

## Americas

### 12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”, including resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Five meetings took the form of briefings, and two meetings were convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>474</sup> More information on the meetings, including participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.<sup>475</sup>

In 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) delivered a briefing to the Council three times further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Mission and twice in emergency meetings convened further to the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the country from September 2022.<sup>476</sup> The Council was also provided a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and two representatives of civil society.<sup>477</sup> The Council also heard a briefing by the representative of Gabon in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) which imposed targeted sanctions.<sup>478</sup> In addition to Haiti, which was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on four occasions, the meetings under this item also featured statements from the representatives of Belize on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Canada on behalf Economic and Social Council Advisory Group on Haiti, the Foreign Minister and

---

<sup>474</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>475</sup> See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 8.

<sup>476</sup> See [S/PV.8969](#), [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#). See also [S/2022/117](#), [S/2022/481](#) and [S/2022/761](#).

<sup>477</sup> See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>478</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).

representative of the Dominican Republic and the Permanent Observer of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.<sup>479</sup>

In her statements to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti reported on the three intersecting crises in the country, namely, economic, security and political. She briefed on the developments following the decision of the Government of Haiti to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, the dire security situation with alarming levels of gang violence, the blockade of the nation's main fuel terminal and its impact on the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, including a new cholera outbreak. She also reported on efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti to address the root causes of the crisis.

At the meeting held on 18 February, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that the situation in Haiti remained fraught and highly polarized, despite some signs of progress.<sup>480</sup> She noted that the unveiling of the new Government of Haiti on 24 November 2021 appeared to have eased tensions somewhat and that momentum seemed to be building around an effort to form an inclusive, credible and effective provisional electoral council. The Special Representative stated that gang violence continued to plunge major urban centres into lawlessness and grief. She added that criminal armed groups had a strong hold on the economic and social lives of millions of children, women and men, particularly noting their indiscriminate use of abduction and murder, as well as sexual and gender-based violence. The Special Representative stressed that the Haitian National Police could not, on its own, curtail the alarming rise in gang-related insecurity. In that regard, she was of the view that the newfound momentum, epitomized by the imminent creation of a United Nations multi-donor basket fund for security assistance for Haiti, had to translate into increased Government funding for the police force, as well as additional international financial and technical support.

Beyond the security situation, the Special Representative highlighted the need for socioeconomic projects and reintegration activities in neighbourhoods most affected by gang violence, ending impunity, and ensuring that reform in the judiciary could be sustained over the long term. Furthermore, she noted that the lack of impact and effectiveness of development aid over many years required the formulation of a new approach, one premised on a deeper

---

<sup>479</sup> See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>480</sup> [S/PV.8969](#).

coordination of international efforts and a real partnership with the Haitian authorities and actors. The Special Representative concluded by stating that it was imperative for all Haitian leaders to engage constructively to steer the country towards elections and for the international community to engage with them to create the security and political conditions necessary for national elections, as well as to ensure urgent structural reforms to tackle gang violence, address impunity and corruption, strengthen the justice system and transform the economy in a sustainable manner.

In her statement on 16 June, the Special Representative drew the attention of Council members to a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Haiti with gangs expanding their zones of influence.<sup>481</sup> She noted a rise of 36 per cent rise in kidnappings and 17 per cent in intentional homicides, compared to the last five months of 2021, incidents of sexual violence against women and girls, restrictions on the freedom of movement people and goods, the displacement of at least 17,000 people, and the absence of basic necessities such as food, water and medicine. With respect to efforts to end the ongoing political and institutional vacuum, the Special Representative noted the formation in late March of a civil society-led tripartite committee to enlarge consensus among various political platforms, including the Government, to forge a common path forward. In parallel, Prime Minister Ariel Henry was holding direct talks with the leadership of the “Montana group” which had proposed new modalities to relaunch formal negotiations.

In his statement, the Executive Director of *Volontariat pour le développement d’Haiti* provided an overview of what, based on his experience with civil society on the ground, were the most pressing challenges in Haiti and recommendations on how they could be addressed.<sup>482</sup> He underscored the need to broaden consensus on governance, urgent transnational action against those involved in the illegal arms trade and financial crimes, and international support for the Haitian National Police. Furthermore, he encouraged BINUH to work more closely with young people and civil society and opined that the Mission would be even more effective if it had adequate resources to strengthen its good offices mission and its work of advising and supporting the Haitian National Police.

---

<sup>481</sup> [S/PV.9066](#).

<sup>482</sup> Ibid.

On 15 July, by resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH as set out in resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of one year until 15 July 2023.<sup>483</sup> The Council acknowledged the letter of the Secretary-General of 29 April 2022 providing recommendations for adjustments to the mandate and resources of BINUH and, on this basis, made several changes to the Mission.<sup>484</sup> Specifically, the Council increased the number of civilian and seconded personnel serving as police and corrections advisors in the police and corrections unit from 30 to 42 and provided that the human rights unit would include a dedicated capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence, including the identification of women's protection advisers.<sup>485</sup> In terms of tasks, the Council requested BINUH to work with UNODC and other relevant UN agencies to support Haitian authorities in combating illicit financial flows as well as trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel and in enhancing management and control of borders and ports.<sup>486</sup> With respect to the situation in Haiti, the Council demanded an immediate cessation of gang violence and criminal activities and expressed its readiness to take appropriate measures, as necessary, against those engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities, or human rights abuses or who otherwise took action that undermined the peace, stability and security of Haiti and the region.<sup>487</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop possible options for enhanced security support for the efforts of the Haitian National Police to combat high levels of gang violence, and to submit a written report by 15 October 2022.<sup>488</sup>

At the meeting held on 26 September, the Special Representative noted that gang, economic and political crises in Haiti had begun to intersect in a new and frightening way. She reported that following the Government's announcement of its decision to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, roadblocks were set up throughout the country which generated a countrywide

---

<sup>483</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For further information on the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, see part X, sect. II.

<sup>484</sup> *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph. See [S/2022/369](#).

<sup>485</sup> Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>486</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8.

<sup>487</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 5.

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 10. See letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report on possible options for enhanced security support for the Haitian National Police ([S/2022/747](#)).

lockdown that lasted for five days.<sup>489</sup> On 18 September, one of the largest alliances of criminal gangs in the capital blocked the nation's main fuel terminal in Varreux, cutting the capital off from its primary source of fuel, creating shortages across the country and closing down hospitals. She observed that the chronic situation at the fuel terminal threatened to highlight the very real limits of the Haitian National Police. The Special Representative noted that national stakeholders had begun to re-engage with a renewed sense of urgency with Government representatives, political groups and civil society organizations, launching new consultations on ways to forge a broader consensus on a path to elections. She added that insecurity also severely curtailed humanitarian access and that the various crises converged into a humanitarian catastrophe. She called upon the Council to take urgent action to support Haitians in their effort to build a better future.

The Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme noted that the humanitarian situation in Haiti had reached new levels of desperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Programme expected food security to further deteriorate in 2022 and surpass the record high of 4.5 million people estimated to face crisis levels of food insecurity or worse. She reported that insecurity made it very difficult and dangerous to implement humanitarian and development programmes. Gangs were blocking access to fuel supplies and key logistics hubs and protesters had ransacked and looted humanitarian warehouses throughout the country. In that regard, she looked forward to increased support from Member States to further facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the protection of humanitarian actors, personnel and assets. The Executive Director of UNODC noted that violence and organized crime, as well as the presence of and clashes between armed groups, were compromising stability, security and the rule of law in Haiti, hampering the efforts aimed at achieving peace and the prospects for lasting development. She underscored the need to prioritize supporting services that aimed to uphold and implement the law and criminal justice to assist the population and prevent any regional destabilization. In that regard, the Haitian Government directly tasked UNODC with supporting its border-management capacity-building endeavors. She also remarked that investments and efforts in the security sector should be

---

<sup>489</sup> See [S/PV.9136](#).

accompanied by similar efforts throughout the entire criminal justice system and noted the activities planned by UNODC, with the support of BINUH and other organizations, on border management and tracking illicit financial flows.

In her briefing on 17 October, the Special Representative reported that in addition to the three intersecting crises – economic, security and political – Haiti was facing a humanitarian crisis as a growing number of cholera cases had been confirmed on the island.<sup>490</sup> Gangs continued to blockade the Varreux terminal and without the free movement of fuel, Haiti would be unable to get ahead of the crisis. Regarding the political situation, the Special Representative noted that resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) had generated a sense of urgency and that society representatives were attempting to bring all stakeholders around a common proposal, with the support of the good offices of the United Nations. Against the backdrop of insecurity and a humanitarian crisis, on 7 October, the Council of Ministers authorized Prime Minister Henry to request the support of a specialized international armed force to help secure the free movement of water, fuel and medical supplies. The Special Representative reiterated the call of the Secretary-General for Haiti's partners to consider that request as a matter of urgency.

On 21 October, by resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously imposed sanctions measures concerning Haiti for an initial period of one year.<sup>491</sup> The measures consisted of a travel ban, asset freeze and targeted arms embargo against individuals and entities designated as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threatened the peace, security or stability of Haiti. By the resolution, the Council established a Committee mandated to monitor the implementation and designate individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, and to consider requests for exemptions.<sup>492</sup> Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to create a Panel of Experts, for an initial period of 13 months, to support the work of the Committee.<sup>493</sup> The Council

---

<sup>490</sup> See [S/PV.9153](#).

<sup>491</sup> Resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), paras. 3, 6 and 11.

<sup>492</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 19(a) and (c).

<sup>493</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 4 and 21.

also expressed its intent to consider authorizing the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests.<sup>494</sup>

Explaining her delegation's vote in favour of the resolution, the representative of the United States, as co-penholder together with Mexico, expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) accomplished the objectives of specifically targeting bad actors in Haiti and allowing humanitarian aid to reach civilians.<sup>495</sup> She added, however, that the measures were only the first step and noted the request from the Government of Haiti and the recommendation of the Secretary-General for the authorization by the Council of a non-United Nations international security assistance mission to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of humanitarian aid. According to the representative of Mexico, by imposing the sanctions measures, the Council gave a clear signal that the violence in Haiti could not remain unpunished.<sup>496</sup> He further stressed the importance of the embargo on the transfer of arms to non-State actors which were destabilizing the country. While noting that his country had always called for caution on the use or threat of use of sanctions in international relations, the representative of China recalled that his delegation was the first to propose the imposition of measures against the criminal gangs in Haiti considering the urgency of the situation. On the other hand, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that, despite his delegation's support for the resolution, it was not convinced that international restrictive measures would provide an adequate response to the range of problems plaguing Haiti and that a lasting solution should lie in an inclusive political process, socioeconomic development and the eradication of poverty and inequality. Several Council members stressed the importance of humanitarian exemptions in the new sanctions regime.<sup>497</sup> Speakers also welcomed the inclusion in the resolution of specific benchmarks to review the sanctions.<sup>498</sup> Some Council members highlighted the Council's recognition of the need for due process safeguards in the resolution, and welcomed

---

<sup>494</sup> Ibid., nineteenth preambular paragraph. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Haiti, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), see part IX, sect. I. B.

<sup>495</sup> See [S/PV.9159](#).

<sup>496</sup> Ibid.

<sup>497</sup> Ibid., Norway, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana.

<sup>498</sup> Ibid., Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana.

its intention to authorize the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests under the new sanctions regime.<sup>499</sup>

Opening the meeting held on 21 December, the Deputy Secretary-General stated that, at the end of 2022, Haiti was in a deepening crisis of unprecedented scale and complexity that was cause for serious alarm.<sup>500</sup> She noted that Port-au-Prince and the region beyond were suffering the worst human rights and humanitarian emergency in decades. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary-General informed Council members that 90 per cent of cholera cases in Haiti were in areas already suffering high rates of severe acute malnutrition. She further condemned the reports of widespread sexual violence by armed gangs. She called for international support and solidarity with Haiti and urged every country with the capacity to do so to urgently consider the Government's request for an international specialized armed force to help restore security and alleviate the humanitarian crisis in accordance with the letter of the Secretary-General dated 8 October 2022.<sup>501</sup>

Following the Deputy Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that the siege of Haiti's main oil terminal came to an end in early November 2022 through a concerted effort by the Haitian National Police.<sup>502</sup> She noted that fuel began to flow in a number of neighborhoods in the Port-au-Prince area, allowing hospitals and businesses to open and creating the semblance of a possible return to normalcy. Hope was quickly dispelled, however, as a new level of gang activity was immediately felt across the capital, marked by spikes in kidnappings, killings and rapes. The increase in recorded rapes, according to the Special Representative, reflected a horrendous modus operandi of the gangs which used sexual violence to intimidate and subjugate whole communities. Further compounding the plight of the millions living amid the violence, she added, was the catastrophic economic situation, with some 20,000 people facing famine-like conditions, large levels of displacement, 34 per cent of schools remaining closed and 15,000 suspected cases of cholera.

The Special Representative noted that the adoption of the sanctions measures under resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) by the Council was widely welcomed by Haitians, while subsequent

---

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., Norway, Ireland and Brazil.

<sup>500</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).

<sup>501</sup> [S/2022/747](#).

<sup>502</sup> See [S/PV.9233](#).



bilateral sanctions appeared to have generated a renewed sense of urgency on ways to restore democratically elected institutions. She highlighted that, in October and November 2022, civil society groups launched a new round of inclusive consultations on a transitional roadmap with members of the “Montana group”, private sector associations, trade unions and religious organizations which resulted in the development of a national consensus document. The document outlined steps for moving Haiti to elections within an 18-month timeframe, with a transitional council and oversight mechanism. She expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by the Council would be most effective as part of a comprehensive approach that included both the ongoing political dialogue and enhanced operational security support to the Haitian National Police, as outlined in the letter of the Secretary-General.

In his first briefing to the Council as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, the representative of Gabon stated that, in accordance with the resolution, the Committee imposed measures on individuals and entities it designated as being complicit in or having participated, directly or indirectly, in activities that threatened peace, security or stability in Haiti including a travel ban, assets freeze and a targeted arms embargo. The Chair informed the Council of his expectation that the Panel of Experts would appoint and assume its duties in January 2023 and would provide the Council with its interim report to the Council no later than 15 March 2023. He further echoed resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) in urging all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts.

Speaking last after the other briefers, the Editor of Haiti Liberté offered the view that previous military interventions in Haiti by the Council following the coup d'états in 1991 and 2004 cemented in place an unjust and illegal status quo and noted that Haitians were patently and almost universally opposed to any more United Nations interventions. He questioned the imposition of targeted sanctions by the Council against Jimmy Cherizier, known as “Barbecue”, whom he described as a spokesman for a federation of neighborhoods dedicated to keeping kidnapping, extortion, rape and other crimes out of their midst. An error of this magnitude, according to the editor, showed how easily misguided, counterproductive and blunt an instrument of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter could be, especially when it was receiving inaccurate and skewed information. The editor underlined the belief of Haiti Liberté

that the situation in the country could not be resolved through foreign intervention, military force or even sanctions and that the only thing the United Nations might do was provide disinterested economic support to rebuild the ravaged economy and political institutions. He concluded by calling on the Council to respect the principles enshrined under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.

In their statements at the meetings held throughout the year, Council members and other Member States focused on the further deterioration of the security situation in Haiti amid rising levels of gang activity and violence, including killings, kidnappings and sexual and gender-based violence as well as on the socioeconomic conditions and the political impasse and institutional vacuum in the country. They expressed grave concern regarding its impact of the civilian population, particularly women and children.<sup>503</sup>

In June, in anticipation of the renewal of the mandate of BINUH, Council members and other delegations took note of the assessment conducted by the Secretary-General and highlighted the need to strengthen different aspects of the Mission's work which they viewed as essential to address the situation on the ground, including good offices and mediation, capacity-building for the Haitian National Police to address gang violence, supporting efforts to curb arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and human rights protection, monitoring and investigation.<sup>504</sup>

In September, following the outbreak of protests over the derogation of fuel price subsidies, including the blocking of Varreux oil terminal, Council members and other speakers expressed deep concern at the increase in violence and deterioration of the humanitarian situation, including the renewed outbreak of cholera in Haiti. They stressed the need for urgent action by the Council in support of national efforts to curb gang activity and ensure humanitarian access. As a means of addressing the gang problem, multiple speakers called for preventing the supply of arms and illicit financial flows to non-State actors and noted the Council's readiness to

---

<sup>503</sup> [S/PV.8969](#), United States, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, France, Albania and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9066](#), Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic; [S/PV.9136](#), China, United States, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation); [S/PV.9153](#), Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates and China; and [S/PV.9233](#), Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Gabon, France, India, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>504</sup> [S/PV.9066](#), Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic.

take appropriate sanctions measures against those responsible for the instability in Haiti as expressed in resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#).<sup>505</sup> Some speakers further stressed that economic and humanitarian conditions and the rule of law could not be restored without first stabilizing the security situation.<sup>506</sup>

In December, further to the adoption of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), several delegations noted their encouragement at the reopening of the oil terminal, but expressed regret that gang violence and insecurity remained widespread.<sup>507</sup> Multiple delegations called on the Council to effectively utilize the sanctions regime to take action against those responsible for the violence and instability in the country.<sup>508</sup> In this regard, some Council members called on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) to promptly begin its work and take action against those responsible for the violence and instability.<sup>509</sup> Generally, however, speakers concurred that sanctions alone were insufficient to address the multifaceted crisis in Haiti and therefore underlined the need for national actors, with the support of the international community, to take the steps necessary to end the political impasse and pave the way for institutional reforms and improving socioeconomic conditions.<sup>510</sup>

At the last two meetings of the year in October and December, Council members and other Member States exchanged views on the possible deployment of a multinational security force in support of the Haitian National Police further to the request of the Government of Haiti and the recommendations of the Secretary-General. Council members held differing views on the approach and benefits of such a deployment. At the meeting held on 17 October, the representative of the United States announced that her delegation was preparing a draft resolution together with Mexico which provided for the authorization of a non-United Nations security force, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>511</sup> The force would facilitate international support to the police and Coast Guard and rely on Member States contributions of

---

<sup>505</sup> [S/PV.9136](#), China, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9153](#), United States, Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China.

<sup>506</sup> [S/PV.9136](#), United States, Albania and France.

<sup>507</sup> [S/PV.9233](#), United States, Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, France and Haiti.

<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, United States, Brazil, Kenya, Ghana, China, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, Brazil, China and France.

<sup>510</sup> *Ibid.*, Mexico, United States, Brazil, Ghana, France and Canada.

<sup>511</sup> [S/PV.9153](#).

personnel, equipment and other resources. Multiple Council members and other Member States over the last two meetings expressed support for the deployment of the force, particularly considering the Government's request for assistance in this regard,<sup>512</sup> while others called for more discussions on how best the Council could support the police.<sup>513</sup> Moreover, multiple speakers cautioned the Council against repeating the mistakes of previous international and United Nations interventions in Haiti, with some of them emphasizing the importance of any measures to this effect having the support of Haitians and regional actors.<sup>514</sup>

In their statements at the meetings held in 2022, the representatives of Haiti, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, focused on the efforts of the Haitian Government to stabilize the security and humanitarian situation and engagement with opposition groups to resolve the impasse and pave the way for future elections. The Foreign Minister stated that his country had experienced the limits of the United Nations presence in recent decades, yet also observed that following the withdrawal of the international forces, local structures could not achieve the same level of performance without receiving adequate training and means.<sup>515</sup> At the meeting on 26 September following the outbreak of violent protests, the Foreign Minister stressed that Haiti needed very strong support from the international community to support the Haitian National Police in combating armed gangs and welcomed the decision by some countries to consider imposing sanctions on those who participated in criminal activities and insecurity in Haiti.<sup>516</sup> After the Council's imposition of sanctions, on 21 December, the Foreign Minister observed that they had a clear impact and would help facilitate inter-Haitian dialogue and support for a national compromise that could lead to general elections in 2023.<sup>517</sup> He added, however, that without establishing an adequate security environment, it was deceptive to think that Haiti would emerge from the crisis for the long-term and stressed that the vast majority of Haitians were in favor of receiving assistance.

---

<sup>512</sup> Ibid., United States, Mexico, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania and Dominican Republic; and [S/PV.9233](#), United States, Kenya, United Kingdom, France, Dominican Republic and Canada.

<sup>513</sup> [S/PV.9153](#), Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and China and [S/PV.9233](#), Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, China, Norway and France.

<sup>514</sup> [S/PV.9153](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); and [S/PV.9233](#), Kenya, Ghana and India.

<sup>515</sup> [S/PV.9066](#).

<sup>516</sup> [S/PV.9136](#).

<sup>517</sup> Ibid.

**Meetings: The question concerning Haiti**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8969</a> 18 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/117</a> )		Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH	13 Council members <sup>a</sup> , all invitees <sup>b</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9066</a> 16 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/481</a> )		Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of Volontariat pour le développement d'Haiti	13 Council members <sup>c</sup> , all invitees <sup>d</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9095</a> 15 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico and the United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/560</a> )			Seven Council members <sup>e</sup>	Resolution <a href="#">2645 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9136</a> 26 September 2022			Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Executive Director of World Food Programme, Executive Director of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	13 Council members <sup>f</sup> , all invitees <sup>g</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9153</a> 17 October 2022	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/747</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated		Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophonie to the United Nations	13 Council members <sup>h</sup> , all invitees <sup>i</sup>	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/761</a> )					
<a href="#">S/PV.9159</a> 21 October 2022	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/747</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico and the United States ( <a href="#">S/2022/765</a> )	Haiti		12 Council members <sup>i</sup> , Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2653 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
<a href="#">S/PV.9233</a> 21 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti ( <a href="#">S/2022/761</a> )		Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General; Editor of <i>Haiti Liberté</i>	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members <sup>k</sup> , all invitees <sup>l</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>b</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

<sup>c</sup> The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya.

<sup>d</sup> Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>e</sup> Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation and United States.

<sup>f</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>g</sup> All participants invited under rule 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure participated in the meeting via videoconference. Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>h</sup> The representative of Kenya also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana.

<sup>i</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference. The representative of Belize spoke on behalf of the 14 member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>j</sup> Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and United States.

<sup>k</sup> The representative of Gabon spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and once in his national capacity.

<sup>l</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference. Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. Canada spoke on behalf of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti.