Right so the BritCard proposal then. Cryptography to the rescue? 1/ I don’t instinctively like the idea of ID cards. It offends my liberal sensibilities. But ignoring the political landscape, digital IDs aren’t the privacy catastrophe they would have been in the 2000s. 2/ Back then, the model was a central database of every citizen, accessible across departments. A honeypot for abuse, leaks, and scope creep. 3/ Today’s digital ID standards are different: built on verifiable credentials. That means you hold your own digital passport/driving licence on your phone, signed by government. 4/ When you need to prove something eg the right to work, you don’t hand over your whole passport. You share just the fact needed. Sometimes even a zero-knowledge proof: “Yes, over 18” without showing date of birth. 5/ Data doesn’t sit in one giant silo. It stays with the issuing authority (passport office, DVLA, Home Office). So-called federated. Checks are done cryptographically, not by copying documents into filing cabinets all over the economy. 6/ Done right, digital ID reduces risk compared to today, where employers and landlords hoard passport scans, and mistakes in manual checks create Windrush-style injustices. 7/ Of course, the devil is in design. A “canonical event log” of every check could easily tip into surveillance. Guardrails are needed: minimal logs, tight retention, transparency reports. 8/ We need three guarantees: – Share less, prove more – No new central database – Errors are visible and appealable 9/ If those are in place, digital IDs don’t have to be a tool of control. They can be an upgrade in privacy and security 10/ The politics will always be tricky. But let’s not fight the battles of 2005. The technology has moved on.
Wesley Sukdao
1mo
This is government overreach.
“Data doesn’t sit in one giant silo. It stays with the issuing authority (passport office, DVLA, Home Office).” But this already exists right? You can already get proof of “right to work,” “right to rent,” etc., from the respective authorities , each of which manages the relevant records independently.
The hole in your argument is Trust. Do I trust the holder of the information, not is the bucket the information in secure or not. That answer is no. Regardless of the data security of the system, i simply dont trust this government in particular, or any future government not to abuse it. That will never fly change and no degree of data security , or promises to behave, or oversight setup by current government ministers or MP's will be enough. The existence of it is temptation beyond the abilities of government apparatus to resist.
It could lead to severe restrictions on freedoms, economic hardship, constant surveillance, and a rigid social system that limits opportunity.
Roxana Irina Big
1mo
Lawrence on your "liberal sensibilities": 1. The rest of Europe has had IDs for decades now! And there it's much harder to forge an identity because it would require a lot of money & corruption from authorities. Whereas in UK, people change their names by themselves without an authorised institution such as the Home Office having to approve this! 🤯🤯 2. If you have a British passport or driving licence, all your information is already held & used by governmental institutions such as the Passport Office, the Home Office, DVLA, HMRC, DWP & potentially others. Only the British that don't have a passport or a driving licence would be affected by mandatory IDs for the whole population starting at 18 as it's done in the rest of Europe (for some countries it's actually done earlier than 18 years!).
Nick Ward
1mo
Well said Lawrence - I recall you explaining some of these techniques back in 2016, and if they're in place digital ID could actually enhance privacy.
Mark Carney
3w
We've got lots of examples where the UKGOV has demonstrated it can't do cryptography properly - I really hope they bring in some actual experts this time.
I will leave the UK before I ever get a mandatory ID.
Alun Hartley
4w
I disagree with a lot of these points. 2) That database effectively already exists - your passport number, driving license number, NHS number and NI number are already linked via the "government gateway" project. 4) You say that, but we know that there are a lot of unscrupulous employers, especially of minimum-wage and below workers. Just because the app has a "prove your right to work" function, doesn't mean prospective employees won't be told "unlock the full app and hand it over". 6) Those same unscrupulous employers are going to take screengrabs/photos of records, keep them around, and share them into the usual casual-labourer blacklists that we know exist. No, these digital IDs are a HUGE step in the wrong direction for personal privacy and data protection, especially amongst disadvantaged segments of the population. As much as I don't like the idea of ID cards, a physical card with only - Photograph - Name - Randomly assigned ID number that ties into your existing records is far safer. That's enough to prove to an employer that you match a specific set of government records, and then there can be an employer portal to verify a simple yes/no to the only question that really matters to them - Can I employ this person?
Cryptographer
1moAgreed. In fact calling them "ID Cards" is a bit of an own goal by the gov. An ID card implies something which you have to carry on you at all times, and which needs to be produced when asked by someone in authority. This is something [although accepted in Europe] is really against the UK view of policing by consent I feel. You might still need physical "ID Cards" for the fraction in the population which do not have smart phones, or with other exclusion issues due to health or whatever. But that should be the exception not the rule. The question then is what should one call such an application. Perhaps simply the Brit Wallet or Brit App is good enough for this?