Scientific Realism

This research theme focuses on understanding the diversity of realist and anti-realist commitments among practitioners of different scientific fields and philosophers of science. It investigates empirical data on attitudes toward the metaphysical and epistemic claims of scientific realism, exploring correlations with disciplinary methods, philosophical stances, and acceptance of key arguments. This matters because it grounds the philosophical debate in actual scientific and scholarly practice, helping clarify where and why divisions exist as well as shedding light on how conceptual frameworks are negotiated across domains.

This theme investigates the persistent problem of empirical underdetermination — the idea that data often underdetermine theory choice — and whether the incorporation of theoretical virtues (like simplicity, explanatory power, unification) and other principled heuristics allows scientific realists to respond to the problem. Studies clarify when underdetermination poses a genuine problem and when it can be tolerated or resolved, including the roles of mathematical equivalences, trivial permutations, and unconceived alternative theories. This deepens understanding of the robustness of realism claims amid empirical and theoretical ambiguity.

This theme probes the impact of historical case studies, especially those featuring impressive predictive successes by later-discredited theories, on the justification of scientific realism. By analyzing such cases scientifically and philosophically, researchers seek to understand if and how realist commitments can be maintained despite discontinuities or seemingly 'miraculous' successes unrelated to truth. This matters because it evaluates the resilience of realist inference in light of scientific revolutions and discontinuities in theory succession.

This theme explores positions like naturalistic quietism and other forms of abstinence from the realism debate, focusing on epistemological attitudes that neither fully commit to realism nor anti-realism. It includes characterizations of philosophically informed non-engagement with metaphysical claims about unobservables, emphasizing science’s own role in resolving such questions. Understanding these stances clarifies the methodological and philosophical boundaries of realism debates and highlights the pluralism of epistemic attitudes towards scientific knowledge claims.

This theme addresses the technical and philosophical articulation of approximate truth, differentiating it from related notions such as probability, vagueness, and confirmation, and applying it to address realist objections like the pessimistic induction. It explores how approximate truth functions as a middle ground to defend realism by securing justified belief despite inevitable falsity of precise truth claims in complex scientific theories. This strengthens the epistemic foundation for realism by clarifying the nature of truth claims invoked in realist arguments.

This theme scrutinizes epistemological defenses of scientific realism that do not appeal primarily to explanatory arguments like IBE and NMA, focusing instead on causal knowledge and empirically attested relations connecting theoretical entities to observables. It evaluates whether belief in unobservables is justified by causal efficacy rather than explanatory virtue, addressing a methodological pivot in supporting scientific realism. This contributes to refining the justificatory strategies available to realists and clarifying the foundations of their epistemic claims.