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Social cohesion and inclusive participation in a polarised Europe

Публикуван: 16 October 2025

This report investigates the dimensions of polarisation in Europe, offering a 20-year perspective based on data from the European Social Survey. It examines trends and national variations in polarisation on various issues, looking at how European values and attitudes have changed over time. In addition, the report explores the drivers of polarisation and changing opinions on support for Ukraine, using insights from the Living and Working in the EU e-survey panel data. Economic instability emerges as the primary driver of political polarisation, whereas social media has a decisive role in reducing support for Ukraine, a pivotal finding of the analysis. Furthermore, the report identifies significant disparities in polarisation, with well-educated and more politically engaged citizens exhibiting higher levels of trust in political institutions. The report also draws attention to new tools to improve democratic participation and engage citizens in policymaking. The results of deliberative processes are illustrated by four case studies, highlighting successes and requirements for an inclusive and resilient democratic ecosystem.

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  • Trust in political institutions fell sharply in the wake of the global economic crisis, and many parts of the population have yet to recover from its effects. Those with a deep distrust of institutions tend to be less financially stable, less educated, have little interest in politics and more dissatisfied with health services.

  • Financial strain weakens solidarity. People struggling to make ends meet are less inclined to prioritise government support for refugees from Ukraine whether in the form of housing, humanitarian or military aid.

  • Attitudes towards gender and sexual equality have steadily become more positive across the EU, resulting in a less divisive and more open environment. However, many remain sceptical about the contribution of immigrants to the cultural life and economy of their country, especially in times of financial insecurity.

  • While values play a smaller role in political polarisation, they do influence considerably how people view society and the economy. Those with traditional values are more likely to hold negative views towards immigration and gender and sexual equality than citizens with more universalist values.

  • Deliberative democratic processes, such as citizens’ assemblies, provide policymakers with practical insight into what citizens want, giving them a voice beyond the ballot box. Such processes must be inclusive and representative of the population and require adequate funding and institutional support to function properly.

European democracies have changed considerably in the past 20 years. The enlargement of the European Union brought renewed optimism after the Cold War, and newly formed democracies enjoyed a period of prosperity, until the global financial crisis exposed divergences within the EU and fostered distrust within and between Member States. Moreover, protracted crises caused economic and geopolitical hardship for people and governments. Notwithstanding, Europe has led the way with regard to establishing human rights and gender equality, cultivating a society based on inclusiveness and equal treatment. The way Europeans live and what they believe have also changed drastically, and new technologies offer anyone a chance to engage with others online. Unfortunately, interactions about public issues have become increasingly hostile and aggressive as polarisation – an extreme form of disagreement that gives rise to a conflictual political and social landscape – has increased. This is harmful for both citizens and democracy.

Against this backdrop, it is important to investigate trends in polarisation in public opinion and the possible drivers of these trends, such as political engagement, perception of economic well-being and use of social media. Has polarisation increased in the EU on equality and economic and political issues? What is the role of social media in polarisation, and how can citizens use digital tools in a proactive way? What new forms of democracy can help restore participation and reduce polarisation? This report tackles these questions by analysing data from the European Social Survey and Eurofound’s Living and Working in the EU e-survey, and presenting four case studies of local, regional and national governments using forums for deliberative democracy to bolster citizen engagement.

Social cohesion has been the topic of several policy actions within the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009, aims to foster active citizenship and bolster social cohesion. The Treaty established a new form of participatory democracy, the European Citizens’ Initiative, consolidated in Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 24(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Citizens’ dialogues and European citizens’ consultations were two other major EU initiatives. In recent years, the EU has addressed the current democratic challenge by proposing a new participatory approach, outlined in the White paper on the future of Europe advocated by President Juncker. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, President von der Leyen announced the first set of proposals as part of the new European Democracy Action Plan. The plan includes measures to strengthen the democratic process by promoting free and fair elections and strong democratic participation, supporting free and independent media, and countering disinformation. This became more pressing at the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the Russian interference in European elections, as evidenced by the institution of the European Democracy Shield in the new Commission guidelines.

  • Public opinion is in constant flux. Analysis of trends in polarisation on issues in Member States shows that polarisation has risen, especially on trust in political institutions, with parts of society being completely without trust in these institutions. This was especially evident during the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing the nexus between crisis, austerity and distrust.

  • Gender and sexual equality have improved across Member States, and on related issues there is a less conflictual and more accepting opinion landscape.

  • Traditional values are negatively correlated with acceptance of immigrants and of gender equality, whereas universalist ones display positive correlations. When looking at political polarisation, both types of values predict increased distrust of political institutions.

  • Perceptions of economic well-being, higher education and political engagement play a crucial role in depolarising citizens and increasing trust.

  • Support for Ukraine is dwindling. The change in opinions with regard to government efforts in helping Ukraine has mostly been driven by war fatigue, financial insecurity and news consumption on social media.

  • Citizens who participated in deliberative processes were highly appreciative of being able to be involved, felt compelled to follow up the related measures and felt more inclined to engage in such processes in the future.

  • Regarding deliberative processes, local governments can be a very fertile field for experimentation, provided that political will, sufficient resources and adequate skills are available. Although digital tools are often used, in-person interaction remains the core of deliberative processes.

  • Incorporating a range of democratic tools selected to suit the policy context appeals to institutions wanting to increase the inclusiveness of their policymaking.

  • Trust is the glue that keeps citizens and institutions together and a fundamental aspect of social cohesion. Understanding the drivers of polarisation and addressing its main roots are of paramount importance for the proper functioning of democracy. Governments might consider investing in their communication channels and including stakeholders with local reach, such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and social partners.

  • Social media and economic hardship are among the main reasons people become polarised against political institutions. Governments might consider addressing the safety of digital spaces, as well as combating misinformation within the remit of the Digital Services Act. This, in combination with measures to secure income, would help depolarise public opinion.

  • Less polarised societies would lead to greater stability, as the policymaking agenda would be dictated less by sudden changes in the economic and geopolitical landscape.

  • A political system that welcomes citizens’ contributions is one that empowers its citizens. Governments might consider encouraging citizens to actively participate in politics and strive for their opinions to be heard. When coupled with a reduction in polarisation, this could create a vibrant political sphere where politicians and policymakers are held accountable by their fellow citizens.

  • Deliberative democracy was found to be a valuable tool in bridging the gap between citizens and institutions at the local, regional and national levels. To function properly, deliberative democracy needs funding, institutional support and political buy-in. Without these three key elements, processes cannot ensure inclusiveness and effectiveness, and their chances of success are reduced.

  • The institutionalisation of deliberative democracy can foster a dynamic democratic ecosystem that has tailored democratic tools for all policy needs. This provides avenues for citizens to gather and engage in informed and moderated discussions, facilitating the sharing of knowledge and understanding among all groups of citizens.

  • Finally, the involvement of social partners and CSOs is fundamental to hold the local and national political fabric together and create an environment in which citizens and institutions listen to each other. CSOs can be the watchdogs of policy implementation and can follow up with citizens.

Този раздел предоставя информация за данните, съдържащи се в тази публикация.

List of tables

Table 1: ESS indicators considered in examining trends in polarisation

Table 2: Results for the indicator ‘Trust in political institutions’

Table 3: Results for the indicator ‘European unification should go further or has gone too far’

Table 4: Results for the indicator ‘Satisfaction with the way in which democracy works in your country’

Table 5: Results for the indicator ‘Importance of living in a democratically governed country’

Table 6: Results for the indicator ‘Gay men and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish’

Table 7: Results for the indicator ‘Gay and lesbian couples should have the right to adopt children’

Table 8: Results for the indicator ‘The country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants’

Table 9: Results for the indicator ‘Immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live’

Table 10: Results for the indicator ‘Immigrants should have the right to access social benefits’

Table 11: Results for the indicator ‘The government should reduce differences in income levels’

Table 12: Results for the indicator ‘Men should have a greater right to a job than women when jobs are scarce’

Table 13: Results for the indicator ‘Immigration is bad or good for the national economy’

Table 14: Results for the indicator ‘Satisfaction with the national economy’

Table 15: Opinion topics considered in the factor analysis

Table 16: Factor loadings

Table 17: Variables used in the model

Table 18: Predictors of polarisation on trust in political institutions, EU, 2023

Table 19: Dynamic model for e-survey cross-sectional sample

Table 20: Static model for e-survey panellists, 2022 and 2024

Table 21: Summary of case studies

Table 22: Regression models for polarisation on acceptance of gender equality, immigrants, and gay men and lesbians, 2023

List of graphs

Figure 1: Human values theoretical framework

Figure 2: Examples of different levels of agreement using Van der Eijk’s model

Figure 3: Trust in political institutions, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 4: European unification should go further, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 5: Satisfaction with national-level democracy, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 6: Correlation between trust in political institutions and satisfaction with national-level democracy, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 7: Importance of living in a democratically governed country, 2012 and 2020

Figure 8: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 9: Gay and lesbian couples should have the right to adopt children, 2016, 2018, 2020 and 2023

Figure 10: The country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 11: Immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 12: Immigrants should have the right to access social benefits, 2008 and 2016

Figure 13: The government should reduce differences in income levels, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 14: Men should have a greater right to a job than women when jobs are scarce, 2004, 2010 and 2016

Figure 15: Immigration is bad or good for the national economy, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 16: Satisfaction with the national economy, 2006, 2012, 2018 and 2023

Figure 17: Age categories and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 18: Educational attainment and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 19: Financial circumstances and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 20: Political effectiveness and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 21: Closeness to a party and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 22: Voting habits and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 23: Distribution of human values, EU, 2023

Figure 24: Correlation between human values and attitudes towards indicators, EU, 2023

Figure 25: Distribution of the four indicators and the coefficient of consensus, EU, 2023

Figure 26: The logistic regression model

Figure 27: Predicted probability of polarisation, by education and financial circumstances, EU, 2023 (%)

Figure 28: Predicted probability of polarisation, by level of political interest and political news consumption, EU, 2023 (%)

Figure 29: Predicted probability of polarisation, by human value, EU, 2023 (%)

Figure 30: Average marginal effect of the three models

Figure 31: Levels of concern about the war against Ukraine, cross-sectional sample, 2022, 2023 and 2024

Figure 32: Estimated marginal mean for ‘concerned about the war in Ukraine’, cross-sectional sample, 2022, 2023 and 2024

Figure 33: Satisfaction with own government’s response to the war against Ukraine, cross-sectional sample (%)

Figure 34: Satisfaction with own government’s provision of housing and assistance to Ukrainian refugees, by financial circumstances, cross-sectional sample, 2022, 2023 and 2024 (%)

Figure 35: Satisfaction with own government’s response to the war against Ukraine, panellists, 2022 and 2024 (%)

Figure 36: Average marginal effect for ‘the government has done too much to house Ukrainians’, cross-sectional sample, 2022, 2023 and 2024

Figure 37: Change in support for the government’s measures to house Ukrainians, by change in ability to make ends meet, panellists, 2022 and 2024 (%)

Figure 38: Average marginal effect for ‘the government has done too much to house Ukrainians’, panellists, 2022 and 2024

Figure 39: Success path for deliberative democracy processes

Figure 40: Distribution of civic assembly participants, by age and education level (%)

Figure 41: Final sample distribution for the We Need to Talk citizens’ assembly panel, by gender, age, language and education level (%)

Figure 42: Sample composition of the Rzeszów citizens’ panel, by gender, age, education level and city district (%)

Figure 43: Financial circumstances of e-survey respondents, cross-sectional sample versus panellists (%)

Figure 44: e-Survey respondents in arrears, cross-sectional sample versus panellists (%)

Figure 45: Household savings of e-survey respondents, cross-sectional sample versus panellists (%)

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Eurofound (2025), Social cohesion and inclusive participation in a polarised Europe, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.

ISBN

978-92-897-2494-4

Брой страници

106

Реф. номер

EF25027

ISBN

978-92-897-2494-4

Номер на каталога

TJ-01-25-015-EN-N

DOI

10.2806/0528201

Постоянен линк

https://eurofound.link/ef25027

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