The idea of truth is not a simple one. While truth can be understood in precise terms in the world of mathematics, it appears to be a highly entangled concept when considered in the context of complex systems in the real world. A complex system, interacting with other complex systems in its environment, can be looked at from various perspectives, with reference to which truth appears to have multiple faces. The principle of excluded middle is assumed to hold in the (...) mathematical world, though it engenders a number of foundational issues. But the dichotomous view of the excluded middle, is too simplistic for the real world, in consequence of which the idea of truth becomes an irreducibly complex one. Our perception and interpretation of the world is based on the explicit approach of reason and, at the same time, on the implicit approach of affect, where the two are almost mystically intertwined in the making of inferences and decisions that are supposed to lead us to truth. It is the inscrutable interaction between the two that makes the idea of truth so elusive. The question as to whether truth is absolute or relative has two aspects to it---the one relating to whether it is dependent on the mindset of individuals and the other to whether it depends on the context of our inquiry into reality. Generally speaking, truth always depends on the context though, ideally, it has to be socially shared, i.e., independent of idiosyncrasies of individuals. Here, however, one has to draw a sharp distinction between truths of science and those pertaining to our social life. While truths arrived at in scientific investigations are generally socially accepted ones, most truths relating to our social interactions are affect-laden and imprinted with the mindset of individuals, because these are based on how people perceive one another's mind. The mind is certainly a part of reality, but the way the myriads of human interactions emerge incessantly in that reality is elusive and mostly indeterminate. Only some of those lend themselves to reasoned perception and interpretation, based on which we seek out truth in our social existence on rare occasions when it gains social acceptance. In the midst of all this complexity shrouding the idea of truth, a steadfast adherence to the path of truth is more a moral principle---one of paramount value in our social life---than a reasoned act that can be defended on grounds of social acceptance. What is more, the ultimate standard of truth resides in our own selves and is of enormous value in our human existence. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms.

Endurantism is not inconsistent with the theory of special relativity, or so I shall argue. Endurantism is not committed to presentism, and thus not committed to a metaphysics that is at least prima facie inconsistent with special relativity. Nor is special relativity inconsistent with the idea that objects are wholly present at a time just if all of their parts co-exist at that time. For the endurantist notion of co-existence in terms of which “wholly present” is defined, is not, I (...) will argue, a notion according to which co-existence is transitive. Although an absence of absolute simultaneity presents some problems for the endurantist claim that objects are wholly present whenever they exist, there are a number of ways that the endurantist can respond to this difficulty. Thus, I conclude, considerations pertaining to the theory of special relativity certainly do not rule out endurantism as a metaphysics of persistence. (shrink)

Informal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations (...) of perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures. (shrink)

Many consequentialists take their theory to be anchored by a deeply intuitive idea, the “Compelling Idea” that it is always permissible to promote the best outcome. I demonstrate that this Idea is not, in fact, intuitive at all either in its agent-neutral or its evaluator-relative form. There are deeply intuitive ideas concerning the relationship of deontic to telic evaluation, but the Compelling Idea is at best a controversial interpretation of such ideas, not itself one of them. Because (...) there is no Compelling Idea at the heart of consequentialism, there is no initial burden of proof to be discharged nor any air of paradox to be cleared away by its opponents. (shrink)

The theory and doctrine of proximate cause has been too easily dismissed. Two primary errors underlie this dismissal: a misunderstanding of “causal proximity,” and a mistaken inference from the correct observation that effects have multiple causes, to the claim that there is no hierarchy between proximate and more remote causes. This article defends the classic conception of proximate causation as causally grounded by reconstructing the doctrine and articulating an underlying concept of proximate causation in which proximity is relative (though (...) still objective). Proximate causation is a relation between two causes and an effect, when one cause mediates the effects of another. This idea informs the doctrines of proximate cause, which, following Bacon’s Maxim, trace back from the injury to its causes, in sequence. along the paths of causation, until responsibility is absorbed, at which point the process terminates. Causal chains “break”: not because the cause and effect are too remote, but because a set of causes that are proximate, relative to these remote causes, are sufficient to absorb responsibility. With responsibility absorbed, there is nothing further to trace back. This is missed if tracing is from cause to injury, rather than in reverse, from injury to cause. As a matter of responsibility, the responsibility of remote actors—those that act through the agency of others, or those that fail to prevent the wrongdoing of others—is always subordinate to that of the causally proximate actor. This does not mean that the proximate actor always bears greater responsibility than the remote one, but when responsibility is transmitted remotely, it must be in virtue of a justifying or excusing condition for the proximate actor’s act. The order of justification follows the order of causation. Properly understood, proximate cause is essentially a defense that asserts that the defendant is not the most proximate cause to the harm, and that someone (or something) else is. The implications for both liability and contribution are discussed. (shrink)

En las actividades ordinarias de nuestra vida cotidiana encontramos nuestros actos de percepción confrontados por las cosas materiales. A ellos ─actos de percepción─ les atribuimos una existencia "real" asumiéndolos de tal manera que los sumergimos y transfundimos, de forma múltiple e indefinida, dentro del entorno de realidades análogas que se unen para formar un único mundo al que yo, con mi propio cuerpo, pertenezco. Ahora bien sí frente a la cotidianidad descrita anteriormente asumimos una actitud escéptica acerca de lo que (...) es “real” en el mundo,nos descubriremos haciendo una reflexión filosófica. Bajo esta deliberación encontramos que, por ejemplo, la cualidad "verde", tiene existencia por medio de la sensación "verde"asociada a un objeto dado por la percepción, lo que nos lleva a pensar que no tiene sentido vincularla sensación como cosa en sí misma a cosas materiales existentes en sí mismos, esto nos lleva a pensar que las cualidades de los sentidostienen carácter subjetivo.A pesar de esta reflexión es conveniente acotar que esta subjetividad no interesaa las ciencias exactas ya que éstas procuran lo objetivo. Desde este punto de vista,encontramos dentro de los estudios de Galileo Galilei el principio que subyace al método matemáticoconstructivo de nuestra física moderna ; de esta manera, y bajo este principio,los colores ─ por ejemplo “verde”─ son solo vibraciones en un medio repudiando de esta forma el carácter subjetivo a la vez que se mantiene la objetividad. Sin embargo, dentro del campo de la filosofía el idealismo transcendental de Kant marca un cambio de paradigma en relación a lo anterior. Kant sostiene que no solamente las cualidades de los sentidos tienen carácter subjetivo, sino que espacio y tiempo, conceptos fundacionales dentro de la física, no tienen significación absoluta; en otras palabras, espacio y tiempo son formas de nuestra percepción. Para Kant aquello que sustenta nuestra percepción y aquello que sustenta el conocimiento matemático aplicado a la experiencia son lo mismo: intuiciones puras a priori del espacio y el tiempo. De esta manera, y bajo esta perspectiva, sólo la teoría de la relatividad deja muyen claro que las dos esencias: espacio y tiempo, como formas de la intuición en términos kantianos, no tienen lugar en el mundo construido por la física matemática concebida por Galileo. Según esto, los colores no son siquiera vibraciones en un medio sino simplemente una serie de valores de funciones matemáticas en las que se producen cuatro parámetros independientes que corresponden a las tres dimensiones del espacio y la del tiempo, expresado como principio general esto significa que el mundo real y cada uno de sus constituyentes con sus características sólo pueden ser, en términos husserlianos, objetos intencionales de actos de conciencia. En otras palabras: los datos inmediatos que recibo son las experiencias de la conciencia. Esto nos permite afirmar que la sensación de un objeto está presente de una forma físicamente real para mí con quien esa sensación se relaciona. Esto es lo que Brentano llama objeto intencional ;es así como al percibir un objeto, por ejemplo: veo este “libro” mi atención está totalmente dirigida hacia él. Yo "tengo" la percepción, pero sólo cuando hago de esta percepción ─ acto libre de reflexión ─algo que "conozco" con respecto a ella ─y no sólo el “libro”─ llego precisamente a un segundo acto: objetos intencionales de actos de conciencia, que son a los que referíamos antes. El objeto intencional es inmanente y lo que es inmanente es absoluto ; es exactamente lo que es en la forma en que lo tengo, y puedo reducir esto, su esencia, por los actos de reflexión. En otras palabras, es un componente real de mis experiencias; contrario a lo que sucede con el acto primario de percepción, donde el objeto es trascendental, esto es, se da en una experiencia de conciencia pero no es un componente real de la misma. Por otra parte, los objetos trascendentales tienen sólo una existencia fenoménica; son apariencias que se presentan de múltiples maneras. Ninguno de estos modos de aparición puede pretender presentar aquello que percibimos – por ejemplo el libro- tal como es en sí, además en toda percepción está involucrada la tesis de la realidad del objeto que aparece en ella; este último es, de hecho, un elemento fijo y duradero de la tesis general de la realidad del mundo. En resumen, lo que interesa ver claramente es la importancia enel dato de la conciencia como punto de partida en el que debemos situarnos si queremos comprender el significado absoluto. (shrink)

This is a three part discussion on linguistic relativity and the New Testament which provides some perspectives towards understanding the inter-relatedness of society, culture, and language as they would have impacted the writers of the New Testament. The ideas discussed should provide useful information for further research into the application of modern linguistics to New Testament hermeneutics, systematic theology, and biblical exegesis. The implications of linguistic relativity theory applied to this genre of literature are of extreme importance in light (...) of resurgence in interest and work in biblical languages and modern linguistics in the last quarter of a century. The tripartite analysis focuses on: transcription of oral tradition, the influence of languages on the autographs, and the implications of linguistic relativity for exegesis. (shrink)

There is a well-established project in moral philosophy which seeks to demarcate deontological normative theories from consequentialist normative theories by defining deontology and deontological restrictions exclusively in terms of their agent-relativity. My aim in this paper is to explain why this project is mistaken and to defend both the possibility and the plausibility of agent-neutral deontological restrictions. I will argue that the common rationale underwriting the alleged agent-relativity of deontological restrictions is not, in fact, deontological at all. If deontological restrictions (...) (qua prohibitions on the performance of particular action-types by particular agents) are to be agent-relative restrictions in the sense that they are grounded in the idea that agents have a special responsibility not to violate them themselves – qua authors of their own actions – then these agent-relative restrictions are best understood as agent-relative consequentialist restrictions. Genuinely deontological restrictions, on the other hand, are agent-neutral restrictions in the sense that they apply to anyone and everyone and are grounded in the inviolable status of those victimised. (shrink)

Can we, in keeping with Fine’s celebrated distinction between essential and merely-necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court, a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account will not deliver the goods on Fine’s celebrated example of Socrates and the set containing him. I argue (...) that, if we have available a notion of intrinsicality which applies to relations in a place-relative way, we avoid the problem. I give independent motivation for the idea that intrinsicality is place-relative, and discuss the philosophical options for understanding place-relative intrinsicality in a way that is suitable for a necessity-plus-intrinsicality account of essence. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the roles of ether and electrons in relativity theory. One of the most radical moves made by Albert Einstein was to dismiss the ether from electrodynamics. His fellow physicists felt challenged by Einstein’s view, and they came up with a variety of responses, ranging from enthusiastic approval, to dismissive rejection. Among the naysayers were the electron theorists, who were unanimous in their affirmation of the ether, even if they agreed with other aspects of Einstein’s theory of relativity. (...) The eventual success of the latter theory (circa 1911) owed much to Hermann Minkowski’s idea of four-dimensional spacetime, which was portrayed as a conceptual substitute of sorts for the ether. (shrink)

Abstract. The theory-change epistemological model, tried on maxwellian revolution and special relativity genesis, is unfolded to apprehend general relativity genesis. It is exhibited that the dynamics of general relativity (GR) construction was largely governed by internal tensions of special relativity and Newton’s theory of gravitation. The research traditions’ encounter engendered construction of the hybrid domain at first with an irregular set of theoretical models. However, step by step, on revealing and gradual eliminating the contradictions between the models involved, the hybrid (...) set was put into order with a help of equivalence principle. A hierarchy of theoretical models starting from the crossbreeds and up to usual hybrids was moulded. The claim to put forward is that Einstein’s unification design could be successfully implemented since his programme embraced the ideas of the Nordström research programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programme of Max Abraham. By and large Einstein’s victory over his rivals became possible because the core of his research strategy was formed by the equivalence principle comprehended in the light of Kantian epistemology. It is stated that the theories of Nordström and Abraham contrived before November 25, 1915, were not merely the scaffolds to construct the GR basic model. They are still the necessary part of the whole GR theory necessary for its common use. Key words: Einstein, Nordstrom, Abraham, general relativity. -/- . (shrink)

Absolutism—the idea that some kinds of acts are absolutely wrong and must never be done—plays an important role in medical ethics. Nicholas Denyer has defended it from some influential consequentialist critics who have alleged that absolutism is committed to “agent-relative constraints” and therefore intolerably complex and messy. Denyer ingeniously argues that, if there are problems with agent-relative constraints, then they are problems for consequentialism, since it contains agent-relative constraints, too. I show that, despite its ingenuity, Denyer’s argument (...) does not succeed. The defense of absolutism must move to other grounds. (shrink)

Within Christian philosophical and systematic theology, God is understood as possessing Omniscience, Omnipotence, and Omnipresence, among (or as an extension of) other attributes such as Immensity and Eternality. However, it is also commonplace in theology and theistic philosophy to posit God as experiencing sequential reality. That is, experiencing time with us rather than possessing Omnitemporality. Curiously, there is agreement among theists that God is outside of matter and space, yet there are objections from both determinists and indeterminists to the idea (...) that God is outside of the domain of time as we experience it. Within this paper, given the understanding of God’s Omni-attributes, I suggest that it is reasonable to doubt that something as immense as God may be subject to, or fully existent within, a temporal manifold; with that in mind, I attempt to create a rudimentary form of Eternalist Compatibilism. I hope to establish this by suggesting that from the human perspective, within time and space, there does exist a real and qualitatively different present tense (A-theory/ Endurantism) as well as libertarian free will, while from outside of the dimension of time (as we know and experience it) God considers all moments as Eternally Present (B-theory/Worm Perdurantism) exercising his Divine Providence deterministically. Therefore, within Christian philosophical theology, it is reasonable to suggest that Persons of the Trinity may experience sequential time alongside humankind (Incarnation, Pentecost, etc.) while the Father remains transcendently outside of time and space. In light of this, I contend that the friction over sovereignty and foreknowledge may be illusory and rather represents two sides of the same but complex reality; in other words, a type of Eternalist Relativity. (shrink)

Spinoza’s epistemology aims at the development of ‘adequate’ and the removal of ‘confused’ ideas. His theory of confusion raises many questions, however. It has often been thought that the confusion of an idea is mind-relative, such that an idea might be confused in my mind but adequate in God’s. In this paper I argue that confusion cannot be mind-relative, because an idea’s confusion is determined by what it represents and for Spinoza, ideas are individuated by their (...) representational content. Instead, I propose that although it is possible to consider one and the same idea both adequately and confusedly, what such acts of considering pick up on are mind-independent features of ideas. (shrink)

This paper proposes a speculative conceptual framework to unify General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics by introducing consciousness as a fundamental, non-physical principle of the universe. We posit that the universe is governed by a universal wave function, where physical reality emerges from the collapse of this function. Gravity is interpreted not as a fundamental force but as an emergent property resulting from the statistical coherence of this wave function. Within this model, unmeasurable phenomena such as dark matter and dark energy (...) are reinterpreted as manifestations of unexpressed or dis-entangled states of the universal wave function. The paper situates this proposal within the intellectual lineage of John Archibald Wheeler’s Participatory Universe, David Bohm’s Implicate Order, and Erik Verlinde’s Emergent Gravity, while extending these ideas toward a testable hypothesis. To address concerns of unfalsifiability, the framework introduces the Global Coherence Experiment: a proposed method to test whether collective consciousness can influence physical constants, such as the gravitational constant or the Hubble constant. While such an experiment is beyond current technological capabilities, it provides a clear, falsifiable pathway that distinguishes this framework from purely philosophical accounts. The work is speculative and exploratory but aims to provoke discussion on the role of consciousness in fundamental physics and the possibility of unification through principles beyond the purely physical domain. (shrink)

The relativity of simultaneity is at the heart of special relativity. It is the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity as opposed to absolute time in pre-relativity physics that leads to the different kinematic and dynamic results between special relativity and pre-relativity physics. Cognition and logic that are at the heart of the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity. Rock’s work on induced self-motion and induced self-rest, including an experiment, supports this idea. A detailed analysis of Einstein’s arguments on the (...) relativity of simultaneity is presented. Einstein maintained that physical measurements are necessary in all instances in his argument. It is shown that logic and cognition replace the apparent need proposed by Einstein for certain physical measurements to demonstrate the relativity of simultaneity. The importance of cognition and logic occurs because of Rock’s empirical finding that a moving human observer can experience himself at rest but cannot experience himself at rest if he knows that he is moving. This human observer experiencing himself at rest in one inertial reference frame can deduce that the simultaneity in his frame does not extend to the other moving frame. The relativity of simultaneity involves two reference frames moving at a constant velocity relative to one another. Rock’s empirical finding allows for the argument on the relativity of simultaneity to made in either direction, i.e. with either reference frame the “stationary” reference frame while the other reference frame is the “moving” reference frame. Without Rock’s findings, there would be a preferred reference frame and special relativity would not be possible. The work discussed here regarding special relativity indicates that oscillating electric fields and magnetic fields arising from the brain are likely the link between body and mind, including consciousness since electromagnetic phenomena can ONLY be correctly understood in special relativity. (shrink)

The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a problem for using truth-relativism to solve the preface puzzle about knowledge. Secondly, it is plausible that vagueness gives rise to some questions having multiple ‘acceptable’ answers, and other questions having no ‘acceptable’ answer. Even if truth-relativism can express the former idea, it can't express the latter. I propose an ideology that is not so rigid. It is preferable to (...) class='Hi'>relative truth. (shrink)

(March 2019) UNBELIEVALBE similar ideas, UNBELIEVABLE similar framework of the article on “quantum mechanics” written by Proietti et al (2019) with my EDWs (2002-2008) -/- Gabriel Vacariu -/- The article that I investigate in this section is -/- (2019) Experimental rejection of observer-independence in the quantum world -/- Massimiliano Proietti,1 Alexander Pickston,1 Francesco Graffitti,1 Peter Barrow,1 Dmytro Kundys,1 Cyril Branciard,2 Martin Ringbauer,1, 3 and Alessandro Fedrizzi1 at arXiv:1902.05080v1 [quant-ph] 13 Feb 2019 -/- In the article written by Proietti et (...) al. (2019), there are UNBLELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas (2002-2008); in fact, the framework of this article seems UNBELIEVABLE similar to my framework, the EDWs perspective!!!! I applied my EDWs to quantum mechanics (getting micro-EW, wave-EW), to Einstein’s special relativity getting EDWs for those two observers (one in the train and one on the pavement), to microparticles and macro-objects (EDWs), etc. -/- The authors of this article work in an UNBELIEVABLE similar framework (see below details), and applied this framework to quantum mechanics referring to the relationship between two observers and the microparticle. In this way, they get EDWs for the same microparticle. However, I have done exactly the same application to Einstein’s special relativity. I emphasize that it would be necessary my EDWs to apply this framework to the same particle. In my book 2014, if the reader replaces the macro-objects with the microparticle, there would obtain exactly the EDWs for the microparticle that can be found in this article! Amazing it is the fact that the authors, having no background in philosophy and having no new theory on quantum mechanics, have discovered the existence of observer-independent “facts of the world” (that are exactly my EDWs!!!). Obviously, the authors are geniuses like sean carroll, markus Gabriel, carolo rovelli, and so many from my manuscript referring to UNBELIEVABLE similarities (see the bibliography at the end of this article!) . (shrink)

Aristotle classifies opposition (ἀντικεῖσθαι) into four groups: relatives (τὰ πρός τι), contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), privation and possession (στρέσις καὶ ἓξις) and affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). (Cat. , 10, 11b15-23) His example of relatives are the double and the half. Aristotle’s description of relatives as a kind of opposition is as such: ‘Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites (αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστι τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται) or in some other way in relation to them. (...) For example, the double is called just what it is double of the other (οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὃπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται). Again, knowledge and the knowable are opposed as relatives, and knowledge is called just what it is, of the knowable, and the knowable too is called just what it is, in relation to its opposite, knowledge; for the knowable is called knowable by something-by knowledge.’ (Cat., 10, 11b24-30) 2) Senses of relatives In Met., Δ, 1020b26-32 Aristotle distinguishes three senses of relatives: i) That which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded. E.g. double to half ii) The active to the passive; e.g. that which can heat to that which can be heated iii) The measurable to the measure, e.g. the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception. 3) Relatives and contraries Aristotle’s discussion of relatives is unbelievably ambiguous. While he enumerates relatives besides contraries, privation-possession and affirmation-negation as four types of opposition (Cat., 10, 11b15-23), not only does not he restrict relatives to oppositions but he also does not totally differentiate it from contraries. Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of relatives one of which is contraries: ‘We have distinguished elsewhere the two senses in which relatives are so called-some as contraries (ὡς ἐναντία), others as knowledge to things known, a term being called relative because what is said one to the other is said by the other to itself (τῷ λέγεσθαί τι ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτό). (Met., I, 1056b34-1057a1) It seems that this differentiation is the same as, and maybe the one he himself refers to, the differentiation between the second and the third senses of relatives in Met., Δ, 1021a27-32: ‘Relative terms which imply number or capacity, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else is related to it (πρός τι πὰντα ἐστὶ πρός τι τῷ ὃπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς ἐκεινο); but that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else is related to it. For the thinkable implies that there is thought of it, but the thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought; for we should then have said the same thing twice.’ Although Aristotle confirms contrariety in relatives (e.g. virtue to vice and knowledge to ignorance), he denies that there is a contrary ‘to every relative’ as there can be no contrary to what is double or treble. (Cat., 7, 6b15-19) The fact that Aristotle dedicates one sense of relatives to contraries means that the fourfold division of oppositions is not such a strict division without any kind of community between them. In his example of the first sense, however, Aristotle says: ‘One and number are in a sense opposed, not as contrary, but as we have said some relative terms are opposed; for inasmuch as one is measure and the other measurable, they are opposed.’ (Met., I, 1057a4-6) Now, the question is: Is Aristotle’s first sense of relative a contrary or not? Aristotle tells us that the opposition in this sense of relatives is the opposition of measure and measurable. The second sense has two differences with the first one: i) it is not a contrary and ii) what is said by one of the relatives to the other is also said by the latter to the former. To differentiate it from the first sense, when the one is the measure of the other, the latter will be the measure of the former as well: ‘But though knowledge is similarly spoken of as related to the knowable, the relation does not work out similarly for while knowledge might be thought to be the measure, and the knowable the thing measured, the fact is that all knowledge is knowable, but not all that is knowable is knowledge, because in a sense knowledge is measured by the knowable.’ (Met., I, 1057a7-12) Aristotle’s assertion at Met., I, 1057a36-37 that ‘of relative terms, those which are not contrary have no intermediate’ ensures us that we must take the first sense as contraries. Here he mentions a criterion of differentiation between two senses: while the first sense accepts intermediates (as, for example, great and small do), the second one does not. (Met., I, 1057a37-b1) It seems, however, that it is only the second sense that is the essential sense of relatives because the first sense, Aristotle says, is an accidental sense: ‘The one is opposed then to the many in numbers as measure to things measureable; and these are opposed as relatives which are not from their very nature relatives.’ (Met., I, 1056b32-34) 4) Definition of relative Aristotle’s first definition of the category of relative (πρός τι) is as such: ‘We call relative all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else (Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὃσα αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστὶν ἓτερων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἓτερον). (Cat., 7, 6a36-37; repeated almost without any change in: Cat., 7, 6b6-8) Aristotle’s examples are larger (because it is what it is than something else (τοῦθ᾿ ὃπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται) that means it is called larger than something) and double. (Cat., 7, 6a37-b1) Aristotle’s aporia regarding relative is about their relation with substances: whether no substance is spoken of as a relative, or whether this is possible with regard to some secondary substances. (Cat., 7, 8a13-15) In the case of primary substances, it seems that he is confident, at least at first, that neither themselves nor their parts are spoken of in relation to anything: neither an individual man is called someone’s individual man nor an individual hand is called someone’s individual hand (but someone’s hand). (Cat., 7, 8a15-21) Although it is obvious that most of secondary substances are not spoken of as relatives (a man is not called someone’s man) (Cat., 7, 8a21-25), there are some with them there is room for dispute: a head is someone’s head and a hand is called someone’s hand, which seem to be relatives. (Cat., 7, 8a25-28) Aristotle thinks this must be due to the previous definition’s being problematic: with that definition ‘it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to reach the solution that no substance is spoken of as a relative.’ (Cat., 7, 8a28-32) Thus, Aristotle changes his previous definition to a new one: ‘Those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something’ (ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί). (Cat., 7, 8a32-34) Although the first definition does indeed apply to all relations, its problem is that it does not take ‘their own being relative’ (τῷ πρός τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι) the same as ‘their being what they are of other things’ (ἃπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι). (Cat., 7, 8a34-37) Although this change of definition is to exclude all substances from being relative, what Aristotle says in Topics (To., Z, 8, 146a39- ), seems to ignore this: ‘For of everything relative the substance is relative to something else, seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something.’ 5) Necessary knowledge of the related Knowledge of that in relation to which a relative is spoken of is necessary when one knows the relative: it is impossible to know a relative and at the same time not to know that in relation to which it is spoken of. (Cat., 7, 8a37-b3) To prove this, Aristotle adheres to the definition of relatives: ‘If someone knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is a relative, and being for relatives is the same as being somehow related to something, he knows that also to which this is somehow related.’ (Cat., 7, 8a37-b3; cf. 7, 8b3-15 for Aristotle’s examples) This necessary knowledge of the related, if we call it so, dedicates Aristotle an epistemological reason, besides the ontological one mentioned in his definition, for the exclusion of substances. As we noted in our discussion of Aristotle’s definition of relatives, he changed his first definition to exclude all substances from being relatives. Therefore, it is evident that for him relatives must not include substances, either primary or secondary. Aristotle does have no problem with primary substances simply because it is evident for him that they cannot be relatives. The same can be said about most of the secondary substances as well. The problem for which he changed the definition of substances was about some secondary substances like ‘head’ or ‘hand’: the fact that it is possible to know a hand or head without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of proves that they are not relatives. (Cat., 7, 8b15-21) 6) Reciprocation Aristotle regards reciprocation (ἀντιστρέφειν) necessary in all relations: ‘All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.’ (Cat., 7, 6b28-29; cf. Cat., 10, 12b21-24) The sense of reciprocation is clear by his own examples: ‘The slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double.’ (Cat., 7, 6b29-31) Reciprocation of relatives is so necessary that if there seems that we do not have reciprocation, it must necessarily be due to a mistake and that in relation to which something is spoken of must have not been given properly. (Cat., 7, 6b36-7a1) Aristotle’s example is this: If a wing is given as of a bird, ‘bird of a wing’ does not reciprocate because it has not been given properly: a wing is of a winged and not of a bird; a wing is wing of a winged and a winged is winged with a wing. (Cat., 7, 7a1-5) Even if we do not have a proper name to have a proper reciprocation, Aristotle points, we must invent names. (Cat., 7, 7a5-15 and 7b10-14) Thus, having proper names is the condition of necessary reciprocation: ‘All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, provided they are properly given.’ (Cat., 7, 7a22-23) This condition is also said in another way: there is no reciprocation if a relation is given as related to some chance thing or to something that is accidentally the related thing like when, for example, a slave is given as of a man or a biped instead of being given as of a master. (Cat., 7, 7a25-31) 7) Simultaneity of relatives Aristotle believes that in most cases relatives are simultaneous: double and half or master and slave must exist at the same time: when there is a half, there is a double and when there is a slave, there is a master. (Cat., 7, 7b10-14) However, this receives some exceptions like knowable, which is prior and can, thus, exist before and without knowledge. (Cat., 7, 7b22-27) What approves this non-simultaneousness for Aristotle is that the destruction of knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. (Cat., 7, 7b27-31) The same is said about perception and perceptible. (Cat., 7, 7b35-8a9) Aristotle attaches simultaneity to reciprocation. This reciprocation, however, is not a simple reciprocation but ‘reciprocation as to implication of existence’ (ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι) with the condition that neither be in any way the cause of the other’s existence. (Cat., 13, 14b27-29; the same is said also at: Cat., 13, 15a4-11) Aristotle’s examples are the double and the half because when there is a double there is a half and when there is a half there is a double but neither is the cause of the other’s existence. (Cat., 13, 14b29-32) (We have ‘reciprocation as to implication of existence’ also in relation between genus and species but it seems that this has a totally different sense there. 8) Having no independent reality That a relative cannot be a substance, either a primary or a secondary substance, is discussed in our review of both the definition of relatives and their reciprocation. The differentiation of relatives and substances are so deep for Aristotle that after questioning the possibility of any common element or principle for substances and relatives (Met., Λ, 1070a33-36), he asserts that no substance, on the one hand, is the element of relatives and none of the relatives, on the other hand, is the element of substances. (Met., Λ, 1070b3-4) Aristotle does not, however, suffice to this. For him, relatives have the least substantiality, which is, for him, almost the same as reality: ‘The relative is least of all categories a real thing (φύσις τις) or substance, and less than quality and quantity; and the relative is an affection of quantity.’ (Met., M, 1088a22-25) Aristotle believes that an evidence of this least reality (ὄν) and substantiality is that relatives have no proper generation, destruction or movement while each of substance, quality and quantity have them. (Met., M, 1088a29-35) Moreover, neither motion (Phy., E, 1) nor any kind of change is applicable to relatives so that relatives are neither themselves alterations nor the subject of alterations (Phy., Z, 3) and the process of losing and acquiring states cannot be considered as alterations because these are the result of the alterations of non-relative things of which they are states. (Phy., Z, 3) Relative is not even matter but is something different. (Met., M, 1088a24-25) The reason is that the matter is potentially of a nature but relative is neither potentially nor actually of a nature. (Met., M, 1088b1-2) To understand the status of relatives in Aristotle’s world, we have to make a tripartite classification; a classification that though Aristotle himself did not make, his assertions approve it. Based on this division, there are three kinds of being in the world: i) Independent beings: This class includes only substances. ii) Dependent beings: This class includes qualities and quantities. Although they are real, they are ‘in’ substances and cannot exist without them. iii) Super dependent beings: This class includes at least relatives. The fact that relatives must be considered in a third class different from substances, on the one hand, and qualities and quantities, on the other hand, is obvious not only from the previously mentioned texts (Met., M, 1088a22-25, 29-35 and b1-2) in which relatives’ reality is considered less than all substances, qualities and quantities and different from matters but from this text: ‘For there is nothing either great or small, many or few, or, in general, relative which is not something (τι ὄν) different (ἓτερον) [that is also] many or few or great or small’. (Met, N, 1088a27-30) Therefore, super dependent beings are those beings that must necessarily be also something else, i.e. an independent or dependent being. Ackrill (1963, 99) points that some of the words used by Aristotle to exemplify relational entities, e.g. slave, are endowed with a complete sense and do not need to be supplemented by a correlate. (Thus, the linguist criterion of incompleteness would be deficient. Some other instances of relative entities like ‘state,’ ‘knowledge’ and perception are not necessarily followed by the genitive case. 9) Extent of relatives What is the extent of relatives? What are or are not included in relatives either among categories or among other concepts? Which concepts or things Aristotle regard as relative? i) Aristotle includes state (ἓξις) and position (θέσις) among relatives. (Cat., 7, 6b2-6; Cat., 7, 6b11-14; Cat., 8, 11a20-24) ii) Although relative is not matter but is something different (Met., M, 1088a24-25), matter is ‘non-being’ only in virtue of an attribute (Phy., A, 9) and is, thus, a relative term. (Phy., B, 2, 194b9) 10) Property and relativity Aristotle draws a contrast between two types of giving a property, absolute and relative: ‘A property is given either in its own right and for always or relative to something else and for a time.’ (To., E, 1, ^128b15-18) Being a civilized man, for example, is an absolute property for man while to command is a relative property for the soul. The absolute property, however, is considered not only potential to be discussed or observed in relation to many things or periods of time, it in fact ‘belongs to its subject relatively to every single thing that there is, so that if the subject is not distinguished relatively to everything else, the property will not have been given correctly.’ (To., E, 1, 129a18-20) Therefore, an absolute property is a property that ‘is ascribed to a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes it from everything else.’ (To., E, 1, 128b33- ) An absolute property is, then, absolutely relative and not conditionally relative, i.e. relative to a specific thing. This is what differentiates it from a relative property, which is relative to a certain thing: ‘A property relative to something else is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but from a particular definite thing.’ (To., E, 1, 128b33- ) One important difference between absolute and relative properties is that while an accident can be a relative property, it can never be an absolute property. (To., I, 5, ^102b20-36) For example, sitting, which is an accident, is also a property relatively to those who are not sitting. (To., I, 5, ^102b20-36) 11) Platonic theories as relatives At least three of Platonic theories Aristotle attaches to relatives: i) Forms ‘It seems that a Form is always spoken of in relation to a Form-this desire itself is for the pleasure itself, and wishing itself is for the good itself.’ (To., Z, 8, 147a^10) Moreover, the theory of Forms takes the relative prior to the absolute as, for example, it takes not the dyad but the number as first. (Met., A, 990b15-17) Aristotle believes that this is against not only the necessities of the case but only the Platonists’ opinion because Forms must be substances only, if they can be shared. (Met., A, 990b27-29) There are, however, things like ‘equal’ which are only relative: they are only in relation to something else. Now the theory that ideas are supposed to be substances only should entail the substantiality of merely relatives. The reason being that Forms are not shared incidentally but each thing shares in that which is not predicated of a subject. (Met., A, 990b29-31) ii) Unequal The Platonic theory of great and small or unequal, which we know more from Aristotle and has, in Platonic philosophy, a role like that of matter in Aristotelian philosophy, is also called relative by Aristole. (Met., M, 1089b4-15) iii) Potentiality Aristotle says that Platonists take what potentially is a ‘this’ and a substance but not actually so a relative because it is ‘neither potentially the one or being, nor the contradictory of the one nor of being, but one among beings.’ (Met., N, 1089b15-20) 12) All things as relative Aristotle attaches the theory that ‘everything is true’ to relativity and thinks the consequence of believing in this theory is that everything is true: ‘He who says all things that appear are true, makes all things relative.’ (Met., Γ, 1011a17-20) 13) Genera and species of relatives There are some genera, Aristotle hints, that are relative but their species are not relative. In such cases, the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular cases are so spoken. (Cat., 8, 11a20-36) Aristole’s examples are knowledge and grammar of which the former is a relative but the latter is a quality. The consequence of this is that there is nothing absurd for a thing to be in both genera of relative and quality. (Cat., 8, 11a37- ) However, when the species is a relative, the genera will be a relative too. (To., Δ, 4, 124b15- ) Moreover, Aristotle asserts that ‘the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative.’ (To., Z, 6, 145a14-16) Things that are called relative are called so, Aristotle says, ‘because the classes that include them are of this sort, e.g. medicine is thought to be relative bcs its genus, knowledge, is thought to be relative,’ (Met., Δ, 1021b4-6) 14) Relatives as indefinite? Fabio Morales takes 1088a29-b1 as a textual evidence supporting the assumption that Aristotle regarded relational terms as indefinite. (shrink)

-/- Unifying General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics: A New Approach Based on the Universal Formula of Balance and Interconnected Systems -/- The challenge of unifying general relativity and quantum mechanics has been one of the most profound unsolved problems in physics for over a century. General relativity, which governs the large-scale structure of the universe and explains the force of gravity, contrasts sharply with quantum mechanics, which describes the behavior of subatomic particles on a minute scale. These two theories operate (...) under fundamentally different principles—one deterministic and continuous, the other probabilistic and discrete. The reconciliation of these frameworks has thus far eluded physicists, but new perspectives, grounded in deeper philosophical and universal principles, may hold the key to resolving this long-standing puzzle. -/- One such perspective can be drawn from Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, which emphasizes balance, interconnectedness, and the defect-free operation of systems. While this formula primarily applies to decision-making and societal systems, its principles offer a unique lens through which we might view the physical laws that govern the universe. In this essay, we will explore how the core tenets of Malicse’s universal formula—balance in nature, interconnectedness of systems, and the need for defect-free operation—could inform and potentially unify general relativity and quantum mechanics. -/- The Core of General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- General relativity provides a framework for understanding gravity as the curvature of spacetime caused by mass and energy. It describes how massive objects like stars and planets bend the fabric of spacetime, and this bending dictates how other objects move in the presence of gravity. General relativity operates on macroscopic scales, governing the behavior of galaxies, black holes, and other large-scale cosmic structures. -/- In contrast, quantum mechanics deals with the microscopic scale, governing the behavior of subatomic particles. At this level, the laws of physics are governed by probabilities, with particles existing in superpositions of states until they are measured. Quantum mechanics introduces phenomena such as wave-particle duality and quantum entanglement, where particles can instantaneously affect one another across vast distances. -/- The difficulty in reconciling these two theories arises from their different conceptual foundations. General relativity is deterministic, describing smooth spacetime geometry, while quantum mechanics is inherently probabilistic, with particles existing in uncertain states. A unified theory would need to bridge the gap between these two, offering a description of gravity at both the macroscopic and quantum scales. -/- Malicse’s Universal Formula and Its Relevance to Unification -/- Malicse’s universal formula focuses on the notion of balance in nature, emphasizing that all systems must operate defect-free to function properly. This law of balance operates across all levels, from individual decisions to societal systems, and is predicated on the idea that everything in the universe is interconnected. According to Malicse, the systems—whether biological, mechanical, or even societal—must operate in harmony with each other to avoid disruptions that lead to imbalance. -/- This concept of balance offers a promising framework for reconciling general relativity and quantum mechanics. Let’s explore how the principles of balance and interconnectedness can help unify these two domains. -/- A. Gravity as a Balanced System -/- In general relativity, gravity is understood as the curvature of spacetime, where mass and energy distort the fabric of spacetime itself. If we apply Malicse’s law of balance, we might consider gravity as a force that arises to maintain the balance of spacetime. Spacetime, under the influence of mass, should curve in a way that ensures the overall stability and harmony of the universe. If spacetime were to curve excessively (such as at singularities, where the curvature becomes infinite), this would represent an imbalance in the system. -/- This principle could suggest that gravity is not simply an effect of mass, but a balancing force that ensures the defect-free operation of spacetime. If we view spacetime as a system that must remain defect-free, the resolution of singularities and other discrepancies in general relativity might be found in a deeper understanding of balance in nature. -/- B. Interconnectedness in Quantum Systems -/- Quantum mechanics deals with the smallest scales of matter, where particles exhibit behavior that appears disconnected from classical notions of space and time. Quantum particles, however, are not isolated entities—they are deeply interconnected, particularly evident in phenomena such as quantum entanglement. This entanglement implies that particles can instantaneously influence each other across vast distances, defying classical ideas of locality. -/- Malicse’s principle of interconnectedness can provide a deeper understanding of these quantum phenomena. Just as individual decisions in a society are interconnected, quantum particles could be seen as parts of a larger, balanced system, where their behavior is shaped by and contributes to the overall harmony of the universe. If we view quantum entanglement as a form of feedback between particles, we might interpret it as an inherent interconnectedness that ensures balance within the quantum realm. -/- The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, where particles exist in superpositions until measured, could also be understood through the lens of balance. In a balanced system, possibilities must exist in equilibrium, and the collapse of a quantum state into a definite outcome upon observation could be seen as a mechanism for maintaining the balance of possible states within the system. -/- C. Unifying Gravity and Quantum Fields -/- At the heart of unification lies the idea that gravity and quantum mechanics are not separate or fundamentally different forces but are interconnected parts of the same system. According to Malicse’s universal formula, everything in the universe operates as part of an interconnected system, and any imbalance within one system will affect the whole. In this view, gravity could be understood as a quantum force—one that, like other quantum forces, operates in harmony with quantum fields. -/- If gravity operates within the framework of quantum mechanics, we might expect it to be mediated by a particle, known as the graviton, which would function similarly to the quantum fields that mediate other forces (such as the photon for electromagnetism). The graviton, like other quantum particles, would be subject to the same feedback loops and principles of balance that govern quantum systems. This insight could lead to a new way of thinking about quantum gravity—where the force of gravity is not merely the curvature of spacetime but a quantum field that interacts with other quantum fields in a way that restores balance to the system. -/- D. The Mathematical Formulation of Unification -/- To advance towards unification, we would need to develop mathematical models that incorporate Malicse’s principles of balance and interconnectedness. One possible approach could involve modifying the Einstein-Hilbert action in general relativity to account for quantum feedback mechanisms. Similarly, the Schrödinger equation, which governs quantum systems, could be modified to include terms that describe the gravitational influence of quantum fields. This would create a hybrid theory where gravity and quantum mechanics are treated as complementary forces that work together to maintain the balance of the universe. -/- E. Practical Implications for the Future of Physics -/- The unification of general relativity and quantum mechanics would revolutionize our understanding of the universe. It would not only explain the behavior of the cosmos on both the largest and smallest scales but also offer new insights into the nature of spacetime, black holes, and the origins of the universe itself. Malicse’s formula, by emphasizing balance and interconnectedness, could provide the conceptual foundation for this new unified theory, guiding future physicists toward a deeper understanding of how the universe operates at every scale. -/- Conclusion -/- The unification of general relativity and quantum mechanics remains one of the most significant challenges in modern physics. By applying the principles of balance, interconnectedness, and defect-free systems from Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, we may be able to shed new light on the relationship between gravity and quantum forces. Through this lens, both general relativity and quantum mechanics can be seen as interconnected aspects of the same unified system, each working to maintain the overall balance of the universe. Further theoretical and mathematical exploration of this idea could ultimately lead to a deeper, more complete theory of everything—a theory that resolves the discrepancies between these two pillars of modern physics and opens the door to a new era of scientific understanding. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the similarity between Wittgenstein’s use of thought experiments and Relativity Theory. I begin with introducing Wittgenstein’s idea of “thought experiments” and a tentative classification of different kinds of thought experiments in Wittgenstein’s work. Then, after presenting a short recap of some remarks on the analogy between Wittgenstein’s point of view and Einstein’s, I suggest three analogies between the status of Wittgenstein’s mental experiments and Relativity theory: the topics of time dilation, the search for invariants, and (...) the role of measuring tools in Special Relativity. This last point will help to better define Wittgenstein’s idea of description as the core of his philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Popularity is Absolutely Relative -/- Popularity is a dynamic and ever-changing concept that depends on context, culture, and perspective. It is not an absolute measure of value or importance but rather a reflection of collective preference at any given time. What is considered popular in one era, society, or social circle may be entirely obscure in another. This essay explores the relativity of popularity by examining its dependence on cultural differences, time, personal perception, external influences, and its relative (...) importance to different kinds of people and their interests. -/- Popularity and Cultural Context -/- One of the most significant factors affecting popularity is cultural context. A person, trend, or idea that is well-received in one culture may be completely irrelevant or even rejected in another. For example, Bollywood actors like Shah Rukh Khan are immensely famous in India and among Indian diaspora communities but are not as well-known in Western countries where Hollywood dominates. Similarly, K-pop, once confined to South Korea, has exploded in global popularity, but there are still regions where it remains relatively unknown. Food preferences also illustrate this relativity—sushi is widely beloved in Japan and internationally, but certain traditional dishes like fermented shark from Iceland remain highly niche. -/- Popularity Over Time -/- Another crucial aspect of popularity’s relativity is its transient nature. Trends, individuals, and ideas that are highly popular today may fade into obscurity tomorrow. For instance, MySpace was once the dominant social media platform but has been replaced by Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok. Similarly, disco music was a cultural phenomenon in the 1970s, only to decline rapidly in the 1980s, while genres like hip-hop gained prominence. Even in literature, authors like Franz Kafka were largely unrecognized during their lifetimes, only to become highly influential figures in later decades. The shifting nature of popularity highlights its dependency on time and societal evolution. -/- Personal Perception and Popularity -/- Popularity is also influenced by individual perspective. What one person considers popular may differ significantly from another’s viewpoint. For example, Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo are regarded as two of the greatest footballers globally, yet someone uninterested in sports may not even recognize their names. Similarly, within the realm of literature, J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series is immensely popular worldwide, but some readers may prefer classic novels by Jane Austen or contemporary sci-fi by authors like Liu Cixin. Social media algorithms further amplify this subjectivity by creating personalized digital environments where different individuals are exposed to different popular trends based on their interests. A person who follows tech news might frequently see updates about Elon Musk, while another who follows beauty influencers may be more familiar with Huda Kattan. -/- The Role of External Influences -/- External influences such as media, marketing, and peer pressure also play a significant role in shaping popularity. Companies invest heavily in advertising to make products appear popular, sometimes manufacturing trends through strategic branding. For example, Apple’s iPhone has been marketed as a must-have device, leading to its sustained popularity, even though there are many competitive alternatives. Similarly, viral TikTok challenges can rapidly turn a simple dance or phrase into a global sensation, such as the "Renegade" dance or the phrase “It’s Corn!” which gained massive traction online. Likewise, the film industry often uses celebrity endorsements to boost a movie’s appeal, as seen with blockbuster franchises like Marvel’s Avengers, where well-known actors contribute to the films’ massive success. However, these external forces do not create universal popularity but rather localized bursts of attention within specific communities. -/- The Relative Importance of Popularity to Different Interests -/- The importance of popularity varies depending on the field of interest and personal aspirations. For entertainers, such as musicians, actors, and influencers, popularity is crucial for success because their careers rely on public engagement and audience growth. For example, pop stars like Taylor Swift and BTS thrive on maintaining a high level of popularity to sell albums, concert tickets, and merchandise. -/- In contrast, popularity may be less relevant for scientists, researchers, or intellectuals who prioritize accuracy and innovation over public approval. Albert Einstein and Nikola Tesla were not as popular in their early careers, but their groundbreaking contributions ultimately reshaped history. In academic fields, success is often measured by peer recognition and contributions to knowledge rather than mainstream popularity. -/- Similarly, in politics, popularity plays a dual role—it is essential for election campaigns and public trust, but effective governance often requires making unpopular decisions. Leaders such as Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill were controversial in their time but later gained historical admiration for their impactful decisions. -/- For entrepreneurs and business leaders, popularity can translate into brand loyalty and financial success. Figures like Steve Jobs and Elon Musk have leveraged their personal and corporate popularity to drive innovation and business growth. However, in industries such as medicine and law, professionals rely more on expertise and reputation within their field rather than mass popularity. -/- Conclusion -/- Popularity is not a fixed or universal concept but a relative phenomenon shaped by cultural context, time, individual perception, external influences, and the significance it holds in different fields. It is a temporary and subjective measure of collective interest rather than an inherent characteristic of any person, idea, or object. Recognizing the relativity of popularity helps us understand its impermanence and the factors that influence it, allowing us to form more independent and informed perspectives rather than blindly following trends. In a world where popularity is constantly shifting, it is essential to prioritize authenticity and personal values over fleeting external validation. -/- . (shrink)

In present times, Science has become more and more contiguous to philosophy due to the advent of Relativity theory and Quantum Mechanics. Relativity has modified our concepts of mass, length, force, law of addition of velocities and simultaneity and has given a new interpretation of the laws of conservation of energy and momentum. It has demonstrated the inner necessity of the idea of dialectic contradiction in the theoretical development of the contents of physics. Quantum Mechanics has continued what began with (...) the theory of relativity. It rejects unlimited detailing of objects in space and of phenomena in time. The concept of energy, momentum and angular momentum have now to take into account the possibility of quantization and the limitations imposed by the uncertainty relations. It has shown that the basic laws of nature are statistical and that the probabilistic form of causality is the fundamental form. It lays emphasis on relations of qualitatively different dialectic types, like the relations of complementarity and relations of interference. In the article, an attempt is made to show that these theories have called for a drastic revision of the seminal kernels of the traditional philosophy of science. (shrink)

Einstein acknowledged that his reading of Hume influenced the development of his special theory of relativity. In this article, I juxtapose Hume’s philosophy with Einstein’s philosophical analysis related to his special relativity. I argue that there are two common points to be found in their writings, namely an empiricist theory of ideas and concepts, and a relationist ontology regarding space and time. The main thesis of this article is that these two points are intertwined in Hume and Einstein.

Conceptual therapy seeks to eliminate from our vocabulary of concepts those that are conceptually pathological. The very use of such concepts—which is much of the time—brings about dysfunctional thinking: thought, that is to say, that leads us astray, paving the way for beliefs and claims to knowledge that are fundamentally nonsensical. A therapy for such concepts may be likened to holding a selective sieve and pouring the ideas with which we attempt to make sense of the world through it, (...) allowing the sieve to filter out those that would otherwise infect our thinking with meaninglessness. -/- Conceptual Therapy: An Introduction to Framework-relative Epistemology was written by the author as an introductory text for university classes in applied skills in epistemological analysis. (shrink)

Abstract:I examine the often-denigrated concept of the novel of ideas from its inception and critical decline to its relatively recent revival. Using a variant of the exploitation-exploration dilemma in psychology, I suggest that early usage referred to works that exploit philosophical principles—or better, enact them—by setting philosophical positions in conflict. By contrast, use of the concept for more recent works sees characters and plots exploring philosophical stances. The shift corresponds with the greater attention paid to complexity and ambiguity that (...) are hallmarks of continental philosophy and neopragmatism, and with it greater need to explore philosophical stances through fiction. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that a semantics for ‘ought’ should be neutral between different ways of deciding what an agent ought to do in a situation. While the idea is, I argue, well-motivated, taking it seriously leads to surprising, even paradoxical, problems for theorizing about the meaning of ‘ought’. This paper describes and defends one strategy—a form of Expressivism for the modal ‘ought’—for navigating these problems.

In this paper, I discuss the similarity between Wittgenstein’s use of thought experiments and Relativity Theory. I begin with introducing Wittgenstein’s idea of “thought experiments” and a tentative classification of different kinds of thought experiments in Wittgenstein’s work. Then, after presenting a short recap of some remarks on the analogy between Wittgenstein’s point of view and Einstein’s, I suggest three analogies between the status of Wittgenstein’s mental experiments and Relativity theory: the topics of time dilation, the search for invariants, and (...) the role of measuring tools in Special Relativity. This last point will help to better define Wittgenstein’s idea of description as the core of his philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

[My conclusion: MANY UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas (2008-2014 + 2016, 2017) referring to my EDWs, Einstein’s both relativities, quantum mechanics (entanglement, etc.), the relationship between Einstien’s general relativity and quantum mechanics!!!!!! -/- In 2008, UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to quantum mechanics; in 2014, 2016, and 2017 - unbelievable similar ideas to Einstein’s both special and general relativity; in 2014, 2016, 2017, unbelievable similar ideas to the relationship between Einstein’s general relativity and quantum mechanics, etc. (...) etc. etc. -/- All their ideas are written using mathematical and physical notions (old or invented by them), but their ideas are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas (in philosophy and Physics)… Just another (“complicated”) language, the same framework, the same ideas….] . (shrink)

This essay wants to analyze the different meanings in which the relationship between "end" and "time" could be interpreted in Kantian philosophy. In the phenomenic context, the end appoints a switch from a temporal series to another one, which, remaining within the continuous horizon of the time, implies a relative end in the context of a continuous un-ended succession. This concept of end in the time, that we can call phenomenic, entails the idea of an endless lenght of time (...) which develops itself towards the future. The perspective of a future infinity opens the idea of a noumenic end, an end of the time since end of the experience horizon. This noumenic end, related to the sinthetic unit of the experience, is the idea of an absolute end which marks out a total discontinuity with everything preceding. Therefore not an endless duration in temporal terms, but a measureless duration, that is a paradoxal notion. So, given that the aporia of the discontinuity between time and eternity remains for the theoretical reason, the bridge which tries to overtake this abyss cannot be run through according to the point of view of the critical reason. Therefore, after the checkmate of the noumenic end, Kant seizes the archimedic point where the thought of the end turns to the thought of the aim: this way the idea of the end acquires a sense only if connected with the idea of an ultimate aim. Proposing himself as the creation ultimate aim, the man finds in the culture the only way in which he could have been able to emancipates himself from nature: the man as moral being is the noumenic man who exerts liberty oversensitive faculty. Nevertheless, it seems that idea of human race progress fights, owing to its intrinsic coherence with a concept of open and endless temporality, against the moral idea of a final aim, which entails the idea of perfection and completion. Here it is that the poetic notion of an end of all things as an end of the time, that is as a sense narrative close, seems to help these requirements. Infact, according to Kant, is possible, through the imaginative action, to replace the cognitive abyss of the time and eternity border instant with a symbolic space of continuity and accomplished duration, that is included in the limits where the human being is no more subject to time but producer and builder of it. (shrink)

Forthcoming in Systematic Thinkers in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Alan Nelson. Abstract: David Hume's science of human nature hinges on a strict separation between simple and complex ideas—a distinction likewise foundational to the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley. This paper examines how Wittgenstein's critique of absolute simples in Philosophical Investigations bears on this distinction. Wittgenstein argues that any distinction between 'simple' and 'composite' is relative to how we (inter-)define these terms, with multiple definitions possible in (...) any context; hence, there is no absolute distinction between simple and complex elements of experience. Does this critique destabilize Hume's project? I argue that the answer depends on whether Hume's distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' ideas is intended to follow from the phenomenology of experience or to serve as a theoretical stipulation with specific explanatory or pragmatic aims. If the former, Wittgenstein's argument is devastating: 'experience itself' is compatible with various ways of drawing such distinctions, not all of which would support Hume's critical arguments. If the latter, however, Hume might have preempted this issue by justifying his theoretical stipulations on pragmatic grounds. (shrink)

General Relativity says gravity is a push caused by space-time's curvature. Combining General Relativity with E=mc2 results in distances being totally deleted from space-time/gravity by future technology, and in expansion or contraction of the universe as a whole being eliminated. The road to these conclusions has branches shining light on supersymmetry and superconductivity. This push of gravitational waves may be directed from intergalactic space towards galaxy centres, helping to hold galaxies together and also creating supermassive black holes. Together with the (...) waves' possible production of "dark" matter in higher dimensions, there's ample reason to believe knowledge of gravitational waves has barely begun. Advanced waves are usually discarded by scientists because they're thought to violate the causality principle. Just as advanced waves are usually discarded, very few physicists or mathematicians will venture to ascribe a physical meaning to Wick rotation and "imaginary" time. Here, that maths (when joined with Mobius-strip and Klein-bottle topology) unifies space and time into one space-time, and allows construction of what may be called "imaginary computers". This research idea you're reading is not intended to be a formal theory presenting scientific jargon and mathematical formalism. (shrink)

The present article placed in the framework of cosmological neuroscience the book titled “Nature Culture, and Inequality’’ by Thomas Piketty, the French economist and sociologist. According to Piketty, it is culture and politics that explains the diversity, degree, and structure of social inequalities, whereas the importance of natural factors, such as personal talents and reserves of natural resources, is relatively limited. In contrast, this article argued that the perhaps cosmically programmed evolution of the human brain is the real, though hopefully (...) transient, determinant of social inequality. The relevant specific message of this paper is that it is the evil side of the evolutionary force of socialization on the human brain’s emotionally and cognitively assisted Motivational system that is responsible for abnormal social inequality across the globe, throughout history. However, agreeing with Piketty, this paper also emphasized that social inequality depends on who controls the government and to what end. The article stood by its author’s previously published opinion that just societies with minimized, therefore socially welcomed and never abused, inequalities can be built only via a Government of Earth responsible, besides governing, for running an intercontinental education system able to train social leaders with equal moral and intellectual excellence, disinterest in personal financial gains, and understanding the cosmic contexts of human history. (shrink)

I propose a gentle reconciliation of Quantum Theory and General Relativity. It is possible to add small, but unshackling constraints to the quantum fields, making them compatible with General Relativity. Not all solutions of the Schrodinger's equation are needed. I show that the continuous and spatially separable solutions are sufficient for the nonlocal manifestations associated with entanglement and wavefunction collapse. After extending this idea to quantum fields, I show that Quantum Field Theory can be defined in terms of partitioned classical (...) fields. One key element is the idea of integral interactions, which also helps clarifying the quantum measurement and classical level problems. The unity of Quantum Theory and General Relativity can now be gained with the help of the partitioned fields' energy-momentum. A brief image of a General Relativistic Quantum Standard Model is outlined. (shrink)

After 2015, carlo rovelli continues to publish more and more UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas!!! His arguments are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my arguments… Until 2015, carlo rovelli had been working within the unicorn world; then he realized a sudden change! I let the reader to understand carlo rovelli’s step after 2015 since I mentioned that my book at Springer has been published in November 2015!! Anyway, I have published FIVE books (2008-2014) with my EDWs, and in 2007, (...) my entire PhD thesis (my first book 2008) was posted at UNSW (Australia) on their site!!! Moreover, in 2005, in Synthese article, in a footnote, I mentioned that the EDWs would be available for all quantum mechanics problems; in 2006 I published and posted on Internet (FREE) an article about my EDWs applied to quantum mechancis! I emaphasize again that I believe that it would be impossible for carlo rovelli to discover the EDWs working within the quatum mechanics. Why? Because I discovered the existence of EDWs working on the mind-body problem, that would involve to special particular entities: the self and the body. Only working within this problem, I could discover the existence of the mind-EW and the macro-EW (where the body is placed). Later, I applied this approach to the wave-particle duality, and after this, I applied my EDWs to the macro-micro duality. After solving all these problems, I could apply my EDWs perspective to Einstein’s special relativity (the person on the train that has constant speed and the person on the pavement are in EDWs) and general relativity (acceleration presupposes the movement from one particular EW to an EDW in each fraction of second! The conclusion is the following: it appears that it was impossible for carlo rovelli to discover the existence of EDWs working ONLY on the problems of Quantum Mechanics. His approach is nothing new, being just a combination of Bohr’s complementarity (Copenhagen interpretation) with Leibniz’s relationism within the unicorn world (i..e, the Universe/world)! No more or less. (shrink)

PLAGIARISM? (Sean Carroll (Physics, Caltech) is on this list!) There are many physicists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers who have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas long time after I published and posted many of my works (FREE) on various sites! There is a manuscript at these addresses (and in attachment)! The content is below. You are not the only one who received this email: I have sent this email to thousands… My name is Gabriel Vacariu (senior professor, (...) Philosophy, Bucharest University, Romania, East Europe). My PhD thesis (the staff of the university posted FREE my PhD thesis on their website in 2007, UNSW, Sydney, Australia) [This thesis is 80% from the first book published in 2008 – FREE at y webpage and it contains the main ideas regarding the EDWs perspective, the mind-brain problem, emergence problem, cognitive neuroscience, quantum mechanics vs. Einstein’s relativity from Springer’s book are in this thesis!] Many years later, many people (many countries, many domains, many of my ideas – some of them are “great” names from great USA and Germany universities!!) have published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas just because discovering the existence of EDWs, I have changed everything, i.e., it has been the greatest “Copernican revolution” until now!!! -/- Gabriel Vacariu, (April 2020 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE SIMILARITIES between the ideas of some people (2011-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would require a REVOLUTION in international academic environment!) here (the LIST is BELOW) . (shrink)

Balance Theory: A Unified Solution to General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- For over a century, physicists have struggled to reconcile General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) into a single unified framework. General Relativity explains the large-scale structure of the universe, governing stars, black holes, and the motion of galaxies. In contrast, Quantum Mechanics describes the microscopic world of particles and forces at the atomic and subatomic levels. These two pillars of modern physics work remarkably well in their respective (...) domains, but they fundamentally contradict each other. -/- A major challenge is that GR treats spacetime as a smooth and continuous fabric, while QM operates in a probabilistic, discrete world of quantum states and uncertainty. When scientists try to apply quantum rules to gravity, mathematical inconsistencies arise, leading to unsolvable infinities and singularities. The lack of a unified theory has prevented a deeper understanding of black holes, the early universe, and the fundamental nature of reality. -/- The Balance Theory Approach -/- Balance Theory proposes that the universe follows a fundamental principle of equilibrium, ensuring that physical laws remain consistent across all scales. Instead of treating gravity and quantum mechanics as separate forces, this approach suggests they emerge from a deeper law of balance that governs all interactions. -/- According to this perspective, nature constantly self-corrects to maintain balance. Just as biological systems regulate themselves to sustain life, and economic markets adjust supply and demand, the universe itself operates under a balancing principle that ensures coherence between the macroscopic and microscopic realms. -/- Gravity as a Balanced Phenomenon -/- In classical General Relativity, gravity is described as the warping of space-time caused by massive objects. This model works extremely well in most cases, but it leads to paradoxes in extreme conditions, such as inside black holes or at the beginning of the universe. -/- Balance Theory suggests that gravity is not just a passive curvature of spacetime but an active force that maintains equilibrium between energy, space, and information. Instead of black holes collapsing into singularities—where density becomes infinite and physical laws break down—the balance principle predicts that an internal stabilizing force prevents such extremes. This would mean that inside a black hole, rather than a singularity, there exists a quantum core that maintains structural balance. -/- Quantum Mechanics as a Balancing Process -/- Quantum mechanics describes particles as existing in multiple states simultaneously until measured, a phenomenon known as superposition. When a measurement is made, the particle’s wave function “collapses” into a definite state, but the mechanism behind this collapse remains mysterious. -/- Balance Theory proposes that wave function collapse is not purely random, as conventional quantum mechanics suggests, but rather a natural balancing process. Instead of requiring an external observer to force a quantum system into one state, the system itself seeks equilibrium within its environment. This idea could help resolve long-standing questions in quantum physics, such as how and why measurement affects particles and whether reality exists independently of observation. -/- Bridging the Gap Between GR and QM -/- One of the key insights of Balance Theory is that gravity and quantum mechanics are not opposing forces but two expressions of the same universal balancing principle. In this view: -/- Gravity emerges as a large-scale balancing mechanism that prevents the universe from collapsing into chaos. -/- Quantum mechanics represents a small-scale balancing process that ensures fundamental particles interact in predictable ways. -/- If this principle is correct, then the unification of physics does not require exotic new dimensions (as in String Theory) or the quantization of space-time itself (as in Loop Quantum Gravity). Instead, it requires a shift in perspective: understanding the universe as a dynamic, self-regulating system where balance is the fundamental law. -/- Predictions and Experimental Tests -/- Any scientific theory must make testable predictions that can be verified through observation or experiment. Balance Theory suggests several novel predictions: -/- 1. Black Holes Should Not Contain Singularities -/- If balance prevents infinite density, black holes should have a stable core rather than a singularity. -/- Future observations of black hole interiors, such as through gravitational wave patterns or high-resolution imaging, could provide evidence of this balance mechanism. -/- 2. Wave function Collapse Should Follow a Pattern -/- Instead of being purely random, wave function collapse should exhibit a hidden balance law. -/- Experiments in quantum optics, such as delayed-choice quantum erasers, could test whether collapse is guided by equilibrium rather than chance. -/- 3. Gravity Should Show Small Deviations at Extreme Scales -/- In extreme conditions, such as during black hole mergers, slight deviations from Einstein’s equations should appear due to quantum balance effects. -/- High-precision gravitational wave detectors could measure these deviations. -/- 4. There Should Be a Minimum Length Scale -/- If balance governs all forces, there should be a smallest possible length scale that prevents space-time from dividing infinitely. -/- High-energy experiments, such as those at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), might reveal unexpected effects at ultra-small distances. -/- Implications for the Nature of Reality -/- If Balance Theory is correct, it would mean that the universe is not fundamentally random or chaotic but governed by an underlying principle of stability. This would challenge the traditional view that quantum mechanics is based solely on probability and uncertainty, suggesting instead that quantum behavior follows a deeper logic rooted in equilibrium. -/- It would also Imply that space-time is not a fixed, unchanging backdrop but a dynamic entity that adapts to maintain balance. This could explain long-standing mysteries, such as why the expansion of the universe is accelerating or how information is preserved in black holes. -/- Conclusion -/- The search for a unified theory of physics has remained elusive for over a century, but Balance Theory offers a new perspective—one based on the idea that the universe maintains equilibrium at all levels, from the smallest quantum particles to the vast structure of space-time itself. By treating gravity and quantum mechanics as different manifestations of the same balancing force, this approach provides a potential pathway toward unification. -/- If validated through experiment, Balance Theory could reshape our understanding of physics, resolving paradoxes and unlocking new insights into the nature of reality itself. The next steps involve rigorous testing, mathematical refinement, and collaboration with physicists across disciplines to explore whether this fundamental principle of balance can finally bridge the gap between Einstein’s relativity and the quantum world. -/- . (shrink)

Balance Theory: A Unified Solution to General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -/- For over a century, physicists have struggled to reconcile General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) into a single unified framework. General Relativity explains the large-scale structure of the universe, governing stars, black holes, and the motion of galaxies. In contrast, Quantum Mechanics describes the microscopic world of particles and forces at the atomic and subatomic levels. These two pillars of modern physics work remarkably well in their respective (...) domains, but they fundamentally contradict each other. -/- A major challenge is that GR treats spacetime as a smooth and continuous fabric, while QM operates in a probabilistic, discrete world of quantum states and uncertainty. When scientists try to apply quantum rules to gravity, mathematical inconsistencies arise, leading to unsolvable infinities and singularities. The lack of a unified theory has prevented a deeper understanding of black holes, the early universe, and the fundamental nature of reality. -/- The Balance Theory Approach -/- Balance Theory proposes that the universe follows a fundamental principle of equilibrium, ensuring that physical laws remain consistent across all scales. Instead of treating gravity and quantum mechanics as separate forces, this approach suggests they emerge from a deeper law of balance that governs all interactions. -/- According to this perspective, nature constantly self-corrects to maintain balance. Just as biological systems regulate themselves to sustain life, and economic markets adjust supply and demand, the universe itself operates under a balancing principle that ensures coherence between the macroscopic and microscopic realms. -/- Gravity as a Balanced Phenomenon -/- In classical General Relativity, gravity is described as the warping of spacetime caused by massive objects. This model works extremely well in most cases, but it leads to paradoxes in extreme conditions, such as inside black holes or at the beginning of the universe. -/- Balance Theory suggests that gravity is not just a passive curvature of spacetime but an active force that maintains equilibrium between energy, space, and information. Instead of black holes collapsing into singularities—where density becomes infinite and physical laws break down—the balance principle predicts that an internal stabilizing force prevents such extremes. This would mean that inside a black hole, rather than a singularity, there exists a quantum core that maintains structural balance. -/- Quantum Mechanics as a Balancing Process -/- Quantum mechanics describes particles as existing in multiple states simultaneously until measured, a phenomenon known as superposition. When a measurement is made, the particle’s wavefunction “collapses” into a definite state, but the mechanism behind this collapse remains mysterious. -/- Balance Theory proposes that wavefunction collapse is not purely random, as conventional quantum mechanics suggests, but rather a natural balancing process. Instead of requiring an external observer to force a quantum system into one state, the system itself seeks equilibrium within its environment. This idea could help resolve long-standing questions in quantum physics, such as how and why measurement affects particles and whether reality exists independently of observation. -/- Bridging the Gap Between GR and QM -/- One of the key insights of Balance Theory is that gravity and quantum mechanics are not opposing forces but two expressions of the same universal balancing principle. In this view: -/- Gravity emerges as a large-scale balancing mechanism that prevents the universe from collapsing into chaos. -/- Quantum mechanics represents a small-scale balancing process that ensures fundamental particles interact in predictable ways. -/- If this principle is correct, then the unification of physics does not require exotic new dimensions (as in String Theory) or the quantization of spacetime itself (as in Loop Quantum Gravity). Instead, it requires a shift in perspective: understanding the universe as a dynamic, self-regulating system where balance is the fundamental law. -/- Predictions and Experimental Tests -/- Any scientific theory must make testable predictions that can be verified through observation or experiment. Balance Theory suggests several novel predictions: -/- 1. Black Holes Should Not Contain Singularities -/- If balance prevents infinite density, black holes should have a stable core rather than a singularity. -/- Future observations of black hole interiors, such as through gravitational wave patterns or high-resolution imaging, could provide evidence of this balance mechanism. -/- 2. Wavefunction Collapse Should Follow a Pattern -/- Instead of being purely random, wavefunction collapse should exhibit a hidden balance law. -/- Experiments in quantum optics, such as delayed-choice quantum erasers, could test whether collapse is guided by equilibrium rather than chance. -/- 3. Gravity Should Show Small Deviations at Extreme Scales -/- In extreme conditions, such as during black hole mergers, slight deviations from Einstein’s equations should appear due to quantum balance effects. -/- High-precision gravitational wave detectors could measure these deviations. -/- 4. There Should Be a Minimum Length Scale -/- If balance governs all forces, there should be a smallest possible length scale that prevents spacetime from dividing infinitely. -/- High-energy experiments, such as those at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), might reveal unexpected effects at ultra-small distances. -/- Implications for the Nature of Reality -/- If Balance Theory is correct, it would mean that the universe is not fundamentally random or chaotic but governed by an underlying principle of stability. This would challenge the traditional view that quantum mechanics is based solely on probability and uncertainty, suggesting instead that quantum behavior follows a deeper logic rooted in equilibrium. -/- It would also Imply that spacetime is not a fixed, unchanging backdrop but a dynamic entity that adapts to maintain balance. This could explain long-standing mysteries, such as why the expansion of the universe is accelerating or how information is preserved in black holes. -/- Conclusion -/- The search for a unified theory of physics has remained elusive for over a century, but Balance Theory offers a new perspective—one based on the idea that the universe maintains equilibrium at all levels, from the smallest quantum particles to the vast structure of spacetime itself. By treating gravity and quantum mechanics as different manifestations of the same balancing force, this approach provides a potential pathway toward unification. -/- If validated through experiment, Balance Theory could reshape our understanding of physics, resolving paradoxes and unlocking new insights into the nature of reality itself. The next steps involve rigorous testing, mathematical refinement, and collaboration with physicists across disciplines to explore whether this fundamental principle of balance can finally bridge the gap between Einstein’s relativity and the quantum world. -/- . (shrink)

I investigate the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of Oreshkov et al. and my ideas. In fact, their framework (the ontological background) is UNBELIEVABLE similar to my EDWs perspective!

This paper develops a speculative but disciplined conceptual framework connecting consciousness, quantum theory, and the emergence of spacetime. Drawing on ideas from Integrated Information Theory and approaches in which spacetime geometry is grounded in entanglement structure, the framework explores how consciousness might be situated within fundamental physics without claiming to alter established theory. A two-level interpretation is proposed. At the first (conservative) level, consciousness is understood as an informational property of physical systems that becomes correlated with quantum measurement outcomes (...) in the ordinary way described by standard quantum theory. On this view, consciousness accompanies observation, but does not itself play a causal role in determining which outcome occurs. At the second (speculative) level, consciousness is tentatively allowed to weakly bias which physically permissible outcomes are realised, while still respecting constraints such as no-signalling. The aim of the paper is not to defend consciousness as a physical cause, but to articulate a clear conceptual space in which such questions can be asked without confusion. A companion paper develops a mathematical formalisation of the speculative level and shows how it might, in principle, be tested. Together, the papers invite philosophical and scientific reflection on whether consciousness may have any structured role in the emergence of physical reality. (shrink)

Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might have (...) led to this misunderstanding. (shrink)

The current technoscientific progress has led to a sectorization in the philosophy of science. Today the philosophy of science isn't is informal interested in studying old problems about the general characteristics of scientific practice. The interest of the philosopher of science is the study of concepts, problems and riddles of particular disciplines. Then, within this progress of philosophy of science, neuroscientific research stands out, because it invades issues traditionally addressed by the humanities, such as the nature of consciousness, action, knowledge, (...) normativity, etc. As a result, the new area of interdisciplinary study of neuroscience and philosophy arises: neurophilosophy. This emerging area applies neuroscientific concepts to traditional philosophical questions, limiting their responses to neuroscientific revelations about nervous systems. Neurophilosophy research focuses on problems related to the indirect nature of mind and brain, computational or representative analysis of brain process, relationships between psychological and neuroscientific research, adequate adaptations of physical and philosophical concepts in neuroscience and the place of cognitive functions. Now, the temporal representation of conscious experience and the types of the neural architecture to represent objects in time have aroused scientific interest. Under these interests, we focus on the studies on the temporary triadic structure of phenomenological consciousness in Dan Lloyd and Rick Grush. From Grush’s studies, the importance of Kantian ideas for cognitive neuroscience emerges, due to the active way in which Kant conceived space and time as forms of intuition, within which the mind interprets its experience. Under this perspective, the theoretical arguments of Dennett-Kinsbourne and Eagleman-Sejnowski represent winks in the direction of Kant-Husserl within the neuroscientific goal while considering that the contents provided by the mind included space, objects and perception of causal relationships. Then, theories of cognitive neuroscience are beginning to suggest that these elements are also, as Kant argued, interpretative elaborations provided by mind / brain, and not only content received from outside. In other words, current cognitive neuroscientific theories try to pass from its Humean phase to a Kantian phase. So, the challenge has been to explain that these elements are provided by the mind and the world itself, and how they have the content they have come from. These are lacking in current studies. Filling this gap helps to involve the analysis of the scientist’s experience in his theoretical attitude. In this sense, an investigation under the Kantian-Husserlian approach that involves pure intuitions a priori with the experience of the scientific and neuroscientific concepts represents a ground-breaking. At present, a neurophilosophical study about this does not exist. In this sense, one feasible proposal for research would be based on the application of neuroscientific results of Moser-Britt to philosophical problems of foundational notions in relativistic physics: space, time, space-time, field, etc., under the Kantian-Husserlian approach, which allows to demonstrate the multidisciplinary link between neurophilosophy and physics. This represents a ground-breaking area in current interests in scientific research, with a positive impact in the field of neuroscience, and contributing to the study of abstraction emphasizing the importance of Kant’s Copernican turn and Husserl’s phenomenological ideas in the construction of physical theories. (shrink)

Natural science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity. First, we need to acknowledge that the actual aims of science are profoundly problematic, in that they make problematic assumptions about metaphysics, values and the social use of science. Then we need to represent these aims in the form of a hierarchy of aims, which become increasingly unproblematic as one goes up the hierarchy; as result we create a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods, (...) high up in the hierarchy, within which much more problematic aims and methods, low down in the hierarchy, may be improved as scientific knowledge improves. Then, we need to generalize this hierarchical, aims-and-methods-improving methodology so that it becomes fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile endeavour with problematic aims. Finally, we need to apply this methodology to the immensely problematic task of making progress towards as good a world as feasible. (shrink)

How are language and thinking related? The “Sapir-Whorf” hypothesis that language determines thinking, has been widely debated but more recently has attracted far less interest and some critics reject it outright, as refuted. Has it been refuted and is there no longer any reason to discuss Sapir and Whorf’s ideas? I will argue that it has not and that, in any case, the “hypothesis” does not express Whorf’s published ideas (nor, probably, Sapir’s). This leads to an even more (...) interesting question: what did Sapir and Whorf really write about the relationship between language and thinking? Because Sapirand Whorf differ significantly and should be treated separately, in this paper, I will focus on Whorf, whose writings I am most familiar with. After briefly describing Edward Sapirand Benjamin Lee Whorf, after whom the hypothesis is named, I will then describe the hypothesis and explain how it is precluded by Whorf’s own writings. (shrink)

Religious experience is one of the fundamental problems of the philosophy of religion. Although it has entered the literature as a proof of God; discussions focus on its nature. The basic approaches to the nature of religious experience are: religious experience as a feeling, religious experience as a perception, religious experience as a comment. The main reason that makes the nature of religious experience controversial is that it consists of two concepts that have a wide range of meaning, such as (...) religion and experience. The meanings that individuals and traditions attach to these two concepts determine the understanding of religious experience. The beginning of religious experience as a term corresponds to the periods of Protestantism. With the emphasis of Enlightenment on the mind, the meanings attributed to religious experience have been reduced and narrowed. In the literature, religious experience is unclear, cannot be transferred to others, instant and extraordinary experiences. The preliminary acceptance of this article is that the meanings attributed to the term religious experience are narrowed and it is wrong to use the term in the same sense for different traditions. This article assumes that the reader knows the current discussion of the problem. Rather than reacting to the concerns of current debate, it takes a more proactive and pre-opener approach. Rather than reacting to the concerns of the current debate, it takes a more proactive approach to the subject. This paper will present a different reading of religious experience than the literature as a problem of the Philosophy of Religion. In this context, the concept of God, universe and human being in al-Ghazali will be firstly revealed as the ontological background of religious experience; then a description of the concept of religious experience will be proposed on this ontological basis. If you mean an experience related to religion, which is within religious boundaries with religious experience; Islam for a Muslim, that all experiences that cater to all aspects of human existence and religious boundaries cannot be the person to enter into any human experience that is experienced throughout the religious life. Certainly, here we can talk about the experiences that religion has ordered and forbidden, or in other words, experiences that religion regards as positive or negative. If an experience related to God is meant for religious experience, here are two cases: when the truth comes to the essence and attributes of God, the human experience does not reach there and in this sense, a religious experience is not possible. If the acts of God are mentioned; all the experiences that people live in are religious in this sense, because everything outside of their own is a deed of God, and whatever happens in the world of being, takes place within God's deeds. Here, too, whether or not people are aware of it, can be mentioned in other words, from conscious and unconscious religious experiences, which is the deciding factor. Faith, then, can be regarded as the first step of the conscious religious experience. If you are referring to experiences that seem to be unusual for those who are religious and have no religious experience, it is an extraordinary experience to go on a journey itself, compared to not going on a journey. That is to say, the faith itself, which is to ascend to a journey to perfection, is an extraordinary experience compared to those who are not on this path, that is, those who do not have it. For instance for children, the experiences of the elders are extraordinary, and therefore being ordinary and extraordinary is a relative concept. It is necessary to acknowledge the differences in conscious religious experiences mentioned above in the meaning of intense and deep living in themselves. There is a deeper and more intense experience that expresses progress in a journey that leads to God in the sense of the strengthening of faith. This is the kind of experience that most people have not experienced in this sense that the task of the person who is experienced in his own journey is not to stick to them and continue on their way. So living out of order for a Muslim is seen as a barrier that must be encountered and which should not be lingered on, while experiencing something extraordinary has a distinctive place for religious experience in current debates. The issue is not that they cannot be explained but they are not deliberately explained due to the fear of misunderstanding. This can be regarded as a method of education that older adults use to train minors. As a result, if we would define a religious experience according to al-Ghazali, we can say that religion is a journey made towards God, and religious experience is the experience of traveling to God. Traveling to him means to get close to Him, but this approach is not in spatial means but in perfection means. So, religious experience is the journey to perfection of the man himself. Man's perfection is to have the attributes of God who have absolute perfection. These attributes are present in man's own essence. What a person must do, is to place an effort to make these virtual adjectives real. This journey is basically an existential necessity as it provides the happiness that is essential to human existence. In this journey, which can be understood as becoming a human being who was born as a human being. It should also be added that it is not possible to be absolutely perfect and to reach the reality of God himself in this endless journey of perfection. Therefore, the absolute perfection belongs to God, and it is necessary to understand the concept of perfect human being as a person who has traveled in the journey to perfection. (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to offer an interpretation about the explanation of the (relative) idea of pure substance in general on John Locke’s philosophy, from Thomas Reid’s notion of ‘natural suggestion’. To achieve this aim, after contextualizing Locke’s notion of pure substance in general and distinguishing it from the idea of particular substance (section 1), we explicit that Locke’s words about the source of the idea of the former in the mind (either empirical or rational) are ambiguous and (...) inconclusive (section 2). Then, we argue that the parallels between this idea and that of ‘relation’, as well as of ‘power’ do not assist in that answer, due to some problems we identify on them (section 3). Finally, we argue that the Reidian explanation for the source of the idea of ‘mind’, from the notion of ‘natural suggestion’ allows us to i) avoid those problems and ii) inasmuch as, according to this interpretation, the idea of pure substance in general would have an empirical source, Lockian empiricism would remain intact (section 4). (shrink)

I argue that Hobbes isn't really a materialist in the early 1640s (in, e.g., the Third Objections to Descartes's Meditations). That is, he doesn't assert that bodies are the only substances. However, he does think that bodies are the only substances we can think about using imagistic ideas.

Hobbes denies in Leviathan that we have an idea of God. He does think, though, that God exists, and does not even deny that we can think about God, even though he says we have no idea of God. There is, Hobbes thinks, another cognitive mechanism by means of which we can think about God. That mechanism allows us only to think a few things about God though. This constrains what Hobbes can say about our knowledge of God, and grounds (...) his belief in a fairly strong version of the thesis that God is incomprehensible. (shrink)

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there (...) to be absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)