ISIS Finances in Iraq: Targeting Terrorist Funding

Metis Study 44 by our colleague Prof. Dr. Eva Herschinger (CISS) on Islamist Terrorism "Islamist terrorism remains a global threat, embodied by groups such as the so-called Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. Currently, the centre of terrorist activity is in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region. New organisational structures, digital recruitment – including young people and women – and flexible attack tactics characterise contemporary Islamist terrorism. Four scenarios are emerging for the near future: from securing local power to criminal hybrid forms to global attack planning and virtual caliphates." DEU: https://lnkd.in/dhvwmSYK ENG: https://lnkd.in/dJztpE5x

Global terrorism has become more fragmented and localized. As risks become harder to predict, new intelligence tools are gaining traction, but their long-term impact remains uncertain. https://ow.ly/Hub550Y4E4j #CrisisManagement #Terrorism #PoliticalViolence #RiskManagement

Global terrorism has become more fragmented and localized. As risks become harder to predict, new intelligence tools are gaining traction, but their long-term impact remains uncertain. https://ow.ly/izyI50Y4X6P #CrisisManagement #Terrorism #PoliticalViolence #RiskManagement

There are many theories of how the Islamic State managed to seize and hold vast territory in such a remarkably short span of time. Military collapse, sectarian fractures, regional geopolitics—all play a role. But some studies go deeper, moving beyond surface explanations to unpack how IS actually operated as an insurgent organisation. This is one of those studies. Rather than treating ISIS as a static or “defeated” phenomenon, this body of research examines its method of insurgency—how it synchronised violence, governance, propaganda, and social control to outcompete state authority and rival actors. The key insight is uncomfortable but essential: IS did not rely on brute force alone. It carefully built systems of control and systems of meaning, often long before it formally captured territory. What makes this especially relevant today is that this is not a closed chapter of history. The Islamic State is no longer in its caliphate phase, but its insurgent methodology is very much alive—adapting, mutating, and being exported to affiliates across regions. This is an evolving, live threat environment, not a post-mortem case study. Understanding these dynamics is about sharpening policy, intelligence, and counter-terrorism responses. If we misread how such movements grow, adapt, and regenerate, we risk fighting the last version of the threat rather than the current one. There are more studies like this, and they deserve sustained attention. Because the next iteration of this challenge will not announce itself in familiar ways—and by the time it does, it may already be too late to respond effectively. This is a long-ish Policy Brief. #CounterTerrorism #InsurgencyStudies #IslamicState #SecurityStudies #TerrorismResearch #StrategicAnalysis #NationalSecurity #ConflictAnalysis

Global terrorism has become more fragmented and localized. As risks become harder to predict, new intelligence tools are gaining traction, but their long-term impact remains uncertain. https://ow.ly/qtoF50Y4vXc #CrisisManagement #Terrorism #PoliticalViolence #RiskManagement

For those interested in African IR/security/terrorism/geopolitics, below are some of the most interesting pieces I’ve come across over the past month or so that are worth a look: 1) "What’s Driving Conflict Today? A Review of Global Trends," ACLED (https://lnkd.in/eUG9-7XY) This end-of-year review from ACLED identifies the shifting patterns of violence globally. Notable findings for Africa-watchers include the fact that 79% of all of the Islamic State’s global attacks in 2025 occurred in Africa, and that, among the top 10 most deadly non-state actors, 9 of the 10 were in Africa. In order of deadliness: RSF (Sudan), ADF (DRC), M23 (DRC), ISSP (Sahel), Fulani militias (Nigeria), armed bandits (Katsina, Nigeria), JNIM (Sahel), armed bandits (Zamfara, Nigeria), “Boko Haram” (Nigeria). 2) "Vivre sous blocus : cas des zones sous influence du JNIM au Mali," Ibrahima Poudiougou, PhD, Mahamadou Bassirou TANGARA (https://lnkd.in/egABGKHn) An important study based on interviews with rural communities in Mali impacted by various iterations of JNIM blockades. Ground-level insights focus on detrimental impacts on agriculture, trade, education, and social cohesion, while also examining community responses such as resistance, negotiation, and solidarity. Notable focus on impacts on women. 3) "ISIS in Northwest Nigeria: Some Quick Thoughts," James Barnett (https://lnkd.in/eQHrKmDT) Barnett, who has been studying the Nigerian Lakurawa movement in Nigeria for years, takes on the thorny question of whether it is accurate to claim that recent U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State militants in northwest Nigeria. Answer: it’s messy. 4) "Al-Qaeda and WMD Terrorism: Has the Worst Case Returned?" Sara H. (https://lnkd.in/erfuJzvy) Harmouch argues that al-Qaeda’s longstanding ambition to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons persists today (as evidenced by recent propaganda) and is made more dangerous by an increasingly permissive environment. 5) "Why the Sahel’s Violence Is More Than a Local Problem," Jason Warner, Ph.D., CJ (Caleb) Pine (https://lnkd.in/evi_r26z) In a piece for The Lawfare Institute, CJ Pine - the former CT focal point for the U.S. Mission to the UN — and I lay bare why the Sahel’s spiraling violence (see above) can no longer be viewed by major powers as devastating but sufficiently contained to be irrelevant to their interests.

Excellent list, Jason Warner, Ph.D. on the evolving security landscape in Africa. One of the most striking takeaways is the ACLED finding that 79% of all Islamic State global attacks in 2025 occurred in Africa. This isn't just a regional shift; it is one of the most significant geopolitical trends of the decade. Jason’s recent piece in Lawfare with CJ (Caleb) Pine is a good reminder to the international community: Sahelian stability is no longer a local issue, but rather a global one. Highly recommend these five pieces for anyone tracking counter-terrorism or African geopolitics. #Geopolitics #AfricanSecurity #Sahel #InternationalRelations #CounterTerrorism

The Syrian government's military offensive against the Kurdish-led SDF has concluded with a landmark integration agreement that fundamentally restructures regional power dynamics and U.S. counter-terrorism strategy. The ceasefire consolidates Damascus's control over oil fields, border crossings, and ISIS detention facilities—shifting strategic leverage in the Middle East. This development signals a critical realignment in Syrian governance, requiring enterprises and policymakers to reassess supply chain resilience, energy market exposure, and geopolitical risk in the region. https://lnkd.in/g4T_Tr3U

Corruption and governance failure are no longer just development challenges in Africa—they are demonstrable security risk multipliers. Evidence from Nigeria, the Sahel, Somalia and Mozambique shows how institutional decay enables terrorist groups to entrench themselves despite sustained military pressure. Sustainable counter-terrorism will not be imported; it must be anchored in domestic accountability, security-sector integrity, and political will.

This may matter less because of #ideology and more because of #weaponsinfrastructure and stockpiles worth targeting in #Syria. When caches get hit, a brief disruption comes, but a familiar pattern follows - stock gets broken up, moved fast, and sold via whoever controls the routes. For Europe, that points straight to the corridors where #smugglingnetworks already have the logistics and contacts in place. Fragmented supply often means smaller shipments and less chance of detection. The same applies to drugs, especially markets linked to the #captagon-era networks. Türkiye remains the key hinge because multiple routes run through it into Europe. What arrives are brokers, transporters, document fixers, and #cashmovers who can switch commodities quickly. And that is where violence risk can sharpen - more guns do not automatically mean more #violence, but they make #escalation easier.