Statement on the 2023 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus

1 Statement on the 2023 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus Professor Andrekos Varnava, FRHistS, Flinders University, South Australia and Honorary Professor, De Montfort University. https://www.flinders.edu.au/people/andrekos.varnava https://twitter.com/AndrekosVarnava Explanatory Note In October 2022 a peer-reviewed academic journal agreed to me writing a preview of the February 2023 Cypriot presidential elections as things stood by mid-November in order for it to have an impact and influence on it. I duly took a week from my schedule to prepare the piece, consulted various other experts in the field, and submitted the article. I was then advised that the reviewers approached rejected the invitations to review the article because the presidential elections were to be held in less than two months and that, therefore, any ex-ante analysis would be soon superseded by the results. This was in fact the point, that the piece had as its aim to influence voters by assessing the candidates. But the reviewers, themselves likely to be Cypriots, probably disagreed with my political views and assessments of the candidates, and did not want the piece to be published. So I am uploading it to my Academia page. What follows under the heading ‘Previewing the Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2023’ is the original article. Obviously, much has also happened in the 2 months since I wrote it, and some ‘predictions’ did not come to pass, and these will be discussed in the last section ‘Last Thoughts on the First Round of Voting in Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2023’. Why should you consider what I have to say? This is a good question. I am a foremost expert on the history and politics of Cyprus, having published four books, over 65 papers (peer-reviewed articles and book chapters) and 16 collections (volumes and journal special issues), almost all on the history and politics of Cyprus. Therefore, I may have something valuable to say about the presidential elections. To whom you give your vote is an important decision that you should not rush, nor should you follow others, nor indeed merely follow convention and vote for whom you or your  2 parents have traditionally voted for. I have no doubt that Cypriots are growing politically apathetic. One need only understand that in the first round of the 2018 presidential elections less than 400k voted, from over 550k registered voters, and when five years previously over 450k had voted in the first round, a staggering difference of over 50k less in 2018. So I urge you to contemplate what I rite below before you make your decision. What follows is the article as submitted to the journal, without any changes. The analysis of the candidates remains the same, although there are certain predictions, mostly hoped for ones, which have not come to light, especially as the four main candidates have officially been nominated and therefore there is no turning back now. What follows after the unpublished article are my latest thoughts on the candidates, their policies, performance in the campaign and what they stand for, before providing my final predictions for the first round. Previewing the Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2023 Presidential elections will be held in the Republic of Cyprus on 5 February 2023 and if no candidate receives 50%, there will be a runoff on 12 February. The incumbent Nicos Anastasiades, of right-wing Democratic Rally (DISY), who won in 2013 and 2018, is not running for office this time. Yet he believes that he would continue to have influence because he assumes that one of the three main candidates will win, all previous colleagues in his government: the front-runner, Nikos Christodoulides, served Anastasiades as his Government Spokesman (April 2014-February 2018) and Foreign Minister (March 2018-January 2022); Averof Neophytou, is the president of DISY since 2013; and Andreas Mavroyiannis, a career diplomat, was appointed by Anastasiades in September 2013 as his negotiator in talks with the Turkish Cypriots on the reunification of Cyprus and in July 2019 was also additionally appointed as the permanent Cypriot representative to the UN. These three, especially the first two, are tripping over themselves to say who will more closely continue the policies of the Anastasiades government. Aside from the disrespect shown by Anastasiades to the other candidates, do Cypriots want a new president that is influenced by the former one and who will continue his policies? Anastasiades’s presidency has not exactly been a roaring success. To be sure the economy rallied after he accepted a bank bailin in 2013, but the costs came at a very high price for society. Firstly, Anastasiades broke campaign promises by agreeing to a bank bailin by the principal bank in Cyprus (Bank of Cyprus) of 47.5% of bank deposits over €100,000 as well as the closure of the second biggest bank (where depositors lost all their deposits in excess of €100,000) to secure a €10-billion bailout from the EU (Cyprus Mail, 2013). As part of the plan to secure the funds, he cut social benefits, and pensions (already low for those in the private sector), and raised VAT and fuel taxes. This caused and continues to cause great hardship in the island for those on low incomes and pensions. Meanwhile, some have claimed that the president warned his associates and friends to move money abroad before the  3 ‘haircut’. Secondly, his handling of the negotiations to reunify the island, which directly implicates Mavroyiannis as his negotiator and Christodoulides as Foreign Minister, has been disappointing. Although Anastasiades had courageously supported the Annan Plan at the referendum in 2004 (eds. Varnava & Faustmann, 2009), the negotiations with Turkish Cypriot leader, Mustafa Akıncı, a pro-reunification independent elected in 2015, led to a disappointing climax at Crans-Montana in July 2017. Akıncı accused the Greek Cypriot team of making ‘maximalist’ demands to scuttle the talks, and this claim has since been supported by sources, notably by the investigative journalist Makarios Drousiotis (Drousiotis, 2021). Thirdly, Anastasiades and his government have been embroiled in numerous scandals. Two from 2019 would suffice to illustrate this point. In August 2019 the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a global network of investigative journalists, linked President Anastasiades’s Law firm, in the infamous ‘Pandora papers’ with business deals linked to a friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, through a network of companies involved in moving Russian money to and from shell companies, which his firm had registered (Gotev, 2022). The other scandal was with the so-called ‘golden passports’, which broke in November 2019 when it was revealed that the Anastasiades cabinet, thus including Christodoulides, gave a passport to the Malaysian fugitive, Jho Low, when it overrode the requirement for granting ‘golden passports’ for applicants to live in Cyprus for 7 years (Low had only owned property in Cyprus for two days before making his application) and ignored evidence that Low was being investigated for fraud and money-laundering (Drousiotis, 2020). In general, the 10-year presidency of Anastasiades has seen no improvement, in fact a slight deterioration, in Cypriot democracy, which was already deficient (Varnava & Yakinthou, 2011; Drousiotis, 2022), as reflected in the scores in the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, for The Economist, which find Cyprus categorised as a ‘flawed democracy’ since rankings began in 2006. The polls currently show that there are four main candidates, with one, Christodoulides, the clear frontrunner. The largest poll in terms of sample selected is that in the Cyprus Times by Analytica, with over 5,200 people questioned, while all others only polled around 1,000 people (Cyprus Times, Analytica poll). Based on the three most recent polls, Rai Consultants for Alpha News with 1,013 polled, Noverna Analytics for Offsite News with 1,240, and Analytica for Cyprus Times, Christodoulides is polling from 30.1%-35.0%, Neophytou from 14.8%-20.8% and Mavroyiannis, 14.4%-18.7%. Tellingly, in the Analytica poll, Christodoulides got 30.1%, Neophytou 20.8% and Mavroyiannis trailed with 18.7%, showing both Neophytou and Mavroyiannis at their higher ranges, while Christodoulides at his lowest. If these polls materialise into reality on 5 February, Christodoulides would easily make it to the second round, and the fight for who joins him would be between Neophytou and Mavroyiannis, with the former currently having the edge. All of these candidates are supported by one or more of the established political parties. Christodoulides, although a member of DISY, has been supported by DIKO, EDEK and DIPA, which collectively received 24.1% of the vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections (see Table). The fact that the three aforementioned polls show him getting at least a third of the vote of those who voted for DISY in the 2021 parliamentary elections helps to explain why he is  4 polling from 30%-35%. Neophytou, the leader of DISY and supported by them, is performing well below the 27.8% that DISY won in the 2021 parliamentary elections, which was itself very down from 34.3% in 2011, because Christodoulides has split the DISY voters. As for Mavroyiannis, who is supported by AKEL, he is polling well under the AKEL vote from 2021, which was 22.3%, and which had fallen off the abyss since 2011, when it was at 32.7% (Varnava, 2016). Table 1: Cypriot Parliamentary Elections 2011-2021 2021 2016 2011 DISY 27.8% 30.7% 34.3% AKEL 22.3% 25.7% 32.7% DIKO 11.3% 14.5% 15.8% ELAM 6.8% 3.7% 1.1% EDEK 6.7% 6.2% 8.9% DIPA 6.1% N/A N/A GREENS 4.4% 4.8% 2.2% Source: Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Cyprus. In clear fourth place in the polls is Achilleas Demetriades, a human rights lawyer and prominent public figure, running as an independent, who is polling between 5% and 6.4%. In the Analytica poll he got 6.4%, which is very high for someone without backing from an established political party, or any previous connection with any parties. To be sure, in 2003 Alecos Markides did receive 6.6% running as an independent, but this was as a DISY member and Attorney-General for the incumbent Glafkos Clerides DISY government, where he managed to split the DISY vote. The support for Demetriades is conversely spontaneous and driven by a desire for someone new, independent and truly progressive, since the three aforementioned polls show him polling from across various sections of the population and parties (the biggest support comes from individuals who have previously abstained, while he is drawing a considerable 25.7% from the Greens, followed by 6.9% from AKEL, based on the 2021 parliamentary elections, in the Analytica poll). His support is also partly a reaction against the three other main candidates who are all linked to the Anastasiades presidency and therefore represent varying degrees of continuity with it. Finally, there is genuine respect for what he has achieved in his career and for the Cypriot community. Finally, the aforementioned three polls are clear on the likely winner in round 2, namely that Christodoulides would win easily with 60% whether he faced Neophytou or Mavroyiannis. The only comparable instance of such a one-sided election in the last 40 years was when in 1983 and 2003 a candidate won in the first round reaching 50%. This then brings into serious question the candidacies of Neophytou and especially Mavroyiannis, since by running they guarantee the election of Christodoulides, but particularly the  5 strategy of AKEL, since Mavroyiannis is polling even lower from the already historically low base in the 2021 parliamentary elections. So who is the frontrunner, Nikos Christodoulides? Christodoulides first became a public figure when in 2009 he was appointed to a lectureship in post-war Cypriot history at the University of Cyprus. This was despite not having a PhD in history. Ultimately the University of Cyprus overturned his appointment because an internal audit of 17 June 2009 found that the composition of the hiring committee breached the Code of Ethics of the University since the head of the committee had developed ‘close interpersonal relations’ with Christodoulides and that another member of the committee had very ‘close scientific or professional relations’ with the head of the committee. Christodoulides sued the University of Cyprus and initially lost (Case No. 219/2010) but later won. The numerous court proceedings did not engage with the substance of the internal audit from 17 June 2009. Meanwhile, Christodoulides continued his career as a diplomat in the Foreign Ministry and rose through the ranks within DISY. After the election of Anastasiades in 2013, Christodoulides was appointed the director of the Diplomatic Office of the President of the Republic of Cyprus. His big break came when he was appointed Government Spokesperson in April 2014, thus making him the public face of the Anastasiades government. He served in this role for almost four years, before being elevated to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 2018. For the duration of his time as Government Spokesman and Foreign Minister, he remained loyal to Anastasiades, and developed a reputation for being one of the least open to the reunification of the island. In January 2022 he resigned as Foreign Minister when the rumours that he wanted to run for president had become too persistent and despite the fact that Averof had already declared his interest to run on 22 December 2021. But Christodoulides already had a plan B to counter the likely event that DISY would support Averof, which it formally did in March 2022, which was to present himself as an independent while remaining a party member and obtaining the support of most of the opposition parties that take the hardest line on the reunification of Cyprus. In relatively quick succession after officially declaring his candidacy in June 2022 DIKO, a hard line party on the Cyprus problem traditionally close to the Cypriot Orthodox Church, EDEK, the socialist party, with a similar stance on the Cyprus problem, and then DIPA, which split from DIKO back in 2018, all followed with their support (Varnava & Yakinthou, 2011). For these parties, being outside the government for 10 years and in some cases even longer was too long a period and hitching their wagon to the populist Christodoulides was therefore probably too enticing. Although the polling for Christodoulides has remained relatively solid at around 30%-35% for the first round and in a clear winning position in round 2 against both Neophytou and Mavroyiannis, this alliance between DIKO, EDEK and DIPA is precarious given that they have strongly opposed the Anastasiades government, and Christodoulides maintains that he represents a continuation of it. The last time DIKO and EDEK supported a presidential candidate in the first round was back in 2008 when they backed the incumbent president, Tassos Papadopoulos, but he failed to make it to the second round (despite the polls showing that he would). For Christodoulides it is about being the president at whatever the cost, even if it means destroying DISY. In the  6 campaign thus far, his strategy is to say that he represents continuity with the Anastasiades DISY presidency, while agreeing with the disparate views and programs of his support in DIKO, EDEK and DIPA, and avoiding debates and side-stepping any difficult questions surrounding the performance of the previous government and the fact that all the parties that support him for president had been strongly opposed to the government he was a part of (Cyprus Mail, 11 August 2022). Also, he has been embroiled in a scandal in which it was revealed that he had authorised the setting up of fake accounts across various social media platforms to attack his opponents, for which whenever questioned about has failed to deny his involvement. While Christodoulides may clearly have a credibility problem as the DISY member backed by DIKO, EDEK and DIPA, Neophytou is a through and through DISY man. But Neophytou, on the other hand, lacks the very populism that has elevated Christodoulides to the frontrunner status. He is also up against the claim by Christodoulides that he offers continuity with the Anastasiades government, which Mavroyiannis does to an extent but is also trying to play down. But it is the move by Christodoulides that has split DISY. Neophytou has largely focussed his last 20 years around DISY. The first and last time he was a minister, was Minister of Communications and Public Works from 1999-2003 in the Clerides government. As leader of DISY he has loyally defended the government of Anastasiades. Now he not only faces the fight of his life to make it to the second round, but also the fight to keep DISY from splintering, since recent polls show that over 30% of those who previously voted for DISY (in the 2021 parliamentary elections) would back Christodoulides if an election were held now. Mavroyiannis, on the other hand, like Christodoulides has a credibility problem, and unlike Neophytou, cannot claim to being the ‘party man’ of the party that is backing him. Also, he cannot claim to be independent. While enjoying a stellar career as a diplomat, Mavroyiannis, although not a member of DISY, was then selected by Anastasiades to serve as the Greek Cypriot negotiator on the talks for the reunification of Cyprus and has supported the Cyprus problem policy of the government. He was plucked, rather from nowhere, by AKEL as its candidate, without any evident progressive credentials to give him credibility as a progressive candidate. The decision, between him and Demetriades, who was the other candidate AKEL was considering supporting, seemed to be a politburo decision, based perhaps on the belief that Mavroyiannis might pull support from various parties. But the polls show the exact oppositive. Mavroyiannis is polling very lowly for an AKEL candidate at 14.4%-18.7%, and 60-75% of his support is coming from AKEL. This indicates that mostly rusted on AKEL voters are currently following the party line. What it also shows is that if the party were to switch, they would follow. Such a switch seems the only chance of stopping a Christodoulides presidency, unless, of course, that is what AKEL would prefer. Meanwhile, Achilleas Demetriades has been running his campaign without the backing of an established political party. Although growing up in a political family, with his father Lellos Demetriades  7 involved in politics for years before becoming the very successful Mayor of Nicosia from 1971-2001 (Demetriades, 1998; Abu-Orf, 2005), Achilleas has preferred to pursue a stellar career in law, particularly human rights law, rather than join a political party. In 1989, while still only 28, Demetriades took the case of Titina Loizidou against Turkey for violation of her rights to access her properties in Kyrenia at the European Court of Human Rights. After a seven-year hearing, he won the landmark case and in 2003 the Turkish government paid Loizidou over $1 million in compensation. A second case for which Achilleas Demetriades made himself known for, was his successful representation of Alexander Modinos, a gay man, when in 1993 the court found that the Republic of Cyprus was in violation of Article 8 of the European Court of Human Rights because it prohibited homosexual relations. This victory led to the change in the law. Finally, Demetriades brought to light the plight of families of those who died in the war in 1974, but whose fate was yet unknown. Demetriades represented one such family. In 1996 the remains of Christofis Vasiliou Ppasha were found in an unmarked grave and after more than two decades of legal battles in Cyprus and abroad, in August 2021, the family was vindicated when the court found that the state was guilty of delay in informing the family of his fate. The case had huge moral repercussions on how the state treats its citizens and the family additionally was awarded €60,000 in compensation. One could only conclude that Achilleas Demetriades has had a very successful career outside politics and the question is whether he could transition to a political career. His skills and capabilities as a leading human rights lawyer and public figure are easily transferable to politics and his progressive program shows this. Its centrepieces are his slogans ‘Honest State’ and ‘Cyprus deserves better’. Unlike the vague promises of his opponents, he outlines specific policies to change the overall direction of the island. He has outlined how he would arrest the democratic defect, such as by applying meritocracy (and not party politics) when making appointments in the civil/public service. He has announced policies to restructure the economy to increase growth and industries, to help those in most need (be scrapping multiple pensions and redirecting these savings to boost the social safety net), to develop small and medium businesses, and reduce the significant gap in wages between public and private sectors. He has also specified how he would make a serious effort to reunify the island, based on realistic and pragmatic compromises. He would acknowledge the role of both communities in the violence from 1955 to 1974, and set up a truth and reconciliation commission based on the Mandela commission in South Africa, along with reputable historians, to go deeper into this unfortunate history, where the other candidates turn a blind eye to any responsibility for the Greek Cypriot leadership and community during those times. From these measures, the reunification of Cyprus could be built upon solid foundations, which the current as well as previous governments have failed to erect. Thus far in the campaign Demetriades has been a breath of fresh air, especially in the few debates he has been invited to participate in. During the debate on 11 October between Neophytou, Demetriades and Christodoulides, the latter accused Demetriades of profiting from his work as a human rights lawyer, and Demetriades immediately quipped that if he had wanted to make money, he would have facilitated the applications of persons for ‘golden passports’ and had Christodoulides sign off on them!  8 Returning to the question of what is likely to happen, with the current choice of candidates there is only one possible winner, and that is Christodoulides. This will mean a continuation of the same policies and practices from the Anastasiades government, while Christodoulides would be beholden to DIKO, EDEK and DIPA and agreeing to have their supporters appointed to ministries and public service roles. Cronyism, already rife, will become endemic. There is only one way of stopping a Christodoulides’s victory. This is for Mavroyiannis to withdraw or for AKEL to withdraw its support for him, and support Achilleas Demetriades. This would overnight boost Demetriades’s polling to about 25% and also bring a substantial number of undecided voters currently considering whether to vote for Mavroyiannis or Demetriades firmly behind Demetriades. This may sway some of those independents, such as Professor Constantinos Christofides, the former rector of the University of Cyprus who is making a similar critique to Demetriades on the three main candidates, and is polling around 2%-3%, to also withdraw and back Demetriades. Regardless, not only would it put Demetriades into the second round, but it would then place the ball in the court of Neophytou and DISY. In the likely event of a battle in the second round between Christodoulides and Demetriades, would DISY support the member of DISY who betrayed the party, in Christodoulides, or would it support, what effectively would become a grand coalition between AKEL and DISY for reform, progress and reunification, behind a truly independent presidency of Achilleas Demetriades? Last Thoughts on the First Round of Voting in Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2023 Obviously, the hoped-for withdrawal of Mavroyiannis did not eventuate (although others have withdrawn) and I did not really expect it to do so given that AKEL selected him over Demetriades because it could exert their control over their chosen candidate. I suspect the reviewers of my article did not like this possible scenario, the withdrawal of Mavroyiannis to elevate Demetriades because he would have been a threat to Christodoulides in round 2. So they did not want my piece above to be published before the confirmation of the candidates. Now that this has happened, the election will take place with only three possible winners, Christodoulides, Mavroyiannis or Neophytou. This is even though the best performed candidate, with the most progressive program, and the most believable, is Demetriades. It does not matter to the AKEL leadership that had Mavroyiannis run as an independent without AKEL support he would be polling about 1%, nor that Demetriades is polling around 6%. Polling shows a tightening race between the three candidates backed by major parties or groups of parties. This tightening began in December and has continued with the latest polls in January. These show that Christodoulides, who is backed by those parties ‘in the centre’ and ‘centre left’, and a faction within DISY, which peddle unrealistic expectations on the reunification of the island, is now no certainty to make it to round 2, despite him declaring that he would, thus taking for granted the election and the people. His first-round vote  9 is likely to be concentrated around 30%, but could fall lower as previous elections have shown that polls have underrepresented the DISY and AKEL backed candidates. Neophytou and Mavroyiannis have improved in polling, especially Mavroyiannis, and are showing to be neck and neck. They are likely to poll around 25%. However, I would not be surprised if all three of these candidates were within 3% of each other, between 26% and 29%, in a three-way race reminiscent of the 2008 election. It is worth remembering that on that occasion the incumbent, Tassos Papadoupoulos, supported by DIKO, was ahead in the polls, but came third in the actual vote, and was thus knocked out. It would be no surprise if Christodoulides came third in the first round, especially given his poor campaign performance, particularly in interviews and debates where he has largely avoided serious questions, but he is potentially safe from being eliminated in the first round by the equally poor performances and lack of character and personality of his two main rivals. Neophtyou seems awkward and under pressure given the betrayal of Christodoulides and other DISY members (now all expelled from the party), and is struggling to get his own traditional voters to back him and not Christodoulides. Mavroyiannis lacks charisma and political acumen, as well as credibility, struggling to convince that he is not the person that was the right-hand-man of Anastasiades as the chief negotiator on reunification. There can be no doubt that Achilleas Demetriades has been the breath of fresh air during this campaign, but without the backing of any party represented in parliament he will fall short of reaching the 2nd round. His program is clearly the most progressive, representing social liberalism, moderate-left wing, Cypriotism, Green, and pro-reunification ideals. At its heart are his attacks on the corruption and cronyism of the party system, in which the parties share governance, each with their time to enjoy the gravy train. This (and their intransigence on reunification) is what unites DIKO, DIPA and EDEK, the parties supporting Christodoulides; their desire to get back on the gravy train and continue the cronyism that is the feature of Cypriot politics, as well as holding onto power by not pursuing reunification. Demetriades stands for a meritocratic administration and state, with clear divisions between state and church, and has therefore hit a chord with those who cannot stand the entrenched and anachronistic cronyism. But too many in Cypriot society rely on this system and that is why it cannot be broken without at least some established party backing the alternative. Polling shows that Demetriades will likely win between 4.5% and 7.5%, a record for someone not backed by any party represented in parliament or for someone who did not belong to any party. What is working against Demetriades is that despite many people who traditionally vote for DISY, AKEL or the Greens wanting to vote for him, many will vote strategically in order to try to lift Neophytou or Mavroyiannis into round 2. What Demetriades ends up with will depend on people resisting this strategic voting and on the voter turn-out, because a high voter turn-out will likely mean more votes for Demetriades, who is attracting support from first-time voters. It is telling, as stated above, that a staggering 50k less voted in 2018 than in 2013, and if Demetriades and indeed Mavroyiannis and Neophytou are to win more voters than the polls show, this trend must be reversed.  10 In any event, if the polls have any semblance of accuracy, my prediction for the first round on 5 February is: Candidate % Christodoulides 28.9% Mavroyiannis 26.9% Neophytou 26.2% Demetriades 6.4% Christou 5.3% Colokassides 2.2% Christofides 1.9% Others (7 others) 2.2% Total 100% 23 January 2023 References Abu-Orf, Hazem, ‘Collaborative Planning in Practice: The Nicosia Master Plan’, Planning Practice & Research, 20(1), 2005, 41-58. Case No. 219 /2 010, Nikos Christodoulides versus University of Cyprus, verdict delivered 16 March 2012 http://www.cylaw.org/cgi-bin/open.pl?file=apofaseis%2Faad%2Fmeros_4%2F2012%2F4-201203-219- 2010.htm&qstring=219%20w%2F1%202010&fbclid=IwAR3JQmlNLBJnelq4Q2gxTpMhZ1aOfHMlI4Meml- DC38lu3n_0EkAwtr4sAI Cyprus Mail, 27 August 2013, https://cyprus-mail.com/2013/08/27/deposit-haircut-was-eurogroups-proposal- anastasiades/ Cyprus Mail, 11 August 2022, https://cyprus-mail.com/2022/08/11/phantom-candidate-christodoulides- ducks-out-of-tv-debates-accused-of-hiding-updated/ Cyprus Times, Analytica poll on presidential election, 9 October 2022: https://cyprustimes.com/politiki/ta- apotelesmata-tis-megalyteris-dimoskopisis-gia-proedrikes-apo-ti-cyprus-times/ Cyprus Times, Analytica poll on whether independents should unite, 16 October 2022: https://cyprustimes.com/politiki/nea-megali-dimoskopisi-cyprus-times-protos-me-diafora-o-achilleas-na- igithei-ton-tessaron/  11 Demetriades, Lellos, ‘The Nicosia Master Plan’, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 8(2), 1998, 169-176. Drousiotis, Makarios, Η Συμμορία: Το διεφθαρμένο σύστημα εξουσίας στην Κύπρο, tο κούρεμα και η διαπλοκή πολιτικών και δικηγόρων (The Gang: The corrupt system of power in Cyprus, the haircut and the entanglement of politicians and lawyers), Alfadi, Nicosia, 2020. Drousiotis, Makarios, Έγκλημα στο Κραν Μοντανά: Πως και γιατί η συμμορία ματαίωσε τη λύση του Κυπριακού (Crime in Crans Montana: How and why the gang thwarted the solution to the Cyprus problem), Alfadi, Nicosia, 2021. Drousiotis, Makarios, Κράτος Μαφία: Πώς η συμμορία κατήργησε το κράτος δικαίου στην Κύπρο (Mafia State: How the gang abolished the rule of law in Cyprus), Alfadi, Nicosia, 2022. Gotev, Georgi, ‘Whistleblower: Spyware helps the mafia rule in Cyprus’, EURACTIV, 4 November 2022. https://www.euractiv.com/section/media/news/whistleblower-spyware-helps-the-mafia-rule-in- cyprus/?fbclid=IwAR3hw4yh7o0SCJ2lYHYgrXn4OENr2wpjwQapXdMcFKMmCnWFX5QJwoLMbag Varnava, Andrekos and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond, I.B. Tauris, London, 2009. Varnava, Andrekos, ‘The May 2016 Greek Cypriot Parliamentary Elections and Beyond’, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) Online Magazine, Issue 4, 2016, 24-36. Varnava, Andrekos and Christalla Yakinthou, ‘Cyprus: Political Modernity and Structures of Democracy in a Divided Island’, (eds.) John Loughlin, Frank Hendriks, and Anders Lidström, The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, 455-77.