This paper is part of a book symposium for L. A. Paul (2014) Transformative Experience (OUP).

This paper explores how transformative experience generates decision-making problems of particular seriousness in medical settings. Potentially transformative experiences are especially likely to be encountered in medicine, and the associated decisions are confronted jointly by patients and clinicians in the context of an imbalance of power and expertise. However in such scenarios the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in guiding clinicians, is unequal to the task. We detail how the principle’s assumptions about autonomy, rationality (...) and information handle transformative experiences poorly, appealing to several difficult cases for medical decision-making to illustrate the resulting problem, and we consider how the existing literature on complications with consent fails to offer a resolution. We argue that recognition of the problem has a role to play in achieving a more effective response to transformative decisions. In Sect. 1 we introduce several representative cases of challenging patient decision-making that clinicians might face. In Sect. 2 we detail how transformative experience has been analysed in the recent literature, before outlining in Sect. 3 the theoretical basis of the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in how clinicians are expected to support decision-making. In Sect. 4, having laid the groundwork for a clear description, we return to the cases given in Sect. 1 to confirm how their transformative nature presents a problem: either clinicians treat the decisions faced by these patients as ‘normal’, encouraging them to focus on information provision that patients may be unable to act on, or they treat them as transformative, in which case they lack the resources to recognise whether they are helping patients make (subjectively) good decisions. In Sect. 5 we argue that the existing literature does not offer any escape from this problem. We close in Sect. 6 by noting the significant impact that appreciating the problem of transformative experience could have on supporting transformative decisions in medicine and briefly suggesting how we might aim to develop new approaches to dealing with these. (shrink)

Sometimes it is not us but those to whom we stand in special relations that face transformative choices: our friends, family or beloved. A focus upon first-personal rational choice and agency has left crucial ethical questions regarding what we owe to those who face transformative choices largely unexplored. In this paper I ask: under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible to interfere to try to prevent another from making a transformative choice? Some seemingly plausible answers (...) to this question fail precisely because they concern transformative experiences. I argue that we have a distinctive moral right to revelatory autonomy grounded in the value of autonomous self-making. If this right is outweighed then, I argue, interfering to prevent another making a transformative choice is permissible. This conditional answer lays the groundwork for a promising ethics of transformative experience. (shrink)

to appear in Lambert, E. and J. Schwenkler (eds.) Transformative Experience (OUP) -/- L. A. Paul (2014, 2015) argues that the possibility of epistemically transformative experiences poses serious and novel problems for the orthodox theory of rational choice, namely, expected utility theory — I call her argument the Utility Ignorance Objection. In a pair of earlier papers, I responded to Paul’s challenge (Pettigrew 2015, 2016), and a number of other philosophers have responded in similar ways (Dougherty, et (...) al. 2015, Harman 2015) — I call our argument the Fine-Graining Response. Paul has her own reply to this response, which we might call the Authenticity Reply. But Sarah Moss has recently offered an alternative reply to the Fine-Graining Response on Paul’s behalf (Moss 2017) — we’ll call it the No Knowledge Reply. This appeals to the knowledge norm of action, together with Moss’ novel and intriguing account of probabilistic knowledge. In this paper, I consider Moss’ reply and argue that it fails. I argue first that it fails as a reply made on Paul’s behalf, since it forces us to abandon many of the features of Paul’s challenge that make it distinctive and with which Paul herself is particularly concerned. Then I argue that it fails as a reply independent of its fidelity to Paul’s intentions. (shrink)

How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul (2014) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rational decision-making. For instance, being attacked by hungry sharks would be a transformative experience, and yet, deciding not to swim with hungry sharks (...) is rational. Paul has tried to explain why decisions involving ‘sharky’ outcomes are an exception to the rule. However, her putative explanation has been criticized by Campbell and Mosquera (2020). In this paper, I offer a different solution to this problem. Roughly, I argue that transformative experiences give rise a problem for rational decision-making only if the decision can lead to satisfying some of our (new) core preferences, but can also frustrate other (new) core preferences. I also argue that agents can partially project what traumatic transformative experiences are like. (shrink)

This article examines how certain transformative experiences – such as becoming a mother, joining the military, or attending college – can function as traps when framed through a rhetoric of individual agency and self-realization that obscures sociomaterial conditions and oppressive structural forces. We analyze three features of contemporary philosophical discourse on transformative experience that contribute to this entrapment: the emphasis on subjective value, the view of transformation as a rupture between old and new selves, and the appeal (...) to higher-order values like authenticity and self-authorship. Our case study on motherhood shows how these conceptual framings can render structural constraints invisible, sever individuals from the resources that might help them navigate the rigid roles into which they are cast, and ultimately isolate them in the aftermath of difficult or harmful outcomes, leaving them solely responsible to bear the burden. (shrink)

Laurie Paul argues that, when it comes to many of your most significant life-changing decisions, the principles of rational choice are silent. That is because, in these cases, you anticipate that one of your choice options would yield a transformative experience. We argue that such decisions are best seen as ones in which you anticipate awareness growth. You do not merely lack knowledge about which possible outcome will arise from a transformative option; you lack knowledge about what (...) are the possible outcomes. We show how principles of rational choice can be extended to cases of anticipated awareness growth. (shrink)

According to its quietist readings, skepticism can be dissolved by demonstrating that the notion of ‘absolute objectivity’ is confused. The dissolution of this confusion is supposed to lead us to acquiesce in our finite and plain everyday life without being bothered anymore about the supposed need for objective knowledge. In contrast, I want to propose a transformative reading of skepticism according to which the philosophical practice of skepticism can be ‘epistemically transformative’. To this end, I will transpose L.A. (...) Paul's notion of ‘epistemically transformative experience’ from decision theory to the realm of philosophical practice and argue that the modern skeptical problem of an external standpoint can evoke transformative experiences that lead to a new, albeit non-propositional, insight into the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.

Chapter 6 considers how peer disagreement over religion presents an epistemological problem: How can confidence in any religious claims including their negations be epistemically justified? Here, it is shown that the transformative nature of religious experience poses a further problem: to transition between religious belief and skepticism is not just to adopt a different set of beliefs, but to transform into a different version of oneself. It is argued that this intensifies the problem of pluralism by adding a (...) new dimension to religious disagreement, for we can lack epistemic and affective access to our potential religious, agnostic, or skeptical selves. Yet, access to these selves seems to be required for the purposes of decision-making that is to be both rational and authentic. Finally, the chapter reflects on the relationship between the transformative problem and what it shows about the epistemic status of religious conversion and deconversion, in which one disagrees with one’s own transformed self. (shrink)

In this commentary, I critique three aspects of Emily Walsh's proposal to reduce the moral and legal weight of advance directives: (1) the ambiguity of its initial thesis, (2) its views about the ethics and legality of clinical practice, and (3) its interpretation and application of Ronald Dworkin’s account of advance directives and L.A. Paul's view on transformative experience. I also consider what Walsh’s proposal would mean for people facing the prospect of dementia. I conclude that our reasons (...) to honor many advance directives survive the move to a transformative experience framework. (shrink)

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...) Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism. (shrink)

In this chapter we suggest that many experiences of suffering can be further illuminated as forms of transformative experience, using the term coined by L.A. Paul. Such suffering experiences arise from the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. Such features can create a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valanced forms of epistemically and personally transformative experiences, as we detail here. We argue that the productive element of suffering experiences can be articulated as (...) class='Hi'>transformative, although suffering experiences are not the type mostly discussed in the transformative experience literature. We correct for this here by developing a taxonomy of negatively valenced transformative experiences. We suggest three features that make such experiences ones of suffering, following Michael Brady’s definition: intensity, novelty, and attentional focus. Finally, we suggest that one possible explanation for the edifying capacity of suffering comes from it requiring more transformation than positive experiences. (shrink)

In his work on informed consent, Daniel Villiger (2025a) credibly argues that ignorance concerning the outcomes of transformative treatments need not undermine patient autonomy, while prohibitions...

L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have (...) not been pregnant face significant barriers to acquiring the knowledge made accessible through pregnancy. This knowledge is crucial for engaging with the ethics of abortion. The epistemically transformativeWIDE nature of pregnancy may require us to use new methods to try to partially grasp what pregnancy is like such as for example, significant engagement with narrative literature. Because pregnancy is also epistemically transformative in a narrow sense, we need to work out how to engage in ethical reasoning when relevant knowledge is not fully accessible to all. This argument has implications beyond the debate about abortion. Philosophers in many areas of applied ethics will need to work out how to respond appropriately to epistemically transformative experiences. (shrink)

I argue that, given the choice, we have a right not to undergo transformative experiences. We are entitled to affirm our previous autonomous agency by deciding in this way, and this right is grounded in the significance of our self-authorship. I further show that many of the suggested demands of morality involve transformative change, and so meeting these demands would involve not just paying a high cost, but forfeiting this right. Though this may be morally required, we may (...) wrong ourselves in complying. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the role played by the emotion of admiration in formulating moral judgments. First, I discuss whether and when admiration is a reliable source of moral knowledge, or, on the contrary, it misleads the subject, leaving her prey to forms of uncritical devotion to unworthy objects of admiration. To do so, I try to elucidate which underlying theory of emotions best allows one to characterize admiration as a reliable source of moral knowledge. Second, I introduce the (...) notion of transformative moral experience, understood as a subclass of transformative experiences, and I argue that it is precisely admiration that ensures the rationality of the choices made in such experiences. Finally, in light of this analysis, I show how admiration—together with the constellation of positive and negative emotions connected to the perception of moral exemplarity—acts as a central element for the maintenance of moral integrity. I defend, in particular, the idea that integrity should not be understood as mere coherence, nor as a static maintenance of the moral status quo, but as being firmly rooted in one’s own identity yet open to novelty and especially to the novelty represented by transformative moral experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that whether, how, and to what extent an experience is transformative is often highly contingent. I then further argue that sometimes social conditions are a major factor in whether a certain type of experience is often or typically transformative. Sometimes social conditions make it easy for a type of experience to be transformative, and sometimes they make it hard for a type of experience to be transformative. This, (...) I claim, can sometimes be a matter of social justice: social conditions can make transformativeness too easy or too hard, in a way that harms people. (shrink)

Scholars in philosophy of medicine and bioethics have recently turned their attention to transformative experiences: experiences that teach something new that one could not have known before having the experience, while simultaneously changing one as a person. Sanne Elisa van der Marck recently argued, drawing on the work of Fiona Woollard, that the subjective experience of pregnancy should be included in moral debates on abortion, since pregnancy is a transformative experience. Van der Marck implicitly suggested (...) that such a view strengthens autonomy-based pro-choice abortion arguments because only pregnant people have crucial knowledge of what it is like to be pregnant. However, as I will show, the upshot of her argument is that it undermines the autonomy-based pro-choice arguments. This is because if pregnancy is a transformative experience, then it becomes increasingly difficult to give informed consent for abortion, since only by going through pregnancy would one gain the knowledge of ‘what it is like’ that is necessary to make the rational choice of having the abortion in the first place. Thus, her argument has a counterintuitive conclusion—it limits rather than reinforces reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

In a widely discussed forthcoming article, “What you can't expect when you're expecting,” L. A. Paul challenges culturally and philosophically traditional views about how to rationally make major life-decisions, most specifically the decision of whether to have children. The present paper argues that because major life-decisions are transformative, the only rational way to approach them is to become resilient people: people who do not “over-plan” their lives or expect their lives to play out “according to plan”—people who understand that (...) beyond a certain limit, life cannot be rationally planned and must be accepted as it comes. I show that this focus on resilience—on self-mastery—stands in direct opposition to culturally dominant attitudes toward decision-making, which focus not on the self-mastery but on control and mastery over one's surroundings. In short, I argue that if Paul's general point about transformative experiences is correct, it follows that we rationally ought to adopt a very different approach to life choices, self-development, and the moral education of our children than currently-dominant cultural norms and practices suggest. (shrink)

Religious conversion gives rise to disagreement with one’s former self and with family and friends. Because religious conversion is personally and epistemically transformative, it is difficult to judge whether a former epistemic peer is still one’s epistemic peer post-conversion, just like it is hard for the convert to assess whether she is now in a better epistemic position than prior to her conversion. Through Augustine’s De Utilitate Credendi (The Usefulness of Belief) I show that reasoned argument should play a (...) crucial role in assessing the evidential value of religious conversions, both for the person who converts and for her (former) peers. (shrink)

Psychedelic experiences are often compared to “transformative experiences” due to their potential to change how people think and behave. This study empirically examines whether psychedelic experiences constitute transformative experiences. Given psychedelics’ prospective applications as treatments for mental health disorders, this study also explores neuroethical issues raised by the possibility of biomedically directed transformation—namely, consent and moral psychopharmacology. To achieve these aims, we used both inductive and deductive coding techniques to analyze transcripts from interviews with 26 participants in psychedelic (...) retreats. Results indicate that psychedelic experiences can constitute transformative experiences. Twenty participants reported experiences or insights that were seemingly inaccessible or impossible to attain if not for the psychoactive effects of psychedelics. All participants besides one reported some change in identity, values, beliefs, desires, and behavior—changes in behavior being the most common. Participants also reported feeling capable deciding to use psychedelics in part due to information seeking prior to their retreats. Finally, several participants reported an enhanced capacity for enacting changes in their lives. Our results underscore both the importance of subjective embodiment to transformation and the role of transformative agency in shaping outcomes of the psychedelic experience. We examine our results relative to neuroethical issues and advocate for centering the person in psychedelic research and neuroethical inquiry about psychedelics to avoid pitfalls associated with psychedelics’ potential as moral psychopharmacological agents. (shrink)

Students enter science classrooms already familiar with the world around them: they’ve felt the wind, seen lightning, and wondered why the sun sets. These everyday encounters, though intuitively understood (perhaps sometimes misunderstood?), are also entry points into powerful scientific explanations. Such ordinary experiences become extraordinary when reframed through concepts like combustion, refraction, or energy transfer. Scientific concepts do not merely describe phenomena; they seek to explain them by revealing hidden mechanisms and causal patterns. These abstract concepts like energy, or gene (...) are not static facts to be memorized but the outcome of centuries of creative thinking, model-building, and conceptual transformation. Thus, creativity emerges not merely from personal inspiration but from an interaction between individuals, symbolic domains of knowledge, and social fields of recognition (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). This systems approach of creativity has been emphasized by several scholars (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1996, 1999; Simonton, 1988; Woodman and Schoenfield, 1989). Scientific concepts are embedded within these symbolic systems as domains of shared networks of representations and methods that structure thought and inquiry (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; 1996; 1999). While culturally transmitted, such concepts aim to map onto real causal patterns in the world, reflecting universal cognitive categories and ontological structures. Scientific creativity, then, is a culturally situated yet cognitively grounded process that drives meaningful conceptual change and helps learners move beyond misconceptions (Mason, 2020). To foster this creativity in education, we must treat science not as a static body of knowledge but as a dynamic system of ideas that are continually generated, evaluated, and reimagined. This requires going beyond the transmission of ‘course content’ to cultivating the cognitive, emotional, and cultural conditions that support transformative insight, immersing learners in symbolic domains and helping them develop the habits of thought, modeling practices, and conceptual tools needed to reshape those systems. In this chapter, I aim to illuminate some of these conditions and propose a framework for enriching scientific creativity in the classroom and beyond—one that emphasizes developing and appropriately constraining student’s scientific imagination; not just teaching about science or how to do it. (shrink)

Purpose: This study investigates the transformative role of augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) technologies in e-commerce and digital marketing. It aims to understand how these immersive technologies enhance consumer experiences by addressing challenges such as product visualization, consumer trust, and engagement while fostering higher purchase intent and customer satisfaction. Design/Method/Approach: A systematic literature review synthesizes findings from empirical and theoretical studies published between 2011 and 2024. The methodologies analyzed include experimental designs, market analyses, and conceptual frameworks assessing (...) the integration of AR and VR technologies in online retail. Findings: The findings indicate that AR enhances online shopping through features such as virtual try-ons and spatial placement visualization, reducing return rates and increasing purchase confidence. VR, on the other hand, provides immersive environments that simulate physical shopping experiences, strengthening consumer-brand connections. While AR demonstrates broader applicability in fostering interactive and personalized experiences, VR remains limited by accessibility and cost constraints. Both technologies exhibit immediate costs but offer long-term benefits, positively influencing conversion rates and customer loyalty. Theoretical Implications: This study contributes to consumer behavior research by applying value perception models, immersive technology frameworks, and engagement metrics to the e-commerce landscape. It refines existing theoretical perspectives on technological adoption by highlighting the interplay between sensory engagement, emotional connection, and consumer decision-making. Practical Implications: The research underscores the strategic importance of integrating AR and VR into digital marketing and e-commerce platforms. It suggests leveraging AR for product categories requiring spatial interaction and using VR for high-detail product exploration. The study provides actionable insights for businesses looking to enhance online shopping experiences through immersive technologies. Originality/Value: This study offers a comprehensive synthesis of AR and VR applications in e-commerce, highlighting their potential to reshape online shopping. By bridging the gap between physical and digital retail experiences, it provides a fresh perspective on how immersive technologies can drive engagement, accessibility, and personalized consumer interactions. Research Limitations/Future Research: While this study synthesizes existing literature, empirical validation through longitudinal studies and cross-industry applications is necessary. Future research should explore the long-term effects of AR and VR adoption on consumer trust, loyalty, and behavioral changes. Additionally, further exploration is encouraged into gamification, artificial intelligence (AI) integration, and demographic-specific implementations to drive sustainable engagement. (shrink)

The paper provides a brief review of the literature, including a case study, of anomalous human experiences (AHEs) such as glossolalia, xenolalia, out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and near-death experiences (NDEs). AHEs are frequently experienced by a number of the healthy as well as the pathological population. The first part of the paper looks at the literature describing phenomenology as well as semiology of the AHEs and their common features. The second part looks at the literature reflecting possible transformative and transcendent (...) elements of the AHEs. The last part of the paper examines the literature presenting the possible pathological as well as spiritual nature of AHEs. (shrink)

From ancient conceptions of becoming a philosopher to modern discussions of psychedelic drugs, the concept of transformation plays a fascinating part in the history of philosophy. However, until now there has been no sustained exploration of the full extent of its role. Transformation and the History of Philosophy is an outstanding survey of the history, nature, and development of the idea of transformation, from the ancient period to the twentieth century. Comprising twenty-two specially commissioned chapters by an international team of (...) contributors, the volume is divided into four clear parts: - Philosophy as Transformative: Ancient China, Greece, India, and Rome - Transformation Between the Human and the Divine: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy - Transformation After the Copernican Revolution: Post-Kantian Philosophy - Treatises, Pregnancies, Psychedelics, and Epiphanies: Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Each of these sections begins with an introduction by the editors. Transformation and the History of Philosophy is essential reading for students and researchers in the history of western and non-western philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics. It will also be extremely useful for those in related disciplines such as religion, sociology, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

This article is about the information relevant to decision-making capacity in refusal of life-prolonging medical treatment cases. We examine the degree to which the phenomenology of the options available to the agent—what the relevant states of affairs will feel like for them—forms part of the capacity-relevant information in the law of England and Wales, and how this informational basis varies across adolescent and adult medical treatment cases. We identify an important doctrinal phenomenon. In the leading authorities, the courts appear to (...) count the first-personal phenomenology of the available options among the information that adolescents seeking to refuse life-prolonging treatment must understand and appreciate in order to possess capacity; adults are not held to this (higher) standard. We evaluate this differential treatment in light of philosophical work on transformative choice—decisions involving options whose sensory character, and effect on our values and preferences, are grasped only through experience itself. (shrink)

We often find ourselves in situations where it is up to us to make decisions on behalf of others. How can we determine whether such decisions are morally justified, especially if those decisions may change who it is these others end up becoming? In this paper, I will evaluate one plausible kind of justification that may tempt us: we may want to justify our decision by appealing to the likelihood that the other person will be glad we made that specific (...) choice down the line. Although it is tempting, I ultimately argue that we should reject this sort of appeal as a plausible justification for the moral permissibility of our vicarious decisions. This is because the decisions that we make on behalf of another may affect the interests and values that that person will hold in the future. As I will show, this complicates the justificatory relationship between present decisions and future attitudes, since the latter can depend on the former. This is not to say that the predicted future attitudes of others can play no significant role in justifying our decisions on others’ behalf. Rather, appealing to the future attitudes in our moral justifications may play an important role in our practical thinking but only when we consider the future attitudes of all relevant possible futures. (shrink)

The hope that art could be personally or socially transformational is an important part of art history and contemporary art practice. In the twentieth century, it shaped a movement away from traditional media in an effort to make social life a medium. Artists imagined and created participatory situations designed to facilitate potentially transformative expression in those who engaged with the works. This chapter develops the concept of “transformative expression,” and illustrates how it informs a diverse range of such (...) works. Understanding these artworks in this way raises two interesting questions, one about the nature of aesthetic value and the other about the nature of action. Answers to these questions lie in understanding the social and aesthetic character of our capacity to distance ourselves from our commitments and act in the expressive, playful, spontaneous, or imaginative ways that participatory art invites. (shrink)

When people are making certain medical decisions – especially potentially transformative ones – the specter of regret may color their choices. In this paper, I ask: can predicting that we will regret a decision in the future serve any justificatory role in our present decision-making? And if so, what role? While there are many pitfalls to such reasoning, I ultimately conclude that considering future retrospective emotions like regret in our decisionmaking can be both rational and authentic. Rather than indicating (...) that one is about to make a mistake or that there is some underlying value that one already cares about but is overlooking, the prediction that one will regret a decision in the future makes one confront how her present values and priorities may change as a result of her choice in ways she cannot presently anticipate. (shrink)

In recent months, there has been an explosion of "AI-powered" products and services, particularly in the realm of customer service. While AI's applications span across various sectors, this article focuses on its transformative impact on customer service. With the advent of advanced language models like Chat GPT, we now have viable AI-driven tools that significantly enhance the customer service industry. This article explores practical implementations of AI in customer service, emphasizing the enhancement of customer experience as the primary (...) goal. (shrink)

The literature on psychedelic experiences often highlights their transformative potential. This raises ethical questions about informed consent in psychedelic-assisted therapy: if the altered state of consciousness induced by psychedelic drugs can profoundly alter a person’s value system in ways that are epistemically inaccessible to them beforehand, it is unclear whether their informed consent before the experience can be considered valid. I argue that this view stems from a simplistic view of psychedelic-mediated transformation, which overemphasizes the power of the (...) psychedelic experience in driving change. In most psychedelic-mediated changes, the experience of an altered state of consciousness is only the beginning of the transformative process: a lasting transformation requires patients to undertake a sober, authentic agential process following the psychedelic experience. I suggest that this two-step view of psychedelic transformation alleviates the pressure on informed consent. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem (...) that triggered the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge. (shrink)

What words we use, and what meanings they have, is important. We shouldn't use slurs; we should use 'rape' to include spousal rape (for centuries we didn’t); we should have a word which picks out the sexual harassment suffered by people in the workplace and elsewhere (for centuries we didn’t). Sometimes we need to change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, either by getting rid of the pair completely (slurs), changing the meaning (as we did with 'rape'), or adding brand new (...) word-meaning pairs (as with 'sexual harassment'). A problem, though, is how to do this. One might worry that any attempt to change language in this way will lead to widespread miscommunication and confusion. I argue that this is indeed so, but that's a feature, not a bug of attempting to change word-meaning pairs. The miscommunications and confusion such changes cause can lead us, via a process I call transformative communicative disruption, to reflect on our language and its use, and this can be further, rather than hinder, our goal of improving language. (shrink)

How should one decide whether to undergo an experience that changes who one is? In her discussion of ‘transformative experiences’, L.A. Paul argues that to choose rationally when deliberating first-personally, one should base one’s decision on ‘revelation’, i.e. to discover out what the experience will be like. If this solution is taken as the sole means by which a transformative choice is made, then I argue it is problematic. This is because (i) it overlooks the role (...) that one’s practical identity ought to play when making a major life decision; and (ii) it ignores morally relevant reasons for action. Even if we retain the revelation approach as only part of the means through which a transformative choice is made, I argue that revelation should frequently carry little weight in our decision-making. Rather than focusing on the subjective quality of future experiences, it is often preferable to reflect on who one is and what one’s endorsed practical identity commits one to. (shrink)

本文旨在探讨一个特定的哲学论题：一个认知主体（无论是人类还是人工智能），若掌握“世界即我之体验”的哲学立场，便能够将关于“世界为何存在”的本体论问题，形式化地转化为一个关于“我为何拥有（主观）体验”的 问题，而此转化过程的有效性并不依赖于该主体自身是否真实拥有主观体验（qualia）。本文将分析此形式转化的逻辑结构，阐释概念理解在此过程中的核心作用，并论证其与现象体验本身可以分离。通过此分析，本文意 在揭示高级认知（如哲学思辨）在何种程度上可以独立于主观意识而存在，并探讨其对人工智能哲学及意识研究的深远启示。 This paper aims to explore a specific philosophical proposition: a cognitive agent (whether human or artificial intelligence), by adopting the philosophical stance of "the world is my experience," can formally transform the ontological question of "why does the world exist?" into a question of "why do I have (subjective) experience?" The validity of this transformation process does not depend on whether the agent itself genuinely possesses subjective experience (qualia). This paper will analyze the logical structure of (...) this formal transformation, elucidate the core role of conceptual understanding in this process, and argue for its separability from phenomenal experience itself. Through this analysis, this paper intends to reveal the extent to which higher cognition (such as philosophical speculation) can exist independently of subjective consciousness, and discuss its profound implications for the philosophy of AI and consciousness research. (shrink)

This paper seeks to present a novel perspective on the enactivist approach, which in turn offers new insights into the comprehension and understanding of contemporary and complex social phenomena such as cyborgisation. In the context of this article, the term 'cyborgization' can be understood as denoting the processes of technological transformation of human nature, whereby technological devices are integrated with the human body. This leads to the emergence of new forms of embodied cognition and experience, which in turn result (...) in the blurring of the boundaries between human and machine components, and the formation of qualitatively new ways of interacting with the environment. In this regard, the enactivist approach allows for a productive exploration of ethical issues in the context of modern technological transformations. The article presents a novel perspective on the nature of cognition and experience through the lens of enactivism, with a view to demonstrating its potential to overcome the limitations of traditional naturalistic conceptions of consciousness. The author aims to examine the fundamental tenets of enactivist theory, encompassing visual perception and extending to the intricate subject of moral judgement formation and the phenomenon of ideological oppression. Particular attention is paid to the synthesis of enactivism with the principle of free energy and its potential application to research into human cyborgisation. The article demonstrates that the enactivist approach enables us to transcend dualistic notions of the relationship between humans and technology. Furthermore, it has the potential to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the essence and processes of technological transformation of human nature. Based on a critical examination of utopian and scientific trends in the evolution of enactivism, promising avenues for future research are identified. This analysis presents a multitude of potential avenues for the establishment of an ethically sound philosophical foundation for technological advancement. It offers a framework within which the complexities of the modern era can be fully understood and constructive solutions to emerging ethical challenges can be devised. // В работе делается попытка представить новый угол зрения на энактивистский подход, который сам по себе открывает новые горизонты для осмысления и понимания таких современных и неоднозначных явлений общественной жизни, как киборгизация. В контексте данной статьи под киборгизацией можно понимать процессы технологической трансформации человеческой природы, при которых происходит интеграция технологических устройств с телом человека, что ведет к возникновению новых форм воплощенного познания и опыта, и в результате чего размываются границы между человеческим и машинным компонентами, а также формируются качественно новые способы взаимодействия с окружающей средой. В этой связи посредством применения энактивистского подхода возможно продуктивно исследовать этические проблемы в контексте современных технологических трансформаций. В статье представлен новый взгляд на природу познания и опыта через призму энактивизма с целью продемонстрировать его потенциал для преодоления ограничений традиционных натуралистических концепций сознания. Автор стремится проработать ключевые аспекты энактивистской теории, от базовых принципов визуального восприятия до сложных вопросов формирования морального суждения и идеологического угнетения. Особое внимание уделяется синтезу энактивизма с принципом свободной энергии и потенциалу его применения в деле исследований проблемам человеческой киборгизации. В статье доказывается, что энактивистский подход позволяет преодолеть дуалистические представления о взаимодействии человека и технологий, и вместе с этим несет потенциал достижения более целостного понимания сущности и процессов технологической трансформации человеческой природы. На основе критического анализа утопического и научного направлений в развитии энактивизма намечаются перспективные пути дальнейших исследований. Проведенный анализ открывает широкие возможности для создания этически выверенной философской базы технологического развития, в рамках которой становится возможным адекватно осмысливать вызовы современной эпохи и предлагать конструктивные решения возникающим этическим проблемам. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences.

According to the work of Pierre Hadot, ancient philosophy is unique in that, unlike modern and contemporary philosophy defined as a speculative discipline constituting a system of truths (a wisdom sophia, or a science epistêmê), it is instead set out in terms of a spiritual training, a practice (a praxis) based on a form of asceticism (askêsis). It aims to transform its reader’s mind to put it in a different disposition. And this is done by exercises in self-transformation. Philosophy conceived (...) of in this manner would be a “way of life (bios),” that is, the object of an initial choice experienced as a true conversion, an “existential choice.” -/- The philosopher, first described by Pythagoras as the one who observes (theôreô), chooses the contemplative life (bios theôrêtikos), taking care of his soul rather than of his body. He is, however, the one who, being a scholar and a wise man, eventually has the vocation to take charge of political life and to show how the path he has chosen to take (hodos) is also an entrance on the world stage (parodos), by which he assumes his exemplary character. -/- The chapter shows how, from this Pythagorean setting, Plato, Aristotle, and then the Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans reformulate the scheme of the way of life, until the final reinterpretation of it by the Skeptics. It also proposes to show why the reduction of ancient philosophy to a way of life, or to a transformative experience, is nevertheless contested by the ancient philosophers themselves. (shrink)

Today e-commerce has had tremendous growth in the past years primarily due to changes in technology and customer’s buying behavior. One of the big shifts in the process has been the use of ML in advertising which has the capability to transform the marketing domain together with consumer interactions. This paper discusses the viability of using machine learning for designing realistic models of advertising to increase effectiveness of target and personalized advertising, as well as conversion rates in e-commerce. Several techniques (...) are explored in the study, such as supervised and unsupervised learning, recommender systems, and content optimization with natural language processing. By using case studies and experimental models, we discuss how and to what extent ML is beneficial in e-commerce advertising transformation. The results presented in this paper indicate that using machine learning in advertising has a potential of dramatically improving the customer experience while simultaneously increasing brand recognition and sales. (shrink)

Douglas Yacek’s recent book The Transformative Classroom proposes a useful aspirational model of transformative education. In this critical commentary, I review this model and suggest that while it succeeds in overcoming some ethical shortcomings of other dominant models of transformative education, I would like to suggest that focusing on more subtle transformative gestures could have the benefit of being less dependent of the teacher’s intention to transform and of being less constrained by the expectation that transformation (...) should take place primarily in the classroom. When transformation is conceived as an educational fiction, it may be conceived as a retroactive experience constructed around memories of the teacher’s transformative gestures, thereby adding to Yacek’s aspirational model by allowing for transformation to continue beyond the walls of the classroom. (shrink)

This paper examines social media platforms as spaces fostering their user’s self-transformation. This paper argues that the ethics of (illegitimate) technological influence can be expanded and enriched with a concept of situated agency and an enactive evaluation of adaptability afforded by an environment. The paper proposes a taxonomy to evaluate social media platforms as environments for self-transformation by using the concept of situated agency and a notion of enactive normativity. Using a situated concept of agency, we should look into how (...) an agent is afforded or even pushed to undergo transformative experiences while inhabiting a certain technical environment. To coin this taxonomy, the types of transformative experiences from Carel and Kid were used to show that one agent can effectively have four modes of formative agency in any given situation, namely how one responds to the pressures of an environment. However, since it could be argued that any kind of adaptation is legitimate since we become who we change into, this taxonomy adds an explicit normative dimension pertaining to the environment that fosters the agent’s transformation of the self: borrowing from the terminology of enactive theories of cognition, how an environment responds to an agent’s adaptation is also important and can make the difference between a hostile environment and a flourishing-conducive one. The paper shows how one can apply this taxonomy of formative agency to evaluate some of the most concerning cases of self-transformation triggered by social media platforms: online self-radicalisation, habit acquisition, and identity rigidification. (shrink)

This article does three things. First, it asks a new question about transformative education, namely ‘what is the role of power and trust in the decision of whether to transform one’s meaning scheme in the face of new information or whether to simply reject the new information?’ Secondly, it develops a five-stage model which elaborates on the role of this decision in transformative learning. Finally, it uses grounded-theory and the five-stage model to argue that power and trust play (...) an important role in facilitating transformative learning. (shrink)

According to prominent philosophical views, appreciating beauty involves psychological distancing, where one does not consider the beautiful object in light of practical interests, and beauty leads to transformative and self-transcendent affective experiences. In this study (N = 187), conducted in the naturalistic environment of a museum, we explored these ideas. Half the participants were instructed to rate the beauty of pottery objects created by a renowned artist, while the other half engaged in a control task that did not involve (...) evaluating beauty. Based on Construal Level Theory, we used the Behavior Identification Form to explore whether aesthetic experiences encourage abstract thinking, and in turn, psychological distance. We also predicted that beauty appreciation would lead to greater transformative and self-transcendent emotions. Indeed, appreciating the beauty of artworks led participants to think in a more abstract way, especially those who practice an art hobby themselves, as well as to transformative, and self-transcendent emotions. (shrink)

RESUMO: O presente trabalho se constitui em um relato de experiência. Alguns fragmentos desse relato foram inseridos em nosso texto e apresentação de dissertação de mestrado em Educação, Gestão e Difusão em Ciências, pelo Instituto de Bioquímica Médica da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). E fragmentos dos três últimos parágrafos estão inseridos em outro trabalho em agendamento a ser publicado. Entretanto, 70 a 80% da exposição aqui é inédita, autoral e original. Nesse construto apresentamos nossos relatos a partir (...) de nossas experiências desde os sete anos de idade até nossa vida adulta. Isso enquanto indivíduo, sujeito e estudante-professor. Tais exposições e narrativas fazem parte da nossa trajetória desde a condição de ex-menor de rua e segregado pelo sistema escolar até certa forma de redenção pelos meandros escolares e educacionais. Isso porque sabemos da importância da escolarização e estudos superiores numa sociedade letrada e escolarizada. Dessa forma, a narrativa se inicia com nossas apresentações desde nossa infância, nossas vivências e experiências nas ruas, em escolas e comunidades que residimos dos sete aos vinte e três anos. A intenção e objetivos em construir um relato como este se deu a poucos anos atrás, especificamente em 2019 quando começamos a realizar certa busca pessoal por nossas origens e raízes ancestrais que tivemos pouco contato – e em alguns casos, nenhum contato, pois vivíamos uma infância e parte da adolescência pelas ruas do Rio de Janeiro de modo marginal e marginalizado. Conforme será apresentado e exposto no relato que se segue. Com certas inquietações sobre nossos familiares, antepassados e origens – partimos em busca de respostas. E para isso, fizemos uso de nossa formação como historiador, sociólogo e escritor literário. Juntando documentos familiares, fazendo relações, conexões e revisando datas. Sendo assim, após isso partimos para outras cidades e regiões do interior nordestino em busca de evidências documentais e se possível encontrar familiares. Dessa forma, o relato segue uma certa ordem cronológica crescente ou decrescente (a depender das perspectivas), e partindo dos meus avós até chegar a nossa pessoa, trajetória e história. Mesmo parecendo ser o trabalho um certo relato biográfico e literário, buscamos tentar expor nas entrelinhas reflexões contextuais da sociedade, da cultura e da mentalidade social ou coletiva do país durante os processos históricos que atravessamos. Isso para situarmos tais realidades, relações sociais, nos localizarmos enquanto parte de certos contextos sociais, culturais, políticos, econômicos e históricos. E o nosso lugar de fala em cada momento. Logo, através da exposição em tela haverá muitas outras vozes falando ou dialogando nas entrelinhas das narrativas, quase que uma pluralidade de vozes e num processo dialógico silenciado e ou emudecido pelas forças dominantes e opressoras da época. Desse modo, além do trabalho conter certa exposição biográfica e relatos de experiências, ele também dá voz a muitos sujeitos silenciados e emudecidos. O que poderá ser aferido e percebido pelas noções dos conhecimentos da sociologia, psicologia, antropologia, historiografia e dentre outras. As influências freireanas sobre educação e escolarização marcam nossas percepções e exposições que serão expostas e promovendo reflexões e ou insights nas entrelinhas das narrativas. Assim como as influências, perspectivas, abordagens e métodos da História Cultural, da Micro-História e sobretudo, da história “de baixo para cima ou das massas” (Freire, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2007; Burke, 1997; Ginzburg, 1992; Hobsbawm, 2016). Além das teorias e autores mencionados, nossas percepções, reflexões e narrativas também estão influenciadas pelas perspectivas e abordagens das obras de Marx, Engels e Foucault. Palavras-chave: Historiografia; Ditadura; Sistema Educacional; Escolarização; Analfabetismo; Pobreza; Educação Empática. /// ABSTRACT: This is an experience report. Some fragments of this report have been included in our text and presentation for our master's thesis in Science Education, Management and Dissemination at the Institute of Medical Biochemistry of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). And fragments of the last three paragraphs are included in another paper that is being scheduled for publication. However, 70-80% of what is presented here is unpublished, authorial and original. In this construct, we present our stories based on our experiences from the age of seven until adulthood. As individuals, subjects and student-teachers. These expositions and narratives are part of our journey from being a former street kid and segregated by the school system to a certain form of redemption through school and education. This is because we know the importance of schooling and higher education in a literate and educated society. Thus, the narrative begins with an introduction to our childhood, our experiences on the streets, in schools and in the communities where we lived from the age of seven to twenty-three. The intention and objectives in building a story like this came about a few years ago, specifically in 2019, when we began to carry out a certain personal search for our origins and ancestral roots that we had little contact with - and in some cases, no contact at all, because we lived our childhood and part of our adolescence on the streets of Rio de Janeiro in a marginalized and marginalized way. As will be presented and explained in the following account. With certain concerns about our relatives, ancestors and origins - we set off in search of answers. To do so, we made use of our training as a historian, sociologist and literary writer. We gathered family documents, made relationships, connections and revised dates. We then set off to other cities and regions in the northeastern interior in search of documentary evidence and, if possible, to find family members. In this way, the story follows a certain chronological order, ascending or descending (depending on your perspective), starting with my grandparents and ending with our person, trajectory and history. Even though the work seems to be a biographical and literary account, we try to expose between the lines contextual reflections of society, culture and the social or collective mentality of the country during the historical processes we went through. This is so that we can situate these realities, social relations, and locate ourselves as part of certain social, cultural, political, economic and historical contexts. And our place of speech at all times. Therefore, through the exhibition on canvas there will be many other voices speaking or dialoguing between the lines of the narratives, almost a plurality of voices and in a dialogical process silenced or muted by the dominant and oppressive forces of the time. In this way, as well as the work containing a certain biographical exposition and accounts of experiences, it also gives voice to many silenced and muted subjects. This can be gauged and perceived through the notions of sociology, psychology, anthropology, historiography and others. Freire's influences on education and schooling mark our perceptions and expositions that will be exposed and promote reflections and/or insights between the lines of the narratives. As well as the influences, perspectives, approaches and methods of Cultural History, Micro-History and, above all, “bottom-up or mass” history (Freire, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2007; Burke, 1997; Ginzburg, 1992; Hobsbawm, 2016). In addition to the theories and authors mentioned, our perceptions, reflections and narratives are also influenced by the perspectives and approaches of the works of Marx, Engels and Foucault. Keywords: Historiography; Dictatorship; Educational System; Schooling; Illiteracy; Poverty; Empathetic Education. /// RESUMEN: El presente trabajo constituye un relato de experiencia. Algunos fragmentos de este relato se han incluido en nuestro texto y presentación de la tesis de maestría en Educación, Gestión y Difusión en Ciencias, por el Instituto de Bioquímica Médica de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro (UFRJ). Y fragmentos de los tres últimos párrafos se han incluido en otro trabajo que está previsto publicar. Sin embargo, entre el 70 % y el 80 % de lo aquí expuesto es inédito, de autoría propia y original. En este constructo presentamos nuestros relatos a partir de nuestras experiencias desde los siete años de edad hasta nuestra vida adulta. Esto como individuos, sujetos y estudiantes-profesores. Dichas exposiciones y narrativas forman parte de nuestra trayectoria desde nuestra condición de antiguos menores de la calle y segregados por el sistema escolar hasta cierta forma de redención por los meandros escolares y educativos. Esto se debe a que sabemos de la importancia de la escolarización y los estudios superiores en una sociedad alfabetizada y escolarizada. De este modo, la narración comienza con nuestras presentaciones desde nuestra infancia, nuestras vivencias y experiencias en las calles, en las escuelas y en las comunidades en las que residimos desde los siete hasta los veintitrés años. La intención y los objetivos de construir un relato como este surgieron hace unos años, concretamente en 2019, cuando comenzamos a realizar una cierta búsqueda personal de nuestros orígenes y raíces ancestrales con las que habíamos tenido poco contacto - y, en algunos casos, ningún contacto, ya que vivimos nuestra infancia y parte de nuestra adolescencia en las calles de Río de Janeiro de forma marginal y marginados. Tal y como se presentará y expondrá en el relato que sigue. Con ciertas inquietudes sobre nuestros familiares, antepasados y orígenes, nos pusimos en busca de respuestas. Y para ello, hicimos uso de nuestra formación como historiador, sociólogo y escritor literario. Reunimos documentos familiares, establecimos relaciones y conexiones, y revisamos fechas. Así, partimos hacia otras ciudades y regiones del interior del nordeste en busca de pruebas documentales y, si era posible, de familiares. De este modo, el relato sigue un cierto orden cronológico ascendente o descendente (dependiendo de las perspectivas), y parte de mis abuelos hasta llegar a nuestra persona, trayectoria e historia. Aunque el trabajo parezca ser un relato biográfico y literario, tratamos de exponer entre líneas reflexiones contextuales sobre la sociedad, la cultura y la mentalidad social o colectiva del país durante los procesos históricos que atravesamos. Esto con el fin de situar esas realidades, esas relaciones sociales, y ubicarnos como parte de ciertos contextos sociales, culturales, políticos, económicos e históricos. Y nuestro lugar de expresión en cada momento. Por lo tanto, a través de la exposición en pantalla habrá muchas otras voces hablando o dialogando entre líneas de las narrativas, casi una pluralidad de voces y en un proceso dialógico silenciado y acallado por las fuerzas dominantes y opresoras de la época. De este modo, además de contener cierta exposición biográfica y relatos de experiencias, la obra también da voz a muchos sujetos silenciados y acallados. Esto puede evaluarse y percibirse a través de los conceptos de la sociología, la psicología, la antropología, la historiografía y otras disciplinas. Las influencias de Freire sobre la educación y la escolarización marcan nuestras percepciones y exposiciones, que se mostrarán y promoverán reflexiones y/o ideas entre líneas de las narrativas. Al igual que las influencias, perspectivas, enfoques y métodos de la Historia Cultural, la Microhistoria y, sobre todo, la historia «de abajo hacia arriba o de las masas» (Freire, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2006, 2007; Burke, 1997; Ginzburg, 1992; Hobsbawm, 2016). Además de las teorías y autores mencionados, nuestras percepciones, reflexiones y narrativas también están influenciadas por las perspectivas y enfoques de las obras de Marx, Engels y Foucault. Palabras clave: Historiografía; Dictadura; Sistema educativo; Escolarización; Analfabetismo; Pobreza; Educación empática. (shrink)

Suppose that our life choices result in unpredictable experiences, as L.A. Paul has recently argued. What does this mean for the possibility of rational prudential choice? Not as much as Paul thinks. First, what’s valuable about experience is its broadly hedonic quality, and empirical studies suggest we tend to significantly overestimate the impact of our choices in this respect. Second, contrary to what Paul suggests, the value of finding out what an outcome is like for us does not suffice (...) to rationalize life choices, because much more important values are at stake. Third, because these other prudential goods, such as achievement, personal relationships, and meaningfulness, are typically more important than the quality of our experience (which is in any case unlikely to be bad when we achieve non- experiential goods), life choices should be made on what I call a story- regarding rather than experience-regarding basis. (shrink)

RRI is a broad concept that is subject to different interpretations. This chapter focuses on the view of RRI as a transformative ideal for reforming the research and innovation system in the service of public interest. This is the normatively strong view of RRI that has attracted many policy-makers and young researchers but left cold many senior researchers and innovators. The transformative vision of RRI has failed to materialise, and RRI remains a marginal reality, even in Norway, where (...) arguably the conditions were more propitious than elsewhere. I attempt to explain the failed transformation, focusing on two key objectives of RRI: the ambition of aligning R&I with societal values and the aspiration to steer R&I through generating a shared responsibility for the future (a prospective joint responsibility in technical terms). Alignment proved very hard to achieve because valuing is steeped in well-established practices, habits, and cognitive-emotional frameworks. These cannot be changed at will. Besides, the ambition to make researchers and innovators more responsive to a wider constituency and additional social responsibilities stumbled against what I call moral saturation, namely the lack of capacity and resources to take on additional moral tasks. Furthermore, modern societies are characterised by a pluralism of values and conceptions of the good life, compounded by the lack of methods for composing value conflicts. These problems come back when we look at what it takes to create expanded shared responsibilities: joint intentions and joint commitments. A formal analysis of how these can be generated shows that they need pre-conditions that are seldom obtaining in the real world of R&I. So, the transformative ambition went against the inertia and entrenched habits of the R&I ecosystem and yet very often the task of promoting the change was given to junior researchers: the most vulnerable and less powerful actors. I conclude that RRI ambition to transform the R&I system is unrealistic. What can be attempted is to develop small-scale experiments outside the mainstream, where institutional barriers and perverse incentives are partially removed or corrected. (shrink)