One might ask why a book on ethnicity, self-determination, and the American empire would contain a chapter on this complicated history of the rise and fall of empires in the Baltic region. The reason is that in order to understand the...
moreOne might ask why a book on ethnicity, self-determination, and the American empire would contain a chapter on this complicated history of the rise and fall of empires in the Baltic region. The reason is that in order to understand the relationship between ethnicity and empire one cannot limit one’s view to the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century, but in some cases one must look back to Ancient History, Medieval, and Pre-Modern History. Contrary to what some post-modernist historians have argued, namely, that ethnicity is solely a matter of self-identification that does not exist prior to use of the term “ethnic,” we have seen with the Germans (the Prussians and the Saxons), the English (the Angles and Saxons), the Scandinavians (the Vikings, the Danes, the Swedes, and Norwegians), and the Slavs (the Russians, Poles, Estonians, Latvian, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) that what I call proto-ethnicity is rooted in linguistic and religious differences in the distant past.
We also have seen that ethnicity is related to empires and empires are best seen in relationship to geography. While history isn’t often written in terms of geographical regions, some historians have shown that geography is the best perspective to see how empires seek to dominate geographic regions through control of resources and transportation and trade routes. In the case of the Baltic region water passage ways connecting the Baltic and the North seas (the Great Belt, Øresund, and the Little Belt), the rivers that drain into the Baltic Sea (the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Neva), the gulfs off the main the sea (the Gulf of Finland, the Gulf of Riga, and the Gulf of Bothnia), and land routes between bodies of water, such as the Isthmus of Karelia (between the Gulf of Finland, Lake Ladoga, and the White Sea) were essential for imperial conquest and control. Denmark and Sweden fought for control of the straits at the western end of Baltic Sea; and Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and Russia fought for control of the eastern reaches of the sea. At first, Poland-Lithuania was dominant in the east and Denmark in the west, then Sweden became the dominant power in both east and west, and finally Russia took control of the east and Prussia (Germany) along the southern shore of the Baltic.
Prior to the modern age the leaders of empire were monarchs, who established dynasties through the secession and intermarriage. This resulted in the rulers of empires not necessarily being of the same proto-ethnicity as the people they ruled. We have seen this with German Hanovians ruling England and Swedish Vasas or Russian Romanovs ruling Prussia, Poland, and Estonia. Yet differences in proto-ethnic groupings based on linguistic families (Slavic-speakers, Baltic or Ural Altaic-speakers, Germanic-speakers) and religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Lutheranism) have been a factor in pre-modern imperial wars, such as the Thirty-Years War or the Northern Baltic wars.
Overall, by viewing the history of the Baltic Sea region through the lenses of geography, ethnicity, and empire lays a foundation for understanding later historical developments, such as the partition of Poland by Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the late eighteenth century; the development of nationalism in Germany, Poland, and Russia and the unification of German in the nineteenth century; the borders settlements and nations (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) re-created by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I; the pact between Germany and Russia to invade Poland prior to World War II; Germany’s invasion of Russia and Russia’s invasion of Finland during the war; and Communist Russia’s annexation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus and its domination of Poland and East Germany after the war. All this reinforces the conclusion that in the global world we live in today, one must understand not only American History and European History, but also World History.