Our article, The Phantom Agent: Artificial Intentionality and Legal Responsibility, co-authored with John Nay, has now been published and is available online. Artificial intelligence systems are more and more acting as though they have intentions. They facilitate negotiations, provide advice, adapt to problems and influence human decisions. But they are not legal persons, and do not have a mind in any conventional sense. Does law require AI personhood to address this? We argue that it does not. Legal intent has not been merely a record of inner mental states. In contract, tort, corporate, and criminal law, intent is a normative device that determines legal effect, assigns blame, and manages risk. It is inferred and imputed routinely, and sometimes fictionalized. In this light, artificial intelligence systems are best understood as non-personal agents whose actions can be traced back to known human principals through doctrines we already have: agency, respondeat superior, electronic-agent contracting, and corporate attribution. We propose a three-level framework for differentiating between status, attribution, and governance, and a factor-based test for when AI conduct should be treated as intentional for the purpose of a legal doctrine. We apply it to recent litigation, including wrongful death claims against a chatbot provider, and compare US and EU trajectories. Bottom line: law can treat artificial agency as consequential without granting AI personhood, consciousness, or moral standing. Human responsibility is still there.https://https://lnkd.in/eyWRRkyX
Your point about adverse inferences where defendants cannot reconstruct system behavior is the one I keep thinking about from the engineering side. Reconstruction is not usually blocked by model opacity. It is blocked by credential design. Agents are typically issued broad shared credentials with no record of who authorized what, so the chain from human principal to specific action was never captured in the first place. That is a solvable architecture problem, and the incentive you describe may be what finally forces it.
This is excellent.
Congrats on the paper. The "responsibility without personhood" framing raises a practical question I think about a lot: if an agent's advice is going to be treated as intentional, the firm needs a record of what the agent was allowed to see and what it relied on. Curious how you see that evidence trail fitting the argument.