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Outline

Extended Mind Complications

Abstract

single function objects: Notebooks, calculators, abacuses, maps, and so on demonstrate a fairly straightforward way of extending the mind and its capabilities. They, if you like, hold information "off line" which the mind can access as required. All of the information and procedures held in such simple devices could, at a stretch, be held by the mind, in the Brain. This extension is more questionable in the case of computational devices like mobile phones or laptops, Using these is more akin to a collaboration with another autonomous device rather than the phone being a simple extension of the mind. This difference is likely to be extended further as AI technology is increasingly incorporated into phones and similar devices.

Extended Mind Complications Michael Wood 23/06/24 Abstract single function objects: Notebooks, calculators, abacuses, maps, and so on demonstrate a fairly straightforward way of extending the mind and its capabilities. They, if you like, hold information “off line” which the mind can access as required. All of the information and procedures held in such simple devices could, at a stretch, be held by the mind, in the Brain. This extension is more questionable in the case of computational devices like mobile phones or laptops, Using these is more akin to a collaboration with another autonomous device rather than the phone being a simple extension of the mind. This difference is likely to be extended further as AI technology is increasingly incorporated into phones and similar devices. One could push this idea further and envisage that other human beings could play the role of “mind extenders”. If another human being becomes part of the extended mind the two brains display synchronization. This illustrates shared attention, shared processing, the same areas become activated in both brains, and implicit understanding of the other's actions, which possibly relates to the embedded nature of the extended mind. This does not happen with computational devices. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that a computational AI enhanced device will better masquerade as a human but it will never cross the rubicon. If the elements of the extended mind are other minds we should bear in mind that they are all embedded in a given context. This perhaps also relates to Heidegger’s dictum that ontologically man (Das Mann) is “thrown into” the world. This leads on to Involvement1 2 Stamford Encyclopedia “Martin Heidegger” An involvement is not a stand-alone structure, but rather a link in a network of intelligibility that he calls a totality of involvements. Take the stock Heideggerian example: the hammer is involved in an act of hammering; that hammering is involved in making something; and that making something is involved in protecting the human agent against bad weather. Such totalities of involvements are the contexts of everyday 1 2 Where does this get us? Clearly the extended mind is not simply a sort of distributed repository whose elements contain data or algorithms which are available “near line” to the mind, although this is part. How the mind interacts with other human minds (a process involving synchronization between brains) is obviously different and how minds interact with computational and AI + computational devices is different again. Keywords: Extended Mind, Enactment, Embedded, Computational Devices, AI, Brain Synchronization The extended mind thesis (from Wikipedia) In philosophy of mind, the extended mind thesis says that the mind does not exclusively reside in the brain or even the body, but extends into the physical world.[3] The thesis proposes that some objects in the external environment can be part of a cognitive process and in that way function as extensions of the mind itself. Examples of such objects are written calculations, a diary, or a PC; in general, it concerns objects that store information. The hypothesis considers the mind to encompass every level of cognition, including the physical level. It was proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in "The Extended Mind" (1998). They describe the idea as "active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes." They give the example of Otto. Otto, in early stage dementia, makes copious use of a notebook to capture detail that he would otherwise forget. So the notebook is functionally equivalent to long term memory. Clark and Chalmers suggest that the mobile phone is a greatly enhanced version of the notebook. So instead of information or action steps recorded passively there is all the capabilities of a typical mobile phone. one would have a device that very straightforwardly extends the mind. Instead of performing mental arithmetic one “delegates” this functionality from the mind to the calculator. Clearly the mind is the principal agent here. The mind poses the arithmetical question and the calculator provides the solution. Now, you and I and everyone we know already have or potentially have, our own Huxleys in the form of software systems like Chatbot GPT and similar. Chatbot GPT is a powerful application that runs on a desktop,laptop, or mobile phone and connects to the internet where it can get access to vast amounts of data as a basis for “deep learning” It exploits developments in Natural Language Processing to converse fluently in several languages. Apple's intention is to integrate Chatbot type technology with the iPhone iPad etc operating systems. Doubtless the intention is to create a more “human like '' interface. So in the near future everyone can have a Human -like mind extension. But there is an important step change here. The mobile phone, as noted, is computational and has a high degree of autonomy. It is directed by its operating system and designed to accept commands from its user. Other configurations are, however, possible. Interaction with computers, especially AI systems, is conversational between two (or more) “agents” rather than a simple delegation of functionality. Could one push this further ? Could other people serve as a mechanism for extending the mind ? Igor Stravinsky, the celebrated composer lived out the latter part of his life in a posh suburb of LA: North Wetherly Drive. His next door neighbor was the novelist, also celebrated, Aldus Huxley. Apparently Huxlley was immensely well read and something of a polymath. This delighted Stravinsky who treated Huxley as a sort of walking encyclopedia. Thus whenever Stravinsky encountered something he didn’t understand or someone asked him a difficult question he would simply give Huxley a ring. So, was Huxly part of Stravinsky’s extended mind ? Conversely, was Stravinsky part of Huxley’s. But let's go back briefly. The extended mind thesis claims that some objects in the external environment can be part of a cognitive process and in that way function as extensions of the mind itself. What is meant by a cognitive process? Well, a cognitive process is a series of chemical and electrical signals that occur in certain areas of the brain that facilitate what we normally call mind. Neurons release chemicals that create electrical signals in nearby neurons. The signals are brain waves or spiking or Action potentials. Neurons are,roughly speaking, oscillators or resonators and it is the spikes or action potentials which are the substrate carrying the phenomena which we call mind.When a neuron transmits waves, these will be intercepted by certain other neurons which will also start to resonate. This happens as a process of synchronization3 . The more coupled a pair of neutrons are, the more 3 A fairly gentle introduction to this topic can be found in Steve Strogatz’s Sync (Penguin 2003) closely in phase is their synchronization. Conscious interpretation of the five senses, procedural knowledge and emotional reactions are all examples of cognition. A lot of recent experimental evidence and theory points to the synchronization of neurons between brains4. Subjects inside scanner technology are invited to collaborate on some task, one example is collaborating on the writing of a children’s story. During this task their relevant brain neurons i.e., brain waves or spikes start to synchronize. The synchronization becomes more pronounced as the task collaboration progresses. Subjects subsequently report that they enjoyed the interaction and the collaboration very much. It is important to be clear about what is claimed by this. Three key areas are: Shared Attention: The synchronized activity likely reflects a shared focus on the task. And its objectives. Both brains are processing similar information and coordinating actions, leading to similar firing patterns. Shared Processes: The synchronization might reflect activation of similar brain regions involved in processing the task, like motor planning or communication. Implicit Understanding: It's possible the synchronization reflects an implicit understanding of each other's actions and intentions. This allows for smooth collaboration without needing to explicitly verbalize every step. This relates to the embedded nature of enactivism (see below) This obviously does not happen if someone is coupling with a computer such as a smartphone, even an enhanced AI one. So interaction or coupling between mind and the contents of the extended mind would not necessarily involve synchronization. Consider the four basic tenets of Enactivism Embodied: that cognition is rooted in the body's interactions with the environment. Embedded: that cognition is inherently embedded within a larger context or environment. Extended: that cognition is not limited to the individual mind Enacted: that cognition is an active and dynamic process of meaning-making. If we focus on the fourth of these: enactment, a dynamic process of meaning -making.. The meaning-making might plausibly occur if there is a human “other” as part of the extended mind, as Huxly was for Stravinsky and it is also plausible given the recent findings that cross brain neuron synchronization occurs when the mind is enacting. If therefore other humans are taken to be resources within the extended mind, interaction with these humans could be characterized by cross brain synchronization. A useful informal summary of this area is contained in: Brain Waves synchronize when people interact Denworth Scientific American July 2023 4 We have a cross mind/cross brain dynamic process of meaning making. We have enactment and enactment between two humans is collaborative. However, it is important to be clear as to what this actually is, as discussed above. In the case of Human - AI interaction, one has a dynamical system interacting with a computational one. This might result, if not now but in the future for the mind to have Enhancement of cognitive abilities: An AI system could process information faster, generate creative ideas, improve Seamless integrated into the mind’s thinking process: Slicker integration with the AI system may be orally through an avatar However as we have seen AI cannot truly "enact" with the world in the same way a human can. AI can't manipulate objects or have embodied experiences. This could limit the ability to co-create in a truly interactive way. AI can process information and respond in a way that simulates understanding, but it doesn’t have feelings or subjective experiences in the same way a human does. But what about embedding, involvement, and being thrown into the world ? To develop the Stravinsky example What of others in Stravinsky's circle? Robert Craft say ? One could imagine an extended mind space comprising,say, things like Musical compositions,Scores, Orchestral parts, Orchestras, Chamber groups, Concert halls, Recording studios, Composers, Impresarios, and so on. This raises the interesting question as to what extent might the extended mind be shared. The elements of the extended mind we should bear in mind are all embedded in a given context. This perhaps also relates to Heidegger’s dictum that ontologically man (Das Mann) is “thrown into” the world. This leads on to Involvement An involvement is not a stand-alone structure, but rather a link in a network of intelligibility that he calls a totality of involvements. Take the stock Heideggerian example: the hammer is involved in an act of hammering; that hammering is involved in making something; and that making something is involved in protecting the human agent against bad weather. Such totalities of involvements are the contexts of everyday So, where does this get us? Clearly the extended mind is not simply a sort of distributed repository whose elements contain data or algorithms which are available “near line” to the mind, although this is part of it. How the mind interacts with other human minds is obviously different and how minds interact with computational and AI + computational devices is different again. The extended mind, or perhaps the brain in which it subsists is clearly a heterogeneous structure whereby the mind couples with different elements of its extension in different ways. Arguably then there is a need for an approach which makes for a clear separation between the conceptual, a logical or conceptual picture of the mind and the detail as to how this is supported by the brain. Clearly they need to be separable, but linked.