Showing posts with label Intellectual Property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Intellectual Property. Show all posts

Thursday, July 27, 2023

U.S. government steps up resistance to proposed EU SEP Regulation: USPTO director Vidal voices concerns at Senate hearing, announces 'all-of-government approach ... data-driven by feedback'

There are policy areas in which the European Union cannot vigorously defend the EU economy's interests without some transatlantic antagonism. Subsidies are an example. Standard-essential patents (SEPs) are not. Much to the contrary, a couple of major European SEP holders generate very significant revenues from licensees based in the United States.

But the EU's proposed SEP regulation is so fundamentally flawed that voices of reason from outside the EU are needed. One of them is the UK IPO with its very careful approach. Another example is the Biden Administration, and I just can't see why an initiative that harms European SEP holders is worth a rift between the EU and the United States.

Almost three months ago I reported on U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo having said at a Senate hearing that the U.S. government has officially commited "concerns" over the proposal to the European Commission. Yesterday (Wednesday, July 26) the Senate's Subcommittee on Intellectual Property (chairman: Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.)) held a USPTO oversight hearing, toward the end of which the following was said:

SENATOR COONS: This is my last question. ... I've been following with genuine concern recent proposed regulations by the European Union for what would essentially be an SEP rate court. That regulation, I'm concerned, validates China's practices ... and I had shared those concerns ... and [Secretary Raimondo] agreed the proposal is problematic. What steps has the USPTO taken to communicate concerns to our European colleagues and what steps do you think the Administration can and should take to guard against restrictions on SEP licensing in the EU and globally?

DIRECTOR VIDAL: As I mentioned in my opening remarks, that's one of the things that I'm keenly focused on: it's standards, because I think it's critical to our economy. I will say that when we withdrew the 2019 policy statement around SEPs with NIST and DOJ, it was because we see standards as an international issue that individual countries weighing in in these ways could be extremely problematic. So what we've done when it comes to the EU directorate is I've met with the EUIPO in Geneva [presumably a WTO/WIPO meeting] just a week and a half ago. I've also spoken to other stakeholders in Europe about this. We also are issuing soon an FR notice, a Federal Register notice, to seek feedback from U.S. stakeholders on international SEP policy so that we can inform an all-of-government approach. That's gonna be not just the USPTO. I'm doing that with NIST, our standards and technology group, and ITA, our international group within [the Department of] Commerce, so that we can get an all-of-government approach that's data-driven by feedback.

Thursday, July 13, 2023

Huawei emphasizes balance and collaboration, announces various patent royalty rates at annual innovation & intellectual property event

This is the third year for me to watch Huawei's annual innovation and intellectual property event, and I found the 2023 edition that was held today particularly interesting. Instead of one very long blog post, I'll talk about the company-specific part today and will reference the event again in an upcoming post on statements by various high-profile patent judges (former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall R. Rader--who was at today's event--and currently actives judges Mr Justice Marcus Smith of the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal and Judge Dr. Klaus Grabinski of the UPC) that should be considered in connection with the European Commission's proposed regulation on standard-essential patents (SEPs).

The SEP licensing landscape is polarized. On one end of the spectrum, pure licensing firms are found, and on the other end, there are net implementers who even if they own SEPs themselves are primarily interested in devaluation. Net licensors who also have a product business can relate to either perspective, but their surplus from patent licensing tends to be substantial. If any of you can point me to a second example, please do, but to the best of my knowledge, there is no major player--other than Huawei--whose inbound and outbound patent licensing activities are pretty much in an equilibrium at this stage.

Huawei generated US$560 million in licensing revenue during the course of 2022, but also spent pretty much the same amount on license fees covering its products over the course of the last two years as it collected. In the past, the ratio was actually 3:1 (inbound:outbound licensing), but then came certain geopolitical developments that have practically excluded Huawei from particular markets. Still, historically Huawei is a net licensee, even if it accidentally attained "net licensor" status (and only by a razor-thin margin) late last year according to a media report.

I find it not only intellectually dishonest, but frankly outrageous and strategically counterproductive when those seeking to devalue SEPs treat Huawei as an enemy, be it in statements to the media or on conference panel. It's a binary "you're with us or against us" attitude, motivated by the convenience of "cheap shots" at a bogeyman. In reality, no company--if it weren't for geopolitical reasons--is better-placed to serve as a bridge between net licensors and net licensees than Huawei with its unique parity between inbound and outbound patent licensing activities. And if you asked them, I'm sure they'd rather become a net implementer, by the traditional of factor of three, as soon as humanly possible.

At today's event named "Bridging Horizons of Innovations 2023 -- Sharing Intellectual Property, Driving Innovation", Huawei's chief legal officer, Dr. Song Liuping, made it very clear: because Huawei also implements standards, it has "a balanced approach" and is "all for reasonable fees, and absolutely against excessively high royalty rates because it would impede competition and hold back SMEs because SMEs normally don't own any SEPs."

As I mentioned geopolitics, at least the institutions of the United Nations maintain a constructive dialog. Today's event included a video address by Tomas Lamanauskas, the Deputy Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union.

Collaboration was another theme (also in that ITU keynote). Huawei reached approximately 200 patent license agreements without the need to resort to litigation (though of course there have been and will continue to be a few cases where it couldn't be avoided). When the moderator asked why they wanted to share their technologies instead of trying to monopolize markets, Huawei's IP chief, Alan fan, had to laugh at the notion of monopolization and replied: "It is not our goal to monopolize. We benefit from competition."

Mattia Fogliacco, the president of patent pool administrator Sisvel, was one of speakers on a discussion panel at the Shenzhen event. He stressed that "the only forward is through a collaborative approach, we must work together and not against each other." And with a view to standards resulting from the contribution of technologies by all companies participating in the standards development process, Mr. Fogliacco asked this rhetorical question: "When there's no investment, how can technologies be good?" In that vein, Huawei IP chief Mr. Fan explained "the virtuous cycle that sustains the industry" where patent licensing income is invested in the development of the next generation of technologies.

While that is not my focus now, the history of this blog is actually that it started with a focus on open source, thus the name (FOSS means "Free and Open Source Software"). Interestingly, Huawei also touted its contributions to open-source software development, being the number one open-source contributor from Asia.

Huawei's press release on today's event notes that royalty rates were announced for the company's different patent license programs. Prior to doing so, however, Huawei showcased some of its groundbreaking innovations such as General Obstacle Detection for autonomous vehicles (i.e., being able to identify obstacles even of a novel nature), the transition from stereo to true 3D audio ("Audio Vivid"), and its contributions to 5.5G, the next major evolution of the 5G cellular standard. Then they announced various royalty caps:

  • Mobile handsets:

    • 5G: $2.5/unit

      4G: $1.5/unit

  • WiFi:

    • consumer grade WiFi 6 product: $0.50/unit

  • Cellular IoT:

    • IoT-centric devices: 1% of net selling price, capped at $0.75/unit, for categories NB, M, and 1; category 4+ to be discussed individually

    • IoT-enhanced devices: from $0.30/unit for Category NB to $1.00/unit for Category 4+

The emphasis today was on innovation, not on monetization, but obviously those using patented inventions must pay license fees. Huawei licenses bilaterally and through pools. I believe we'll hear more about that between now and their next annual innovation & IP event.

Sunday, January 29, 2023

Automakers' cellular patent licenses must be upgraded to 5G this year: Continental, FSA to argue with success (Avanci, Huawei) at Auto IP Summit in Munich

A few months ago, the Avanci patent pool announced that its 4G program had licensed most of the industry. This year, the world's car makers will have to upgrade their cellular standard-essential patent (SEP) licenses from 4G to 5G. Will that transition go smoothly? I think it should, but it's too early to tell.

In the first part of this post I'd like to draw your attention to an interesting automotive IP conference that will be held in Munich on March 1-2; subsequently I'll also share a few observations on IPlytics' efforts to market their services to the automotive sector in ways that may raise false hopes.

Auto IP & Legal World Summit (Munich, March 1-2, 2023)

Last April, conference organizer Ardensi held its Auto IP & Legal World Summit in Frankfurt, and it was a very interesting event in terms of attendees and content. This year's edition will take place in Munich on the first two days of March (click on the image to enlarge):

The conference covers a broad range of auto IP topics. The first part is about the ramifications of the Unified Patent Court (UPC), with speakers from industry players Thyssen Krupp and ABB, the EPO's Michael Froehlich (whom I remember from his days as Germany-based IP in-house counsel of BlackBerry), and two lawyers from well-known firms: Meissner Bolte's Philipp Rastemborski, who also spoke at last year's Auto IP Summit and now heads his firm's litigation practice, and Powell Gilbert's Rajvinder Jagdev, whose list of key cases is truly impressive.

A panel discussion FRAND litigation, negotiation, and dispute resolution promises some rather lively debate: Continental's Michael Schloegl ("Schlögl" in German) and the Fair Standard Alliance's Secretary General Evelina Kurgonaite will represent implementers in a debate with Avanci's Senior VP Laurie Fitzgerald and the head of Huawei's European IP department, Xiaowu (Emil) Zhang. As I wrote earlier this month, Huawei--which has recently signed up a number of car makers as licensees--has become an "accidental" net licensor, but remains a major implementer, too.

In a way, Conti and the FSA--represented at the conference by speakers who do not shy away from controversy--will have to argue with success: Avanci works. Huawei's licensing program works. But the FSA has members such as Apple and Continental who have a different vision for how they would like wireless SEP licensing to work.

One of Conti's key competitors, TomTom, will give a presentation on the changing licensing landscape.

Upon my request, the organizers provided the following short description:

The Annual Auto IP & Legal World Summit discusses the most pressing challenges faced by the global auto industry. Every year attendees from leading companies like Continental, VW, Bosch, BMW, Volvo, Mercedes Benz, Schaeffler and more gather to talk key issues, potential solutions surrounding IP risks, SEPs & FRAND negotiations, UPC, technology and more through panels, presentations and roundtable discussions. Join 100+ attendees and 30+ speakers from 01-02 March 2023 at the Hilton Munich City, Munich, Germany. Contact Vaishali on [email protected] to get involved in the Summit.

IPlytics claims to speak for the automotive industry, favors complications over simple solutions

Patent database services are useful or certain purposes, but what I take issue with is when those offering them overstate the reliability of their results or the impact their tools can make.

A few days ago, IAM published an op-ed by IPlytics' founder, Auto industry demands a fresh SEP/FRAND focus in 2023. What does this mean? Has IPlytics become a lobbying front for the automotive industry? What mandate does Tim Pohlmann have to speak for an entire sector?

The automotive industry wants smooth and efficient solutions. But if things go too smoothly and efficiently, that industry may not have much of a need for patent analytics services. In that indirect sense, IPlytics definitely is an automotive stakeholder...

The previous day, IPlytics hosted a webinar, How to gain the competitive edge for V2X technology. Can a patent analytics firm really give innovators and implementers as "competitive edge"? You be the judge.

Back to the IAM op-ed. I disagree with the suggestion that something disruptive is needed: we're just talking about an upgrade from 4G to 5G. I also disagree with some specific statements.

Mr. Pohlmann says "[car makers' buying] power is so significant that most suppliers include indemnification provisions in their contracts." But in the Continental v. Avanci dispute (which ended last year when Conti finally stopped throwing good money after bad) Conti was unable to establish injury, and a key reason for that was that it couldn't point to any actual indemnification claim. Almost the entire automotive industry has the Avanci 4G license by now, but no indemnification claim by any of those licensees against any of their suppliers has become known to date.

The traditional allocation of liability in the automotive industry is indeed that suppliers are responsible. But by now that industry has accepted to take licenses at the end-product (i.e., car) level, which eliminates the need for indemnification clauses.

The following suggestion of a causation makes no sense to me:

"A battle of where to license in the value chain was fought in US courts between automotive supplier Continental, and Avanci and Nokia. Much of the heat dissipated from the dispute when Daimler opted to take a licence from Avanci."

Conti filed its U.S. complaint (in the Northern District of California, from where it was transferred at Avanci's request to the Northern District of Texas) in 2019. Daimler initially took a car-level license from Nokia, which was announced on June 1, 2021. But Continental's federal lawsuit had been dismissed (with prejudice) approximately nine months earlier: on September 10, 2020--and it took well over a year from that dismissal until Daimler took an Avanci license (December 2021).

A few months later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. My article on the initial panel opinion has since been nominated for the Antitrust Writing Awards by Concurrences and George Washington University.

The chronology of events renders IPlytics' theory implausible. If there was any causation, it was the opposite: the fact that Conti failed with its U.S. litigation may have persuaded not only Daimler but also other car makers that taking an Avanci license was a pragmatic choice.

After Daimler took not only the Nokia but ultimately also the Avanci license, Conti still brought two petitions for rehearing en banc with the Fifth Circuit. The only thing Conti did not try was to appeal the case further to the Supreme Court, presumably for lack of support from potential amici curiae who didn't deem such a weak case the right vehicle to push for an obligation to license SEPs at the component level.

No one stands to gain anything from fighting the lost war over component-level licensing again in connection with 5G, other than litigation firms and other service providers, such as IPlytics.

Tuesday, October 25, 2022

Judge Zigann will not (at least not initially) hear patent infringement cases in his new role as Presiding Judge of the Munich Higher Regional Court's 38th Civil Senate

Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann (until next Monday, the Presiding Judge of the Munich I Regional Court's 7th Civil Chamber) will serve on the Munich Local Division of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) (together with Judge Tobias Pichlmaier and other colleagues), but in his new role as Presiding Judge of the 38th Civil Senate of the Munich Higher Regional Court he will not hear patent infringement cases, at least not initially according to the court's official assignment of fields of law to his division. Of course, there could always be a situation in which the Munich appeals court's 6th Civil Chamber might be inundated with patent infringement appeals, in which case Judge Dr. Zigann would be the obvious choice for reassignment--if he isn't a full-time UPC judge by then.

In the post I just linked to, I pointed to a Juve Patent report on Judge Dr. Zigann's promotion. That article likened the creation of a second intellectual property-specialized division at the Munich appeals court to the two civil senates of the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court that hear patent cases (the 2nd Civil Senate under soon-to-retire Presiding Judge Dr. Thomas Kuehnen ("Kühnen" in German) and the 15th Civil Senate under Presiding Judge Ulrike Voss ("Voß" in German)). But both the 2nd and 15th Civil Senates in Dusseldorf hear patent infringement appeals, which is not what the Munich Higher Regional Court's Presidium decided yesterday afternoon in the same session in which Judge Dr. Zigann was officially promoted to the higher court.

The relevant passage of the Munich appeals court's Local Rules refers to IP (including, but not limited to, copyright) and certain antitrust matters, and there is a passing reference to matters involving patent attorneys' liability (as a carve-out), but patent infringement cases are clearly not part of the new division's purview. This means Judge Dr. Zigann will normally hear patent infringement cases only when serving on the UPC's Munich Local Division (which will hold its hearings and trials at the courthouse of the Munich II Regional Court on Denisstrasse 3 (Munich I is for the city, Munich II for the surroundings), not when adjudicating appeals at the Munich Higher Regional Court on Prielmayerstrasse 5 (adjacent to the Palace of Justice).

Finally, here's the full text of that passage from the appeals court's Local Rules in German:

"Der 38. Zivilsenat übernimmt a) zur Entlastung der Senate im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und in Ansehung der vom Gesetzgeber geforderten Konzentration (vgl. § 129 Abs. 1 VGG ) von den Geschäftsaufgaben des 6. Zivilsenats: i) Entscheidungen nach § 15 Abs. 1 (in der bis zum 31.12.2007 geltenden Fassung), § 16 Abs. 4 (in der bis zum 31.05.2016 geltenden Fassung) des Gesetzes über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten, § 129 Abs. 1 und 4 des Gesetzes über die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften (VGG) und Entscheidungen, die nach der bis zum 31.05.2016 geltenden Verordnung über die Schiedsstelle für Urheberrechtsstreitfälle zu treffen sind, mit Ausnahme der Entscheidung über die gerichtliche Festsetzung der Kosten (bisher Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 4 des 6. Zivilsenats) sowie Rechtsstreitigkeiten, die Ansprüche über die Haftung von Rechtsanwälten im Zusammenhang mit der Bearbeitung von Sachen aus den Bereichen der vorstehenden Geschäftsaufgabe betreffen; dies gilt auch, wenn der Anspruch im Wege der Einwendung geltend gemacht wird (bisher Teil der Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 6 des 6. Zivilsenats). Dabei ist der 38. Zivilsenat in den Fällen aus den aufgeführten Bereichen (mit Ausnahme der Ansprüche über die Haftung der Rechtsanwälte und Patentanwälte) als Kartellsenat zuständig, bei denen im Falle der erstinstanzlichen Zuständigkeit eine ausschließliche Zuständigkeit nach § 87 GWB begründet wäre (bisher Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 8c des 6. Zivilsenats); ii) Die bis einschließlich 31.10.2022 beim 6. Zivilsenat unter den Az. 6 Sch …/…. WG geführten Verfahren zur weiteren Bearbeitung, ungeachtet des jeweiligen Verfahrensstandes, in dem sich diese zum Stichtag befinden und abweichend von den Regelungen in Nr. II. B der allgemeinen Bestimmungen auch in den dort genannten Konstellationen. b) zur Entlastung der Senate im gewerblichen Rechtsschutz von den Geschäftsaufgaben des 29. Zivilsenats: Rechtsstreitigkeiten nach § 1 Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG) und § 13 des früheren AGB-Gesetzes, soweit es sich nicht um eine Banksache gemäß Nr. II A 1 der allgemeinen Bestimmungen handelt oder eine Sonderzuständigkeit des 9. Zivilsenats (Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 2) oder des 32. Zivilsenats (Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 3) gegeben ist (bisher Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 3 des 29. Zivilsenats) sowie Rechtsstreitigkeiten, die Ansprüche über die Haftung von Rechtsanwälten im Zusammenhang mit der Bearbeitung von Sachen aus den Bereichen der vorstehenden Geschäftsaufgabe betreffen; dies gilt auch, wenn der Anspruch im Wege der Einwendung geltend gemacht wird (bisher Teil der Geschäftsaufgabe Nr. 5 des 29. Zivilsenats). - 4 - c) zur Entlastung der Turnussenate die weitere Geschäftsaufgabe: Rechtsstreitigkeiten aus den Landgerichtsbezirken München I und München II, die nicht unter die Verteilung nach Sachgebieten fallen, sowie Dieselsachen im Turnus der Eingänge gemäß Nr. II D der Allgemeinen Bestimmungen. Der 38. Zivilsenat nimmt bis auf weiteres an den Turnusdurchgängen I bis IX teil, wobei beim 38. Zivilsenat dessen neu eingehende Angelegenheiten aus den Geschäftsaufgaben Nrn. 1 und 3 bis 6 auf den Berufungsturnus anzurechnen sind. d) zur Entlastung des 25. Zivilsenats: Versicherungssachen, soweit sie Verfahren wegen Beitragserhöhung und/oder Auskunftsverlangen in der privaten Krankenversicherung betreffen. Der 38. Zivilsenat ist insoweit Spezialsenat i.S.v. § 119a Satz 1 Nr. 4 GVG."

Saturday, September 17, 2022

[GUEST POST] Antitrust defense to patent infringement in Japan: IP High Court overruled Tokyo District Court in toner cartridge recycling case

Every once in a while, I invite experts to contribute to this blog in order to shed more light on fields or jurisdictions I'm not too familiar with, but which are of interest to a significant part of FOSS Patents' audience. This is a guest post on which I have collaborated with Takanori ABE, the founding partner of Japanese law firm ABE&PARTNERS. He is also a Guest Professor at the Osaka University Graduate School of Medicine.

Antimonopoly Act Defense against Patent Enforcement Awakened in Japan?

Ds Japan is in the toner cartridge recycling business. Refilling Ricoh's toners per se does not appear to give rise to patent assertions. But there are electronic components in Ricoh's toner cartridges on which Ricoh holds patents, and those components may be necessary in order to display the toner level. Ds Japan replaced certain components in order to ensure that a correct toner status would be displayed. From Ds Japan's perspective, doing so--while it was deemed an act of patent infringement-–is inevitable in order to level the playing field: otherwise the display would show a question mark instead of an approximate toner level, and consumers would potentially lack faith in cartridges refilled by third parties like Ds Japan.

The lower court agreed with Ds Japan that Ricoh's patent enforcement in this case constituted an unfair restraint on competition and, therefore, a violation of Japan's antitrust law, the Antimonopoly Act. The Tokyo District Court placed the emphasis on the fact that Ricoh insisted the actions of Ds Japan resulted in either a patent infringement or a decline in competitiveness. The higher court, however, focused on the fact that recycled cartridges could be used. Even if Ricoh's patents-in-suit are not infringed and cartridges are simply refilled without replacing electronic components, users will always know whether or not the toner level is sufficient at any given point in time.

The IP High Court assumed that users looking to save money on cartridges would accept that kind of shortcoming. In addition, the IP High Court agreed with Ricoh who claimed and proved that the recycling companies were able to manufacture recycled products that do not display a question mark, simultaneously avoiding infringement of Ricoh’s patents, by providing the result of an experiment to show that "it was confirmed that the remaining quantity of the toner was displayed instead of a question mark and Ricoh’s printer operated normally." Therefore, the IP High Court concluded that the restrictive effect on competition was too limited for Ricoh's patent enforcement to constitute exclusionary conduct and to run afoul of the Antimonopoly Act.

Further details on this case (which may ultimately be resolved Japan's Supreme Court) can be found in the following two articles:

Thursday, June 16, 2022

Will Apple's 'Sherlocking' practice draw antitrust scrutiny? Alternative app stores would not solve--but in many cases alleviate--the problem.

There's nothing wrong with Apple making the iPhone and the iPad so attractive that customers will pay those premium prices. I'd still prefer Android even if I wouldn't save a cent, but that's subjective. The real issue is that Apple, like any company, wants to grow as fast and as big as possible. The path of least resistance and maximum profitability is to leverage its market power as long as judges, lawmakers, and regulators let them get away with it. "To leverage its market power" is the non-judgmental way to put it. Unfortunately, in some contexts it is appropriate to accuse Apple of monopoly abuse, or at least to raise the question of whether that's what's happening.

Even where there is no antitrust violation, reasonable people may wonder whether Apple--almost a decade after its "thermonuclear war" on Android subsided--is now strategically interested in weakening intellectual property rights. "Might makes right" is so much more convenient and profitable when you're as powerful as Apple. Three of the most important wireless innovators--Ericsson (which is continuously making headway in its 5G patent dispute with Apple), Qualcomm, and Nokia--call out Apple on its standard-essential patent (SEP) devaluation crusade. In order to devalue patents, Apple even purports to advocate the interests of small IoT device makers.

At this year's Apple Worldwide Developer Conference (WWDC), Apple shocked the developer community by "Sherlocking"--obliterating--an unusually large number of reasonably popular apps made by small companies:

For an explanation of how the term Sherlocking was coined, and for various examples of apps that were Sherlocked at WWDC 2022, let me refer you to this article by TechCrunch's Ivan Metha. TechCrunch is particularly concerned with the risks facing startups.

As the article recalls, an Apple offering named Sherlock replaced a third-party app named Watson. Considering that Sherlock (Holmes) and (Dr.) Watson are famous fictional friends and coworkers. It shows Apple's utter contempt for app developers that it chose "Sherlock" as the name of a substitute for a third-party app named "Watson." It's an example of adding insult to injury. And it may be in Apple's DNA, as Steve Jobs himself admitted they "have always been shameless about stealing great ideas" (in reference to Picasso saying that "good artists copy, great artists steal").

Before Apple runs roughshod over large parts of the tech industry, intervention by courts, lawmakers, and regulators--with major new antitrust investigations that may curb only a couple of Apple's practices having been announced just this week in the UK and Germany.

Sherlocking must be looked at from two angles: in an aggregated form, which suggests structural remedies, and on a case-by-case basis.

The structural problem is that Apple's App Store monopoly allows it to keep track exactly of how well certain apps perform. By injecting itself into the relationship that developers have with the users of their products (as Horacio Gutierrez--then with Spotify, now Disney's chief lawyer--described it), Apple actually has more data than developers. And one of the two antitrust investigations I just mentioned raises the issue of self-preferencing in connection with app tracking, which is so hypocritical because Apple argued that its ATT policy was needed to ensure customers' privacy but actually meant "rules for thee, not for me." Self-preferencing also affects app distribution.

Alternative app stores wouldn't fully solve the problem, but at least developers who don't trust Apple would have the option to distribute their apps through channels where Apple can't collect data. It could still try to do that at the operating system level, but that would become a privacy issue.

There are politicians who believe a breakup of certain Big Techs is needed. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has been advocating that solution for a while. I'm not at the point yet at which I believe Apple's app business would have to be separated from its device business, though if Apple continues to become bolder and bolder even in the face of increasing antitrust scrutiny and legislative initiatives, even I may reach that point further down the road. For the time being, my position is that surgical intervention is insufficient and powerful remedies are key, but it should be a key objective to get there without the nuclear option. To be honest, I consider it "only" unlikely, but not entirely inconceivable, that I might join the Break Up Big Tech campaign during my professional life.

Even a hypothetical breakup wouldn't necessarily solve the Sherlocking problem in all respects. Apple would still have to be allowed to improve iOS and the basic set of default apps provided to customers. New features could still render existing third-party apps superfluous, though post-breakup Apple might have only one incentive: to make the iPhone and the iPad better products. In a hypothetical best-case scenario, the apps to get Sherlocked post-breakup would only be the ones that don't pass the test of "Is it a feature or a product?" That is, by the way, one of the questions venture investors ask themselves routinely when they evaluate opportunities. And it's the question that startup founders must ask themselves. In fact, before I embarked on my current project--which will be a productivity app--I spent weeks to really think this through, creating slide decks that were initially just for myself as I sought to get clarity on the question of whether what my app will do (and in an early implementation already is doing) would justify installing a separate app as opposed to a few features being added to existing apps that already have a large user base. And while I've answered the question, it makes me happy every time that I see and feel (when actually using the thing) how the underlying idea requires and justifies a stand-alone app. I never lose sight of the feature-or-product question.

The first example of this year's victims of Sherlocking in that TechCrunch article looks to me like something that was more of a feature than a product: an app named Camo already enabled the iPhone to serve as a webcam. That's a nice idea, but when you have a camera, it's not that hard to just utilize it for a webcam purpose. And Apple deserves credit for having announced a Camera Continuity API that will make it easy for all sorts of apps to integrate that feature--plus there's going to be a special mount as a result of a partnership between Apple and Belkin.

TechCrunch also explains why Camo is "not completely dead" as some uses cases remain, partly because Apple with its typical lock-in strategy doesn't support the use of the iPhone as a webcam for other desktop or laptop computers than a Mac. In fact, cross-platform availability and compatibility can sometimes make the difference between a feature and a product. So what Apple has only partially Sherlocked Camo. If the primary benefit that led many users download Camo was just what Apple now provides through the Camera Continuity API, then Camo may lose steam on iOS, but Apple's decision to provide Camera Continuity appears irreproachable, and its decision to provide the functionality to all apps is exactly the way it should be (otherwise there'd be a self-preferencing issue).

My angle here is really that of competition policy and enforcement, and TechCrunch also raises that point. But they're not saying there's a potential antitrust issue in each and every one of the examples they provide, and they may want that article to be a tale of caution for app developers who create features that don't justify standalone products.

The first major software patent damages case I remember was Stac v. Microsoft in the mid-1990s. It was the first of many similar achievements for Irell & Manella's Morgan Chu--who nowadays often represents clients against Apple, but also many other companies.

Stac had a patent on a hard-disk compression invention that promised to roughly double the effective storage capacity. It made a lot of sense for Microsoft to provide that feature, but it ultimately had to settle with the patent holder. It's hard to imagine that Camo could hold a valid patent on the idea of using an existing smartphone camera on a continuous basis, even more so post-Alice.

Many app developers despise software patents. But if you come up with a Camo-like idea that is more of a feature than a product, you really do want to talk to a patent attorney before you make anything public (or submit any app to Apple for TestFlight approval!) because only a patent (ideally, even more than one) will put you in a position to negotiate one final payment from Apple if your app gets Sherlocked. If all else fails, you can then talk to litigation funders--and maybe even to Morgan Chu. (To be fair, I could also think of other U.S. IP litigators, such as David Hecht, who's been successfully adverse to Apple on various occasions and likes the little guys.)

While Camo doesn't have me concerned unless I missed something, and Apple isn't actually creating another revenue stream through Camera Continuity, the very next example on TechCrunch's list does look like a potentially serious issue: Apple Pay Later. Just last month, the European Commission sent Apple a Statement of Objections (SO; a preliminary antitrust ruling) over certain practices regarding Apple Pay. The issue there is whether Apple limited access to standard technology for contactless payments (Near-Field Communication, NFC) to its own apps, disadvantaging other mobile wallets on iOS. That scope may even be too narrow, but they have to start someplace.

Apple's expansion into mobile payments--and now also with a pay-later service--will presumably continue to be debated, and the aforementioned SO is almost certainly not the last word. Apple Pay Later is of concern to the likes of Klarna.

The third example of WWDC 2022 Sherlocking that TechCrunch discusses is the Visual Lookup feature that lets users "pick up" an object from a photo or video and share it as a separate image (by removing the background). An app named Remove.bg had that capability. Unless that app developer has a patent and Apple's implementation infringes it, it's just another case of a feature that is not a sustainable product.

Medication Tracking (logging and reminders) looks like it's sooner or later going to raise concerns. Apps like MyTherapy and Pillbox already provided such functionality. Apple may not have incorporated inventory tracking yet, but likely will. The problem I see is that Apple will use the Power of Default and the fact that it doesn't depend on a revenue stream specific to that app, but it will then collect even more data about its users (so much for its privacy pretext) and may exploit all sorts of commercial opportunities, potentially competing with online pharmacies and companies like GoodRx.

Was it really necessary for Apple to provide medication tracking itself? I have my doubts. Competition between third-party apps would probably have been better for consumers, and ultimately those apps would either have been cheap to download (even cheaper if Apple's 30% app tax got eliminated) or, if ad-financed, competition would have forced app makers to ensure that users wouldn't be annoyed by ads.

Sleep tracking by WatchOS is also an eHealth feature, and that functionality may spell doom for third-party apps like Oura and Whoop. At first sight, it seems fundamentally less problematic than medication tracking, and it appears more reasonable to make it a standard feature.

TechCrunch also mentions Freeform, a new Apple app for collaboration on a digital whiteboard. According to TechCrunch, Figma's FigJam is just one of many apps that provide such functionality, of which it mentions GoodNotes and Explain Everything. This is an issue on which I don't know where I'd come down if I analyzed it in detail. It's not as clear to me as the Continuity Camera case on one end of the spectrum and Medication Tracking on the other. The truth may be somewhere in the middle.

TechCrunch's list of Sherlocked apps is presumably not exhaustive, and if you wish to draw my attention to other such problems (including past cases), feel free to use this blog's contact form.

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Wednesday, April 27, 2022

Deadline for EU Commission consultation on SEP framework approaching--and progress report on implementation of IP Action Plan

This is the third post in a row on the Auto IP & Legal World Summit in Frankfurt, though it goes beyond the narrow question of patent licensing in the automotive industry.

The previous two posts commented on a Volkswagen keynote on the licensing process and on a panel debate (with a particular focus on a lawyer's prediction that certain German judges, whose positions are very well known, will hand down patentee-friendly rulings once they serve on the Unified Patent Court). I'd just like to add a clarifying nuance to Volkswagen IP chief Uwe Wiesner's position on license fees. The concern Mr. Wiesner reiterated was that standard-essential patent (SEP) holder might capture value beyond the specific technical contribution of their patents to the standard, such as downstream investments in other types of innovation. In my opinion, that comes down to the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit (SSPPU) and royalty base argument we've heard from others, particularly Apple.

SEP holders counter this argument by pointing to the value-add enabled by cellular telecommunications technologies. Nokia's litigation chief Clemens Heusch mentioned yesterday that after a couple of years of using certain mobile data services, the car maker told him he needed to pay for a subscription. I've experienced that more than once, and in fact keep receiving Mercedes ME emails though I even emailed them and asked them to delete me from the distribution list. It's only human that SEP holders want their fair share.

As we're in the middle of a policy debate, let me share an update that Elena Kostadinova of the European Commission's Directorate-General for the Internal Market (DG GROW) provided at the Frankfurt conference on the implementation of the Commission's IP Action Plan (this post continues below the document):

Kostadinova - Auto IP &... by Florian Mueller

The part about SEPs still isn't very specific, but that's because the consultation is still open. So if you haven't provided your input to the Commission yet, now's a good time. The deadline is on May 9 (midnight Brussels time). Click on this link, and on that page you find a yellow "Respond to the questionnaire" button.

To the extent that the initiative and the ongoing consultation have been discussed in IP-specialized media, the Commission has been urged to take a hands-off approach at this critical juncture. Europe's most important wireless patent holders are currently dealing with outstanding as well as upcoming renewals of key license agreements, above all with Apple. Anyway, whatever side you may take, make sure the Commission hears your views.

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Friday, November 19, 2021

After Google's announcement of bad-faith compliance with in-app payments law, South Korean lawmakers must go back to the drawing board if they respect themselves and want to be respected

Barring the unforeseeable, I intend not to comment again on app store matters after this post until the Ninth Circuit has ruled on (and most likely will have granted) Apple's motion for a stay of Epic's injunction. But a follow-up to the previous post, which I just linked to, is warranted by Google's official announcement of how the search giant and mobile operating system market leader intends to "comply with the [new South Korean in-app payments] law" (quotation marks are not enough to put this into perspective). I had not addressed this part in my previous post, but it's the same pattern as what Apple intends to do--and Google's announced new terms just took effect yesterday.

The issue is precisely the same one. The South Korean law theoretically requires Apple and Google to do what Epic Games has so far failed to win in court (except in the eyes of a journalist who may never stop reiterating clearly erroneous legal interpretations) and the odds tend to be against Epic's appeal). Yet the bill proves pointless, useless, worthless in practice. But I strongly suspect that this is not how the South Korean legislature wants to be seen, so this is presumably not the end of the story.

The tax and review tyranny of the two leading mobile app stores (Apple's iOS App Store and Google's Android equivalent named Google Play) is under attack on multiple fronts in different ways. There is litigation, which has so far not helped in any meaningful way other than exposing certain issues; there are antitrust investigations, the mere specter of which already played a key role in getting Apple and Google to change some of their terms; and there are legislative initiatives, with South Korea theoretically having been ahead of the rest of the world but now risking to be nothing more than Apple and Google's laughing stock.

Here's the problem with what Google describes as compliance with the South Korean law requiring alternative in-app payment options:

"Service fees for distributing apps via Android and Google Play will continue to be based on digital sales on the platform. We recognize, however, that developers will incur costs to support their billing system, so when a user selects alternative billing, we will reduce the developer’s service fee by 4%."

So, if you're large enough that you normally pay 30%, the Google Play tax goes down to 26%; if you're eligible for small business terms, or if you're large and a particular customer's subscription has been in place for long enough, it's reduced from 15% to 11%; and for Google's Media Experience Program, it changes from 10% to 6%.

4% is just marginally above payment processing fees. If developers don't use Google Play, they have to use some other service or, if large enough, they might opt to work directly with credit card companies. To put this into perspective, let me quote the Bankrate.com website:

"Visa and Mastercard tend to charge merchants between 1.5% and 2.5% to accept their credit cards, whereas American Express charges between 2.5% to 3.5%."

So Google's reduction would leave a margin for third-party payment processing of only about 2.5% in the best case and 0.5% in the worst case (Amex's peak rate).

As a result, end users wouldn't save enough money to even bother to enter payment credentials elsewhere.

No app developer could profitably offer users a non-negligible discount if they used an alternative payment system. The saving (on what the developer owes Google) is just not going to make a difference.

The same would happen in the U.S. if the Epic Games v. Apple injunction ever got enforced (which it never might).

As I wrote yesterday, Apple has already declared its intent to levy its app tax on payments made by users who follow external links that take them out of an iOS app to complete a transaction. I'm sure Apple would not offer "sweeter" terms in that hypothetical scenario of Epic enforcing its consolation-prize injunction (again, I think the injunction will be stayed, and I don't think the anti-anti-steering injunction based on California UCL is all that solid).

The difference is just that the Epic Games v. Apple judgment explicitly authorizes Apple to do this. The judge recognized Apple's right to tax app developers. The South Korean law, as far as I can see, neither endorses the app tax nor does it prevent Google from at least trying to get away with bad-faith compliance that is not against the letter of the law.

Whether Apple will play the same game in South Korea or just stop selling devices there remains to be seen. South Korea is pretty much "Samsung Country." It might not be worth it for Apple to serve a limited number of Korean customers if it has to make the kind of concession that no other jurisdiction, for the time being, requires it to make. It could always return to the market later, and various South Korean Apple fans would probably buy their devices abroad.

But Android is huge in South Korea, so Google won't leave the market: it just capitalizes on the in-app payment law's biggest structural weakness.

In the short term, this may be the right move for Google. It might backfire, however, in the event that South Korean lawmakers recognize that their original bill was not intelligently designed, and come back to require an equal footing for alternative app stores, ruling out that alternative app stores can be taxed. But that would then raise the question of whether South Korea would expropriate Google (and Apple, if the iPhone maker even wanted to stay in that market under those circumstances). There is intellectual property involved, even though--ironically, in no small part as a result of Google's 11-year litigation with Oracle--it would be hard to enforce profitably through infringement litigation. Here, the platform makers can just leverage the market power of their platforms. And at some point the question would then be whether any jurisdiction could and would force them to make their developer tools available to everyone. Theoretically, third-party developer tools could do the job. Practically, constant operating system changes might put alternative tool makers at a fundamental disadvantage, or simply out of business.

There would be challenges even if alternative app stores were allowed. But app store diversity would be structurally stronger and more enforceable, provided that the platform makers would be barred from self-preferencing or from sabotaging third-party app stores. Any restrictions of access to API, or performance degradations by design, could be proven with the help of technical experts, and then those companies could be fined.

So far, Russia and Japan have been most effective, though I think that the European Commission, just by looking at certain issues over many years, was intimidating enough that Apple started to lower its fees, such as the 15% rate for long-running subscriptions (most subscriptions are actually not in place for very long, so what looks like a generous gesture has limited financial impact in practice).

Russia broke the app review monopoly by enabling its government to dictate what Russian apps Apple needs to pre-install. There was some doubt about whether Apple would accept this, but ultimately Apple wanted to keep the rubles rolling and acquiesced. Japan reached an "e-reader" settlement with Apple, which has global impact, but the jury is out on whether Apple will figure out a way of rendering it a lot less effective, such as by restrictions on cross-purchases.

South Korea initially appeared to make the boldest move, but after Google's announcement the question is just whether Apple will adopt the same approach or, more likely, refuse to comply altogether. Either way, the South Korean bill doesn't help developers or consumers in the slightest as things stand.

The South Korean parliament needs to amend its bill or Google will be laughing all the way to the bank.

And there's a geopolitical issue here: South Korea is somewhat dependent on the United States (not just for military reasons). For a variety of reasons it may not be feasible in the foreseeable future, but the best solution for countries like South Korea and even Japan, Russia, India, or possibly Latin American countries, would be to cooperate more closely than ever with the European Union on the regulation of digital markets. I'm not doubting the good intentions of U.S. lawmakers, such as the one and only David Cicilline (just one example), to address these issues. But should it turn out that the U.S. government would ultimately stand behind Apple and Google once countries like South Korea seriously regulated digital marketplaces, smaller countries might have to team up with others lest they be bullied around.

Microsoft is on the right side of history with respect to app distribution. It never did anything even 1% as bad as what Apple and Google have been doing for more than a decade now. But there was a time when Microsoft's conduct raised issues, and in a way, Google's announcement reminds me of Microsoft having been forced by the European Commission (and the EU judiciary) to offer a "Windows N" edition without the Media Player: it did nothing to create additional opportunities for alternative media players as customers saved nothing, Microsoft obviously had no incentive to promote it, and hardly anyone ever spotted, much less purchased, a "Windows N" edition. However, the far more important part of the EU Microsoft case involved network protocols, and that one did have an impact. Interestingly, in that part of the case IP was key (as Microsoft could have tried to enforce patents against third-party implementations of its protocols, and asserted copyright over documentation), and the EU ensured that only a small license fee could be charged. Also, Microsoft has been extremely careful to avoid antitrust issues ever since (there may still be occasional complaints, but they don't appear to have substance), which is more than Apple and Google can say at this stage.

Google's announcement is just the South Korean equivalent of "Windows N": a jurisdiction tells them to offer choice, and the target of the new regulation says "you can have choice, but it's not our problem whether anyone will actually end up choosing the alternative we are forced to provide."

South Korea didn't get this right the first time because Google can just provide a choice that makes no business sense. But no one is ever beaten unless they give up the fight. Better luck next time, South Korea! And may lawmakers and other decision makers (judges, regulators) around the globe learn from South Korea's initial mistake.

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Wednesday, September 15, 2021

Intellectual property rights might not entitle Apple to any 'commission' on app revenues, but in any event nowhere near 30%: court misunderstood Epic's lawyers

For a blog with "patents" in the name it would actually have made a lot of sense to start the discussion of the Epic Games v. Apple ruling with the intellectual property aspects of the case. But I had to combat disinformation of app developers regarding the practical effects of the injunction (should it ever be enforced).

The court ruling is unfair to Epic with respect to what it actually wanted and argued. (Some would argue that it's unfair in other ways, too, but I wish to keep a narrow focus in this post.)

In the decision, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers accuses Epic of "overreach" and suggests that Epic wanted Apple to receive nothing from app developers, though even her own decision notes that "Epic Games does not venture to argue that Apple is not entitled to be paid for its intellectual property." The passage I just quoted is an understatement. Epic's counsel unequivocally said during closing argument that Apple is entitled to reasonable and non-discriminatory compensation for any intellectual property, but an antitrust case is always about putting an end to illegal practices (without necessarily replacing them with an alternative compensation scheme right away). It was not about a free ride. It was about not letting Apple (ab)use its App Store monopoly, and subsequently one could still talk about IP (but not in that same case).

I have no idea what Epic's appeal will focus on, but I wouldn't be surprised if the appeals court agreed with Epic that a sequential approach is precisely the way antitrust law works: you stop the illegal practice first, and then the defendant can come up with a new practice, which may invite further challenges (but those won't happen, or at least won't have merit, if the new practice is reasonable and non-discriminatory). The appeals court may tell the district judge that the purpose of a unilateral conduct case is not to replace an illegal practice with a legal one.

One question that some people are asking themselves already is whether Apple will seek its App Store commission on payments made outside an iOS app but because of an app linking out to, for example, a website. As I explained in my previous two posts, there's no way that Apple would have to tolerate alternative payment systems. The court made it clear that it's just about generating awareness for offerings on other platforms while Apple remains free to require the exclusive use of its own IAP system, and Apple will benefit from the legal standard, which allows Apple to interpret the injunction (in light of the underlying order) in the way most favorable to its own interests, as long as it's not unreasonable.

In practical terms, it would be possible but a real hassle for Apple to have to collect app commissions from developers that are generated through other payment systems. Apple couldn't possibly audit each and every developer's books. Maybe it could impose some severe penalties for fraud and then just perform audits in suspicious cases plus a few random audits. But we don't really have to think too much about that. Again, the injunction--if and when it actually gets enforced--is not going to be a major problem for Apple. They can reasonably interpret the court ruling as not having to condone any "end run" around its IAP rule, such as a mere web shop where users purchase digital items they consume on iOS.

With some console makers not allowing cross-wallet/cross-purchase (or seeking an additional compensation for cross-play), Apple could take the same position now. That would have political implications, but the Epic v. Apple ruling doesn't prohibit it.

As some people are discussing now, the court says that Apple could collect a commission even on sales through other app stores--though it would then be an IP license fee in the form of a percentage of sales, which is why the term "commission" doesn't fit. I think the court should have defined the term more narrowly. (On a previous occasion I also criticized Apple for broadening its meaning.)

What the court got absolutely right is that the 30% cut is not a market rate for the intellectual property in question. The court even takes note of "Apple’s low apparent investment in App Store-specific intellectual property." The commission is practically imposed and enforced because of Apple's app distribution monopoly. The term "gatekeeper" (which is very popular in EU tech policy and law) doesn't appear in that ruling, but that's what it's all about.

That leads us to an interesting question: what is the commission rate going to be in a future scenario (it's really a question of when--not if--this happens) where new legislation and/or a successful appeal by Epic would do away with the gatekeeper toll and would instead leave Apple with only one tool at its disposal--IP enforcement--to collect money from developers?

What if (actually, when) developers can publish iOS apps without depending on Apple's app review because they can go through alternative app stores (and "sideloading")?

The Epic v. Apple ruling explains the following:

"Apple distributes its basic developer tools for free but charges an annual fee for membership in its developer program to distribute apps and which allows access to, for instance, more advanced APIs (many of which are protected by patents, copyrights, and trademarks) and beta software."

"Apple’s intellectual property as it relates to the iOS ecosystem generally are significant. The record is undisputed that Apple holds approximately 1,237 U.S. patents with 559 patent applications pending. With respect to the App Store itself, Apple holds an additional 165 U.S. patents with 91 more U.S. patent applications pending. Other than these patents, Apple does not identify specifically how the rest of its intellectual property portfolio impacts the technology at issue in this case nor does it specifically justify its 30% commission based on the value of the intellectual property. It only assumes it justifies the rate."

Given this year's Supreme Court decision in Oracle v. Google, I can't see how developers' use of Apple's APIs would not constitute fair use. Google even got away with incorporating APIs into a new product that competed with (and ultimately displaced in the mobile market) the original platform (Java). Developers, however, don't use Apple's APIs to build a new operating system: instead, they build applications, with a strong presumption in each case that it constitutes transformative use.

Patent counts mean little. Epic wasn't going to turn this antitrust dispute over Apple's App Store monopoly into a declaratory judgment case over Apple's iOS and App Store patents.

If Apple had to resort to patent litigation against app developers in order to collect a commission, it would have to overcome developers' non-infringement and invalidity defenses. Developers would likely also raise equitable defenses, but let's not get into that here.

Those patent numbers may seem staggering, but they could melt down very quickly as most of those patents might simply never be infringed by a developer and others might get invalidated once challenged. If any valid patents are actually infringed, the next question is whether developers could work around them. Let's assume, just hypothetically, that there would be one or more valid patents left that are infringed and cannot be worked around. Then we get to the remedies stage.

Seriously, Apple wouldn't get anywhere near 30% (or even 15%) of developers' revenues in the form of damages or ongoing royalties.

The only way Apple could theoretically still get its 30% cut would be if it obtained an injunction. In the U.S., Apple would have to meet the eBay v. MercExchange standard. Developers would argue that Apple actually benefits from the availability of apps and makes money on its devices. That would up the eBay ante for Apple. In some other jurisdictions, particularly Germany, Apple could obtain injunctions more easily, but it probably has fewer patents there.

Even if Apple obtained an injunction, it might then face an antitrust challenge to its rates--with the same arguments Apple makes against standard-essential patent (SEP) holders. Sure, Apple would argue that it never made a FRAND licensing promise with respect to its iOS IP. But in Europe, SEP case law is antitrust-, not contract-based, and Apple made the same arguments there (and it also brought antitrust claims in the U.S. over SEPs, such as against Samsung, though in vain, and against Qualcomm, though the San Diego Apple v. Qualcomm case settled during opening arguments).

To sum it up, Apple needs the gatekeeper's leverage to collect its 30% (or 15% under the Small Business Program) commission from app developers. On an IP basis, at least in the U.S. (where it would likely be denied patent injunctions against developers), Apple would get nothing or a much smaller amount. In light of the risk-opportunity ratio, Apple might not even have an incentive to bring any IP infringement litigation against developers.

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Wednesday, November 25, 2020

European Commission's Action Plan on Intellectual Property deemphasizes automotive industry concerns, prioritizes upload filters

Today the European Commission formally adopted and announced its Action Plan on Intellectual Property ("IP Action Plan").

A near-final draft of the document already leaked last week and generated some media attention. I elected to wait for the final document (also because I'm very busy with the impending launch of my iOS and Android game). Given that some significant changes have been made, I'm glad I did hold off.

So here's my rapid response, and I may go into more detail on some of these issues later or in a follow-up post:

  • While a draft version of the document placed a great deal of emphasis on the need to engage with the automotive sector (given the particular issues it is facing with a view to the licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs)), the final plan downgrades that industry's problems or at least seeks to defocus from them:

    "Although currently the biggest disputes seem to occur in the automotive sector, they may extend further as SEPs licensing is relevant also in the health, energy, smart manufacturing, digital and electronics ecosystems." (emphasis added)

    "With a view to clarifying these issues and identify [sic] best practices, the Commission has launched a study, with a specific focus on strategic sectors including the healthcare and automotive sectors." (emphasis added)

    The fact that the Commission deemphasizes the automotive industry's SEP issues may be attributable to the immense lobbying firepower and persistent, highly professional efforts by major SEP holders such as Nokia and Ericsson, which is not a conspiracy theory but based in fact (and would serve to explain the repeated postponement of the publication of this document). The automotive industry's lobbying departments are basically one-trick ponies that only know about emissions standards and similar topics. Those organizations may need another decade or two before they figure out IP policy.

    I actually doubt that the automotive industry would have had to expect anything positive to come out from the Commission's DG GROW (formerly called DG MARKT) "brokering" an agreement between the automotive sector and major SEP holders. That's because the commissioner in charge of DG GROW, Thierry Breton, is totally in the tank for Nokia and Ericsson, even up to the point where he describes fake news as "a fact! A fact! It is a fact!".

  • The paper recognizes that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) don't account for lots of patent filings. But basically the answer this plan attempts to give is just a combination of ever more internationalization and subsidies. Nowhere does the plan recognize that many SMEs would rather be protected from patents than by patents.

  • One of the top two or three fallacies in the patent policy context is reiterated by the IP Action Plan:

    "Between 2010 and 2019, the number of European patents granted rose from 58 000 to 137 000, approximately - although the rise is less marked than in other parts of the world, notably Asia, where economies are quickly catching up on IP generation."

    A European patent is a patent that can be asserted in Europe--not a patent granted to a European company. None of the top four filers with the European Patent Office (EPO) is European.

  • Artificial Intelligence (AI) patents are software patents, which actually shouldn't be granted in Europe in the first place. Here's what the paper says about Europe's low share of AI patent applications:

    "[A]lthough 26% of high-value research publications on AI comes from Europe, only 4 out of the top 30 applicants (13%) and 7% of businesses, engaged in AI patenting worldwide, are European."

    The reason for that is mostly that major platform companies (in the digital platform economy, Europe is at a level with Africa and irrelevant compared to the U.S. and Asia) generate a lot of income from their core businessees and invest some of that money into AI, enabling them to offer the most attractive working conditions to researchers--and to file for many patents in that field. I can't see how the IP Action Plan would change a thing about that.

  • The Commission loves its upload filters:

    "A crucial part of this work concerns the implementation of Article 17 of the Copyright Directive, which sets out a specific legal regime for the use of copyright-protected content by user-uploaded content sharing platforms. The Commission has carried out an extensive stakeholder dialogue to gather the views of relevant stakeholders on the main topics related to this article's application. Taking into account the results of the dialogue, the Commission will soon issue guidance to support Member States in implementing this provision."

    Just last week, a senior Commission official actually acknowledged that Article 17 may not survive a pending court challenge. I opposed it (even spoke at a couple of demonstrations against it).

  • While this is outside the industry focus of this blog, I believe it would make a whole lot of sense for the Commission to "to introduce a unified [Supplementary Protection Certificate] grant mechanism and/or create a unitary SPC title," which the IP Action Plan mentions as possibilities.

The IP Action Plan is per se underwhelming and unspecific, but that doesn't mean that the initiatives it outlines as potential measures couldn't be impactful in the end--possibly even with respect to SEPs. We'll have to stay tuned.

[Update] The Fair Standards Alliance (FSA) just issued a statement, saying the organization "welcomes the European Commission’s goal to bring more transparency to standard essential patent (SEP) licensing." [/Update]

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Thursday, May 29, 2014

Patent royalties may exceed $120 per smartphone, undermine industry profitability: working paper

A working paper by an Intel in-house counsel and two WilmerHale lawyers, The Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, has just been published (direct link to PDF). Intel Vice President and Associate General Counsel Ann Armstrong and WilmerHale's Joseph Mueller and Timothy Syrett have made an invaluable contribution to the debate over reasonable royalties and incentives for innovation in this field.

This first-rate paper finally answers the billion-dollar question everyone with an interest in smartphone patents has been asking for some time: the total licensing cost per device. The authors have thoroughly researched the licensing environment and highlight various key facts that should give policymakers, regulators and courts pause. They note that royalty stacking, "in which the cumulative demands of patent holders across the relevant technology or the device threaten to make it economically unviable to offer the product, [...] is not merely a theoretical concern" (as, by the way, the likes of Qualcomm allege). Based on publicly-available data, these competent authors "estimate potential patent royalties in excess of $120 on a hypothetical $400 smartphone--which is almost equal to the cost of [the] device's components" (estimated to be $120 to $150 in total based on figures published by Nomura Securities in reliance on Gartner data). They conclude that "those costs may be undermining industry profitability--and, in turn, diminishing incentives to invest and compete". I also believe that smartphone-related patent licensing costs, relating to standard-essential as well as non-standard-essential patents, must come down. Policymakers, antitrust enforcers and judges -- Judge Posner certainly did his best in this regard -- will hopefully bring those fees down in the years ahead.

The paper does properly distinguish between royalty demands and actual royalty payments. Patent holders frequently have to lower their demands during the course of negotiation. Cross-licenses and "patent exhaustion arising from licensed sales by component suppliers" can also make a major difference, but the terms on which companies actually agree are usually kept confidential. Royalty demands sometimes surface in litigation.

The authors based their study entirely on public documents. They (especially the WilmerHale lawyers, who, among other things, defend Apple against Samsung's counterclaims) have obviously seen some confidential license agreements, but couldn't make use of any of that information for their working paper. They also don't speak for any particular company or firm. Apple just demanded a "reasonable royalty" of $40 per device from Samsung at the recent California trial, for five software patents. Now a paper authored in part by lawyers representing Apple against Samsung (with a defensive focus, but still) says that $120 per device for everyone's patents, -- hardware and software patents, standard-essential and non-standard-essential patents -- may be "diminishing incentives to invest and compete". This shows independent thinking and writing. I would not be surprised to see Samsung's lawyers quote certain key findings of this study in their U.S. litigations with Apple. The paper appears slightly Apple-friendly to me in the context of the design patents-related part of Apple v. Samsung, but within reason (I agree in principle with what it says about that). The study also notes that UI patents can typically be worked around, and "[a] truly distinctive and innovative user interface--as distinct from a copied or derivative design--may result in minimal or no royalty exposure".

One key characteristic of the study is that it analyzes licensing costs on a component-by-component (including software components) basis: cellular baseband chip, random access memory (different kinds), flash memory (different kinds), WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, NFC, battery, power management, audio (different subcategories such as MP3), camera/video (non-standards-based as well as standards-based formats like JPEG and H.264), applications processor, operating system, other pre-installed software, SMS, MMS, email, W3C (royalty-free standards), UPnP (royalty-free), digital media sharing, USB, user interface, outer design (also an area in which the study notes that infringement can be easily avoided).

The study has a much broader focus than my own litigation monitoring in recent years. Its findings appear plausible to me, except that I believe the "operating system" part of the royalty stack is underestimated. No operating system patent holder ever told me what their demands or actual deal terms were, but a couple of years ago I downloaded a litigation-related document that was publicly accessible for less than a day on the ITC document system that mentioned a major operating system patent holder's royalty demands. Against that background I think the study published today is very conservative (to say the least) with respect to operating system patent licensing costs -- but this, if anything, reinforces the overall message.

This is not a policy paper per se, but it does raise and stress policy concerns, particularly about non-practicing entities (NPEs), colloquially often referred to as "patent trolls", and the growing problem of "privateering" (patent transfers from major operating companies to NPEs in order to hide behind others that will assert patents aggressively against the original patent holder's competitors). Certain patent holders' demands, tactics and positions are discussed as examples of factors that exacerbate the royalty-stacking problem. Those patent holders include Ericsson and, to a far greater extent, Nokia, a company that has sold patents to a number of NPEs in recent years and is itself increasinly turning into a patent assertion entity.

This paper is recommended reading for everyone with an interest in smartphone IP issues from a legal and/or economic point of view. It's particularly recommended reading for all those who could, through their actions and decisions, address at least parts of the problem this paper describes. I believe it will be quoted a lot in court documents and academic writings in the years ahead.

If you'd like to be updated on the smartphone patent disputes and other intellectual property matters I cover, please subscribe to my RSS feed (in the right-hand column) and/or follow me on Twitter @FOSSpatents and Google+.

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Thursday, April 3, 2014

Apple does not 'own' multitouch smartphones and tablets any more than Samsung 'owns' phablets

My blog posts yesterday about the limitations of Apple's ability to lay exclusive claim to modern-day computing technologies -- "10 European judges found Apple had not invented slide-to-unlock (star patent at Samsung trial)" and "In 49 months of holy war, Apple has not proved that it owns any feature other than rubber-banding" -- have already been read widely and they have sparked some debate.

All in all, I'm very happy about the reactions I received (and 10% of moronic emails don't matter). I sense that a growing number of Android fans understand that I am one of them (and an Android app developer as well), but that I separate my platform preferences from my intellectual property and antitrust analysis. And I can see that those who would like Apple to "destroy" (as Steve Jobs put it) Android in court (for which Apple's own customers would also pay the price) increasingly realize that Apple does not appear to be, if the results of more than four years of litigation are any indication, a nuclear world power.

I did want to add a few general thoughts. For more detail, I recommend the two posts I linked to further above, which these reflections here are just meant to complement.

There's a sense of entitlement in the Apple camp and it is centered around the notion that Apple, because it reinvented the smartphone (I agree) and built the first popular tablet in history (I agree, too), has exclusionary rights that give it serious leverage over Google and its hardware partners (on this one I disagree for non-philosophical reasons after watching Apple's lawsuits for several years). A secondary consideration is that Google's then-CEO Eric Schmidt stayed on Apple's board of directors for way too long. I would agree on this one philosophically, but Apple never claimed any violations of trade secrets.

This sense of entitlement is interdependent with many people's fear that history might repeat itself and just like "Wintel" (Windows PCs with Intel CPUs) once marginalized the Mac to the extent that Microsoft had to give Apple a $150 million "shot in the arm" (though Apple had an advanced graphical user interface before Microsoft did), Android devices might marginalize the iPhone and the iPad. In other words, what happened with mouse-based user interfaces could now happen in the arena of multitouch user interfaces. Obviously, Apple is now starting from a much higher level, and its cash reserves won't be exhausted too soon unless activist shareholders get their way.

In the debate following yesterday's posts I've seen some Apple fans and investors discount that possibility. They argue that Android devices, especially, tablets are mostly low-priced, and that the market share of iOS in major markets is still amazing given that this relates to only one vendor (true, but that did not help Apple against Wintel) and that Apple just needs to focus on the most affluent customers to do well. A few days ago I walked by a newspaper vending machine here in Munich and I saw a headline: "Best tablets under €200 ($275)" -- and those were obviously all Android- or Chrome-based. But Samsung is clearly competing with Apple at the high end as well. Samsung's counsel, in a transparent attempt to reduce the impact of Apple marketing chief Phil Schiller's testimony but nevertheless on a factual basis, drew the jury's attention to Apple's concern about a Wall Street Journal article entitled "Has Apple Lost Its Cool to Samsung?".

I am, by the way, not among those who blame Apple's management. While I don't disagree with Oracle CEO Larry Ellison's conclusion, I think even Steve Jobs would not be able to overcome the incredible force called "network effects".

I've been a strong believer in the importance of network effects for decades, even before the term became popular. Network effects have certain limits, of course. For example, Facebook was not the first social network, but it's now the leading one. Microsoft was considered unstoppable because of network effects and it's now giving Windows Phone away for free on small-screen devices. It's not like there's no room, or no opportunity for a successful market entrance, left for anyone if an incumbent benefits from massive network effects. But depending on the dynamics and mechanics of a given market, that room can be very limited. Take online auctions, for example: eBay is not the only game in town, but it's where the largest number of sellers meets the largest number of buyers, and the only other way to make money in that business is at the extremely high end, not the top 10% of the market but a fraction of the top 1%.

I don't believe that Apple's high-price business model is sustainable at the same time as a high market share. It will work for several more years. But Apple has to make a choice, like any other business, between short-term profitability and long-term viability. It won't be able to pursue both conflicting goals equally well -- nobody can. If it gave away iOS for free to third-party device makers the way Microsoft gives Windows Phone away now, it would maximize market share and network effects. But it would no longer be very profitable, in the short term. The stock market looks at this mostly on a quarter-by-quarter basis, and that's Apple's dilemma. From a consumer point of view, prices have to come down further. And it isn't desirable to artificially inflate them by using patent rights, especially if the true and valid scope of those patent rights doesn't justify it anyway.

Apple deserved, and continues to deserve, a substantial reward for the impact it had on the market. But unless it lowers its prices and accepts lower profits (which its shareholders won't allow management to do until it's too late), Android will become so extremely popular that third-party innovation will concentrate on Android the way it did on Windows. No single company can match the power of a massive ecosystem, and the Android ecosystem is now by far the most powerful one, with the gap widening further every day.

Not only in the patent damages context but also in the strategy debate I often notice that Apple's fans grossly overestimate the amounts of money Apple spent on research and development when it created the iPhone and the iPad. It spent that money very wisely, and I like the fact that it has increased its R&D budgets in recent years, but in terms of R&D budgets, companies like Microsoft and Samsung still invest a lot more money in innovation. See this CNET article, "Apple's R&D up 32 percent in 2013, still dwarfed by rivals". Apple and some of its fans have unreasonable and unrealistic ROI (return on investment) expectations, such as that Samsung should pay, for its alleged infringement of five allegedly-valid patents, more than 40% of Apple's annual R&D budget.

Apple has been and continues to be rewarded generously, but this level of profitability is in my opinion not sustainable at the same high volumes unless Apple comes up with "the next big thing" that really convinces customers to pay a hefty premium. (I guess that's what Larry Ellison meant.)

Let's again talk about what the focus of this blog is for the most part, intellectual property. Against "Wintel", Apple tried to enforce copyright all the way up to the Supreme Court but failed "except for the ruling that the trash can icon and folder icons from Hewlett-Packard's NewWave windows application were infringing". Copyright is, by definition, narrow. You can't use it to enforce broad monopolies. Patents can be far broader. By comparison, the 7,000 lines of Java API declaring code that Google copied from Oracle would correspond to a patent claim with more than 7,000 claim limitations (at least one limitation per line, but some lines and some structural aspects would result in additional limitations), while the kinds of patents Apple is asserting against Samsung now have, depending on the level of granularity, roughly a dozen limitations each. A key difference beween patents and copyright is that each and every limitation of such a monster claim would have to be practiced, while copyright applies to subsets that are deserving of protection. Still, you get the idea: copyright helps you against outright copying. Apple accuses Samsung of "copying" all the time, but it's not even asserting copyrights because Google and Samsung wrote all of their program code (except for those Java APIs) themselves. Imitation and inspiration don't constitute infringement, however.

For the reasons I explained in my previous posts, Apple's patents have not proved powerful enough in those more than four years of litigation. The HTC settlement doesn't mean too much because Apple had prevailed on only one patent (!) at the time of the settlement and wasn't close to prevailing on any additional ones anytime soon. Also, it would be wrong to blame Apple's management, including its legal department, or its outside counsel. The problem is more fundamental:

Patent rights are not designed to protect form factors, much less those who are not the first ones to come up with a form factor but merely the first ones to make those form factors popular.

I said in one of my previous posts that the revolution Apple brought about with the iPhone and the iPad is not just a result of first-rate marketing: it took some serious R&D work to make it work. But patents protect only an inventive contribution to the state of the art. The delta (the difference). If you add a better graphical representation on top of previously-existing slide-to-unlock mechanisms, you own that particular visualization, but not the underlying concepts of slider bars or of unlocking a device.

Four of my six multitouch smartphones, and all of the ones I bought over the last couple of years, are phablets. No small part of the market share that Apple claims Samsung took away by copying is attributable to the fact that Samsung made phablets popular. This, too, wasn't easy to do. Otherwise it would have been done by others.

Even if Apple could have done it, it simply didn't. The argument that you can't use a phablet with one hand never convinced me (nor the tens of millions of other customers who bought phablets in recent years). Assuming that Apple could have done it (maybe with screens supplied by Samsung), it would have been a mistake. Of course (we discussed short-term vs. long-term before), it's much more profitable to have fewer form factors and fewer shelf-keeping units and to avoid any cannibalization within your product portfolio. You make more money that way in the short term. But it also means that you don't meet consumer needs. The greed of shareholders (of any company) is the enemy of consumer choice. That created an opportunity for Samsung. But it doesn't mean that Samsung now "owns" phablets in an intellectual property sense.

It would have been a better and more consumer-friendly choice for Apple to make a phablet than to sue, as it is doing in the current California case, someone else over phablets.

Even if Apple prevailed on all five of the patents it's asserting, it couldn't claim ownership of the categories of multitouch smartphones and tablets. With the greatest respect, an incremental improvement of slide-to-unlock, a particular variant of autocomplete, "data tapping", a synchronization method and unified search are just a small subset of all of the functionalities found in those kinds of devices.

Just like copyright law didn't solve Apple's problem in the 1990s, patent law won't solve it in the 2010s. Apple would need a whole new sui generis kind of intellectual property right that is detached in its scope from creative expression (copyright) and inventive contribution (patents) and simply says that if you did something creative (Apple did) and you make some inventive contribution (even if the only exclusive feature you can currently claim under patent law is rubber-banding) and you succeed in the marketplace, no one else has the right to take market share away from you. But that kind of intellectual property right does not exist and never will. Even Apple's fans would not want to live in such a static world because innovation would slow down while prices would go up.

About ten years ago I attended a conference on software patents in the European Parliament and there was a banner, put up by free software activists, that said: "In the heaven of Gates, you pay the Bill." Competitive dynamics have changed the landscape to the extent that device makers no longer have to pay Microsoft anything for Windows Phone on smaller devices. But the concern that some people had with respect to Microsoft is one that many people would have now, if not for Android's success, with respect to Apple's business model.

Update: You can't please everyone...

It's interesting how one can be attacked by two opposing camps at the same time for taking centrist positions. After this post went live, someone wrote on an Apple investor board (pointing to this post and the two previous ones and vaguely referring to other posts "over the past few weeks"):

"Is Florian Mueller being blackmailed? His child kidnapped? Or merely sold out?

Any sane person would ask such questions after noting the sudden swerve toward concentrated anti-Apple posts on FOSS blog over the past few weeks, a bizarre trend that has recently accelerated."

What's bizarre is that someone would even raise any of those questions in light of the facts. In November 2012 -- a few months after Apple's first Samsung trial in California and shortly after the settlement with HTC -- I took the same positions on Apple's business model in even more detail. At the time I argued that Apple needed to ensure product differentiation through IP enforcement. I still find Apple's enforcement legitimate, and I even wrote on Twitter on Monday that Apple deserves to emerge victorious from the trial, within reason. But between that November 2012 post and today's post, a number of things have happened that dictated an adjustment of my opinion on what Apple could achieve. Most notably, Apple was twice denied permanent injunctive relief in the U.S. (before and after an appeal) because it couldn't convince the court that Samsung's competing products are substantially unlawful; a host of Apple patents came to judgment at the Federal Patent Court of Germany (and one at the European Patent Office), with each and every one getting invalidated in its entirety -- all granted claims and even all (narrowing) amendments proposed by Apple's lawyers; and it now turns out that the U.S. import ban Apple won at the ITC over two patents including the "Steve Jobs patent" has no commercial impact whatsoever on Samsung (workarounds are perfectly lawful). There simply comes a point where I can't ignore those facts and have to draw the appropriate, inevitable conclusions.

There are people who do understand the need to adjust positions to reality. Yesterday I received two emails from someone who had emailed me several times over the last three years. The first one had this subject line:

"OMG, what just happened"

And this was at the end of that message:

"Sir, what happened? I hear Samsung pays well, but I thought you were above that!"

I actually stated clearly on Monday that I never did any work for Apple or Samsung, that I am not doing any now, and won't do any anytime soon. Judge Koh is independent. So are the judges of the Federal Patent Court of Germany. The ITC is a U.S. government agency but nevertheless cleared Samsung's workaround for the "Steve Jobs patent", and as a result, Samsung is still selling tons of products there. Conspiracy theories are of no use here.

I didn't reply, and not much later I got another email from this user -- and now it gets really interesting:

"taking a big breath"

"I re-read your latest post a third time, after several cups of coffee. And I can say that I actually agree with much of what you say.

I can actually also say that it then appears as though Patent law in the world is so far behind the times as to be mostly useless except to patent trolls, who are making much money on this."

Without any response from me, this reader understood things by re-reading what I actually wrote.

To be fair and balanced, similar things -- negative commentary as well as adjustments of positions -- are not unique to the Apple fan community but also found in Android circles, despite the fact that I was invited by HTC's lead counsel in Germany to give a surprise keynote at an HTC-Nokia settlement party. Take this Monday morning tweet, for example:

I did some work for Microsoft and announced it a long time ago; that does not make me a "mouth piece". I also announced a working relationship with Oracle a long time ago; same thing -- and when the appellate decision in Oracle v. Google comes down, a lot of people will suddenly see that I was right. As for Apple, I addressed that one further above, and if I had had in an alternative universe an opportunity to work for Apple at this stage, I would have been unable to comment on this trial publicly because of my fundamental disagreement with Apple's damages claims and its disproportionate infringement allegations. My opinions are not for sale. And I'm still on Apple's side on a number of issues.

Let me also show you a couple of comments from (presumably) Android users below a Google+ post:

The closest thing to a conflict of interest that I currently have is that I made the decision to focus on Android for my app (by the way, Windows will probably be my second priority, which is now even more likely to be the case in light of this announcement Microsoft made yesterday about universal Windows phone and desktop apps, but also because I'm writing my level editor and the cloud part under Windows anyway). This platform choice is not really a conflict of interest because it's consistent with what I say. I'm putting my time and money where my mouth is: Android first. I would have set a different priority if I expected Apple's patent enforcement to have major impact on Google and Samsung or if I saw, at this point, any other reason for which Apple could bring about the trend reversal that its marketing chief Phil Schiller admitted (in an internal email shown at the trial) would be a difficult turnaround. I'm not suddenly in favor of IP infringement. I just believe that there are reasonable, low-impact licensing solutions to the problem.

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