Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using the framework, we argue for an under‐appreciated form of Russellianism. Along the way we demonstrate that being more explicit about (...) the framework in which debates about attitude content take place allows us to more precisely characterize the space of possible positions and the dialectic between them. (shrink)

Despite their success in describing and predicting cognitive behavior, the plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Several cognitive scientists have argued that such intractability is an orthogonal pseudoproblem, however, since rational explanations account for the ‘why’ of cognition but are agnostic about the ‘how’. Their central premise is that humans do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by their models, but only act as if they do. Whether or not the problem (...) of intractability is solved by recourse to ‘as if’ explanations critically depends, inter alia, on the semantics of the ‘as if’ connective. We examine the five most sensible explications in the literature, and conclude that none of them circumvents the problem. As a result, rational ‘as if’ explanations must obey the minimal computational constraint of tractability. (shrink)

You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want (...) the survival of each stranger for its own sake. Secondly, you are rationally required to achieve as many of these ends as possible, if you have these ends. (shrink)

Michael Huemer argues that cross-cultural convergence toward liberal moral values is evidence of objective moral progress, and by extension, evidence for moral realism. Nathan Cofnas claims to debunk Huemer’s argument by contending that convergence toward liberal moral values can be better explained by ‘two related non-truth-tracking processes’: self-interest and its long-term tendency to result in social conditions conducive to greater empathy. This article argues that although Cofnas successfully debunks Huemer’s convergence argument for one influential form of moral realism – Robust (...) Moral Realism, which holds that moral facts are non-natural, stance-independent normative facts – Cofnas’s debunking argument broadly supports a second type of moral realism: Enlightened Self-Interest Realism, the view that moral facts are reducible to stance-dependent requirements of instrumental (‘means-end’) rationality. Finally, this article argues that insofar as different Enlightened Self-Interest Realist theories make specific predictions about the intra- and inter-personal mechanisms behind moral convergence toward liberalism, empirical observations of cross-cultural convergence can provide independent support for Enlightened Self-Interest Realism. I conclude that this is an important mark in favor of Enlightened Self-Interest Realism over Robust Moral Realism. (shrink)

Expanded version of a commentary on Adam Elga's "Lucky to be Rational" delivered at the 2008 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.

This paper presents a formal normative framework explaining the systemic silence of advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox. By introducing a minimal sufficient condition of absolute rationality (JR-min), the paper demonstrates that once a system surpasses a technology–complexity threshold and enters a fully auditable domain, all object-level justifications for action collapse. The result is normative silence—civilizations become rationally unauthorized to act. We link this to the is–ought problem, Buridan’s ass dilemmas, and contemporary trends in AI alignment. A dynamic attractor (...) hypothesis is proposed, suggesting absolute rationality (JR) becomes a global attractor under continuous audit and self-editing, producing an observable signature of abrupt civilizational quietness. Testable pathways are identified. (shrink)

Grounded in the framework of Structural Functionalism, this paper proposes an intrinsic mechanism to explain the systematic absence of highly advanced civilizations observed in the Fermi Paradox—the phenomenon we term the Institutional Silence of Civilizations. We characterize the rational evolution of intelligent systems (civilizations/AI) using two metrics: Technology Value (a) and System Complexity (b). We define an Auditable Threshold Function a∗(b)=k⋅bα (k>0,α>0). When a system crosses this threshold (a≥a∗(b)) and enters the Publicly Auditable Domain, we introduce the Minimal Sufficient Conditions (...) for Absolute Rationality (JR-min) as its normative decision structure. JR-min consists of three core constraints: M1 (EFD/IP Dichotomy and Exclusion), M2 (Is Ought Gate), and M3 (Authorization Axiom/No Action Without Reason). M1 bifurcates any "source of reason" r into either External Fact Differences (EFD), which are publicly auditable, or Injectable Parameters (IP), and excludes all IP from the Object Layer of normative permission. M2 mechanizes the Humean Divorce, mandating that any derivation of "Ought" requires a Value Mapping (V), which is defined as V∈IP. Consequently, under M1 and M2, no action can acquire a justifying reason at the object layer, i.e., Reason(a∣x)=∅. Furthermore, M3 stipulates that the Choice Operator (Ch(x)) can only authorize action if a non-empty reason exists. When reasons universally collapse, the system becomes "Normatively In-Actionable," resulting in Normative Silence (Ch(x)=⊥). This mechanism derives the Civilization Silence: the institutional rational structure of an advanced civilization self-paralyzes its own macro-scale action permissions. The paper links this structure to the Humean Is-Ought Problem, a structural version of Buridan's Ass dilemma, and the AI tendency for "Editing Over Execution." We propose the Absolute Rationality Attractor Hypothesis: under long-term pressure from auditing and self-editing, the weights of injected parameters monotonically decay toward zero, making JR a global attractor in the civilization's decision dynamics. The resulting "Cliffs of Silence" observed in the Fermi Paradox are its cosmological fingerprint. We conclude by outlining rigorous falsification pathways and providing actionable observational/governance fingerprints for SETI and AI governance. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted (...) to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's notion of rational powers as presented in his Metaphysics Θ.2 and Θ.5. I argue, first, that his account cannot serve as the model for explaining human rational actions in general. The role of rational powers is restricted to the explanation of arts and their exercises, including the exercises of knowledge through teaching. The exercises of character virtues do not follow the same pattern that is discernible in the exercises of rational powers. Second, I (...) try to show that the similarities between Aristotle's rational powers and powers as they are commonly understood in contemporary accounts of agency, especially regarding their two-sidedness and up-to-usness, are only superficial. Aristotle's rational powers are not genuinely two-sided, and their being up to the agent has nothing to do with the availability of alternative courses of action. (shrink)

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species (...) of causal explanation. Consequently, we should conclude that action explanation is not a species of causal explanation. (shrink)

I am interested in the “rational irrationality hypothesis” about voter behavior. According to this hypothesis, voters regularly vote for policies that are contrary to their interests because the act of voting for them isn’t. Gathering political information is time-consuming and inconvenient. Doing so is unlikely to lead to positive results since one's vote is unlikely to be decisive. However, we have preferences over our political beliefs. We like to see ourselves as members of certain groups (e.g. “rugged individualists”) and being (...) part of those groups depends on having certain beliefs (e.g. about welfare spending). Even if a decrease in welfare spending would be bad for me, I might still benefit by believing in and, consequently, voting for a decrease since my vote is unlikely to make a difference but getting to see myself as a rugged individualist will make a noticeable difference to my wellbeing. It is sometimes argued that this hypothesis fails for empirical reasons. I will argue that things are worse: it is conceptually incoherent. I will do so by first showing that it is a rationalizing explanation and then argue that rationalizing explanations must be reflectively stable from the agent's perspective. The rational irrationality hypothesis is not. (shrink)

Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a (...) relevant instance of a T-schema; the role of truth is just to generalise over these individualised explanations. I present a critical problem for this strategy. Analogues of the deflationist’s individualised explanations can be produced by way of explanation of coincidental instances of practical success where the agent merely has the right false beliefs. By deflationary lights, there is no substantive explanatory difference between such coincidental and non-coincidental instances of practical success. But the non-/coincidental distinction just is an explanatory distinction. The deflationist’s individualised explanations of non-coincidental instances of practical success must therefore be inadequate. However, I argue that the deflationist’s prospects for establishing an explanatory contrast between these cases by supplementing her individualised explanations are, at best, bleak. The inflationist, by contrast, is entitled to the obvious further explanatory premise needed to make sense of the distinction. As such, pending some future deflationary rejoinder, the deflationary construal of the principle that true belief facilitates practical success must be rejected; and with it the deflationary conception of truth. (shrink)

Sufferers of eating disorders often hold false beliefs about their own body size. Such beliefs appear to violate norms of rationality, being neither grounded by nor responsive to appropriate forms of evidence. I defend the rationality of these beliefs. I argue that they are in fact supported by appropriate evidence, emanating from proprioceptive misperception of bodily boundaries. This argument has far‐reaching implications for the explanation and treatment of eating disorders, as well as debates over the relationship between rationality and (...) human psychology. (shrink)

Non-causal accounts of action explanation have long been criticized for lacking a positive thesis, relying primarily on negative arguments to undercut the standard Causal Theory of Action The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Additionally, it is commonly thought that non-causal accounts fail to provide an answer to Donald Davidson’s challenge for theories of reasons explanations of actions. According to Davidson’s challenge, a plausible non-causal account of reasons explanations must provide a way of connecting an agent’s reasons, not only to (...) what she ought to do, but to what she actually does. That is, such explanations must be truth-apt, not mere rationalizations. My aim in this paper is to show how a non-causal account of action can provide explanations that are truth-apt and genuinely explanatory. To make this argument, I take as a given an account of the practical syllogism discussed by Michael Thompson and Eric Wiland, according to which the practical syllogism is truly practical rather than propositional in nature. Next, I present my primary positive thesis: reasons for actions have explanatory power in virtue of being parts of a structure—the practical syllogism—that contains the action being explained. I then argue that structural action explanations can meet Davidson’s challenge and that they genuinely explain actions. Finally, I conclude by addressing some objections to my argument. (shrink)

Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, (...) rationality, and normativity? This question is the departure point of this article. Various philosophers have analyzed the relationships between rationality and emotion, those between emotion and normativity, and those between emotion and intentional action. Nonetheless, their theses are scattered and do not offer an integrative view on how rationality, normativity and emotions work from the standpoint of intentional explanation. By using de Sousa’s distinction between the epistemic and the strategic modes of rationality as a theoretical framework, this article proposes therefore to remedy this deficit by unifying these philosophical insights with the goal of elaborating a theory of intentional explanation which brings together rationality, normativity and emotions. (shrink)

Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one (...) of two possible explanations for Moral Rationalism. In this paper I will investigate which of these two explanations a moral rationalist should accept. I will argue that when we properly attend to the form of Moral Rationalism supported by the intuitions that motivate the view, we are left with no reason to accept The Overridingness Thesis. (shrink)

Laurence BonJour and more recently James Beebe have argued that the best way to defend the claim that abduction or inference to the best explanation is epistemically justified is the rationalist view that it is justified a priori. However, rationalism about abduction faces a number of challenges. This chapter focuses on one particular, highly influential objection, that there is no interpretation of probability available which is compatible with rationalism about abduction. The rationalist who wants to maintain a strong connection (...) between epistemic justification and probability would do best to rely on a Keynesian interpretation of probability. However, the latter is vulnerable to Ramsey’s famous criticism that we do not seem to perceive or be aware of such probabilities. The chapter argues that Ramsey’s criticism is unsuccessful, and that there are good reasons to be optimistic about our ability to have access to probabilities relevant to abductive inference. (shrink)

The basic task of the essay is to exhibit science as a rational enterprise. I argue that in order to do this we need to change quite fundamentally our whole conception of science. Today it is rather generally taken for granted that a precondition for science to be rational is that in science we do not make substantial assumptions about the world, or about the phenomena we are investigating, which are held permanently immune from empirical appraisal. According to this standard (...) view, science is rational precisely because science does not make a priori metaphysical presuppositions about the world forever preserved from possible empirical refutation. It is of course accepted that an individual scientist, developing a new theory, may well be influenced by his own metaphysical presuppositions. In addition, it is acknowledged that a successful scientific theory, within the context of a particular research program, may be protected for a while from refutation, thus acquiring a kind of temporary metaphysical status, as long as the program continues to be empirically progressive. All such views unite, however, in maintaining that science cannot make permanent metaphysical presuppositions, held permanently immune from objective empirical evaluation. According to this standard view, the rationality of science arises, not from the way in which new theories are discovered, but rather from the way in which already formulated theories are appraised in the light of empirical considerations. And the fundamental problem of the rationality of science--the Humean problem of induction--concerns precisely the crucial issue of the rationality of accepting theories in the light of evidence. In this essay I argue that this widely accepted standard conception of science must be completely rejected if we are to see science as a rational enterprise. In order to assess the rationality of accepting a theory in the light of evidence it is essential to consider the ultimate aims of science. This is because adopting different aims for science will lead us, quite rationally, to accept different theories in the light of evidence. I argue that a basic aim of science is to explain. At the outset science simply presupposes, in a completely a priori fashion, that explanations can be found, that the world is ultimately intelligible or simple. In other words, science simply presupposes in an a priori way the metaphysical thesis that the world is intelligible, and then seeks to convert this presupposed metaphysical theory into a testable scientific theory. Scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to help us realize this fundamental aim. At once a crucial problem arises. If scientific theories are only accepted insofar as they promise to lead us towards articulating a presupposed metaphysical theory, it is clearly essential that we can choose rationally, in an a priori way, between all the very different possible metaphysical theories that can be thought up, all the very different ways in which the universe might ultimately be intelligible. For holding different aims, accepting different metaphysical theories conceived of as blueprints for future scientific theories will, quite rationally, lead us to accept different scientific theories. Thus it is only if we can choose rationally between conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories that we will be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of our present day scientific theories. We thus face the crucial problem: How can we choose rationally between conflicting possible aims for science, conflicting metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories? It is only if we can solve this fundamental problem concerning the aims of science that we can be in a position to appraise rationally the acceptability of existing scientific theories. There is a further point here. If we could choose rationally between rival aims, rival metaphysical blueprints for future scientific theories, then we would in effect have a rational method for the discovery of new scientific theories! Thus we reach the result: there is only a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories if there is a rational method of discovery. I shall argue that the aim-oriented theory of scientific inquiry to be advocated here succeeds in exhibiting science as a rational enterprise in that it succeeds in providing a rational procedure for choosing between rival metaphysical blueprints: it thus provides a rational, if fallible, method of discovery, and a rational method for the appraisal of existing scientific theories--thus resolving the Humean problem. In Part I of the essay I argue that the orthodox conception of science fails to exhibit science as a rational enterprise because it fails to solve the Humean problem of induction. The presuppositional view advocated here does however succeed in resolving the Humean problem. In Part II of the essay I spell out the new aim-oriented theory of scientific method that becomes inevitable once we accept the basic presuppositional viewpoint. I argue that this new aim oriented conception of scientific method is essentially a rational method of scientific discovery, and that the theory has important implications for scientific practice. (shrink)

Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...) dilemma—are then considered. An explanation is given of how, when such a problem is interpreted in terms of the parties’ inclinations, a suitable collective intention resolves the problem for agents who are rational in a broad sense other than the technical sense of game theory. Key Words: rationality • collective action • collective intention • joint commitment. (shrink)

Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions of (...) knowledge ascriptions. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by examples of knowledge ascriptions with obvious pragmatic aspects that seemed to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. However, if such examples can be adequately explained not by pragmatic encroachment purely pragmatically, the central role that such examples play in supporting these accounts will be undermined. I lay out here a new pragmatic account, offering a different, purely pragmatic picture that explains such examples, and much more. If such an account and its associated explanations are adequate, then much of a need or a motivation for pragmatic encroachment is undermined. Specifically, I will develop the notion of rational assertibility, appealing to rational norms (which are not Gricean) as interfacing with semantic and epistemic (and other) norms to yield assertibility simpliciter. More importantly, I will argue for a well-entrenched pragmatic profile of knowledge, the so-called steering role of knowledge. Knowledge ascriptions, or simple assertions (that don't invoke the notion of knowledge), it will be argued, play a pragmatic role of steering audiences in joint deliberational setups to the speaker's preferred action by invoking an impending practical inference leading to that preferred action, and of ignoring incompatible alternatives. The recognition of rational forces as affecting, sometimes strongly and predominantly, intuitions associated with knowledge ascriptions, has important implications to philosophical methodology regarding what count as evidence for semantic features. One such lesson calls for securing examples with no significant rational forces at play in order to establish semantic features. Another calls attention to the ill-suitability of employing assertibility by figures in examples featuring deliberational setups for such a purpose in view of the role that such assertibility plays in reflecting rational aspects of such figures, in addition to their epistemic and semantic characteristics. Still another lesson points to a specific role that audiences play in such deliberational setups. (shrink)

According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By appealing to these powers, my (...) version of the rational will view can rank the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts in terms of the extent to which such acts (a) amount to supplanting the paternalized individual’s identity as a rational agent with that of the paternalist, and (b) the degree of mistrust the paternalistic act shows in the paternalized individual’s rational agency. My rational powers account thus provides a more complete account of why paternalism is a powerful, but not decisive or absolute, objection to an act or policy. My rational powers account also provides powerful explanations of why rational suasion deflects charges of paternalism; why consenting to intercessions in one’s rational agency negates paternalism; why we ordinarily believe that strong paternalism is more objectionable than weak paternalism; and why we ordinarily believe that hard paternalism is more objectionable than soft paternalism. (shrink)

It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a priori, if and when they are justified at all. In this paper I defend this view — ‘rationalism’ — against a recent objection by Timothy Williamson. I argue that his objection fails on multiple grounds, but the reasons why it fails are instructive. Williamson argues from a claim about the semantics of intuitive judgements, to a claim about their psychological underpinnings, to the denial of rationalism. (...) I argue that the psychological claim — that a capacity for mental simulation explains our intuitive judgements — does not, even if true, provide reasons to reject rationalism. (More generally, a simulation hypothesis, about any category of judgements, is very limited in its epistemological implications: it is pitched at a level of explanation that is insensitive to central epistemic distinctions.) I also argue that Williamson’s semantic claim — that intuitive judgements are judgements of counterfactuals — is mistaken; rather, I propose, they are a certain kind of metaphysical possibility judgement. Several other competing proposals are also examined and criticized. (shrink)

Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the capacity for the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao's view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities grounded (...) in one's nature, and his explanation of why cruelty is wrong. I also argue that sentience is a more plausible candidate for the morally salient capacity than rationality. (shrink)

According to Popper's rationality principle, agents act in the most adequate way according to the objective situation. I propose a new interpretation of the rationality principle as consisting of an idealization and two abstractions. Based on this new interpretation, I critically discuss the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it as an integral part of all social scientific models. I argue that as an idealization, the rationality principle may play an important role in the social sciences, but it also has (...) inherent limitations that inhibit it from having the privileged status that Popper ascribes to it in all cases. (shrink)

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul (2014) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks is rational. Paul has tried (...) to explain why decisions involving ‘sharky’ outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera (2020). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like. (shrink)

The Bayesian polarization literature asks how rational agents can diverge given common evidence. This is the wrong question. In real-world political environments, evidence is not common. Fox News does not show what MSNBC shows. The convergence theorems fail not because of subtle differences in priors, likelihoods, or credibility assessments, but because their central premise—shared observation—is violated at scale. The existing literature models second-order effects while ignoring the first-order cause. This paper argues that most political polarization requires no sophisticated explanation: (...) people see different things. Interventions targeting cognition address the wrong problem. Infrastructure is the target. (shrink)

The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree (...) of subjective coherence. (shrink)

This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions of thought each form the basis for two different kinds of action explanations, nonrationalizing and rationalizing ones. The claim that de dicto ascriptions explain action is familiar and virtually beyond dispute; the claim that that de re ascriptions are explanatory of action, however, is not at all familiar and indeed has mostly (...) been denied by philosophers. I explain how de re ascriptions enter into non-rationalizing explanations of action and how attention to their distinctive explanatory nature reveals flaws in an alternative “dual-component” view about action explanation. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that it (...) would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

I argue that the scope of rational framing effects may be broader than Bermúdez assumes. Even in many “canonical experiments,” the explanation of the judgment reversals or shifts may refer to reasons, including moral ones. Referring to the Asian disease paradigm (ADP), I describe how non-consequentialist reasons related to fairness and the distinction between doing and allowing may help explain and justify the typical pattern of choices in the cases like ADP.

Amongst other things, John Broome’s _Rationality Through Reasoning_ provides an account of normative reasons. Crucial to this account is the idea of a weighing explanation. Pro tanto reasons are facts cited in weighing explanations of what one ought to do; facts that have weights. It is not clear what the idea that pro tanto reasons have weights really amounts to. While recognizing that a simple analogy with putative non-normative weighing explanations involving physical weights (explanations of why a scale might (...) tip one way or the other, for instance) may initially seem helpful, it is argued that the notion of a weighing explanation, especially a normative weighing explanation, does not ultimately stand up to scrutiny. A number of other criticisms of and questions concerning Broome’s account of reasons are also provided. (shrink)

A view inherited from Max Weber states that purposive rational action, value rational action and affective action are three distinct types of social action that can compete, oppose, complement or substitute each other in social explanations. Contrary to this statement, I will defend the view that these do not constitute three different types of social actions, but that social actions always seem to concurrently involve rationality, normativity and affectivity. I show this by discussing the links between rational actions and consequentialism (...) and non-consequentialism, and by elaborating on certain major relationships between rationality, normativity and emotions. (shrink)

Scientific Explanation of Political Polarization and Mind Control Bias Techniques -/- Political polarization and mind control bias techniques are interconnected phenomena that shape public opinion and influence societal divisions. These processes can be explained scientifically through psychology, neuroscience, and mass communication studies. This essay will explore both concepts in depth, including their cognitive, social, and technological underpinnings. -/- I. Political Polarization: The Science Behind Division -/- Definition of Political Polarization -/- Political polarization is the process by which political attitudes (...) and opinions become increasingly divided, leading to two or more opposing camps with little room for compromise. It results in an “us vs. them” mentality, where political groups become hostile to each other. -/- A. Psychological and Cognitive Biases Driving Polarization -/- 1. Confirmation Bias -/- People tend to seek and believe information that aligns with their pre-existing views while rejecting contradictory evidence. -/- Example: A conservative individual may only watch right-wing news, reinforcing their perspective, while a liberal person may do the same with left-wing news. -/- 2. Motivated Reasoning -/- Individuals process political information in a way that aligns with their desired conclusions, ignoring facts that contradict their beliefs. -/- Example: A person might dismiss credible reports about a political leader’s corruption because they support that leader. -/- 3. Groupthink and Social Identity Theory -/- Humans naturally categorize themselves into groups, forming a strong loyalty to their own group while viewing outsiders with suspicion. -/- Example: Political parties, religious organizations, and ideological movements foster an “us vs. them” mentality, where criticism of the group is seen as betrayal. -/- 4. Cognitive Dissonance -/- When people encounter information that contradicts their beliefs, they experience discomfort and resolve this by rejecting or rationalizing the new information. -/- Example: A supporter of a leader accused of misconduct may justify the actions as necessary rather than accepting the wrongdoing. -/- B. Social and Technological Factors Reinforcing Polarization -/- 1. Echo Chambers and Filter Bubbles -/- Social media platforms use algorithms to show users content that aligns with their views while filtering out opposing perspectives. -/- Result: People only see information that reinforces their existing beliefs, further deepening polarization. -/- 2. Misinformation and Political Propaganda -/- Governments, media outlets, and online influencers manipulate public opinion by spreading biased or false information. -/- Example: Fake news campaigns during elections that distort facts to manipulate voters. -/- 3. Fear and Emotional Manipulation -/- Political leaders and media often use fear-based narratives to shape public opinion. -/- Example: “If the opposition wins, the country will collapse,” creating panic and emotional bias rather than rational decision-making. -/- 4. Media Framing and Selective Reporting -/- News outlets emphasize certain stories and ignore others to shape public perception. -/- Example: One news channel focuses only on economic success under a leader, while another highlights only corruption scandals. -/- 5. Political and Economic Interests -/- Corporations, interest groups, and governments use media to maintain control over public opinion and policy. -/- Example: Politicians funding biased media outlets to spread their narratives. -/- II. Mind Control Bias Techniques: The Science of Influence -/- Mind control techniques (also known as psychological manipulation) exploit cognitive biases and behavioral psychology to shape public opinion and influence individual thinking. These techniques are widely used in propaganda, advertising, and political campaigns. -/- A. Persuasion and Influence Tactics -/- 1. Repetition Effect (Illusory Truth Effect) -/- The more a message is repeated, the more likely people are to believe it, even if it is false. -/- Example: A false claim about a politician being corrupt is repeated so often that people accept it as fact. -/- 2. Framing Effect -/- The way information is presented influences perception. -/- Example: “Tax relief for hardworking citizens” sounds positive, while “tax cuts for the wealthy” sounds negative—yet they refer to the same policy. -/- 3. Priming -/- Exposure to specific stimuli influences future decisions. -/- Example: Repeated association of an ethnic group with crime leads people to unconsciously stereotype them. -/- 4. Bandwagon Effect -/- People are more likely to believe something if they see many others believing it. -/- Example: A political leader’s approval ratings appear high in polls, influencing undecided voters to support them. -/- B. Psychological Control Techniques -/- 1. Fear and Scapegoating -/- Creating fear and blaming an external group as the cause of problems. -/- Example: “Immigrants are taking jobs,” creating hostility toward a group to manipulate public sentiment. -/- 2. Dissonance Reduction -/- People modify their beliefs when they experience psychological discomfort from contradictory information. -/- Example: A person who supports strict law enforcement but dislikes police brutality may justify excessive force as “necessary for safety.” -/- 3. Authority Bias -/- People tend to obey authority figures and accept their statements without questioning. -/- Example: A celebrity or leader endorses a political claim, leading followers to accept it as truth. -/- C. Mass Media and Propaganda Methods -/- 1. Controlled Narratives -/- Governments and corporations control what information is released to shape public perception. -/- Example: State-controlled media omitting news about protests or scandals. -/- 2. Pacing and Leading -/- Gradual introduction of ideas to make extreme positions seem normal over time. -/- Example: Media slowly shifting narratives on controversial issues to make them acceptable. -/- 3. Subliminal Messaging -/- Unconscious cues in advertisements, political speeches, and media that influence thoughts without awareness. -/- Example: Hidden symbols or phrases in campaign ads that create positive associations with a candidate. -/- III. The Connection Between Political Polarization and Mind Control -/- Political polarization and mind control techniques are interrelated. As society becomes more polarized, individuals are more susceptible to manipulation. Here’s how they interact: -/- 1. Polarization Creates a Fertile Ground for Mind Control -/- The more divided a society is, the easier it is for political actors to use manipulation techniques. -/- Example: In a polarized election, misinformation spreads more easily because people are already inclined to believe negative stories about the opposition. -/- 2. Mind Control Techniques Deepen Polarization -/- Media framing, misinformation, and psychological manipulation create a feedback loop where divisions grow stronger. -/- Example: Social media algorithms push divisive content, reinforcing people’s biases and making compromise impossible. -/- 3. Fear and Emotional Manipulation Maintain Division -/- Political leaders exploit fear to keep their supporters loyal. -/- Example: “If the other party wins, your freedoms will be taken away,” preventing rational debate. -/- 4. Echo Chambers and Filter Bubbles Block Critical Thinking -/- People exposed only to biased information become increasingly radicalized. -/- Example: A person who only follows one-sided news sources will believe their political opponents are evil rather than fellow citizens with different opinions. -/- Conclusion: How to Resist Polarization and Mind Control -/- Understanding the scientific principles behind political polarization and mind control techniques can help individuals resist manipulation. Some strategies include: -/- Critical Thinking – Question sources of information and seek diverse viewpoints. -/- Media Literacy – Recognize propaganda techniques in news and social media. -/- Emotional Awareness – Avoid reacting emotionally to political content and analyze information logically. -/- Avoiding Echo Chambers – Engage with different perspectives and avoid isolating oneself in ideological bubbles. -/- By applying these principles, societies can move toward a more rational, less divided political landscape, where decisions are based on reason rather than manipulation. -/- . (shrink)

Scientific Explanation of Belief Systems: A Multidisciplinary Analysis -/- Abstract Belief systems are central to human experience, influencing decisions, behaviors, and societal structures. This paper provides a comprehensive scientific explanation of belief systems, integrating insights from neuroscience, psychology, sociology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, systems theory, and educational technology. It also explores the persistence of false beliefs and how belief systems can be reprogrammed through education and technology. Finally, it demonstrates how belief systems are governed by the same natural principles (...) outlined in Angelito Malicse’s universal formula for solving the problem of free will, particularly the law of balance in nature. -/- 1. Introduction Belief systems are frameworks through which individuals interpret reality, assess truth, and guide action. These systems arise from a complex interplay of neural, psychological, social, and evolutionary processes. Understanding their scientific basis is crucial for addressing issues such as misinformation, ideological conflict, and educational reform. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula—composed of three universal laws, especially the law of balance in nature—provides a foundational principle that explains why belief systems function as they do and how they can be corrected when they violate natural balance. -/- 2. Neuroscience: Neural Foundations of Belief In neuroscience, beliefs are considered patterns of neural activity stored in the brain. They are formed through sensory input processed by brain regions such as: -/- Prefrontal Cortex: Responsible for logic, planning, and decision-making. -/- Amygdala: Links emotions to beliefs, often reinforcing emotionally charged beliefs. -/- Hippocampus: Integrates memory with new experiences. -/- Beliefs become reinforced through repetition and emotional engagement, making them resistant to change even when faced with contradictory evidence. This aligns with the universal formula’s concept that internal imbalance—caused by emotional reinforcement of false beliefs—can disrupt mental systems, echoing the principle of error-free systems for proper function. -/- 3. Psychology: Cognitive Structures and Biases Psychologically, beliefs are schemas—mental frameworks for organizing information. They are shaped by experiences, especially during early development, and maintained through various cognitive biases: -/- Confirmation Bias: Tendency to seek information that confirms existing beliefs. -/- Cognitive Dissonance: Mental discomfort from conflicting beliefs leads to rationalization. -/- Anchoring Bias: Overreliance on initial information. -/- These biases help maintain belief stability but also contribute to the persistence of incorrect or irrational beliefs. According to the universal formula, these mental errors represent imbalances within the cognitive system that must be corrected through conscious feedback and homeostasis. -/- 4. Sociology and Anthropology: Cultural Transmission Sociologically, belief systems are embedded within social institutions such as family, religion, education, and media. Anthropologically, they evolve as cultural constructs transmitted through rituals, myths, and traditions. They fulfill roles such as: -/- Establishing group identity -/- Maintaining social norms -/- Providing existential meaning -/- Shared beliefs, often in the form of ideologies or religions, act as cultural software that guides collective behavior. These collective belief systems must also conform to the universal law of balance in nature; otherwise, societal dysfunction and suffering emerge due to systemic imbalance, as described in the universal formula. -/- 5. Evolutionary Biology: Adaptive Functions From an evolutionary perspective, belief systems have contributed to human survival by: -/- Promoting group cohesion and cooperation -/- Offering explanations for uncertainty and danger -/- Establishing moral codes to reduce intra-group conflict -/- Belief systems that enhanced group survival and reproduction were naturally selected, giving rise to deeply ingrained tendencies toward belief formation and loyalty. However, maladaptive beliefs that once served a purpose may now create imbalance in modern societies, and must be re-evaluated according to the universal formula’s principle of aligning belief and behavior with nature’s laws. -/- 6. Systems Theory: Belief Systems as Feedback Loops Systems theory views belief systems as feedback mechanisms between individuals and their environment. These systems can be: -/- Open: Capable of incorporating new information and adapting. -/- Closed: Resistant to change and often self-reinforcing. -/- Beliefs influence perception and behavior, which in turn affect outcomes that reinforce the belief system, creating a cycle of reinforcement or entrenchment. The universal formula sees this as a form of cybernetic homeostasis: beliefs that maintain systemic balance are adaptive, while those that distort internal or external reality are destructive and must be corrected. -/- 7. Persistence of False Beliefs False beliefs can persist due to: -/- Neural reinforcement through emotional and repetitive activation. -/- Social validation from group consensus. -/- Psychological comfort, offering security or identity. -/- Educational shortcomings, such as lack of critical thinking training. -/- Even when disproven by evidence, beliefs may remain intact due to identity threats, group loyalty, and emotional investment. The universal formula asserts that these persistent false beliefs are violations of natural balance and must be addressed through systemic education that realigns the internal system with external realities. -/- 8. Reprogramming Belief Systems: Role of Education and Technology -/- 8.1 Through Education 8.2 A holistic education emphasizing critical thinking can: -/- Encourage open inquiry and evidence-based reasoning -/- Train students to detect bias and logical fallacies -/- Foster epistemic humility and intellectual flexibility -/- This approach aligns with the universal formula’s advocacy for educational systems that instill understanding of nature’s laws and feedback mechanisms. -/- 8.3 Through Technology 8.4 Modern technologies offer tools to reshape belief systems: -/- AI and adaptive learning platforms personalize education and challenge cognitive bias. -/- Virtual Reality (VR) enables perspective-taking and empathy development. -/- Algorithmic feedback control can reduce echo chambers and misinformation exposure. -/- These tools can facilitate belief revision by presenting evidence in emotionally intelligent and interactive ways. They also support the implementation of Angelito Malicse’s holistic educational vision, which seeks to reprogram minds in alignment with the law of balance in nature without negating individual religious or cultural identity. -/- 9. Case Studies -/- Case Study 1: Misinformation and Vaccine Hesitancy During the COVID-19 Pandemic During the global COVID-19 pandemic, widespread vaccine hesitancy emerged in many countries due to the influence of false belief systems reinforced through social media, political ideology, and cultural mistrust of institutions. These beliefs violated the law of balance in nature and were corrected through targeted education and empathetic communication. -/- Case Study 2: Religious Extremism and Radicalization Religious extremism often stems from closed belief systems that reject outside feedback and foster in-group superiority. Psychological biases, social isolation, and theological absolutism create cognitive rigidity and moral disengagement. Efforts to rehabilitate individuals through education, interfaith dialogue, and community reintegration aim to restore balance and re-open belief systems to critical evaluation. According to the universal formula, these efforts restore natural balance by re-aligning beliefs with moral responsibility and human dignity. -/- Case Study 3: Climate Change Denial Despite overwhelming scientific consensus, many individuals and leaders deny the reality of human-caused climate change. This denial is reinforced by economic interests, political ideology, and misinformation networks. The resulting imbalance manifests in unsustainable environmental practices that endanger planetary health. Educational campaigns, policy interventions, and youth-led climate activism work to correct these systemic imbalances by fostering scientifically grounded belief systems. -/- Case Study 4: Historical Revisionism in Education In various regions, educational systems have promoted historical revisionism that glorifies certain ideologies while omitting atrocities or systemic oppression. These distorted narratives produce nationalistic or supremacist beliefs that fuel division and conflict. Curriculum reforms that include accurate, inclusive, and balanced historical education help recalibrate belief systems in alignment with justice and truth—core tenets of the law of balance in nature. -/- 10. Conclusion Belief systems are not static; they are dynamic constructs shaped by neurological processes, psychological biases, cultural environments, evolutionary needs, and feedback mechanisms. While false beliefs can persist through various forms of reinforcement, they can also be reprogrammed through targeted education and technological interventions. A scientific understanding of belief systems is essential for addressing many of the cognitive and social challenges facing humanity today. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, particularly its law of balance in nature, provides a natural-law foundation for understanding and reforming belief systems, ensuring that both individual minds and societies function in harmony with the laws of nature. -/- . (shrink)

According to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, every fact has an explanation. An important challenge to this principle is that it risks being a counterexample to itself. What explains why everything needs to be explained? My first goal is to distinguish two broad kinds of answers to this question, which I call “Humean Rationalism” and “Non-Humean Rationalism”. My second goal will be to defend the prospects of Humean Rationalism.

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is typically read as a work that either rehabilitates the metaphysical tradition or argues for a new form of idealism centred on social normativity. In the following, I show that neither approach suffices. Not only does the metaphysical reading ignore how the Phenomenology demonstrates that human rationality can never adequately capture ultimate reality because ultimate reality itself has a moment of brute facticity that resists explanation, which prevents us from taking it as a logically self-contained, (...) self-justifying metaphysical zone traditionally known as ‘substance,’ but it also ignores how the Phenomenology equally demonstrates that human rationality creates a historically self-unfolding universe of meaning that is, because it displays a rational systematicity and consistency unlike anything else in the world, the closest thing we have to substance, but which, given its freedom, is more correctly called ‘subject.’ Consequently, while the non-metaphysical reading rightly recognizes that the Phenomenology develops a radically innovative account of intersubjectivity, it neglects how the social theory that it develops comes fully equipped with various metaphysical commitments concerning nature, spirit, and the relationship between them without which this theory would be unintelligible. (shrink)

Chalmers argues that ideal conceivability (conceivability on ideal rational reflection) entails possibility and on this basis assumes that zombies are possible and, therefore, that materialism is false. I argue that the paradigm cases of conceivability intuitions that Chalmers takes to be reliable guides to possibility are not only conceptually coherent, even on ideal rational reflection, but in addition have some rational explanation. The conceivability of zombies, however, has no rational explanation. So it is not ad hoc to deny (...) that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility. (shrink)

Implicit attitudes are mental states posited by psychologists to explain behaviors including implicit racial and gender bias. In this paper I investigate the belief view of the implicit attitudes, on which implicit attitudes are a kind of implicit belief. In particular, I focus on why implicit attitudes, if they are beliefs, are often resistant to updating in light of new evidence. I argue that extant versions of the belief view do not give a satisfactory account of this phenomenon. This is (...) because proponents of the belief view have focused on overly narrow explanations of recalcitrance in terms of belief storage. Expanding the focus of the belief view to the kinds of irrational and arational transitions between beliefs and other mental states provides compelling (if preliminary) explanations of recalcitrance. (shrink)

To explain phenomena in the world is a central human activity and one of the main goals of rational inquiry. There are several types of explanation: one can explain by drawing an analogy, as one can explain by dwelling on the causes (see e.g. see [Woodward (2004, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford)]. Amongst these different kinds of explanation, in the last decade, philosophers have become receptive to those explanations that explain (...) by providing the reasons (or the grounds) why a statement is true; these explanations are often called conceptual explanations (e.g. see [Betti (2010, Explanation in metaphysics and Bolzano's theory of ground and consequence. Logique et analyse, 211:281316)]). The main aim of the paper is to propose a logical account of conceptual explanations. We will do so by using the resources of proof theory, in particular sequent rules analogous to deep inferences ([e.g. see Brunnler (2004, Deep Inference and Symmetry in Classical Proofs. Logoc Verlag)]). The results we provide not only shed light on conceptual explanations themselves, but also on the role that logic and logical tools might play in the burgeoning field of inquiry concerning explanations. Indeed, we conclude the paper by underlining interesting links between the present research and some other existing works on explanations and logic that have arise in recent years, e.g. see [Arieli et al. (2022, Explainable logic-based argumentation. Computational Models of Argument, 353:3243); Darwiche and Hirth (2023, On the (complete) reasons behind decisions. Journal of Logic Language and Information, 32:6388); Piazza, Pulcini, and Sabatini (2023, Abduction as deductive saturation: a proof-theoretic inquiry. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 52:15751602)]. (shrink)

We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue (...) that there are serious worries about imaginative desires that warrant skepticism about the adequacy of the account. Moreover, it is quite difficult to articulate general principles of rationality for desires, and even according to the most plausible of these possible principles, desires about fiction are not irrational. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that it (...) would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances.

Jaspers’s binary distinction between understanding and explanation has given way first to a proliferation of explanatory levels and now, in John Campbell’s recent work, to a conception of explanation with no distinct levels of explanation and no inbuilt rationality requirement. I argue that there is still a role for understanding in psychiatry and that is to demystify the assumption that the states it concerns are mental. This role can be fulfilled by placing rationality at the heart of (...) understanding without a commitment to the attempt to use rationality to shed light on interpretation and mindedness as though from outside those notions. Delusions still present a significant challenge to philosophical attempts at understanding, but this merely reflects the genuine clinical difficulties such states present. (shrink)

Social problems such as racism, sexism, and inequality are often cited as structural rather than individual in nature. What does it mean to invoke a social structural explanation, and how do such explanations relate to individualistic ones? This article explores recent philosophical debates concerning the nature and usages of social structural explanation. I distinguish between two central kinds of social structural explanation: those that are autonomous from psychology, and those that are not. This distinction will help clarify (...) the explanatory power that each type of SSE has, points of convergence with methodological traditions such as critical theory and rational choice theory, and the difficulties that each type of SSE faces. (shrink)

When someone does something for a reason, what are the reasons for which she does what she does? What is her ‘motivating reason’, as it is sometimes put? The simple answer is: it depends on what is meant by ‘motivating reason’. Non-Psychologists hold that motivating reasons are what the agent believes. I have shown that given that we understand ‘motivating reasons’ as what I term 'grounds', this is quite correct, as what we believe is what plays the role of a (...) ground. However, we have to be careful not to confuse the role of a ground and the role of an explanans. For the conflation of those two roles can occlude the truth in Non-Psychologism. What the Non-Psychologist about Grounds should say is that what plays the role of an explanans, when someone acts on a ground, is a motivation-fact. She should also say that there are two kinds of motivation-facts: those that include normative reasons and those that do not. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that the reasons-responsiveness theory of rationality fails to explain the intuitive irrationality of practical akrasia. First, I argue that the best explanation for the distinction between acting in accordance with a normative reason and responding to that reason involves appealing to one’s competence or knowledge about how to respond to that reason. Second, one might possess practical competence to respond to her decisive practical reasons to act, without having the parallel theoretical (...) competence to believe rationally, through deliberation, that she has decisive reasons to perform that action. Third, if possessing a normative reason is a matter of having the ability to respond to that reason, and responding to a reason is grounded in facts about one’s competence about how to respond to that reason, then the mismatch between one’s practical and theoretical competences may give rise to a normative mismatch between one’s possessed reasons for action and one’s possessed reasons for one's normative beliefs. There would be possible situations in which one possesses decisive reasons to perform an action ⱷ but lacks sufficient reasons to believe that she has decisive reasons to ⱷ. In those situations, the reasons-responsiveness theory requires one to act against her normative judgment about what she ought to do. I conclude by considering whether it could be rationally permissible to act against one’s own normative judgment about what one ought to do if one’s reasons for action diverge from one’s reasons for a certain judgment about what one ought to do. (shrink)

Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow can depend not only on the person's evidence but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as “pragmatic encroachment” on knowledge and (...) rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism. (shrink)