HABIT

HABIT Etymology and use of term Habit, in the view of Aquinas, is an analogous term that in its most general sense signifies a quality that a person possesses, in addition to his basic properties and essential characteristics, which modifies either his being or one of his operative powers. In Medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s works, LT habitus translated GK ἕξις, hexis, and was rooted in LT habere, “to have.” The concept of “to have” is stronger than “to borrow” or “to use” but is weaker than “to be.” In contrast, GK διάθεσις, diathesis, trans. LT dispositio, is a disposition or a quality superficially added to one’s nature, faculty, or power. Diathesis/dis- positio is a condition that is less permanent and more easily changeable, whereas hexis/habitus is a modification that is longer-lasting and not easily changed (Categories VI, 8b25-9a13; 15b18-32). Aquinas’s mature understanding of these concepts was greatly influenced by Wil- liam of Moerbeke’s translations of Simplicius’s 6th-Century Neo-Platonic commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories [Predicamenta], Peri Hermeneias [Super de Interpretatione], De Caelo, and De Anima. Theological influences also helped Aquinas frame and deepen his understanding of habitus. One locus for the medieval theology of habitus was given by the Vulgate of Philippi- ans 2:7, “et habitu inventus es ut homo,” referring to Christ’s assumption of human nature. To make sense of this text, Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Aquinas employed Augustine’s discussion in his De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 73. Augustine pro- vides two taxonomies and an incisive analysis of habitus (see Super Philip., c. 2, l. 2; ST I-II, q. 49, a. 1, arg. 1). In addition, Maximus the Confessor and Ps.-Dionysius helped Aquinas grasp the difference between angelic and human habitus (see Super Sent. III, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, arg. 1 and ST I-II, q. 50, a. 6 [and elsewhere], citing Maximus, Comment. super Cael. Hier. Dionysii, c. 7). Scholars widely dispute how habitus should be translated into modern languages. S. Pinckaers and his followers do not translate the LT term, arguing that FR habitude indicates a mechanical “automatism” and consequently lies outside of the moral dimension conveyed by Aquinas’s habitus. Meanwhile, Anthony Kenny confusingly rendered habitus as “disposition” and dispositio as “state” (see his 1964 trans. of ST I-II, qq. 49-54). Others prefer to render Aristotle’s hexis as “state of character.” The present article maintains ENG “habit” since, as we will see, habitus is a polyvalent analogous concept that includes qualities that arise from non-chosen causes as well as moral choice. Definition of habit; non-human subjects Having treated habits piecemeal in his earlier works (Super Sent. III, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2-3; Ibid., d. 23, q. 1; De Ver., q. 10, a. 9; ibid., q. 12, a. 1; q. 14, a. 9), Aquinas’s so-called “Treatise on Habits,” in ST I-II, qq. 49-54, constitutes his most mature contribution to the topic and remains one of the most complete and sophisticated analyses of habit ever written. Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s basic definition of hexis/habit: “a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to an- other, as health is a habit” (Metaphysics V.20, 1022b10-12; see Sent. Meta., lib. 5, l. 20, n. 5 ff.). Aquinas explains the health-habit analogy (see Categories VI, 8b36-7): health is a quality of the body, a disposition of the parts in relation to the subject’s nature (Sent. Meta., lib. 5, l. 20, n. 7; In Physic., lib. II, c. 7, l. 11, n. 6). Pace Simplicius, habits may be understood as “perfect dispositions” (ST I-II, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3); as perfected, they are qualities “difficult to change” (Metaphysics VII.12, 1038a9-18; Sent. Meta., lib. 7, l. 12, nn. 1551-4; ST I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3). Because “nature is the first object of consideration in a thing,” it follows that “habit 1 is placed in the first species of quality” among those enumerated by Aristotle in Metaphysics V.20 (ST I-II, q. 49, a. 2). Some beings by their very nature cannot have habits. The first is God. Since “habit” is a quality existing as “the mean between potentiality and act,” habits are more perfect than po- tency, but less perfect than pure actuality (ST I, q. 14, a. 1, arg 1). But is pure act, being itself (ST I, q. 44, a. 1), pure form, with no potential whatsoever (ST I, q. 12, a. 1, ad 2). God is “infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot ac- quire anything new” (ST I, q. 9, a. 1). Accordingly, God does “have” knowledge as a possession added to His nature: “knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act” (Ibid., ad 1). God does not “have” love; He is love (1 Jn 4:16). In sum, God does not possess any habits. Non-living things also cannot have habits. Their natural striving after the good (De veritate, q. 22, a. 1), which includes some kind of “natural appetite” and “natural love” (ST I- II, q. 26, a. 1), is received from a prior agent: without a soul, they have no internal form, no intrinsic principle of movement (See De potentia, q. 3, a. 11, ad 5; In Physicorum lib. 8, l. 8, n. 7). Consequently, non-living things they cannot be habituated toward self-movement in any way: “the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times” (Nicomachean Ethics II.1, 1103ª21-22; Sent. Ethic., lib. 2, l. 1, n. 4, n. 248). Ensouled creatures such as non-human animals, and to a much lesser extent, plants, can be trained. Animals do not evidence self-reflexive activity—trying to shape its own emotions, imagination, behavior, etc., as such—but other agents can do this: a mother bird trains her chicks to fly (ST I, q. 101, a. 2, ad 2). More importantly, humans can train animals behaviors: “so, in this way, one can admit the existence of habits in brute animals” (ST I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad 2). One could call this a non-voluntary habit-disposition. For humans, the issue is more com- plex. Human and angelic dispositions and habits Humans possess a series of integrated habit-dispositions on account of their “com- posed” nature of body and soul. Distinguishing them by their active principles results in the following list (see ST I-II, q. 54, a. 2). [1] A creature’s specific nature is the source of some innate habit-dispositions. For hu- mans, synderesis is a “natural habit” that inclines a person to grasp universal principles of the natural law (De Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, c.; ST I, q. 79, a. 12), even without the investigation of reason (ST I, q. 79, a. 13). This “first natural habit” exists in the soul “according to its begin- ning” and is activated through experience (ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1). It seems that instincts (instinc- tus) also constitute natural habit-dispositions: actional inclinations on account of one’s mem- bership in a species, such as instincts toward happiness, altruism, even to religion (see, respec- tively, ST I, q. 19, a. 10; SCG III, c. 117, n. 6; SCG III, c. 119, n. 7). [2] Individual nature, that is, a person’s unique bodily composition or temperament (complexio), also provides basic non-chosen inclinations. Four basic temperaments entail emo- tional-actional dispositions, wholly attributable to physical causes: “phlegmatics are naturally lazy; cholerics, irascible; melancholics, sad; sanguine [persons] jovial” (Sent. Ethic. lib. 3, l. 12, n. 1). Aquinas calls an inclination derived from a person’s complexio a “natural habit”: an innate disposition toward operation caused by a person’s bodily nature (ST I-II, q. 46, a. 5; Sent. Ethic. lib. 6, l. 11, n. 2). [3] Custom (consuetudine), once it has taken root in the soul, exists as a habit-disposi- tion: “[it is] pleasant insofar as it becomes natural, for custom is like a second nature” (ST I-II, q. 32, a. 2, ad 3; On Memory and Reminiscence c. 2, 452a28). These dispositions are often non- volitional acquired qualities, for customs often arise from the choices of others: “Custom, 2 especially that which is from childhood, comes to have the force of nature. Consequently, a soul strongly clings to those things in which it was imbued from childhood, as if they were naturally and per se known” (SCG I, c. 11, n. 1). Society can have customs and habits, to possible great negative effect: “the secondary precepts of the natural law can be removed from the hearts of men […] on account of depraved customs and corrupt habits” (ST I-II, q. 94, a. 6). [5] Habits in the highest part of the soul, the intellect and the will, can be acquired from an individual’s choice. As Augustine and Averroës say, it is of the ratio of habit that it only inclines its possessor: it does not force action; it can be resisted or freely chosen (ST I-II, q. 49, a. 3, s.c.; see Augustine, De bono coniugali, c. 21; Averroës/Ibn Rushd, In III de Anima, 18). Because these habits are matters of choice, “habit is above all found in the soul,” for, “Even from the very nature of habit, it is apparent that it is principally related to the will” (ST I-II, q. 50, a. 2; ibid., a. 5). Angels have habits like this, “since they exist in potency with respect to Pure Act” (ST I-II, q. 50, a. 6). Angelic habits are therefore “habitual perfections by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation” (ibid.). Voluntary habituation involves shaping one’s powers in light of one’s reasons for choosing particular objects and acting toward an end (De virtutibus q. 1, a. 12, ad 19). Volun- tary habits include skills, e.g., artistic or mechanical, and the natural virtues—all acquired through correct practice (Sent. Ethic., lib. 2, l. 1, n. 6) and directed toward good objects reach- able by natural power (ST I-II, q. 62, a. 2). Intellectual virtues are fully-voluntary habits that perfect the intellect so that it easily, quickly, and delightedly grasps speculative or practical truth (ST I-II, q. 56, a. 3, ad 2). Lower appetitive powers—concupiscible and irascible appe- tites—can also be the seats of virtue insofar as they can participate in reason (ST I-II, q. 50, a. 5). [6] Some habits are infused by God into the intellect and will, which are activated by the creature: these are infused grace and the infused theological virtues. Since “grace perfects nature according to the mode of nature” (ST I, q. 62, a. 5), infused supernatural habits elevate, purify, and vivify our natural habits (ST I-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 1). Unlike the other habits [1-5], infused habits are directed to a supernatural object, the Holy Trinity, the supreme ultimate end, surpassing our reason (ibid., c.). Angels in grace possess the infused habit of charity and infused knowledge and wisdom (ST I, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3; ibid., q. 62, a. 6), whereas humans in grace on earth possess infused faith, hope, and charity (ST I-II, q. 62, a. 3). [7] Finally, some habits are like supernatural instincts: infused participations in the ac- tion of God, called the seven “Gifts of the Holy Spirit” (see Is 11:1-3; ST I-II, q. 68, a. 1). By the Gifts, a person is enable to operate under the inspiration of God, in a divine and heroic mode (Super Matt, c. 5, l. 2, n. 410). For example, “to know the invisible things of God is through a human mode: and this understanding pertains to the virtue of faith; but to know those things clearly and in a super-human mode pertains to the Gift of Understanding” (Super Gal., c. 5, l. 6, n. 329). Augmenting, diminishing, and corrupting habits Insofar as a habits are fitting (conveniens) to the agent’s nature, they are good; insofar as they are unfitting to nature or corrupt a determinate, they are evil (ST I-II, q. 54, a. 3, c. and ad 2). The suitability or unsuitability of voluntary habits depends, above all, on their object as measured by nature and reason: one’s will is oriented by one’s habits, habits are specified by their objects, and objects are shaped by one’s mode of willing in relation to reason (ST I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1). Good habits are perfections that aid nature’s proper operation (Aristotle, Physics VII.3, 246a11-13; ST I-II, q. 49, a. 4, s.c.). Aquinas adopts Cicero’s understanding of moral virtue as “a habit in the mode of [second] nature in harmony with reason” (De Inventione, II, c. 53, n. 159; De veritate, q. 1, a. 5, ad 13; ST I-II, q. 56, a. 5). Good habits, therefore, are 3 qualities that rightly dispose a person to perform more perfect actions easily, quickly, skillfully, and with delight (ST I-II, q. 49, a. 4, c.; Ethics, II.2, 1104b3-5; Sent. Ethic., lib. 2, l. 3, n. 265- 9). Contrastingly, when the will consistently chooses an unfitting and disordered good, it grows weaker and is more enslaved to what it has chosen (ST III, q. 87, a. 2, ad 3). In the next life, the formal aspect of habits will be perfected, and remain perfected, in the blessed (ST I-II, q. 67, a. 1). However, imperfect habits in this life can be augmented both with regard to the habit as well as to the possessor (ST I-II, q. 51, a. 1). Habits themselves can be augmented both intensively and extensively: intensively, as when natural prudence is per- fected through the Gift of Council (ST II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad 1); extensively, as applying to a greater number of subjects, as when more people receive the habit of faith. Possessors of habits can augment some their habits both intensively and extensively: intensively, by participating in the habit more to a greater degree, when one’s charity becomes more fervent (ST II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3); extensively, when more parts of the individual participate in habit, as when the beatific vision overflows from the soul to the body (see ST I-II, q. 4, aa. 5-6). A habit is “corrupted” when one habit replaces another, that is, when one form takes the place of its contrary (ST I-II, q. 53, a. 1). Thus: “it is clear that false reason can corrupt the habit of true opinion or even of science” (ibid.). Insofar as the subject is less suitable for a habit, he can participate less in the habit, as when a moderately sick person participates less in health. Extensively, a habit can be accidentally diminished when fewer people participate in it. Inten- sively, a habit can be diminished when its act is performed with less intensity, or in an unfitting manner, e.g., negligently (ST I-II, q. 52, a. 3, sc. See Nicomachean Ethics II.2, 1104a29). Fi- nally, cessation can diminish or even entirely destroy a habit: “when a person ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, immoderate fantasies arise […] rendering a person less apt for judging rightly” (ST I-II, q. 53, a. 3). Bibliography – ARISTOTLE. BARNES, J. (Ed.). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Trans- lation, Vol I and II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. BERGAMO, P. Habitus. In: In Opera Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Index, Seu: Tabula Area Eximii Doctoris F. Petri de Bergomo, editio fototypica. Roma: Edi- tiones Paulinae, 1960; reprint of ed. Vives, 1880, 456-9. BOLAND, V. “Aquinas and Simplicius on Disposi- tions—A Question in Fundamental Moral Theory,” New Blackfriars, Vol. 82, No. 968 (October 2001): 467-78. 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