

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Senegal and Portugal concerning violations of Senegalese territory by the Portuguese military forces,

"Deploring the incidents that have occurred near the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guinea,

"Noting with concern that the state of relations in this area between the two parties concerned may lead to tension on the occasion of any incident, and expressing the hope that such tension will be eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Taking note of the declared intention of the Portuguese Government scrupulously to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal.

"1. Deplores any incursion by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory as well as the incident which occurred at Bouniak on 8 April 1963;

"2. Requests the Government of Portugal, in accordance with its declared intentions, to take whatever action may be necessary to prevent any violation of Senegal's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the development of the situation under review."

The question remained on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

COMPLAINT BY HAITI

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By a telegram^{539/} dated 5 May 1963 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti requested the President of the Security Council, in accordance with Articles 35 (1) and 34 of the Charter, to convene an urgent meeting of the Council in order to consider the situation "caused by the repeated threats of aggression and attempts at interference made by the Dominican Republic", which were "infringements of Haiti's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and constituted a danger to international peace and security. The Council also had before it a note verbale^{540/} dated 6 May 1963 from the Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic transmitting the texts of (1) a note addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti concerning the severance of diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries, and the refusal of the Dominican Government to withdraw the staff of its diplomatic mission until certain guarantees were offered by the Haitian Government, and (2) a message addressed by the President of the Dominican Republic to the Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States offering to co-operate with the commission of investigation established by the Council of the Organization, acting as provisional Organ of Consultation, to study the situation on the spot.

^{539/} S/5302, O.R., 18th year, Suppl. for April-June 1963, pp. 38-39.
^{540/} S/5306, *ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

The item was included in the agenda^{541/} and was considered by the Council at its 1035th and 1036th meetings on 8 and 9 May 1963. The representatives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic were invited to participate in the discussion.^{542/}

Decision of 9 May 1963 (1036th meeting): Statement by the President summarizing the debate and stating that the Council would remain seized of the question

In his initial statement before the Council at the 1035th meeting on 8 May 1963, the representative of Haiti* stated that the Council was fully aware of the danger inherent in the situation brought to its consideration, not only for the peace of the Caribbean area—where the situation was already so disturbed—but also for the peace of the world. In this area, which had such a strategic importance, a dangerous situation had developed ever since the Government of the Dominican Republic had violated the most elementary laws of co-existence and of the inter-American legal system. Its present attempt was made within the context of efforts to destroy the only Negro nation in the New World. There had been repeated threats of invasion by the President of the Dominican Republic, and the Dominican Republic had made unfounded accusations regarding the violation of its Port-au-Prince Embassy and had presented to the Haitian Government an ultimatum of twenty-four hours in connexion with those accusations. On numerous occasions, threats of invasion had been made. The Government of the Dominican Republic also showed more than tolerance to the subversive activities of the Haitian exiles who had established training camps on Dominican territory and even boasted of the facilities that had been granted to them. There had been numerous violations of the treaty of peace, trade, navigation and extradition signed between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti on 9 November 1874, including repeated violations of Haitian airspace and massive concentrations of Dominican troops on Haiti's frontiers. The Haitian Government denounced all these threats and acts of aggression of the Dominican Republic against Haiti. The Haitian Government, wishing to maintain and defend its independence and the integrity of its territory which was being threatened, had used its legitimate right to appeal to the Security Council, and was confident that this appeal would receive proper attention. However, if the Council deemed it advisable, despite the exceptional seriousness of the situation, to await the result of the OAS peace mission established under a resolution adopted by that regional organization, the Government of Haiti, which also had confidence in the regional organization, would have no objection, provided, however, that the Security Council did not decide not to proceed with the question and remained ready to take it up again at any time^{543/}

The representative of the Dominican Republic* contended that the situation which had arisen between his country and Haiti had been caused by the behaviour

^{541/} 1035th meeting: before para. 1.

^{542/} 1035th meeting: para. 2.

^{543/} 1035th meeting: paras. 6-4 ; 1036th meeting: paras. 4-19.

of President Duvalier who maintained a rule of terror in Haiti, and, as a climax, had ordered an undisciplined and fanatic soldiery to invade the Dominican Republic Embassy in Port-au-Prince to seize and imprison the adversaries of his regime, at the same time ordering the military occupation of the premises of the Dominican diplomatic mission in the Haitian capital. The attacks against the symbols of the Dominican Republic in Haitian territory such as those committed against its diplomatic mission clearly constituted acts of provocation. The deployment of troops on the Dominican-Haitian frontier could not be considered an act of aggression since they were in a posture of legitimate defence, and in order to prevent the carrying out of Haitian incursions into Dominican territory. The chaotic situation in Haiti resulted from the very nature of the political situation there and not from pressure exercised from the territory of the Dominican Republic. Both the Dominican Republic and Haiti had referred the dispute to the Organization of American States, the regional organization which was intended to solve conflicts of the nature that had emerged between them. In this connexion, the Dominican representative quoted Article 52 of the Charter, paragraphs 2 and 3 of which were the application of the principles of Articles 33 and 36. The Dominican Republic hoped that in accordance with those Articles the Security Council would decide to suspend its consideration of the matter and leave it in the hands of the OAS.

The representative of the Dominican Republic stated further that he would also like to point out the weakness of the Haitian argument that the fundamental cause of the crisis between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti was the effort of the former to destroy the only Negro State in the Americas. This allegation was, in his view, so absurd that it did not even require a denial, for the fact should be stressed that within the Dominican Republic there had never been racial antagonisms, nor could such antagonisms conceivably exist, since the population was composed of elements from both races who lived together in a close community of interests and feelings. The Dominican Republic had no aggressive designs against the Haitian people or any other people. It saw no reason for the Haitian Government to bring the question before the Security Council since the problem was already being dealt with by the Organization of American States, which had already taken measures that were expected to be effective in re-establishing as soon as possible harmony between both countries.^{544/}

At the end of the discussion, the President (France) noted that all the members of the Council had had an opportunity to express their views on the question and stated that most of the Council members considered it preferable, at the current stage, to leave the initiative to the regional organization which was trying to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute between two of its members. Those members had indicated that they had no objection to that procedure. The President also stated that the question would remain on the agenda of the Council. He added that he was convinced that, in conformity with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, the two parties would avoid any action which might compromise

the success of measures likely to bring about a peaceful solution of their disputes.^{545/}

REPORTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING YEMEN

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter^{546/} dated 8 June 1963, the representative of the USSR requested the President of the Security Council to convene the Council in order to consider the reports of the Secretary-General^{547/} on developments relating to Yemen, "since the reports contain proposals concerning possible measures by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, on which, under the Charter, decisions are taken by the Security Council".

In his first report to the Security Council, dated 29 April 1963 (S/5298), the Secretary-General referred to consultations he had with the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the Yemen Arab Republic regarding "certain aspects of the situation in Yemen of external origin" with a view to making the Office of the Secretary-General "available to the parties for such assistance as might be desired towards ensuring against any developments in that situation which might threaten the peace of the area". As a result of these efforts, undertaken to ease tension and restore conditions to normal, there had emerged an agreement among the three Governments concerned on "identical terms of disengagement in Yemen". In substance, the terms of the agreement provided that the Government of Saudi Arabia would terminate all support and aid to the Royalists of Yemen and prohibit the use of Saudi Arabian territory by Royalist leaders for the purpose of carrying on their struggle against the Republican Government in Yemen. The United Arab Republic undertook to begin simultaneously withdrawal from Yemen of the troops sent on request of the Yemen Republican Government. A demilitarized zone to a distance of twenty kilometres on each side of the demarcated Saudi Arabia-Yemen border was to be established. The demilitarized zone was to be under the observation of impartial observers. The United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia had further undertaken to cooperate with a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in reaching agreement on the modalities and verification of disengagement. The Secretary-General reported further that he had designated General Von Horn as his representative to undertake exploratory talks in this respect with the authorities of the parties concerned.

In his second report, dated 27 May 1963 (S/5321), the Secretary-General concluded, as a result of the talks held by General Von Horn, that "United Nations observers in the Saudi Arabia-Yemen area are vitally necessary and could well be the decisive factor in avoiding serious trouble in that area; their presence is desired by all parties concerned; moreover, as the need is urgent, they should be dispatched

^{545/} 1036th meeting: para. 150.

^{546/} S/5326, C.R., 18th year, Suppl. for April-June 1963, p. 51.

^{547/} S/5298, *ibid.*, pp. 33-34; S/5321, *ibid.*, pp. 46-48; S/5323, *ibid.*, pp. 46-50; S/5325, *ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

^{544/} 1035th meeting: paras. 42-53; 1036th meeting: paras. 21-28.