Jay Janzen’s Post

View profile for Jay Janzen

Strategic Communications Director (J10) at NATO

Peter Pomerantsev and Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi have published a compelling case in Foreign Policy on the need for the west to act decisively in the cognitive domain. The article cites three big questions on contesting for cognitive advantage with adversaries. Question 1: Does it work? The authors cite examples of slowing Russia’s efforts to recruit new soldiers, which had some success. They go on to suggest that other issues might be more effective, such as: criminals in the army, failure to pay promised compensation when soldiers are killed, and the degradation of social services in Russia. Question 2: Can it bypass heavy censorship? The article refers to Ukraine’s successes using social media, online video ads, and satellite TV and the cat and mouse game over access via VPNs and other technology. The authors stress that the trick is to provide content that is so important to audiences that they will be prepared to seek it. This necessitates a deep understanding of the audiences we wish to reach, along with communications that meet their needs. Question 3: Can NATO conduct this ethically? The writers are clear that NATO’s efforts will not imitate the Kremlin’s “toolbox of lies.” There is scope for military deception and Psychological operations during crisis and conflict, but wider efforts do not need to hide their origins and should focus on widening understanding while minimizing risk for audiences. The article concludes with a call for collaboration across civil, government and military sectors in order to build “cognitive deterrence.” The authors note that NATO’s ongoing work on the Cognitive Warfare Concept is a positive step in the right direction. https://lnkd.in/edk2GG2r

Dr. Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven

Expert on Hybrid warfare. Author. Ambassador ret. and fmr NATO Intelligence coordinator l Senior Advisor, Berlin Global Advisors | Visiting Professor, Natolin College of Europe

1w

Excellent points. Need to raise the cost and develop deterrence strategies also in the non-military domain. “Cognitive deterrence” is a promising concept. Strange that governments have been so reluctant to open up such avenues

John Fuisz

CEO/Founder at Veriphix - Belief data and shifting belief. Dual use COTS. NATO Challenge Winner. MissionLink '23 cohort

1w

1. Unless NATO lied, NATO can not engage in offensive Cognitive Warfare. NATO is defensive only. 2. Other countries can do as they see fit. The UKR entities use 10+ year old techniques that NOBODY is going to use or copy. If you want to see the before-and-after cognitive MOE that tracked impact of the Daria Dugin death, see below. But NATO is DEFENSIVE and you use old tech so you don’t see member nations playing.

  • No alternative text description for this image
Dixie O.

Strategic Readiness Leader | Foresight, Strategy, Operations, Crisis Management

1w
Like
Reply
See more comments

To view or add a comment, sign in

Explore content categories