




European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

EU energy infrastructure & security of supply: Outlook ahead, future cost drivers & possible implications

TTE Council Ministerial – Council Presidency of Hungary
Brussels, 16 December 2024

Christian Zinglensen, *ACER Director*



Infrastructure – a double challenge




Security of electricity supply – upsides & downsides




***Case in point?* – price volatility in Central & Eastern Europe**

Starting with two over-arching themes ...


Expected changes in electricity cost components with the energy transition



Expected changes in electricity cost components with the energy transition




Leveraging energy resource endowments across the EU




Infrastructure - a double challenge

Network costs at risk of doubling by 2050

Grid costs are expected to increase ...



... while electricity costs should decrease




>3x
 More expensive to connect to distribution than transmission grid

Significant cross-border needs remain unaddressed

Approx. half of the cross-border needs identified via network planning instruments seem not to be addressed by current grid projects.



This means the potential benefits of this cross-border build-out, if left unaddressed, will remain ‘on paper’.

There are more cross-border needs than planned cross-border investments



Anticipated demand drives network build-out, right?

Unrealistic forecasts of future consumption
may raise costs for actual consumers and give rise
to potential sunk costs




Integrated planning? Yes, but ‘easier said than done’

Year-on-year change for main electricity generation technologies, Q3 2024 (TWh)



Percentage of hours when electricity day-ahead prices were above costs of producing electricity from gas on average in the EU-27, Q1-Q3 2020-2024 (%)




Compared with the same period last year, gas-fired power generation in the EU declined by 12 TWh in the third quarter of 2024. Increased renewables’ output limited the opportunities for conventional power plants (gas and coal) to run profitably. This resulted in reduced carbon emissions, loosened the EU gas demand-supply balance and reduced the role of gas as the marginal price setter in electricity markets.

Source: ACER calculations based on European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) data.

Note: Hydro does not include hydro-pumped storage. Hydro-pumped storage, biomass and other generation sources were accounted for separately, under the category ‘Other’. ‘Demand’ combines consumption and net imports from countries outside the EU.


So, less relevance of gas? Well, it depends ...

EU gas storage withdrawals, November 2021-2024 (TWh)




Security of electricity supply – upsides & downsides

In 2021, a major operational incident split Continental Europe into two parts




France became a huge importer of electricity during the energy crisis




Note: The length of the arrow is directly proportional to the amount of electricity imported or exported.

Is security of supply worsening?

This Winter



Short-term



Mid-term




Long-term



■ Adequacy concern identified ■ No adequacy concern identified

Costs of capacity mechanisms are significant

Costs of capacity mechanisms are on the rise,
likely a sign-of-things-to-come




Source: ACER calculations based on data provided by NRAs.

Note: Costs for 2024 are projections. The figure includes the costs of legacy contracts in Spain and Portugal.

Costs of capacity ^{and possibly flexibility} mechanisms are significant




Costs of capacity mechanisms are on the rise, likely a sign-of-things-to-come




Source: ACER calculations based on data provided by NRAs.

Note: Costs for 2024 are projections. The figure includes the costs of legacy contracts in Spain and Portugal.

A wave of flexibility support schemes may come on top


-  Capacity mechanism
-  Flexibility scheme
-  Capacity mechanism and flexibility scheme



Might greater 'resource sharing' mitigate the rise in costs?

Costs of capacity mechanisms are significant *and possibly flexibility*

Costs of capacity mechanisms are on the rise, likely a sign-of-things-to-come



Source: ACER calculations based on data provided by NRAs.


Note: Costs for 2024 are projections. The figure includes the costs of legacy contracts in Spain and Portugal.

Cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms



A wave of flexibility support schemes may come on top

- Capacity mechanism
- Flexibility scheme
- Capacity mechanism and flexibility scheme



85% of
long-term contracts


Through capacity
mechanisms directed
to fossil-fuel generators
in 2035




Case in point? – price volatility in Central & Eastern Europe

Zooming in on ‘summer developments’

Average day-ahead prices in the EU at 19:00 CET,
 1 July-23 September 2024 (EUR/MWh)




Evolution of average day-ahead prices in select EU bidding
 zones, July-September 2024 (EUR/MWh)



More interconnector capacity needs to be made available

There is limited progress towards 70%


Average minimum hourly margin available for cross-zonal trade in the Core capacity calculation region per Member State – H2 2022-2023 (% of Fmax)



*“ACER estimates that, during the summer of 2024, meeting the 70% requirement would have yielded **between 10 and 25% of additional margin of capacity** in the most relevant bottlenecks [affecting Central Eastern Europe].”*

More interconnector capacity needs to be made available

There is limited progress towards 70%



*“ACER estimates that, during the summer of 2024, meeting the 70% requirement would have yielded **between 10 and 25% of additional margin of capacity** in the most relevant bottlenecks [affecting Central Eastern Europe].”*

A greater role for demand response & storage

Barrier	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	NO	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK	
Lack of a proper legal framework to allow market access																													
Unavailability or lack of incentives to provide flexibility																													
Restrictive requirements to providing balancing services																													
Restrictive requirements to providing congestion management																													
Restrictive requirements to participating in capacity mechanisms																													
Restrictive requirements to participating in interruptibility schemes																													
Limited competitive pressure in the retail market																													
Retail price interventions																													

■ High
 ■ Moderate
 ■ Low
 ■ Not (too) restrictive
 ■ N/A
 ■ NAP




Barriers to demand response are often ‘**hiding in plain sight**’.
The sum of many small obstacles can add up to significant barriers, impeding system flexibility.
 A detailed and updated ACER report on the first three barriers listed above will be released in early 2025.

ACER and national regulators scrutinise markets for potential abuse

- Insider trading
- Price manipulation
- Deception, misleading behaviour or information

Market concentration \neq market manipulation



Conclusion

Many interdependencies in the energy transition (e.g. pace of electrification, flexibility, renewables rollout, grids) suggest that price volatility will likely be a recurrent feature.

How to moderate this volatility?

- Greater uptake of (low-carbon) flexibility
- Active monitoring in order for decision-makers to better 'ANM' the journey (*anticipate, navigate, mitigate*)



‘Doing more together’ invariably links to ‘trust’




1. **It starts & ends with political will:** Commitment to structurally integrate energy markets; a commitment that is anchored institutionally.
2. Coordinated **infrastructure planning and cost-/benefit-sharing** across borders, done or verified by public authorities.
3. **Coordinated renewable and flexibility deployment** across borders.
4. Closer **integration of real-time operation** (especially offshore).
5. **Rigorous enforcement by public authorities** to ensure trust in the whole framework; why else accept increased interdependence?

So, might it be time to renew (or revisit) those initial vows?



Taking a fresh look at future cost drivers



Consider 'doing more together' on infrastructure and security of supply



Flexibility becomes an imperative to moderate price volatility



A relationship test ahead: Key policy choices for the Energy Union

Thank you. Any questions?

The contents of this document do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the Agency.



European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

✉ info@acer.europa.eu
🖱 acer.europa.eu

✂ [@eu_acer](https://twitter.com/eu_acer)
🌐 [linkedin.com/company/eu-acer](https://www.linkedin.com/company/eu-acer)



European Union Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators

ACER is hiring!

Join us in powering Europe's energy future.

Check out our job vacancies (in many areas).





- **Supporting the integration of energy markets in the EU** (by common rules at EU level). Primarily directed towards transmission system operators and power exchanges.
- **Contributing to efficient trans-European energy infrastructure**, ensuring alignment with EU priorities.
- Monitoring energy markets to ensure that they function well, **detering market manipulation and abusive behaviour**.
- Where necessary, **coordinating cross-national regulatory action**.
- Governance: **Regulatory oversight is shared** with national regulators. **Decision-making** within ACER is collaborative and joint (formal decisions requiring 2/3 majority of national regulators). **Decentralised enforcement** at national level.
- Headquartered in Ljubljana, Slovenia. **Engaged across the EU**.