Military Strategy Concepts

A few weeks ago, NATO's Chief Scientist released a report on cognitive warfare that deserves more attention than it's gotten. Not because the language is alarming, it's actually quite measured, but because what it describes has been underway for years and most institutions still aren't treating it seriously. The core argument is this: shaping how populations perceive reality, make decisions, and hold together as societies has become a central element of strategic competition. That's a meaningful departure from what we used to call propaganda. Traditional influence operations tried to change what you believe. Cognitive warfare goes after something more fundamental. It asks how you decide what to believe, and then quietly reshapes that process. The distinction sounds abstract until you look at what it means in practice. When adversaries map behavioral patterns at scale, using data analytics and AI, they don't need overtly false content to be effective. They need calibrated content, information optimized for how you personally process information and assess risk. Your decisions feel reasoned. They feel like yours. But the framework within which you're reasoning has been shaped by someone else. What makes this so difficult to defend against is precisely what makes it attractive as a tool of gray zone competition. There's no invasion, no missile launch, nothing that triggers conventional response mechanisms. The targeting is diffuse. Attribution is elusive. And the legal frameworks we've built around physical harm struggle to define what cognitive harm even means, much less how to respond to it. I've been thinking about this through the lens of what I call Mind Sovereignty: the capacity to recognize when your thinking is being shaped by external systems, and to actively defend your cognitive autonomy. That's not paranoia. It's an awareness that infrastructure is never neutral. It carries embedded values and assumptions, and those get baked into design long before any individual user interacts with them. The NATO report is a signal that this is no longer a fringe concern. It's now recognized at the alliance level as a domain of active operational competition. The question for leaders, in government, in the private sector, in civil society, is whether their organizations are treating cognitive security as a core function or still relegating it to the margins. Most invest heavily in protecting networks and data. Far fewer invest comparably in protecting the decision-making architecture that sits above all of it.

When countries enter armed conflict, the cyber threat landscape shifts for everyone. There are some parallels we can draw with the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although conflict always brings unpredictability. At the outset of the Ukraine invasion, global ransomware activity dropped as many regional cyber actors redirected their focus towards the conflict. This reflected the reality that many ransomware groups were based in Russia, Ukraine, or neighbouring states such as Belarus, and their priorities became more nationalistic. Some groups even fractured along national lines, as seen with Conti. The dip was brief though, and most groups soon returned to criminal operations, with non‑regional actors quickly filling any gaps. While the Middle East does not have the same concentration of ransomware operators, it is reasonable to expect regional groups to adjust their targeting in support of the current conflict. During the early days of the Ukraine war, we also saw disruptive activity against organisations such as ViaSat, a satellite communications provider used by the Ukrainian military. The attack aimed to undermine defensive coordination but caused wider collateral disruption across Europe, including outages at German windfarms that relied on ViaSat for monitoring. Although the current conflict has so far been dominated by missiles, drones and air power, recent reporting indicates the United States has used cyber operations in other theatres to neutralise air defence systems. It would not be surprising to see similar tactics here. This raises the risk of unintended spillover when military and civilian systems are tightly linked, including where defence manufacturers provide remote support. A significant strategic risk lies in understanding Iran’s historic approach to retaliation. Iran has previously responded to international pressure with deliberate, proportional actions. For example, following United States‑led economic sanctions in the early 2010s, Iran launched DDoS attacks against the US financial sector, its own form of economic retaliation. Over the weekend, Iran carried out drone and missile strikes against regional states it believes facilitated the US‑Israeli operation, alongside statements promising revenge for the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. For now, its response remains kinetic and focused on regional US assets that fall within missile and drone range. However, if the United States were to use offensive cyber capabilities against Iran, particularly if civilian infrastructure were affected, Iran may seek a proportional response against US civilian systems. And, of course, it is worth noting that cyber operations can reach far beyond the range of conventional weapons. #OperationEpicFury #Iran #CyberThreat #CyberSecurity

Modern conflict increasingly turns not on attrition or manoeuvre alone, but on the disruption or denial of decision-making processes. In this context, the UK’s Digital Targeting Web (DTW) will become the UK's strategic centre of gravity. If an adversary can distort the data it ingests, interfere with its logic, or break the trust in its outputs, the systemic impact is severe: paralysis of effects delivery, hesitation in command, and erosion of political will. In this context, the UK’s technological advantage will only translate into operational advantage if it dominates the algorithmic and CEMA deception battlespace. In this fight, trust must be engineered, deception must be deliberate, and resilience must be automated. Success will belong to the side that can protect its own decision cycles while disrupting those of the adversary.

Cognitive warfare, the strategic use of technology, psychology, and information to influence, manipulate, or disrupt adversaries decision-making processes and perceptions, has emerged as a pivotal arena. The report "Mitigating and Responding to Cognitive Warfare" sheds light on the modern battlefield, focusing on the significance of science and technology in defending against such threats. Some key conclusions from the report: 🗡️The Imperative of Technological Innovation Innovation is the cornerstone of maintaining cognitive superiority. The rapid advancement of technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, information and communication technologies, neuroscience, biotechnology, and human enhancement, are vital. By staying at the forefront of technological innovation, NATO and its allies can develop sophisticated tools and methods to detect, counter, and ultimately deter adversaries' cognitive warfare tactics. 🗡️Understanding Adversarial Tactics A profound understanding of the enemy's playbook is essential. Cognitive warfare relies heavily on the manipulation of information to sway individual and group perceptions, making it imperative for NATO forces to be well-versed in identifying and understanding these tactics. This knowledge base extends to recognizing the misuse of information and the psychological underpinnings that make such strategies effective. 🗡️The Role of Education and Training To combat cognitive threats effectively, NATO personnel must be equipped with the knowledge and skills to identify and counteract these attacks. Education and training programs focused on enhancing awareness of information manipulation and cognitive biases are crucial. These initiatives will cultivate a more resilient force, capable of navigating the complexities of cognitive warfare with acumen and insight. 🗡️Ethical and Legal Considerations The deployment of defense technologies against cognitive warfare poses ethical and legal quandaries. It's paramount that the development and use of such technologies are aligned with international laws and norms. This ethical compass ensures that the countermeasures not only protect against cognitive threats but also uphold the values and principles that NATO stands for. 🗡️The Power of International Collaboration No nation is an island in the fight against cognitive warfare. Effective defense strategies necessitate robust collaboration between NATO countries and partnerships with non-NATO nations, research institutions, and the private sector. Sharing knowledge, resources, and best practices across this network will bolster the collective ability to thwart cognitive threats. https://lnkd.in/dRjCN8_e

A lift truck. A window. Four minutes. The Louvre’s crown jewels....gone. What happened in Paris isn’t just a museum heist it’s a modern case study in how layered defenses fail when coordination breaks down. The thieves didn’t hack a network. They hacked the system of trust. They posed as maintenance workers, exploited a construction zone, used legitimate equipment, and slipped through a window under broad daylight — all while alarms stayed silent and guards never reacted in time. Those aren’t just physical failures they’re operational ones: 👉 Access control gaps: a truck and lift entered restricted space without challenge. Monitoring blind spots: cameras saw activity, but no one correlated it in real time. 👉 Vendor oversight failures: maintenance zones and contractor access went unchecked. 👉 Procedural drift: staff trusted normalcy over verification. It’s the same pattern we see in cyber incidents every day trust extended too far, detection delayed too long, and response happening only after impact. If this were a cyber incident, the remediation plan would start here: 🔅 Close visibility gaps- unify physical and digital telemetry; no blind corners in operations or networks. 🔅 Revalidate third-party access-verify every credential, badge, and privileged login. 🔅 Integrate incident response-physical security, SOC, and leadership operate as one team, one playbook. 🔅 Run joint simulations- practice the handoffs between facilities, IT, and executive decision-making. 🔅 Rebuild a culture of readiness- where trust is earned daily and complacency is treated as risk. Every breach digital or physical starts with misplaced trust and ends with a test of resilience. That’s why the future of security isn’t cyber or physical it’s both, secured together. Every time I read about incidents like this, I’m reminded how fast the world can change when readiness slips and how fast we can recover when it doesn’t. #SecureAllTogether #SecurityConvergence #OperationalResilience #LouvreHeist https://lnkd.in/gj5FVTAC

Cyber Warfare Merges with Kinetic Conflict in the Iran War The Iran conflict is demonstrating a new phase of warfare where digital operations are tightly synchronized with physical attacks. A recent incident highlights this convergence, as civilians fleeing missile strikes received deceptive messages that appeared to offer safety information but instead installed spyware, granting attackers access to personal devices. This operation reflects a high level of coordination between cyber and military actions. The timing of the phishing messages, delivered during active missile strikes, suggests an intentional effort to exploit moments of vulnerability. Once installed, the spyware enabled access to sensitive data, including location, communications, and device controls, effectively turning personal smartphones into intelligence assets. This tactic illustrates how cyber tools are being used not just for espionage, but as force multipliers within active combat scenarios. The broader campaign underscores how nations are integrating cyber capabilities to offset conventional military limitations. Iran and its affiliates are leveraging hacking, disinformation, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence to expand their operational reach. Targets are no longer limited to military infrastructure but include civilians, healthcare systems, and critical services, blurring the lines between battlefield and society. The implications are profound. Modern conflict is no longer confined to physical domains but extends deeply into digital ecosystems that underpin daily life. This evolution demands a rethinking of defense strategies, where cybersecurity becomes as critical as traditional military readiness. Protecting civilian infrastructure, strengthening digital resilience, and developing rapid response mechanisms will be essential as cyber-physical warfare becomes a defining characteristic of future conflicts. I share daily insights with tens of thousands followers across defense, tech, and policy. If this topic resonates, I invite you to connect and continue the conversation. Keith King https://lnkd.in/gHPvUttw

Nation-state actors are combining their cyber expertise with traditional kinetic military operations. Cyber actors create and help refine missile targeting data. We've want to ensure the community is looking out for this kind of activity, and RAPIDLY sharing data with the right folks. Security has always been a collective endeavor; no single organization can address threats in isolation. That's why we’re sharing important findings from our threat intelligence team about a trend we’re seeing among nation-state threat actors. Our team has uncovered what we're calling "cyber-enabled kinetic targeting": an approach to warfare that blurs the lines between cyber and traditional kinetic operations. In multiple instances, nation-state actors first compromised digital systems to gather intelligence – such as accessing location data for ships or security camera feeds – and shortly after, those exact locations became targets of missile strikes. This represents a deliberate strategy where digital operations directly enable and enhance physical attacks. Amazon has unique visibility into trends like these, and with this visibility comes a responsibility to share what we learn. By publishing these findings, we hope to help organizations adapt their security strategies to this evolving landscape. You can find our analysis and recommendations in our latest blog post: https://lnkd.in/eydj3Ppn

How do we deter in a world where war is fast, noisy, digital, multi-domain, and saturated with information? Across NATO and the EU, both the pace of conflict and the complexity of the environment have outgrown our current systems of cooperation. This isn’t just a technology gap- it’s an alignment gap. Recent conversations with senior leaders echo the same concern: we still lack a shared, real-time operational picture across domains and borders. When a senior officer can openly ask how to gain situational awareness of the Baltic Sea, one of the most strategically active regions in Europe, it tells us something fundamental is missing. And it’s not only about C2 or data flows. It’s also about how nations work together. During a defence discussion earlier this year, a senior naval leader raised a critical question: Why is it so hard for nations to recognise their respective strengths, align around them, and act jointly and instead of every country reinventing the same wheel in isolation when time, money and human resources are limited? That question sits at the heart of deterrence in 2025. Because deterrence today requires: - Shared situational awareness, not fragmented pictures - Combined strengths, not duplicated efforts - Cross-border integration, not parallel national projects alone - Mission-led capability development, not technology for its own sake - Coherent C2 architectures, not disconnected legacy networks This article explores what true deterrence looks like in the modern battlespace and what must change if Allies want to keep pace with the accelerating character of war. Deterrence is no longer just force posture. Deterrence is collaboration at scale: across nations, domains, data, processes, and the entire capability lifecycle. If this is the work you’re driving- C2, uncrewed systems, AI, digital integration, experimentation, or capability development- always open to connect and accelerate it together. #Deterrence #DefenceStrategy #NATO #NATOC2 #NATOC2COE #C2Transformation #MultiDomainOperations #SituationalAwareness #Interoperability #DigitalBackbone #InformationSharing #EmergingTech #UncrewedSystems #AIForDefence #ISR #DecisionAdvantage #CapabilityDevelopment #MilitaryInnovation #AlliedCooperation #EDAStrategy #MissionCommand #Resilience #SecurityPolicy #BalticSeaRegion

Cognitive Warfare (CogWar) — key takeaways from the NATO Office of the Chief Scientist (STO-OCS) #report ▪︎ What it is: the fight for cognitive superiority, activities (military & non-military) designed to gain, maintain and protect cognitive advantage across the competition, conflict spectrum. ▪︎ Core objective: exploit facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify decision-making, by altering behaviour through any means, increasingly amplified by technology. ▪︎ Why it matters now: adversaries exploit the openness and interconnectedness of democratic societies; fragmenting public trust + disinformation (incl. deepfakes) raise systemic vulnerability. ▪︎ Not “just” InfoOps/PsyOps/Cyber: CogWar is broader, often below the threshold of armed conflict, may not target a single audience, and can aim to create chaos/complexity as an outcome. ▪︎ Where it hits: individual, group and societal levels, eroding trust, increasing polarisation, shaping perceptions and behaviours (illustrated in the report’s “main aspects” model). ▪︎ Decision advantage is the centre of gravity: attacks can exploit the OODA loop (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act), degrading sense-making and the ability to decide/act effectively. ▪︎ Defence posture (STO lens): 3 functions to invest in ○ Degrade adversary capabilities (limit their ability to influence/change behaviour) ○ Improve human & technological cognition (capabilities above baseline) ○ Withstand & recover performance (resilience) ▪︎ House Model = practical research map (7 knowledge areas): situational awareness/sense-making, cognitive effects, modus operandi, tech enablers/force multipliers, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive & behavioural science, social & cultural science, grounded in legal/ethical frameworks. ▪︎ Whole-of-society requirement: because civilians and militaries are both targets, counter-CogWar needs coordinated policy, research, and resilience planning across stakeholders. ▪︎ Scale of NATO work: #CogWar is a strategic S&T challenge; 20 #STO activities initiated (as of Apr 2025), with broad Allied/Partner participation and a dedicated Community of Interest. https://lnkd.in/dwCZMeiR