

C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Security Council held six meetings under this item. Four meetings took the form of a briefing and two were convened to adopt a decision.¹¹⁸⁷ The Council adopted a resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).¹¹⁸⁸ In addition, one draft resolution failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of two permanent members. More information on the meetings, including speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.¹¹⁸⁹

During the review period, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations. Their briefings focused on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launches of unprecedented numbers of ballistic missiles during the year and the risk of a significant escalation of tension in the region and beyond.¹¹⁹⁰ In their briefings, they reaffirmed the Secretary-General's commitment to working with all the parties for sustainable peace and a complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, reiterating that the unity of the Council was essential to ease tensions and overcome the diplomatic impasse. Noting the negative action-reaction cycle of missile launches and military exercises, the briefers stressed the importance of strengthening communication channels, including inter-Korean and military-to-military ones, in de-escalating tensions and lowering the risk of miscalculation.¹¹⁹¹ On the grave humanitarian situation in the country, the briefers expressed the readiness of the United Nations to assist people in need and reiterated the Secretary-General's call for the unimpeded entry of international staff and humanitarian supplies. In addition to Council members, Japan and the

¹¹⁸⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹¹⁸⁸ For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

¹¹⁸⁹ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 33.

¹¹⁹⁰ See, for example, [S/PV. 9004](#), [S/PV. 9146](#) and [S/PV. 9183](#).

¹¹⁹¹ See [S/PV. 9183](#) and [S/PV. 9197](#).

Republic of Korea participated in all meetings of the Council under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At those meetings, Council members held differing views regarding the approach to the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Many Council members considered that the continued nuclear weapons' development and testing undermined the non-proliferation regime and raised tensions in the region and beyond, posing a threat to international peace and stability.¹¹⁹² Some speakers criticized the continued silence of the Council.¹¹⁹³ Considering the absence of a consensus on the adoption of a draft resolution on the situation, the representative of the United States expressed the intention to propose a draft presidential statement to hold the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accountable for its dangerous rhetoric and destabilizing actions. Several Council members called on all parties to demonstrate restraint and reaffirm in practice their readiness to renew dialogue.¹¹⁹⁴ While also expressing concern over the rising tensions and intensifying confrontation on the Korean peninsula, the representatives of China and Russian Federation expressed opposition to any military activity threatening the security of the peninsula.¹¹⁹⁵ They further argued that the joint draft resolution proposed by China and the Russian Federation would help ease the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, create an atmosphere for dialogue and promote the realization of a political statement.

At the meetings, Council members also discussed the role of sanctions in addressing the peace and security issues on the Korean peninsula. Some Council members affirmed the effectiveness of sanctions in slowing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's weapons-of-mass-destruction and ballistic-missile advancements,¹¹⁹⁶ and underlined the importance of sanctions compliance by all Member States and the full implementation of relevant Security

¹¹⁹² See for example, [S/PV. 9197](#), United States, Albania, Ireland, Gabon, India, Kenya, Brazil and United Arab Emirates.

¹¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico and Republic of Korea.

¹¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Gabon, Mexico, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates.

¹¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, China and Russian Federation.

¹¹⁹⁶ See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), United States; [S/PV. 9183](#), Norway and United Arab Emirates.

Council resolutions.¹¹⁹⁷ Some Council members expressed concern regarding the evasion of sanctions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea allowing continued funding to its illegal weapons of mass destruction programs, including through cyberactivity,¹¹⁹⁸ and some opined that all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent evasion and the current sanctions regime should be updated to cover the new areas and stricter sanctions should be imposed.¹¹⁹⁹ Stressing that sanctions were only a means to an end, at a meeting held on 11 May, the representative of China stated that sanctions should not be equated to, or used to replace, diplomatic efforts, and considered that furthering sanctions by means of a resolution, as proposed by the United States, was an inappropriate way to address the situation.¹²⁰⁰ At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed the conviction that seeking a mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solution was the only way to peacefully resolve the issues concerning the Korean peninsula and regretted that the Council had only tightened the sanctions while ignoring the positive signals from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the past few years. He believed that the further strengthening of sanctions exceeded the scope of the measures needed to cut off channels for funding nuclear missile programmes and exposed the people of North Korea to unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian turmoil. At a meeting held on 5 October, the representative of Brazil called on the Council to seriously explore alternative avenues to reducing tensions on the peninsula and breaking the deadlock. He was of the view that while multilateral sanctions were part of a comprehensive response, they alone could not address the peace and security issue of the peninsula.¹²⁰¹

In their deliberations, Council members also addressed the grave humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Some Council members believed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself had worsened the situation of its own people through diverting resources from humanitarian needs to illegal military and ballistic missile programmes, and called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to prioritize the needs of

¹¹⁹⁷ See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), Ireland and United Arab Emirates and [S/PV. 9146](#), United States, Albania, Ireland and Norway.

¹¹⁹⁸ See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Norway; [S/PV. 9183](#), Mexico.

¹¹⁹⁹ See, for example, [S/PV. 9030](#), France; [S/PV. 9183](#), France and United Arab Emirates.

¹²⁰⁰ See [S/PV. 9030](#).

¹²⁰¹ See [S/PV. 9146](#). For more information on the imposition of sanctions by the Council, see part VII, sect. III.

its people over costly military ventures, and to allow the entry of relief organizations and the flow of humanitarian aid into the country.¹²⁰² In response to the concern that sanctions exacerbated the humanitarian situation, the representative of Norway, who chaired the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) in 2022, stated at various meetings that sanctions were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilians and pointed out that members of the Council continued to show that they had taken the humanitarian situation in the country seriously, as requests for humanitarian sanctions were swiftly processed in the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).¹²⁰³

In addition, in 2022, the Council convened twice to adopt decisions in connection with this item. On 25 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2627 \(2022\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2023.¹²⁰⁴ Several Council members made statements after the adoption of the resolution, noting with concern the leaks of the 2021 interim and final reports of the Panel of Experts and the potential damages to the credibility of the work of the Committee, and stressed the need for the Panel to improve its working methods.¹²⁰⁵ The representative of Mexico regretted that the Council members could not reach agreement on explicit instructions to the Panel of Experts to investigate and report in a timely manner on incidents relating to the launch of ballistic missiles in addition to its interim and final reports. Despite having voted in favour, the representative of China expressed regret and discontent that the concerns of his delegation, supported by a large number of Council members, were not taken on board by the penholder of the resolution.

On 26 May, the Council convened to vote on a draft resolution submitted by the United States.¹²⁰⁶ As the penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States made a statement before the vote affirming that the launch of six intercontinental ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2022, including those launched on 25 May, constituted a threat to the peace and

¹²⁰² See, for example, [S/PV. 9183](#), United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV. 9197](#), Ireland, Kenya and United Arab Emirates; and [S/PV. 9146](#), Albania, United Kingdom.

¹²⁰³ See, for example, [S/PV. 9183](#), Norway and [S/PV. 9197](#), Norway. See also [S/2022/2](#).

¹²⁰⁴ See resolution [2627 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

¹²⁰⁵ See [S/PV. 9004](#), United States, China and Russian Federation.

¹²⁰⁶ See [S/2022/431](#).

security of the entire international community.¹²⁰⁷ She noted that there had not been a response by the Council to any of the six intercontinental ballistic missiles launched despite the commitment made in resolution [2397 \(2017\)](#). She also explained that some Council members had argued that a presidential statement was the appropriate response to the launches. She recalled that her delegation had proposed press elements and a press statement following many of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s launches in the year but had been told that any such statement could lead to escalation or destabilize the Korean peninsula. She argued that the exact opposite had happened, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had taken the Council’s silence as a green light to act with impunity and escalate tensions on the peninsula. She added that with the adoption of the draft resolution, Council members could send a message to all proliferators that they would not stand for any actions on their part that sought to undermine international peace and security. She also stated that if adopted, the resolution would restrict the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ability to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes, streamline sanctions implementation and further facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The draft resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of two permanent members.¹²⁰⁸

Following the vote, 13 Council members made statements. The representative of China stated that with regard to the peninsula issue, the Council should play a positive and constructive role, and its actions should help de-escalate the situation and prevent it from deteriorating and even spiralling out of control, adding that reliance on sanctions would not help to resolve the issue.¹²⁰⁹ He said that sanctions would not only fail to resolve the problem but would lead to further negative consequences and an escalation of the confrontation. He noted that his delegation had repeatedly expressed the hope that the United States would consider issuing a presidential statement instead, as the best way to garner consensus among Council members and

¹²⁰⁷ See [S/PV. 9048](#).

¹²⁰⁸ The results of the vote were as follows: *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *Against*: China and Russian Federation. Further to the veto cast at the meeting, pursuant to GA resolution [76/262](#), the Security Council transmitted a special report to the Assembly on the use of the veto at the 9048th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 May 2022 in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” ([A/76/853](#)). For further details, see part IV, sect. I. F.

¹²⁰⁹ [S/PV. 9048](#).

avoid confrontation. Explaining his country's vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that the penholder had ignored the frequent clarifications made and that his delegation's appeals for it to be issued as a presidential statement instead had gone unheeded. According to the representative of the Russian Federation, strengthening the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang was not only futile but extremely dangerous considering the humanitarian consequences of such measures. He added that the quest for mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions was the only possible way to reach a peaceful solution to the Korean peninsula question and establish robust security mechanisms in North-East Asia. Other speakers pointed out that the continued launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of ballistic missiles, including that of intercontinental range, had been a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and regretted that the draft resolution had not been adopted due to the veto by two permanent members.¹²¹⁰ Some speakers expressed concern that the veto would send a wrong signal of impunity and embolden the authority of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.¹²¹¹ In that connection, several Council members called for the swift issuance of a special report by the Council to the General Assembly explaining the veto in accordance with the General Assembly resolution [76/262](#).¹²¹²

Meetings: Non-proliferation / Democratic Republic of Korea

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV. 9004 25 March 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/263)	Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	Resolution 2627 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9030 11 May 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	

¹²¹⁰ Ibid., Kenya, Mexico, Albania, Ireland, Ghana, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, United States, Japan and Republic of Korea.

¹²¹¹ Ibid., Brazil, United Kingdom, France, United States and Republic of Korea.

¹²¹² For more information on the special reports issued further to General Assembly resolution [76/262](#), see part IV, sect. I. F.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9048 26 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/431)	Japan, Republic of Korea		13 Council members ^a , all invitees	Draft resolution S/2022/431 13-0-2 ^b (not adopted)
S/PV.9146 5 October 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9183 4 November 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9197 21 November 2022			Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

^b In favour: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America Against: China, Russian Federation.