



# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

## **DELEGATION FOR THE OBSERVATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN TOGO**

**(11 to 16 October 2007)**

**Report by  
Marie-Arlette Carlotti,  
Delegation Chair**

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## **Introduction**

Acting in response to an invitation from the Government of the Republic of Togo, and on a proposal by the Election Coordination Group, the Conference of Presidents of the political groups in the European Parliament decided on 16 May 2007 to send a delegation to observe the parliamentary election in Togo. The election was postponed several times before finally being fixed for 14 October 2007. In a letter dated 9 October, the President of the European Parliament formally noted the new date.

The political groups appointed five members to make up the delegation, in accordance with their own rules.

The delegation held its constituent meeting in Strasbourg on 26 September. It appointed Marie-Arlette Carlotti as its Chair and then held an exchange of views with Chief Observer Fiona Hall.

A second meeting took place in Brussels on 3 October, when the delegation exchanged views with Commission representatives and discussed its planned activities.

The delegation was in Togo between 11 and 16 October 2007. It met representatives of the six political parties that had signed the country's recent Comprehensive Political Agreement (*Accord politique global*), as well as the Prime Minister, the Independent National Electoral Commission (*Commission électorale nationale indépendante*, CENI), the European Commission representative, the ambassadors of several Member States (Germany, Spain, France and Italy) and Olatokunbo Ige, resident representative of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and worked in close ongoing cooperation with Fiona Hall. An audience with the President of Togo, before polling day, had been requested for the entire delegation. In the event, the President received Delegation Chair Marie-Arlette Carlotti, without her colleagues but accompanied by Fiona Hall and the European Commission representative, on 16 October. The delegation regrets that, in a departure from customary practice, it was not invited to this meeting as a body.

On polling day the delegation members deployed to Lomé, Aného and surrounding area and Kara and surrounding area.

The delegation was involved in preparing the Observation Mission's Preliminary Statement (annexed) and in its press conference. This report is intended to give a general overview of the situation and to record the delegation's work. It also illustrates the specific contribution that a parliamentary delegation can make to an election observation process.

The election results, which were published by the Constitutional Court on 30 October, are annexed to the report.

## **Background to the election**

The poll on 14 October 2007 was an important step in Togo's democratisation process. Previous elections had been marred by fraud and by military intervention,

bringing popular protests to a violent end: the repressive response following the last presidential election in April 2005 had resulted in hundreds of deaths and had driven tens of thousands of Togolese into exile. Developments since 2005, however, have gradually broken the vicious circle. As part of a consultation process with the EU, Togo signed up to '22 undertakings'. The main political parties concluded the Comprehensive Political Agreement, laying the foundation for a return, by consensus, to democracy and civic accord after a series of free and transparently conducted elections. The six political groups which signed the Agreement are the Rally of the Togolese People (*Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais*, RPT) – the party of President Faure Gnassingbé (son of former ruler Gnassingbé Eyadema), referred to in the Agreement as the 'presidential movement' – the Patriotic Pan-African Convergence (*Convergence patriotique panafricaine*, CPP), the Action Committee for Renewal (*Comité d'action pour le renouveau*, CAR), the Party for Democracy and Renewal (*Parti pour la démocratie et le renouveau*, PDR), the Democratic Convention of African Peoples (*Convention démocratique des peuples africains*, CDPA) and the Union of Forces for Change (UFC). While the parliamentary election on 14 October marked the first step in the planned series of polls, the culmination of the process will undoubtedly be the election of the President in 2010, as Togo's system of government is a presidential one.

A new and important feature of the Comprehensive Political Agreement is the participation of the UFC, historically an opposition party with solid popular support, which had boycotted previous elections. The UFC was, however, the only one of the six signatory parties that did not join the 'National Unity Government' formed by Prime Minister Yawovi Madji Agboyibo (CAR).

The system chosen for the 14 October election was proportional representation using the highest-average method of seat allocation. Unusually for this form of voting, however, the 81 parliamentary seats were not filled using national lists of candidates or large regional constituencies; instead there were 31 constituencies each returning two or three members (the Tone and Lomé Commune constituencies were exceptions, with four and five seats to fill respectively). The distribution of seats by number of electors varied substantially from the north to the south of the country. For example, one voter in Assoli – in the Kara administrative area – carried the same weight as 13 in Lomé Golfe. This extremely unbalanced allocation of seats had, however, been agreed among the parties that signed the Comprehensive Political Agreement.

The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) played a key role in organising the election and took charge of the census conducted in preparation for the poll. Under the Electoral Code, the CENI's tasks include organising and supervising referendums and elections, and drafting the various texts, legal instruments and procedural documents that are required in order to ensure, on the one hand, that voting is conducted in a lawful, secure and transparent manner and, on the other, that both voters and candidates are free to exercise their rights. The CENI supervises the entire polling procedure and, in particular, has the task of compiling and declaring the election results.

The CENI comprises 19 members: five drawn from the 'presidential movement' (RPT), 10 from the other parties that signed the Agreement (the CAR, CDPA, CPP, PDR and UFC), two representing civil society and two representing the Government (who do not have voting rights).

The national body has a number of subsidiary Independent Local Electoral Commissions (CELIs), which manage polling stations and are responsible for the collation of results at local level.

### **The census**

The Comprehensive Political Agreement provided for a census to be conducted, with a view to producing a reliable electoral register and issuing national identity cards. The census was organised by the CENI in cooperation with the Government. Voters were then issued with secure, fraud-proof poll cards.

The CENI took an agreed approach to the highly sensitive business of carrying out the census, and on polling day our delegation did not observe any specific difficulties arising from the census procedures or from the lists of those who failed to file a census return.

### **Authentication of ballot papers**

There was a certain amount of prevarication with regard to authenticating ballot papers. It had initially been agreed in the CENI that ballot papers would be validated by two signatures, those of the presiding officer and the rapporteur at each polling station. Less than a week before the poll, following a shift in the RPT's position, it was agreed in the CENI that small stickers would be placed on the backs of the ballot papers. These were printed in Burkina Faso – as were the other electoral materials – and then hastily distributed to all the polling stations. It turned out, however, that not enough of them had been supplied: there were approximately 500 stickers for every 700 registered electors at the polling stations visited by the European Parliament delegation. In the afternoon, a further batch was distributed by CENI supervisors, who noted on sheets of paper the total number of stickers issued – the original plan to distribute them by sheets of 50 having been abandoned.

Generally speaking, there was clearly some confusion at the polling stations about the procedure to be followed, and no official instructions were given on the positioning of the stickers. At some polling stations, all ballot papers were stickered in advance, while at others the procedure was simply overlooked. Recognising the confusion, the CENI decided in the later afternoon, after a stormy meeting, that the poll should go ahead without ballot papers being authenticated. However, this belated instruction was not smoothly implemented at all the polling stations.

The sticker procedure undoubtedly proved both complicated and pointless, and resulted in delays. More seriously, it had the potential to be a source of fraud.

### **Polling day**

On polling day the European Parliament delegation split into three teams. The delegation's overall assessment of the polling process is set out below.

- 1 – The voting took place without any major violence and that, in itself, constitutes a positive outcome of this election.
- 2 – People also turned out to vote in an atmosphere of calm and in large numbers.

3 – The decision, under the Comprehensive Political Agreement, that armed forces should be strictly confined to barracks was respected. FOSEL, the specially constituted election security force, was present in close proximity to the polling stations. The behaviour of the members of this force differed: in the south of the country they maintained a discreet presence which helped to promote confidence; in the north they tended to make their presence felt and there were incidences of intimidation.

4 – It is clear that confidence in the electoral process has not been fully re-established, but progress seems to have been made in comparison with earlier polls.

5 – The pervading climate of goodwill and the constructive attitude apparent at the polling stations went a long way to overcoming the small number of organisational failings.

6 – It ultimately proved impossible to implement the procedure for identifying ballot papers.

It is also important to note that:

- the delegation of MEPs was well received everywhere, embodying as it did a positive image of Europe uncompromised by associations with the former dictatorship;
- its members were made welcome at the polling stations they inspected because they were regarded as objective and impartial guarantors of the ongoing electoral process.

Nothing must be done to mar that image.

### *Lomé*

In Lomé the voting was well organised and the teams staffing the polling stations had a firm grasp of the procedure. A degree of anxiety became apparent towards the end of the day as the queues of voters lengthened and uncertainty about the use of stickers on the ballot papers caused delays.

Two teams observed the count in the municipality of Lomé. The first covered the polling stations in schools at Bassadji and Dangbipe and Strebler College and then at Camp RIT Primary School. At Camp RIT, members of the armed forces had cast their votes in an advance poll on 11 October. There was a specific procedure for the soldiers' ballot papers to be mixed with those of the rest of the electorate for a single count on Sunday 14. The RPT won a large majority of the votes at this centre. In general there were no instances of irregularity to report.

The second team attended the count at the various polling stations in La Poudrière. The UFC was the most successful party here with more than 80% of the votes. A problem arose around the definition of spoiled ballot papers, as officers at different polling stations interpreted the rules differently. At Marina E Primary School, for example, a very strict approach was taken and 71 ballot papers were discounted because they had not been marked with the requisite cross or because the mark was not placed clearly within the box provided. Of these 71 papers, we observed that 58 could have been classed as valid (56 of them representing votes for the UFC, one a vote for the RPT and one a vote for the CDPA).

A FOSEL member was present at each centre visited, keeping a discreet watch outside the premises.

It is worth recording that in Lomé, which is traditionally a UFC stronghold, voters frequently urged our delegation: 'Don't let them steal our victory!'

### *Aného*

The team in Aného also observed that voters turned out in large numbers as soon as the polling stations opened. The attitude adopted by one traditional chief – a local 'king' – at Agbodrafo College No 1 polling station could have been problematic. He appeared to be supervising the voting and said that he had kept sensitive material (namely the ballot box and ballot papers) at his home overnight and intended to convey it to the CELI at the close of polling. He also told the polling station staff, 'If you do your job well you will get paid at the end of the day.' Another problem was noted at Togokome Primary School No 1 polling station. The principle of the secret ballot was not properly observed there because the presiding officer designated political party representatives – reportedly on a 'turn about' basis – to accompany illiterate voters into the polling booth and 'help' them to mark their ballot papers with a fingerprint. One woman protested because she had been made to vote for someone other than the candidate of her choice.

At every polling station a FOSEL member maintained a discreet presence in the yard outside.

### *Kara*

The team that travelled to Kara had a completely different experience. The polling stations visited there were at Tomde Public Primary School, Tchatsude Catholic Primary School in East Tomde, Kolde Public Primary School, Elimde Catholic School, Lower Samala Public Primary School, Tcheou Catholic Primary School, Kassi and Landa Public Primary Schools, Lassahaoto Evangelical School, Somieda and Landa. The delegation observed a strong presence by FOSEL members, under the command of officers, who moved about inside the polling stations. At four of the stations visited the FOSEL members left when the observers arrived. It was obvious that the presiding officers and rapporteurs knew the individuals concerned. The voters were intimidated and even fearful, the presence of the FOSEL officers aggravating their anxiety.

At several polling stations the electoral registers were not available at the appointed time for the poll to open and voting could not get under way until 1 pm. As the result of intervention by the observers, these polling stations remained open after 5 pm so that the large numbers of electors who turned out could cast their votes.

At one of the polling stations observed, the supply of stickers was quickly used up and confusion ensued until the decision to proceed without ballot-paper authentication was conveyed to the staff.

One group of observers found the count excessively lengthy, taking place as it did under difficult conditions (without electricity).

When the ballot boxes were being transported to the CELI, several polling station staff were reprimanded on their arrival because they had forgotten their official jackets. They were required to go back, in the darkness of night, to fetch them.

The observers also noted that staff at one polling station failed to report a discrepancy between the number of papers found in the ballot box (572) and the number of electors recorded on the return (541). Unauthorised persons were present on the premises when the ballot papers were being counted.

In this case, therefore, the voting cannot be deemed to have been transparent.

### **The count**

The polling stations – including some in Lomé that had been scheduled to remain open for a further hour – closed at 5 pm. Generally the delegation considered that the process was well handled. One problem that did arise was with the mandatory sealing of the ballot boxes. Each ballot box was supposed to be secured with up to four non-reusable plastic seals. However, the CENI failed to deliver enough seals, so that where four seals had been used to secure the ballot boxes during the polling process there were not enough left in the evening to re-seal them, with the official reports and other sensitive material. Some polling stations dealt with the situation by using sticky tape.

### **Central collation of results**

The process of collating and confirming the results was observed in Lomé throughout the night of 14 October and into the following day. There was an obvious flaw in the procedure. The CELI operated from the county administrative centre (*préfecture*) even though premises equipped with computers had been made available for it. The results were checked manually using paper forms. CELI members checked each spoiled ballot paper individually and the procedure was particularly slow.

Outside, ballot boxes were piled in an untidy heap. As the hours passed, they accumulated on the forecourt and then spilled onto the square. Presiding officers and assessors fell asleep on the bare floor. By noon on Monday, 24 hours into the count, with fatigue, hunger and thirst taking their toll, the tension became palpable. We reported this situation and our concern about it to the CENI. Eventually it was decided to handle the official reporting of results at a number of central offices, using an improvised procedure that did nothing to promote transparency.

It is unfortunate that this crucial phase of the process had been so poorly planned in advance.

The problems during the count and the collation of results seemed partly due to a somewhat unresponsive, if not easy-going, style of management by the CENI.

## **Publication of results**

There were no statutory stipulations as to when or how the CENI should declare the election results. It finally decided on 17 October, after our delegation had left, to announce the results for just 29 constituencies – leaving out Golfe and Lomé Commune, where votes were still being counted at CELI level. At this point, the two UFC representatives decided to dissociate themselves from the CENI. On the following day the results for the Golfe constituency were published. Then on the evening of Tuesday 23 October, the CENI announced provisional results for Lomé Commune, four seats going to the UFC and the fifth to the RPT. The CENI had thus provisionally attributed 50 seats in the National Assembly (an absolute majority) to the RPT, 27 to the UFC and four to the CAR. As this report was being drafted, the UFC was contesting the results for Lomé Commune and a large number of disputes had been referred to the Constitutional Court.

## **Cooperation with the EOM and the European Commission**

The parliamentary delegation worked closely with the Election Observation Mission headed by Fiona Hall. It was involved in drafting the preamble to the Mission's Preliminary Statement and its Chair, Marie-Arlette Carlotti, was given an opportunity to speak at the official press conference.

On 16 October, a few hours before the press conference, the delegation members learned of the press release from Commissioners Benita Ferrero Waldner and Louis Michel, the latter welcoming the smooth conduct of the election before a view had been expressed by the Observation Mission on the ground. The members were dismayed at this disregard for the work of the EOM and their own delegation – which was not even mentioned in the Commissioners' press release. Anxious not to send out mixed messages from the European Union, they declined to make a separate statement but decided to report what they regarded as a major inter-institutional incident to the President of Parliament.

On a more general note, the delegation members believe that the EOM's independence from the Commission and the Member States ought to be reinforced.

## **Conclusion**

A number of comments must be made.

### ***The electoral process itself***

1 – The delegation is satisfied with the way the voting was organised – taking place, as it did for the first time, without violence and with the participation of all the political parties – despite the functional failings and omissions mentioned in this report and the disputed results currently the subject of challenges in the Constitutional Court. Lessons need to be drawn from the various hitches in the electoral process for the organisation of future polls.



Shortcomings notwithstanding, the results of this election have provided a political snapshot of Togo, which must now form the basis for pursuing the democratic process there.

2 – In the delegation’s opinion, the most serious failing is the unbalanced allocation of seats to the various electoral constituencies.

### *The election result*

- The new Assembly is strongly polarised between the RPT and the UFC, the CAR’s representation is very slim and the other parties have no seats.
- The polarisation partly reflects Togo’s north-south divide, which is in some respects traditional.
- Because it was decided to have small constituencies, the proportional representation system could not fulfil its function of ensuring plurality and the proper representation of Togolese society in the new Assembly.
- Based as it is on public ballot, the new Assembly will enjoy democratic and political legitimacy. Its capacity to act will depend, however, on the resources available to it, on the degree of movement allowed it by the executive and on an independence that it has yet to win.
- The situation in the country remains sensitive following the poll: a section of the population is frustrated at the outcome and there is a legitimate sense of waiting for the ‘democratic dividend’. It will take time to rebuild confidence.

### *Future measures*

With regard to measures that might be taken in the future, the delegation notes with interest that President Faure Gnassingbé has declared that he is willing to address a number of issues:

- combating impunity (the President has high expectations of a committee that is due to make proposals in this regard);
- reform of the judicial system;
- military reform;
- introducing official legal recognition of opposition parties.

In any event, the 14 October election is an important step – although only a step – in the process of democratisation in Togo, which has to be pursued. In support of that process the European Parliament must aim to:

- strengthen the capacity of the new Togolese Assembly through the European Development Fund (EDF);
- step up its dialogue with the Togolese Assembly, particularly in the context of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA);
- request that an observation mission should attend forthcoming elections, notably the presidential election in 2010. The legitimacy of the Togolese President will depend on a free and transparent electoral process;
- ensure that the parliamentary election leads to a normalisation of relations with all funding bodies and with the EU;

- ensure that progress is sustained in the area of governance and that the pre-conditions for implementing financial support (repeatedly asserted by the European Parliament) are strictly met;
- forward the strategic document on Togo prepared for the 10th EDF programme to all parties in the Togolese National Assembly, via the JPA, and make time for debate on this document and its implementation, involving the Togolese National Assembly, the European Parliament and the European Commission;
- make human development in Togo the top priority, focusing on access to water, education and basic health care, and address the needs that the Parliamentary delegation observed on the ground.

Following on from the Observation Mission, the European Parliament will continue to support Togo's democratic development, within the framework of meeting the 22 undertakings and achieving the aims of the Comprehensive Political Agreement.

On behalf of the European Parliament, the delegation is determined to keep a close watch on all aspects of the situation as it develops, so that the Togolese people can be given maximum support at this crucial period of their history.

## **Annex A: Participants**

### **Delegation members**

Marie-Arlette Carlotti, PES, France, Chair  
Valdis Dombrovskis, EPP, Latvia  
Patrick Gaubert, EPP, France  
Horst Posdorf, EPP, Germany  
Eugenijus Maldeikis, UEN, Lithuania

### **Secretariat**

Etienne Bassot  
Francis Cole  
Petra Uhrmeister

### **Political groups**

Joseph Lukyamuzi, EPP

### **Interpreters**

Agnès Bernard (chief interpreter)  
Momar Khary Diagne  
Mike Hill

## **Annex B: Programme**

### **EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

#### **PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN TOGO, 14 OCTOBER 2007 ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION 11-16 October 2007**

#### **Programme**

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#### **Thursday 11 October**

- 5.35 pm Members arrive (on flight AF 848 from Paris) and transfer to hotel
- 7-8 pm Interview with Chief Observer Fiona Hall and the EOM management team

#### **Friday 12 October**

- 8.30-10 am Joint EP-EOM-EC breakfast meeting (at the French Ambassador's residence)

#### **Meetings with the signatories to the Comprehensive Political Agreement:**

- 10.30-11 am Meeting with CDPA, represented by Dosseh Tettekpoe, Hervé Johnson and Joseph Gbadago
- 11.15-11.45 am Meeting with CAR, represented by Joan Kissi, Maurice Erdorh, Fabien Akakpo and Georges Aïdam
- 12.45-1.15 pm Meeting with PDR, represented by Mama Traoré, Habila Agbere and Moussa Ali Izotou
- 2.30-3 pm Meeting with UFC, represented by Adama Doe-Bruce, Jean-Pierre Fabre and Georges Lawson
- 3.15-3.45 pm Meeting with CPP (cancelled)
- 7-8.30 pm Meeting with Gilbert Bawara, Minister for Cooperation and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and member of the RPT

#### **Saturday 13 October**

- 8-8.30 am Meeting with Olatokunbo Ige, resident representative of the UN High Commission for Human Rights
- 9-10 am Audience with Prime Minister Yawovi Madji Agboyibo at his offices

- 10.30-11.30 am* Meeting with Tozim Potopere, Chair of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), Kokou Biossey Tozoun, Rapporteur, Kokou Séname Amaglo, Deputy Chair, and Adodo Johnson, Deputy Rapporteur, at the CENI offices
- 11 am* Team departs for Kara
- Afternoon* Deployment and visits to polling stations

**Sunday 14 October, election day**

- 5.30 am-midnight* Opening of polling stations; visits to polling stations; close of polling; count; central collation of results at Independent Local Electoral Commissions (Lomé, Aného and Kara)

**Monday 15 October**

- 11 am-2 pm* Visit to Lomé Independent Local Electoral Commission (CELI)
- 1 pm* Team returns from Kara
- 5-7 pm* Delegation meeting with Fiona Hall and members of the mission
- 7.30 pm* Cocktail reception and buffet hosted by the MEPs at the Sarakawa Hotel

**Tuesday 16 October**

- 9-10 am* Audience with the Head of State (involving Marie-Arlette Carlotti, Fiona Hall and the European Commission Representative)
- 9.30-10 am* Meeting with Assarid Imbarcaouane (Mali), member of the JPA
- 10 am-1 pm* Delegation meeting with the German, French and Italian Ambassadors and the European Commission Representative (at the German Embassy)
- 4-5 pm* Preliminary Statement and press conference at the Sarakawa Hotel
- 10.05 pm* Departure of flight AF 849

## **Annex C: Preliminary Statement**

### **European Union Election Observation Mission to Togo**

#### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

*There was a massive turnout by the Togolese people for the parliamentary election on 14 October, evidence of the will to build a pluralist democracy*

**Through their massive turnout and their enthusiasm the Togolese people have demonstrated, at every step in the electoral process, their wish to be fully involved in the ongoing transition to democracy. On polling day the general goodwill among voters, polling station staff and political party representatives helped to overcome a small number of logistical and technical difficulties.**

**It is now up to all the players in the transition process, as well as the people of Togo, to pursue this joint approach, which has signalled their desire to build a pluralist, peaceful democracy.**

**Lomé, 16 October 2007**

*At the invitation of the Togolese authorities, the European Commission decided to deploy an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the parliamentary election on 14 October 2007. The EOM was headed by Fiona Hall, a Member of the European Parliament.*

*The EOM has been in Togo since 8 September 2007 and will remain there until 3 November 2007. It is operating in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation of 27 October 2005. The long-term observation exercise is covering all stages of the electoral process and aims to help to improve transparency, giving credibility to the election and promoting confidence among all those involved. The mission enjoys independence in making its observations and in its conclusions.*

*The EOM deployed 94 observers – nationals of 20 of the 27 European Union Member States – to monitor the parliamentary election in Togo's 31 administrative areas (préfectures). A five-member delegation from the European Parliament, headed by Marie-Arlette Carlotti, took part in the work of the EOM and is a party to this statement.*

*In the course of polling day the EOM observers visited 435 polling stations – 7.3% of the total of 5 930. The Mission is currently observing the central collation of results by the Independent Local Electoral Commissions (CELIs) and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). It will remain in the country to follow post-election developments including any disputes in relation to the results. A final report, containing conclusions based on the EOM's observations and recommendations for future elections, will be presented within two months of completion of the electoral process.*

## Preliminary conclusions

- The parliamentary election of 14 October 2007 has taken place in what have so far been generally satisfactory conditions. Despite a number of difficulties and certain shortcomings, the CENI has managed the electoral process in a way that has enabled the voters to express their choice. The election campaign, conducted in an atmosphere of calm, gave the political parties the opportunity to present their programmes to the electorate. The turnout on polling day – although not yet precisely determined – appeared to be very high throughout the country.
- Very early on polling day it became clear that there was a problem with the distribution and allocation of the stickers being used to validate ballot papers. Our observations indicate that the problem was partially resolved as the day went on and that it affected only a limited number of electors, who were ultimately allowed to cast their votes on un-stickered ballot papers.
- The parliamentary election of 14 October 2007 constitutes an important step in the process of developing democracy in Togo through the election of a multi-party National Assembly. The Comprehensive Political Agreement (*Accord Politique Global* or APG) provided for the creation of ‘a new National Assembly following a transparent, fair and democratic election process’.
- Given Togo’s controversial experience with previous presidential and parliamentary elections marred by irregularities and violence, the broad participation by the political parties in the various stages of this electoral process and the calm that continues to reign, as it did throughout the election campaign, are noteworthy and should be welcomed.
- The statutory framework within which the poll was organised is generally in line with international standards for the conduct of competitive and credible elections. There are, however, certain grey areas, ambiguities and inconsistencies stemming from the fact that the relevant legal texts have not been consolidated following successive reforms of the Electoral Code.
- The APG made detailed stipulations on the structure of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The model chosen was that of a pluralistic electoral commission comprising representatives of the signatory parties to the APG. A structure of this type was necessary in order to bring the electoral process to its conclusion and to ensure trust among the signatory parties, although it resulted in some cases in cumbersome decision-making procedures that could not produce a rapid response to issues as they emerged. Despite these difficulties, the CENI ran the electoral process in a generally satisfactory way.
- The electoral registration drive brought the number of registered voters to approximately 2 974 000. The production of provisional electoral rolls and the establishment of polling stations (5 930 in total) proceeded without major problems. However, the time allowed for the display and amendment of the electoral rolls proved too short to permit correction of all the mistakes identified.
- The registration of lists of candidates is governed by a series of articles in the Electoral Code that are still coloured by the logic of the single-member constituency system. The connection between the respective roles of the CENI,

which processes the names submitted, and the Constitutional Court, which publishes the definitive list of candidates is also ill-defined. The process was carried out in a climate of inclusiveness that was generally satisfactory. Twenty-nine parties fielded candidates for the National Assembly and eight put up lists in at least two or three constituencies.

- The fortnight of election campaigning was conducted in an atmosphere of calm, with all the political parties and the public actively participating. This new and positive situation is worth highlighting as it reflected well on all those involved.
- By allowing private-sector media companies to report the election campaign on the same footing as their public-sector counterparts, the Audiovisual and Communications Authority (*Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuelle et de la Communication*, HAAC) opened the door to pluralistic media coverage – something unprecedented in Togo. A sample analysis by the EOM indicates that the private-sector media observed the principle of treating the candidates equitably and tried to give them equal access. The public-sector media ensured pluralism of political expression, although in many cases the RPT and the CAR were given more airtime or column inches than the other parties.
- The national election monitoring effort, with support from the PEACE programme, was a coordinated one, involving five national NGOs. Together they deployed almost 3 000 observers to cover some 5 000 polling stations.
- On 11 October there was an advance poll for members of the armed forces and local and national police. The delayed decision to hold this poll was a further source of logistical and operational complications. The advance poll was conducted satisfactorily in terms of provision for secret balloting, although a number of abuses of the proxy voting system were detected. At the same time, the fact that a limited number of electors (approximately 10 000) took part in this poll, puts the impact of the contested votes into perspective.
- The EOM has monitored, and continues to monitor, the central collation of the results. The degree of transparency with which this crucial phase has proceeded at CELI level has varied but, in every case, candidates, their representatives and election observers have enjoyed free access. The EOM has noted that the collation of results at CELI level was proving laborious due to a lack of resources for managing and processing the results properly in the largest constituencies.



## Preliminary observations

### Political climate

After 40 years of one-party rule in Togo, the sudden death of President Gnassingbé Eyadema in February 2005 was followed by the election of his son, Faure Gnassingbé, in April of the same year in circumstances hotly contested by the opposition. This led to further divisions and to outbreaks of violence, which were criticised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and other members of the international community. At the request of the Togolese Government, consultations were opened with the EU and these produced agreement by the Government to '22 undertakings' as a means of breaking the political deadlock. The joint decision by the ruling party – the Rally of the Togolese People (*Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais*, RPT) – and several opposition parties to embark on a national dialogue, paving the way for Togo's democratisation, was a positive response to a very difficult situation that had served only to impede the country's proper functioning. The signing on 20 August 2006 of a Comprehensive Political Agreement (*Accord Politique Global*, APG) meant that a roadmap could be prepared for the gradual re-establishment of politics founded on a basic measure of consensus among the different currents.

The APG was signed by six parties: the RPT, the Action Committee for Renewal (*Comité d'action pour le renouveau*, CAR), the Democratic Convention of African Peoples (*Convention démocratique des peuples africains*, CDPA), the Patriotic Pan-African Convergence (*Convergence patriotique panafricaine*, CPP), the Union of Forces for Change (UFC), the Party for Democracy and Renewal (*Parti pour la démocratie et le renouveau*, PDR) and two voluntary-sector women's organisations, the 'Women, Democracy and Development Reflection and Action Group' (*Groupe de réflexion et d'action: femme, démocratie et développement*, GF2D) and the Network of African Women Ministers and Members of Parliament (*Réseau des femmes africaines ministres et parlementaires*, REFAMP/T). Following the signing of the APG, a Government of National Union was set up, including all the signatory parties except the UFC, which nonetheless remained associated with the Agreement.

The APG provided specifically for the creation of 'a new National Assembly following a transparent, fair and democratic election process' and for the setting-up of an independent electoral authority, the CENI, to organise the election. All the parties that signed the APG were represented in the CENI. The parliamentary election of 14 October 2007 constitutes an important step in the process of developing democracy in Togo through the election of a multi-party National Assembly.

Given Togo's controversial experience with previous presidential and parliamentary elections marred by irregularities and violence, the broad participation by the political parties in the various stages of this electoral process and the calm that continues to reign, as it did throughout the election campaign, are noteworthy and should be welcomed.

### Statutory framework

The statutory framework within which the poll was organised is generally in line with international standards for the conduct of competitive and credible elections. There are, however, certain grey areas, ambiguities and inconsistencies stemming from the fact that the relevant legal texts have not been consolidated following successive reforms of the

Electoral Code. By bringing in a list-based system of proportional representation, the APG further complicated the situation because the changes it introduced did not adequately amend the Electoral Code provisions to meet the specific requirements of the new voting system.

As a result, problems of two kinds emerged.

- On the one hand there were problems of adjustment, resulting from the co-existence of provisions for the former first-past-the-post system, with its 81 single-seat constituencies, and the imperatives of the newly introduced PR system. These problems surfaced, for example, in relation to provisions on candidacy and the processing of candidacies.
- On the other hand, technical and functional problems arose because the impact of the reforms on the election timetable had not been foreseen and it now proved hard to implement the timetable at operational level. This was a particularly sensitive issue throughout the process of producing the ballot papers, which had to be amended several times in the course of their preparation in order to reflect changing decisions at a legal level.

Generally speaking, those in charge of the process often had to steer a course between two approaches to interpretation of the law: one literal and frequently inappropriate, the other flexible but diverging from the letter of the relevant texts. There is, moreover, little case law on electoral matters and what exists has proved to be of limited value in clarifying issues as yet unresolved.

Uncertainty also emerged on various points, notably the election timetable, for which the legal provisions are not sufficiently detailed. This led to some confusion, requiring arrangements to be adjusted ad hoc, for example with regard to the deadline for candidates to lodge their deposits, the opening of the election campaign etc.

The EOM noted that some aspects of Togo's institutional situation had an impact on the electoral process. This was particularly obvious in relation to campaign funding. Although the Electoral Code provides that campaign spending shall not exceed XOF 3 million per candidate, this stipulation was rendered inoperable in the absence of an Auditor General's Department to monitor its observance. The scale and nature of certain campaigns observed by the EOM suggest that the ceiling was ignored in many cases. On a similar note, there is a strong case for involving administrative courts in the electoral apparatus as soon as they have been properly constituted.

With regard to the actual voting system, the APG left three options open. The system ultimately chosen was that of proportional representation using the highest-average method of seat allocation in 31 constituencies. The formula used for allocating seats to the various constituencies resulted in major imbalances in terms of representivity: at the extent of the range, one voter in Assoli carried the same weight as 13 in Lomé Golfe. The EOM is bound to point out that, in this respect, the electoral system departs significantly from relevant international recommendations, such as those made by the UN Committee on Human Rights on its comments on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Liberties.

In the context of this election, however, the EOM would also point out that the signatories to the APG accepted this system and that it is now the task of the newly elected

representatives, working with the parties to the Agreement, to consider the options for minimising such imbalances in the future.

### **Electoral administration**

The APG made detailed stipulations on the structure of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI). The model chosen was that of a pluralistic electoral commission comprising representatives of the signatory parties to the Agreement. A structure of this type was necessary in order to bring the electoral process to its conclusion and to ensure trust among the signatory parties, although it resulted in some cases in cumbersome decision-making procedures that could not produce a rapid response to issues as they emerged. Following the outbreak of controversy, in the run-up to the election, about whether ballot papers should be authenticated by a signature on polling day, it took the intervention of an external mediator – in the person of the President of Burkina Faso – to produce a compromise that all parties could accept, namely that stickers would be placed on the reverse of the ballot papers to indicate that they were in order.

In the absence of a proper support structure, CENI members were involved directly in managing the electoral process and were obliged, with regard to numerous technical issues, to draw on the international technical assistance provided by the UNPD Project Management Unit and financed in large part by the EU. The EOM pays tribute to the contribution made by the CENI members and by the technical assistance personnel, although it would have been preferable had their established day-to-day cooperation been used as a basis for developing a more permanent system of electoral administration. In the same context, the EOM salutes the work done by the National Data Processing Centre (*Centre National de Traitement des Données*, CNTD), which demonstrated its ability to meet expectations with regard to managing the electoral register and producing reliable returns.

The composition of the CENI's subsidiary bodies – the Independent Local Electoral Commissions (*Commissions Electorales Locales Indépendantes*, CELIs), the Electoral Roll and Poll Card Committees (*Comités des Listes et Cartes*, CLCs) and the polling station teams – helped to reinforce the climate of confidence by ensuring a degree of direct involvement for the political parties that had signed the APG. The EOM's observer teams noted generally that the CELIs and their presiding officers were determined to conduct the process with maximum efficiency despite the problems encountered. In some cases, the unstructured nature of the central body was clearly one of the problems, inasmuch as communication between the CENI and the CELIs could have been better developed and more regular, and this shortcoming may have hindered the process because its various operational phases were not fully joined up.

It proved hard to keep to the timetable for the election process because constraints imposed by the Electoral Code led to major hold-ups, leaving little room for manoeuvre on difficult issues. For example, the statutory provisions for the Constitutional Court to publish final lists of candidates 'no later than 18 days before the poll' limited the scope for improving ballot-paper security and traceability measures.

Generally speaking and despite the difficulties created by its own structural limitations, the CENI fulfilled its role, partly thanks to good organisation at its supplies warehouse.

## **Voter registration**

Provisional results of the registration campaign, based on written reports from the CELIs, showed the number of registered voters as 2 946 852. After electronic data checking, the slightly higher figure of 2 974 000 was confirmed. Because demographic statistics are not reliable and in-depth analysis of the figures is thus extremely problematic, the rate of registration cannot be established with certainty. In all probability, however, it is very high, given the structure of the population and the possible age ranges based on 1981 census data. This level of popular enthusiasm for the electoral process and the unanimously positive assessment of it by all those involved are two very important indicators.

None of the few irregularities drawn to the EOM's attention ever looked likely to undermine the credibility of the operation, which succeeded in providing a stable basis for the poll and has proved to be a mechanism worth maintaining and developing for future elections – as, indeed, is required under the Electoral Code. The National Data Processing Centre (CNTD) coped well with the production of provisional electoral rolls and the establishment of polling stations (5 930 in number), no major problems arising despite very tight deadlines.

It is true that the time allowed for display and amendment of the electoral rolls (a statutory nine days) proved too short to permit correction of all the mistakes identified. However, the number of omissions – estimated by the CNTD through statistical crosschecks – appeared to be low and this was borne out by observations on the ground on polling day.

## **Candidacies**

The registration of lists of candidates is governed by a series of articles in the Electoral Code that are still coloured by the logic of the single-member constituency system. The connection between the respective roles of the CENI, which processes the names submitted, and the Constitutional Court, which publishes the definitive list of candidates is also ill defined. Nonetheless, the process proceeded in a climate of inclusiveness that was generally satisfactory.

A total of 29 parties fielded candidates for the National Assembly and the following put up lists in at least two or three constituencies: the Rally of the Togolese People (*Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais*, RPT), the Union of Forces for Change (UFC), the Action Committee for Renewal (*Comité d'action pour le renouveau*, CAR), the Democratic Convention of African Peoples (*Convention démocratique des peuples africains*, CDPA), the Togolese Democratic Alliance (*Alliance Togolaise des Démocrates*, ATD), the Patriotic Pan-African Convergence (*Convergence patriotique panafricaine*, CPP), the Party for Democracy and Renewal (*Parti pour la démocratie et le renouveau*, PDR) and the Socialist Party for Renewal (*Parti Socialiste pour le Renouveau*, PSR). Women candidates comprised only 10% of the parties' lists, the percentage of women in winnable positions on lists being even lower.

## **The election campaign**

The fortnight of election campaigning was conducted in an atmosphere of calm, with all the political parties and the public actively participating. This new and positive situation is worth highlighting as it reflected well on all those involved.

There was some confusion about the date on which campaigning was to open (28 or 29 September) but no incidents resulted. In general, the candidates' rights to freedom of expression and freedom of movement were respected, although a number of very minor disputes were noted.

The campaign revealed imbalances among the political parties in terms of financial and organisational resources. The RPT, in particular, had substantial means at its disposal, as evidenced by its extensive poster campaign in Lomé. The CAR, UFC and RPT out-organised and out-mobilised the other parties.

The candidates tended to campaign on issues related to the peace process, the need for change and political cooperation rather than clearly defined programmes. Constitutional reform, modernisation of the state and economic recovery were seen as the policy priorities for the next government.

### **The media**

By allowing private-sector media companies to report the election campaign on the same footing as their public-sector counterparts, the Audiovisual and Communications Authority (*Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuelle et de la Communication*, HAAC) opened the door to pluralistic media coverage – something unprecedented in Togo. The Decision of 31 August 2007, concerning observance by the private-sector media of the principles of pluralism and balanced reporting, paved the way for progress by the Togolese media.

The numerous training courses that had been organised on the theme of information management in an election period proved worthwhile. Although most of the political parties had limited resources and no structured communications policies, the media showed a high level of determination and commitment in informing the public about all aspects of the electoral process.

A significant number of reports, in a positive and courteous tone, were broadcast throughout the election campaign, informing the electorate and enabling the candidates to present their programmes. A sample analysis by the EOM indicates that the private-sector media observed the principle of treating the candidates equitably and tried to give them equal access. The private media companies were generally self-disciplined and self-regulating. The public-sector media organisations (TVT, Radio Lomé and Togo Presse) ensured pluralism of political expression, although in many cases the RPT and the CAR were given more airtime or column inches than the other parties.

Despite its lack of monitoring equipment, the HAAC fulfilled its regulatory role with precision and rigour. In a series of press releases it sharply criticised particular media companies (TVT, Radio Lomé, Radio Nostalgie, RTDS and TV7), reminded political parties about the extent of their entitlement to airtime and condemned SMS propaganda campaigns run by the UFC, CAR, RPT and CDPA. The HAAC identified and criticised several cases of covert campaigning in both public-sector and private-sector media before the official opening of the campaign period. Some of these breaches of the rules occurred because press organisations had difficulty interpreting Article 90 of the Electoral Code.

## **National observation**

The national election monitoring effort, with support from the PEACE programme, was a coordinated one, involving five national NGOs selected through a competitive tender procedure. From 12 October onwards, they deployed some 3 000 observers under the control of two supervisors per constituency. Each NGO took responsibility for a specific geographical area, coordinating all the observers deployed there irrespective of their provenance, the overall aim being to cover some 5 000 polling stations.

## **Advance poll for members of the security forces**

On 11 October an advance poll was organised for members of the armed forces and local and national police, as provided for in the Electoral Code. The delayed decision to hold this poll was a further source of logistical and operational complications. Due to insufficient preparation, the practical difficulties involved had been under-estimated, with the result that a series of measures for facilitation and proxy voting and derogations from normal procedure were required. The effect of all the special provisions was to open the advance poll to potential abuses. Nonetheless, although a number of abuses of the proxy voting system were detected, the overall poll was conducted satisfactorily in terms of provision for secret balloting. At the same time, the fact that a limited number of electors (approximately 10 000) took part, puts the impact of the contested votes into perspective.

## **Polling day**

At those polling stations which the EOM observers visited the voting proceeded in a generally satisfactory manner; while the precise percentage turnout is not yet known, it appeared to be very high throughout the country. Queues, some of them lengthy, formed in the morning as soon as polling opened. Delays were experienced in opening the poll at some stations. In most cases the wait was not long and the problem simply reflected a lack of experience on the part of the polling station staff. Longer delays occurred at certain polling stations because of hold-ups in the distribution of essential voting materials. In general, however, the CELIs managed to rectify the mistakes: only a limited number of polling stations in Kara experienced major technical difficulties and even these did not prevent people there from voting.

Very early in the day it became clear that there was a problem with the distribution and allocation of the stickers being used to validate ballot papers. The simple explanation of this problem was that the CENI had not had enough time to check the packages of stickers properly on delivery, before they had to be forwarded to the CELIs. The CELIs therefore had to manage as best they could, sharing the stickers among the polling stations on an ad hoc basis. In those constituencies with a small number of polling stations the glitches were ironed out by the end of the day. In other constituencies the scale of the task rendered it impossible to make up the shortfalls without running out of stocks completely. This happened at a small number of polling stations in Lomé and more exceptionally in other constituencies. Our observations indicate that the problem was resolved to some extent as the day went on and that it affected only a limited number of electors, who were ultimately allowed to cast their votes on un-stickered ballot papers. Nonetheless, at those centres which experienced the worst of the problem, the voters' legitimate anxiety led to tension. The main cause of difficulty was the fact that the procedure had been introduced at a late stage and its operational implications had been under-estimated.

Overall, however, the polling stations managed to function in such a way that voters were able to express their choices freely. Most of the irregularities observed could be attributed to awkward interpretation of procedures, some of which had been determined only at a very late stage and were therefore not fully assimilated. The main problem observed was in the interpretation at some polling stations of provisions on assistance for voters with disabilities: either there was failure to respect stipulations on the disabled voter's right to select the person assisting, or assistance was wrongly extended to illiterate voters.

The closure of the polling stations and the vote-counting process proceeded in a climate of calm and, in accordance with the Electoral Code, public access to the count was maintained. Following the CENI's decision at the end of the day to authorise voting on non-stickered ballot papers, three types of papers were ultimately accepted: those carrying a sticker, those with no validating mark and those bearing a signature instead of a sticker.

### **Central collation of results**

The EOM has monitored, and continues to monitor, the central collation of the results. The degree of transparency with which this crucial phase has proceeded at CELI level has varied but, in every case, candidates, their representatives and election observers have enjoyed free access to the count. The EOM has noted that the collation of results at CELI level was proving laborious due to a lack of resources for managing and processing the results properly in the largest constituencies. The EOM intends to continue its observation work throughout the declaration of the results and in the subsequent phase of dealing with any challenges to them.

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The EOM would like to thank the electoral and government authorities, the political parties and candidates, the media, the observers and, in particular, the Togolese people for all their cooperation throughout the mission.

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## **Annex E: Letter from the Chair of the Delegation to the President of the EP**

[stamp: 'EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT']

[stamp: '316914 22.10.2007']

Hans-Gert Pöttering  
President of the European Parliament  
PHS 11 B 011  
Brussels

Brussels, 19 October 2007

Dear Mr President,

I write on behalf of the European Parliament delegation for the observation of the parliamentary election in Togo, which visited that country between 11 and 16 October. With the full agreement of my colleagues I wish to make you aware of an incident that occurred there.

The delegation met the national authorities and the main political parties and deployed to the regions of Lomé and Aného in the south of the country and Kara in the north. It was thus able to reach an informed opinion on the election and the conditions in which it was conducted. The delegation worked as one with the Election Observation Mission deployed by the European Union. I should like to emphasise the excellent nature of our relations with our colleague, Fiona Hall, the Chief Observer, who involved us fully in the mission's work.

We were therefore particularly surprised and disappointed to learn - at noon on Tuesday 16 October, i.e. four hours before the press conference - of a press release issued by Louis Michel, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid. This press release passed judgment on the electoral process, thus undermining the work of the Election Observation Mission and the European Parliament delegation. The delegation, moreover, was not even mentioned in the document.

While our assessment of the electoral process differs little from that of the Commissioner, we nonetheless consider that the procedure followed shows scant regard for the work of the Observation Mission and could potentially erode its independence. The incident is also bad for institutional relations between Parliament and the Commission.

I am willing to meet you and to discuss the results of our work. I shall also ensure that you are sent a copy of the mission report as soon as it is available.

Yours sincerely,

[signature]  
Marie-Arlette Carlotti,  
Delegation Chair

*Enclosed: European Commission press release*  
*Copies to: Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Co-Chair of the Election Coordination Group*  
*Josep Borrell Fontelles, Co-Chair of the Election Coordination Group*



Brussels, 16 October 2007

**Togo: all calm as parliamentary elections are held on 14 October 2007**

***The European Union is closely monitoring the parliamentary elections in Togo. The elections are a major step forward on the country's road to democracy.***

Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, is delighted that, *'Sunday's elections in Togo took place in calm conditions and with a massive turn-out at the polls by the electorate. I'm delighted to have witnessed the confident and mature manner in which the Togolese people carried out this democratic process. I would like to congratulate the people and the authorities of Togo as well as all those who helped bring this about. I call for the authorities and the political parties to respect the democratic path that the citizens of Togo have so clearly chosen.'*

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy, said *'I congratulate the Togolese people on their turnout. I call on all Togolese to continue the democratic process peacefully. If the electoral process continues smoothly, the elections will be a major landmark in the return to democracy. I await with interest the initial findings of the EU election observation mission – which has been on the ground since 8 September – on the elections, which will be presented on Tuesday 16 October.'*

The European Union had sent an election observation mission (EOM), headed by Chief Observer Fiona Hall, to monitor the electoral campaign, the preparations for the elections and polling day. Over 80 observers were in the country on polling day. The mission will stay there to monitor the rest of the electoral process, which includes the counting of the votes, the totting up of the results and the handling of any complaints.

The European Commission is supporting the transition process with a grant of €13.6 million from the EDF to the UN Trust Fund that has been specially set up.

Some measures to improve governance and restore Togolese confidence are already underway while others are in the pipeline.

For further information visit:

<http://www.eueom-togo.org/Main/default.html>

<http://ec.europa.eu/development/Geographical/RegionsCountries/Countries/Togo.htm>

[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/human\\_rights/eu\\_election\\_ass\\_observ/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/index.htm)

Contacts:

Christiane Hohmann 02/29 91196 or John Clancy 02/29 53773

## **ANNEX F: election results as announced by the Constitutional Court on 30 October**

- The total number of registered electors in the Republic of Togo is 2 974 718.
- The total number who voted was 2 526 049.
- There were 181 941 spoiled ballot papers.
- The total number of valid votes cast was 2 344 108.
- There was a turnout of 85% of the electorate.

### **AGOU CONSTITUENCY**

- 1 Kokou Fifi MENSAH, RPT
- 2 Kossi Enyonam KPOYI, UFC
- 3 Adjaratou ABDOULAYE, RPT
- 4 Aboubakar BA-TRAORE, RPT

### **ASSOLI CONSTITUENCY**

- 5 Kudjow-kum PEKEMSI, RPT
- 6 Satchi Koffi EDOH, RPT
- 7 Kokou Kpébou AMOUDJI, RPT

### **BLITTA CONSTITUENCY**

- 8 Koffi Agbényéga VOULE-FRITITI, RPT
- 9 Yawo Pascal SOGADJI, UFC

### **DANYI CONSTITUENCY**

- 10 Komi Sélom KLASSOU, RPT
- 11 Agboka AMOUDJI, UFC

### **HAHO CONSTITUENCY**

- 12 Pahorsiki TOUH, RPT
- 13 Abalounorou ATABA, RPT

### **BINAH CONSTITUENCY**

- 14 Ayao HABIA, UFC
- 15 Atisso Kodjo SEMEGLO, UFC

### **AVE CONSTITUENCY**

- 16 Jean-Pierre FABRE, UFC
- 17 Latévi Georges LAWSON, UFC
- 18 Kossiwa Mana Félicité AGBOKOU, UFC
- 19 Adama Ruben DOE BRUCE, UFC
- 20 Kondi Charles AGBA, RPT

### **LOME COMMUNE CONSTITUENCY**

- 21 Payadowa BOUKPESSI, RPT
- 22 Awédéou TCHASSE, RPT
- 23 Sim KPOHOU, RPT

### **SOTOUBOUA CONSTITUENCY**

- 24 Dama DRAMANI, RPT
- 25 Atsoh Larba APOUDJAK, RPT

### **TCHAMBA CONSTITUENCY**

- 26 K Dodji APEVON, CAR

27 Akakpo ATTIKPA, UFC  
28 Assewouw AKEPE, UFC

**VO CONSTITUENCY**

29 Yawovi AGBOYIBO, CAR  
30 Yawovi Honam Henri GBONE, CAR  
31 Kossiko Kalenyo KOFFI, CAR

**YOTO CONSTITUENCY**

32 Pé Boèvi Banku LAWSON, UFC  
33 Kossi Edem BADJAGBO, UFC  
34 Amoussouvi KPADENOU, UFC

**LES LACS CONSTITUENCY**

35 Viwoto Sewonou SOSSOU, RPT  
36 Mawulikplimi SOD AHLON, UFC

**LE MOYEN MONO CONSTITUENCY**

37 Yentema SAMBIANI, RPT  
38 Sampoguili GAMBE, RPT

**KPENDJAL CONSTITUENCY**

39 Ayitou SINGO, RPT  
40 N'térantémou KOUAGOU, RPT

**LA KERAN CONSTITUENCY**

41 Komlan MALLY, RPT  
42 Agbéko IDOH, RPT  
43 Ididou TCHAKPANA, UFC

**L'AMOU CONSTITUENCY**

44 Abass BONFOH, RPT  
45 Kossi GNANDI, RPT  
46 Yaowai NAMBOU, RPT

**BASSAR CONSTITUENCY**

47 Mémounatou IBRAHIMA, RPT  
48 Lekpa Antoine GBEBENI, RPT

**DANKPEN CONSTITUENCY**

49 Yao KANEKATOUA, RPT  
50 Adji Otèth AYASSOR, RPT

**DOUFELGOU CONSTITUENCY**

51 Komla Kuma Mawulawoe AMEYI, RPT  
52 Manavi Isabelle Djigbodi AMEGANVI, UFC  
53 Koffi Senyo SEGLA, UFC

**KLOTO CONSTITUENCY**

54 Kpatcha GNASSINGBE, RPT  
55 Edjaîdè Péhéna WALLA, RPT  
56 Mila-Bellè TELOU (married name BELEI), RPT

**LA KOZAH CONSTITUENCY**

57 Kodjo ATAKPAMEY, UFC

58 Edoh BAROMI, RPT  
59 Essoyaba BOUKPESSI, RPT

**L'OGOU CONSTITUENCY**

60 Issifou OKOULOU KANTCHATI, RPT  
61 Mindi LAMBONI, RPT  
62 Dammipi NOUPOKOU, RPT

**L'OTI CONSTITUENCY**

63 Yobate KOLANI, RPT  
64 Minsoabé BARNABO, RPT

**TANDJOUARE CONSTITUENCY**

65 Bakalawa FOFANA, UFC  
66 Katari FOLI-BAZI, RPT  
67 Békéyi Essoham SOGOYOU, RPT

**TCHAOUDJO CONSTITUENCY**

68 Koffi Santy Sany ADADE, RPT  
69 Ossobé Kwami YAKPO, UFC  
70 Kwami MANTI, UFC

**WAWA CONSTITUENCY**

71 Yao Victor KETOGLO, UFC  
72 Kokou AKAKPO, UFC  
73 Kokou AHOLOU, UFC

**ZIO CONSTITUENCY**

74 Ahli Komla Apénya BRUCE, UFC  
75 Gbéya TSIMESSE, UFC

**LE GOLFE CONSTITUENCY**

76 Tchiko Koffi Joseph AKODA, RPT  
77 Mouwounaïso I. K. KAMBIA, RPT

**L'EST MONO CONSTITUENCY**

78 Yandja YENTCHABRE, RPT  
79 Dago YABRE, RPT  
80 Libibe Yendoubé YENDOUME, RPT  
81 Yempabe KOLANI, RPT

**TONE CONSTITUENCY**

78 Yandja YENTCHABRE, RPT  
79 Dago YABRE, RPT  
80 Libibe Yendoubé YENDOUME, RPT  
81 Yempabe KOLANI, RPT