Max Rollwage

A prominent source of polarised and entrenched beliefs is confirmation bias, where evidence against one’s position is selectively disregarded. This effect is most starkly evident when opposing parties are highly confident in their decisions. Here we combine human magnetoencephalography (MEG) with behavioural and neural modelling to identify alterations in post-decisional processing that contribute to the phenomenon of confirmation bias. We show that holding high confidence in a decision leads… Show more

A prominent source of polarised and entrenched beliefs is confirmation bias, where evidence against one’s position is selectively disregarded. This effect is most starkly evident when opposing parties are highly confident in their decisions. Here we combine human magnetoencephalography (MEG) with behavioural and neural modelling to identify alterations in post-decisional processing that contribute to the phenomenon of confirmation bias. We show that holding high confidence in a decision leads to a striking modulation of post-decision neural processing, such that integration of confirmatory evidence is amplified while disconfirmatory evidence processing is abolished. We conclude that confidence shapes a selective neural gating for choice-consistent information, reducing the likelihood of changes of mind on the basis of new information. A central role for confidence in shaping the fidelity of evidence accumulation indicates that metacognitive interventions may help ameliorate this pervasive cognitive bias. Show less

Estimating invested effort is a core dimension for evaluating own and others’ actions, and views on the relationship between effort and rewards are deeply ingrained in various societal attitudes. Internal representations of effort, however, are inherently noisy, e.g. due to the variability of sensorimotor and visceral responses to physical exertion. The uncertainty in effort judgments is further aggravated when there is no direct access to the internal representations of exertion – such as when… Show more

Estimating invested effort is a core dimension for evaluating own and others’ actions, and views on the relationship between effort and rewards are deeply ingrained in various societal attitudes. Internal representations of effort, however, are inherently noisy, e.g. due to the variability of sensorimotor and visceral responses to physical exertion. The uncertainty in effort judgments is further aggravated when there is no direct access to the internal representations of exertion – such as when estimating the effort of another person. Bayesian cue integration suggests that this uncertainty can be resolved by incorporating additional cues that are predictive of effort, e.g. received rewards. We hypothesized that judgments about the effort spent on a task will be influenced by the magnitude of received rewards. Additionally, we surmised that such influence might further depend on individual beliefs regarding the relationship between hard work and prosperity, as exemplified by a conservative work ethic. To test these predictions, participants performed an effortful task interleaved with a partner and were informed about the obtained reward before rating either their own or the partner’s effort. We show that higher rewards led to higher estimations of exerted effort in self-judgments, and this effect was even more pronounced for other-judgments. In both types of judgment, computational modelling revealed that reward information and sensorimotor markers of exertion were combined in a Bayes-optimal manner in order to reduce uncertainty. Remarkably, the extent to which rewards influenced effort judgments was associated with conservative world-views, indicating links between this phenomenon and general beliefs about the relationship between effort and earnings in society. Show less

Metacognition, or the ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts, may be important in the development of depressive symptoms. Recent work has reported that depressive symptoms were associated with lower metacognitive bias (overall confidence) during perceptual decision making and a trend toward a positive association with metacognitive sensitivity (the ability to discriminate correct and incorrect decisions). Here, we extended this work, investigating whether confidence judgments are more… Show more

Metacognition, or the ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts, may be important in the development of depressive symptoms. Recent work has reported that depressive symptoms were associated with lower metacognitive bias (overall confidence) during perceptual decision making and a trend toward a positive association with metacognitive sensitivity (the ability to discriminate correct and incorrect decisions). Here, we extended this work, investigating whether confidence judgments are more malleable in individuals experiencing depressive symptoms. We hypothesized that depressive symptoms would be associated with greater adjustment of confidence in light of new evidence presented after a perceptual decision had been made. Show less

Polarization is one of the biggest societal challenges of our time, yet its drivers are poorly understood. Here we propose a novel approach - computational political psychology - which uses behavioral tasks in combination with formal computational models to identify candidate cognitive processes underpinning susceptibility to polarized beliefs about political and societal issues.

Widening polarization about political, religious, and scientific issues threatens open societies, leading to entrenchment of beliefs, reduced mutual understanding, and a pervasive negativity surrounding the very idea of consensus [1, 2]. Such radicalization has been linked to systematic differences in the certainty with which people adhere to particular beliefs [3, 4, 5, 6]. However, the drivers of unjustified certainty in radicals are rarely considered from the perspective of models of… Show more

Widening polarization about political, religious, and scientific issues threatens open societies, leading to entrenchment of beliefs, reduced mutual understanding, and a pervasive negativity surrounding the very idea of consensus [1, 2]. Such radicalization has been linked to systematic differences in the certainty with which people adhere to particular beliefs [3, 4, 5, 6]. However, the drivers of unjustified certainty in radicals are rarely considered from the perspective of models of metacognition, and it remains unknown whether radicals show alterations in confidence bias (a tendency to publicly espouse higher confidence), metacognitive sensitivity (insight into the correctness of one’s beliefs), or both [7]. Within two independent general population samples (n = 381 and n = 417), here we show that individuals holding radical beliefs (as measured by questionnaires about political attitudes) display a specific impairment in metacognitive sensitivity about low-level perceptual discrimination judgments. Specifically, more radical participants displayed less insight into the correctness of their choices and reduced updating of their confidence when presented with post-decision evidence. Our use of a simple perceptual decision task enables us to rule out effects of previous knowledge, task performance, and motivational factors underpinning differences in metacognition. Instead, our findings highlight a generic resistance to recognizing and revising incorrect beliefs as a potential driver of radicalization. Show less

This study investigated individual risky choice behavior in a gambling task and its relation with traits proposed by the Reinforcer-Sensitivity-Theory-5 (RST-5; Corr & McNaughton in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(10), 2339–2354, 2012) as well as with frontal EEG asymmetry. As assumed by the RST-5, the results showed independent influences of approach/avoidance and gain/loss sensitivities on participants’ behavior in risky choices. Individual approach/avoidance sensitivity was… Show more

This study investigated individual risky choice behavior in a gambling task and its relation with traits proposed by the Reinforcer-Sensitivity-Theory-5 (RST-5; Corr & McNaughton in Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(10), 2339–2354, 2012) as well as with frontal EEG asymmetry. As assumed by the RST-5, the results showed independent influences of approach/avoidance and gain/loss sensitivities on participants’ behavior in risky choices. Individual approach/avoidance sensitivity was predicted by trait measures of the behavioral approach system (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), while no such correlation was present for gain/loss sensitivity. EEG recordings revealed relatively stronger left-frontal cortical activity for trials with approach motivation compared to conflict and avoidance motivation. On the individual level, relatively stronger left-frontal cortical activity was associated with trait BAS. In addition, activity changes in frontal EEG asymmetry were associated relatively higher behavioral approach sensitivity. We conclude that frontal EEG asymmetry is an especially useful neuronal marker of BAS sensitivity and that the traits proposed by the RST-5 (measured by frontal EEG asymmetry and self-report) can be used to explain individual differences in risky choice behavior. Show less