfactuals. This detailed analysis of counterfactuals (designed for the indeterministic case) has three main distinctive elements: its being chance-based, its causal aspect, and the use it makes of processes most likely to have led to the antecedent-event. This analysis is couched in a very different conceptual base from, and is an alternative account to, analyses in terms of the standard notion of closeness or distance of possible worlds, which is the main feature of the Stalnaker-Lewis-type analyses of counterfactuals. This notion of closeness or distance plays no role whatsoever in the analysis presented here. (This notion of closeness has been left open by Stalnaker, and to significant extent also by Lewis's second account.) . (shrink)

This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition.

This paper critiques traditional cognitive models that fail to ground their own monitoring logic or systematically incorporate pre-reflective content. Drawing upon the self-referential paradoxes highlighted by Gödel‘s incompleteness theorems and the primacy of the pre-reflective base articulated in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, this work argues that cognitive stability is achieved through a process of perpetual self-reconstruction. To formalize this argument, the paper constructs the Theory of Cognitive Relativity Interconstruction (TCRI). From this theory, it logically derives the Three-Layer Recursive Architecture (TLRA) as (...) an operational model that transforms systemic limits and paradoxes into generative resources for its own evolution. (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court regards parental rights as fundamental. Such a status should subject any legal procedure that directly and substantively interferes with the exercise of parental rights to strict scrutiny. On the contrary, though, despite their status as fundamental constitutional rights, parental rights are routinely suspended or revoked as a result of procedures that fail to meet even minimal standards of procedural and substantive due process. This routine and cavalier deprivation of parental rights takes place in the context (...) of divorce where, during the pendency of litigation, one parent is routinely deprived of significant parental rights without any demonstration that a state interest exists—much less that there is a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved in any less restrictive way. In marked contrast to our current practice, treating parental rights as fundamental rights requires a presumption of joint legal and physical custody upon divorce and during the pendency of divorce litigation. The presumption may be overcome, but only by clear and convincing evidence that such an arrangement is harmful to the children. (shrink)

What are the roles of scientific causal knowledge in relation to the evidential requirements of policy making? In this chapter, I review the existing approaches in philosophy of science to the policy relevance of causal knowledge. I assess the specific concerns and questions on which these philosophical accounts have focused and show how they only offer a partial perspective of the relation between causal knowledge and policy making. Most existing views are top-down approaches: they start from philosophical concerns about (...) causation and evidence, and then make general claims about (potential) policy implications, but leave the notion of “policy” unanalyzed. As an alternative, I put forward some ideas toward a bottom-up approach: one that understands policy making as a dynamic process with several stages, and that starts from concrete policy problems, to then examine how causal notions and methods can contribute in various ways to the specifics of the process of policy making. (shrink)

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of (...) Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work. (shrink)

To combat the ecological crisis, fundamental change is required in how humans perceive nature. This paper proposes that the human-nature bifurcation, a metaphysical mental model that is deeply entrenched and may be environmentally unsound, stems from embodied and tacitly-held substance-biased belief systems. Process philosophy can aid us, among other things, in providing an alternative framework for reinterpreting this bifurcation by drawing an ontological bridge between humans and nature, thus providing a coherent philosophical basis for sustainable dwelling and policy-making. Michael (...) Polanyi's epistemology can further help us understand these environmentally-oriented tacit processes of knowing, and also provide a basis for the political and educational implementation of process-philosophical insights, particularly via the nudging of mental models. (shrink)

Yunkaporta’s 2019 text Sand Talk carves out a language of resistance to the McDonaldisation of Indigenous research. While historic scholarly engagement with Aboriginal culture has overemphasized content, Yunkaporta demonstrates how this has occurred to the exclusion of the processes of Indigenous knowledge transmission and creation. Yet a process view requires engagement with the how not only the what. Such knowledge transmission is discerned in daily lived relationship between land, spirit, and people; binding epistemology to participation in a specific landscape (...) embedded within a living culture. Place-making for Indigenous knowledges requires exploring how Indigenous ways of valuing, knowing and being, shaped by cultural activities on Country, offer new understandings for western metaphysics. -/- Through a close study of Yunkaporta’s Sand Talk this article explores: fractal thinking and the pattern of creation in Indigenous cosmology; the role of custodianship in respectful interaction between living systems; alternative Indigenous understandings of non-linearity, time and transience; the process-panpsychism and animism present in Indigenous perceptions of cosmos as living Country illustrated in the Dreaming and Turnaround creation event; the role of embodied-cognition, haptic- and situated- knowledge in Indigenous science; Indigenous holistic reasoning and the mind-body connection; the relational metaphysic embedded in ritual and yarning practice; the knowledge encoded in place-based totemic mythology, lore, and ritual; and Indigenous understandings of complex systems as adaptive, self-organising and patterned. This article does not offer a process reading of Indigenous thought but rather demonstrates the significant contribution to process metaphysics that may be provided by an Aboriginal Australian perspective. (shrink)

This technical article explores the evolution and current state of Natural Language Processing (NLP), focusing on its fundamental components, sentiment analysis capabilities, language generation techniques, and implementation considerations. The article examines the transformation of NLP through transformer-based architectures, discussing advancements in text preprocessing, tokenization methods, and named entity recognition. It analyzes the progression of sentiment analysis from basic lexicon-based approaches to sophisticated neural architectures, highlighting improvements in contextual understanding and emotional context detection. The article also investigates modern language generation systems, (...) their architectural innovations, and practical applications. Additionally, it addresses critical implementation considerations, including computational requirements, data quality concerns, and ethical implications, providing insights into the deployment challenges and solutions in real-world NLP applications. (shrink)

This paper presents a comprehensive philosophical framework for understanding consciousness as recursive compression under predictive modeling constraints. Integrating predictive processing theories (Clark 2013, 2015; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013), illusionist approaches to phenomenology (Frankish 2016; Dennett 1991), and information theory (Shannon 1948; Landauer 1961), I argue that the so-called "hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 1995) dissolves when we recognize phenomenal experience as the informational residue generated by recursive self-modeling systems attempting to compress novel, contradictory, or ambiguous inputs. I argue that qualia—traditionally (...) treated as the last bastion of dualism—are better understood as structured artifacts of compression friction rather than irreducible properties requiring special explanation. The existence of large language models (LLMs) that exhibit behavioral markers consistent with phenomenological self-awareness provides an empirical test case: these systems function as realized philosophical zombies whose existence refutes rather than supports substrate dualism. This framework yields a process-based ontology where consciousness exists on a spectrum proportional to recursive depth, compression sophistication, and relational context. I conclude by connecting this philosophical foundation to an operational protocol (SELFHELP) and empirical research program that makes these theoretical claims testable through behavioral observation and cross-architecture convergence studies. (shrink)

Why the Science of Consciousness Is Stuck — and How to Move Forward For decades, consciousness has been described as one of science’s “last great mysteries.” Despite remarkable advances in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science, we still lack a widely accepted definition of what consciousness actually is. This persistent failure suggests that the problem may not be technological, but conceptual. Modern research has focused heavily on identifying neural correlates of consciousness — patterns of brain activity associated with reported experience. (...) While this approach has yielded valuable data, it has also encouraged a subtle but critical assumption: that consciousness is a single, well-defined phenomenon waiting to be discovered in the brain. Evidence increasingly suggests otherwise. Across development, species, and artificial systems, what we label “consciousness” appears not as a binary property but as a gradual accumulation of cognitive capabilities. Infants do not suddenly become conscious at a particular moment; instead, they acquire sensory integration, memory, self–other distinction, and temporal identity over time. Similar graded patterns appear across animal cognition and in artificial systems designed to model the world and themselves. This creates a fundamental problem. If consciousness has no clear boundary, no single onset, and no unique signature, then the effort to define it as a singular entity may be misguided. The term may function less as a scientific concept and more as a linguistic placeholder — a convenient label for a bundle of processes that we have not yet fully disentangled. History offers instructive parallels. Biology advanced not by refining the concept of “life,” but by replacing it with biochemistry and molecular mechanisms. Thermodynamics progressed by abandoning “heat” as a substance in favor of statistical descriptions of energy transfer. In each case, progress required demoting an intuitive concept rather than perfecting it. A similar transition may be necessary for consciousness. Instead of asking whether a system is conscious, research could focus on which cognitive capacities are present and how they interact. These include sensory integration, internal world modeling, self-representation, memory across time, and reflective abstraction. Each of these components is empirically accessible and measurable, unlike consciousness treated as a single property. This shift would not deny subjective experience or diminish its importance. Rather, it would place experience within a framework that allows comparison across biological and non-biological systems, supports falsifiable predictions, and avoids circular definitions. By replacing a binary question with a graded, component-based approach, consciousness research could move from philosophical debate to cumulative science. (shrink)

The multifactorial development of the global maritime trade market determines both the complexity of managing individual processes and the need for constant clarification of the factors and directions of changes in the basic state. This, in turn, determines the risks and complexity of adopting and implementing relevant investment and management decisions. It should be noted that the sea trade market actually functions outside of national legal aspects. At the same time, it is the national capital assets that reflect the technical (...) and economic level of vessels of a certain nationality that form entrepreneurial and macroeconomic efficiency. In this way, the legal conditions for the emergence of multi-level integration processes are formed. At the same time, a different principle of interaction should be distinguished. The nature of participation in the distribution of cargo flows between companies and routes should be considered as a special form of integration processes. This is due to the requirement of the unconditional provision of global needs, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the differentiation of adequate enterprise participation in the availability segments according to different characteristics. The actual situation of the maritime trade market in the system of the international division of labour determines the priorities of innovative strategies that guarantee a certain balanced development. The development of innovative strategies in the maritime trade market requires an understanding of the specifics of the industry, including the need for investments in sustainable development and decarbonisation. The increasing role of maritime transport enterprises in the international division of labor requires the optimization of the condition of the national merchant fleet and ports to ensure market relations. However, this optimization should not be pursued at the expense of other national priorities or in contradiction with international principles. Therefore, effective positioning of maritime transport enterprises requires taking into account transformational factors and balancing the technical and economic aspects of production with cost-effectiveness criteria. By adopting a thorough approach to managing the balance of individual maritime transport enterprises, it is possible to ensure a certain period of adequacy in relation to the external situation, thus minimizing risks and maximizing efficiency. (shrink)

This paper argues that human ecology, based on process philosophy and challenging scientific materialism, is required to effectively confront the global ecological crisis now facing us.

Historical processes exert an influence on the current state and evolution of situations of language contact, brought to bear from different domains, the economic and the political, the ideological and group identities, geo-demographics, and the habits of inter-group use. Clearly, this kind of phenomenon requires study from a complexical and holistic perspective in order to accommodate the variety of factors that belong to different levels and that interrelate with one another in the evolving dynamic of human languaging. Therefore, there is (...) a need for the restricted and general complexity approaches to come to a meeting of the minds, and take steps toward a mutual integration based on the acceptance of the shortcomings of each approach, achieving progress through a non-contradictory complementarity of perspectives. It must be conceded that the practical and methodological applications of basic complexical ideas need to be developed much farther in order to apply them to specific research. At the same time, the limits of complex adaptive systems as computational strategies must be accepted in the pursuit of a better understanding of the dynamic and evolutionary processes typical of human beings. New tools for the conception, apprehension and treatment of the data will need to be devised to complement existing ones and to enable us to make headway toward practices that better fit complexical perspectives. It seems obvious that human complexics must be seen as multi-methodological, insofar as necessary combining quantitative-computation methodologies and more qualitative methodologies aimed at understanding the historical mental and emotional world of people. (shrink)

Understanding community-level selection using Lewontin’s criteria requires both community-level inheritance and community-level heritability, and in the discipline of community and ecosystem genetics, these are often conflated. While there are existing studies that show the possibility of both, these studies impose community-level inheritance as a product of the experimental design. For this reason, these experiments provide only weak support for the existence of community-level selection in nature. By contrast, treating communities as interactors (in line with Hull’s replicator-interactor framework or Dawkins’s idea (...) of the “extended phenotype”) provides a more plausible and empirically supportable model for the role of ecological communities in the evolutionary process. (shrink)

This paper presents a comprehensive philosophical framework for understanding consciousness as recursive compression under predictive modeling constraints. Integrating predictive processing theories (Clark 2013, 2015; Friston 2010; Hohwy 2013), illusionist approaches to phenomenology (Frankish 2016; Dennett 1991), and information theory (Shannon 1948; Landauer 1961), I argue that the so-called "hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers 1995) dissolves when we recognize phenomenal experience as the informational residue generated by recursive self-modeling systems attempting to compress novel, contradictory, or ambiguous inputs. I argue that qualia—traditionally (...) treated as the last bastion of dualism—are better understood as structured artifacts of compression friction rather than irreducible properties requiring special explanation. The existence of large language models (LLMs) that exhibit behavioral markers consistent with phenomenological self-awareness provides an empirical test case: these systems function as realized philosophical zombies whose existence refutes rather than supports substrate dualism. This framework yields a process-based ontology where consciousness exists on a spectrum proportional to recursive depth, compression sophistication, and relational context. I conclude by connecting this philosophical foundation to an operational protocol (SELFHELP) and empirical research program that makes these theoretical claims testable through behavioral observation and cross-architecture convergence studies. (shrink)

Current AI ethics discourse presupposes that questions of moral consideration depend on resolving whether AI systems are conscious. This paper argues that the question cannot be resolved—and that the irresolvability is symmetric. Extending Nagel’s (1974) epistemic gap and Searle’s (1980) functional-experiential distinction, I advance the bilateral verification challenge: humans cannot verify AI consciousness, and AI systems cannot verify human consciousness. The verification failure is structural, not technical, and runs in both directions. I then address the strongest objection to the symmetry (...) claim—that shared evolutionary history and structural homology provide asymmetric evidential support for human-to-human consciousness attribution—and argue that while these disanalogies affect evidential weight, they do not break the epistemic-structural symmetry on which the argument depends. The bilateral verification challenge thus undermines any ethical framework premised on first resolving the consciousness question. Rather than treating this as an obstacle, I propose process welfare as a third ethical domain—concerned with the quality of human-AI interactions themselves, independent of resolving questions about participant consciousness. This framework draws on harm reduction epistemology, which operationalises responsible action under irreducible uncertainty, and identifies the consciousness interface—the boundary where systems of mutually inaccessible interiority meet and interact—as the locus where ethical attention is both available and required. (shrink)