The domain of social media investigations and disinformation is facing a crisis of genre. At the major European conference on disinformation in Ljubljana (Disinfo25), I watched dozens of brilliant investigators and academics present research on hostile information operations. Great work, rigorous tracking, beautiful visualizations of bot networks and inauthentic accounts. But I believe the "analyse & understand" part is more or less solved. We're hitting diminishing returns. We've mapped Russia's tactics exhaustively. The TTPs are catalogued. We know how it works and at what scale. I can see at least 5 structural problems that block us from moving beyond analysis: 1. Platform cooperation collapsed. Social media companies are less willing to act on takedowns. The investigations pile up with nowhere to go. 2. Takedowns don't matter anymore. Even when platforms act, bot accounts resurrect in hours at insignificant cost. We're playing whack-a-mole at industrial scale. They automate creation faster than we can document deletion. 3. Inoculation can't scale. Pre-bunking works in controlled studies. They collapse when you try to reach populations at the speed and scale that hostile operations move. We're bringing seminars to a machine-gun fight. 4. We're not taking the fight to them. Information warfare stays one-directional. Russia operates in our information space daily. We remain absent from theirs. The democratic world is paralyzed by ethics debates and escalation fears while the adversary faces no comparable pressure. 5. We have no deterrence. NATO members might not possess up-to-date information warfare capabilities and might not be able to deploy them when needed. But "when needed" was yesterday. Russia doesn't fear retaliation in the cognitive domain because we've never shown we're willing to act there. Deterrence requires credible threat. We offer research reports. While we're producing analysis, Russia is producing effects. We've perfected the diagnosis while the patient gets worse. The question isn't what our adversaries are doing. We know. The question is what we're willing to do about it, and how fast we can move. Would love to hear from the industry leaders - would you relate to this problem list or see anything else?
another conference to discuss the issue could help 🤣
The call to action is anything but clear. However, if we ask who should take action — who should conduct offensive influence operations on our behalf — the answer is likely to be the intelligence services. If intelligence services are our champions in this struggle, we should reasonably expect this to be a covert fight, carried out in secrecy. As analysts, we must avoid falling into the trap of assuming that what we see is all there is, especially when we rely solely on OSINT. There are valid reasons why security clearances are necessary in this field.
I keep hearing the same feedback from the conferences. Can’t agree more!
I really like this framing 🇺🇦Sviat Hnizdovskyi. Adam Bryson check this out.
For years, the West’s war on disinformation has gone nowhere — stuck spinning its wheels while Moscow plays rugby and we play fact-check bingo. When it comes to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), you don’t win by sitting back on defense or patting yourself on the back for “pre-bunking” and winning prizes for "fact-checking". This battlefield calls for a "double-track decision". Remember 1979. The West (or what is left of it) must make unmistakably clear that it’s prepared to surge its information-war capabilities against Putin’s regime with FIMI too. And yes, that means to quietly saturate the Kremlin’s information space with disruptive counter-narratives powerful enough to fracture the propaganda bubble and rattle the foundations of Russian public opinion. No ethics, no journalism, just "brutal disinformation". And simultaneously, the West should put talks on the table — real negotiations to end hostile FIMI on both sides. With controls and monitoring on both sides. Strength in one hand, diplomacy in the other. That’s how you win a contest the Kremlin already treats like war.
I think what is needed is a whole-of-society embrace of the things that matter: kindness, love, morale, selflessness - all of those qualities, or values, which keep Ukraine going despite all. And the ”glue”, culture and spirituality. Russkiy mir is all about values, building worlds and projecting visions through storytelling. Pomerantsev is right, we need to beat the Russians at their game, but with heart.
Thank you for this spot-on analysis! You're absolutely right that we can’t afford to remain in the analytical comfort zone of merely dissecting disinformation narratives and dynamics. Beyond offensive measures and prebunking by default — ideally starting early, but also continuing throughout and after every educational and professional path — I’m convinced we should invest more in reaching the silent middle, those increasingly fatigued by social media. We should create meaningful incentives and environments that invite them to take part in constructive exchange, both online and in person, before these arenas are fully saturated with propaganda narratives. This is the groundwork for strengthening networks of credible multipliers who still engage with those drifting beyond the reach of democratic discourse. Outwardly, as you say, we need less diagnosis and more action.
CEO @OpenMinds | Cognitive Defense
6dWould love to hear from the industry leaders - would you relate to this problem list or see anything else?