Mohamed Atta’s Post

View profile for Mohamed Atta

OT Cybersecurity Expert | OT SOC Visionary ISA/IEC 62443 Expert | GRID | SCADA Security Manager

OT Detection Use Cases for your OT SOC When it comes to building an OT SOC, there’s a big misconception: many assume success is about collecting every log or integrating every system In reality, the key is focusing on operationally meaningful visibility — the detections that actually help you understand what’s happening inside your control network >> In industrial environments, context defines everything > The same Modbus write command could mean two very different things: > a maintenance engineer performing a scheduled update — or an attacker changing control logic. > Without context, both look identical in your SIEM. >> An OT SOC must speak the language of process, assets, and operations, not just alerts. It should tell you when something changes, who initiated it, and whether it threatens safety, reliability, or integrity >> Below are 10 detection use cases I always recommend as a starting point. They’re mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS and NCA OTCC, but more importantly, they’re grounded in what actually happens inside real plants and industrial networks 1. Unauthorized PLC Programming Detect logic or configuration changes outside scheduled maintenance windows 2. ICS Protocol in IT Zone Flag Modbus, DNP3, or BACnet traffic on IT networks — strong evidence of segmentation drift or misconfiguration 3. PLC Stop or Mode Change Command Detect STOP or PROGRAM mode changes — an event that can halt production and indicate malicious control 4. Remote Access to HMI from Unapproved Source Identify RDP, VNC, or TeamViewer sessions from IT zones targeting OT HMIs — a common lateral movement path 5. New Device in Control VLAN Catch unauthorized or rogue devices joining deterministic control networks where new assets should rarely appear 6. PLC Firmware Downgrade or Version Change Detect unauthorized firmware rollbacks — a subtle but serious method of tampering or hiding malicious code 7. OPC UA Anonymous Session Identify untrusted or anonymous OPC UA sessions that bypass normal authentication or encryption 8. Engineering Software on Non-Engineering Host Detect the execution of TIA Portal, Control Builder, or similar tools on unauthorized systems — often a sign of credential misuse or insider activity 9. PLC Configuration Upload Monitor FTP/TFTP uploads to PLCs — an activity that could replace control logic or inject malicious configuration 10. Abnormal HMI Behavior Spot rapid screen changes, tag edits, or command spamming from operators — signs of misuse, automation, or compromise They aren’t just security detections — they’re process integrity safeguards. Each one gives the SOC visibility into the exact actions adversaries use during real OT incidents — often before physical impact occurs When combined with contextual data (authorized engineers, maintenance schedules, device baselines) and network telemetry , these detections evolve from simple alerts into actionable operational intelligence #OTSOC #OTsecurity #ICSsecurity

  • No alternative text description for this image
  • No alternative text description for this image
  • No alternative text description for this image
Nick Peeters

OT/ICS Security Passionate - CVO @ Soterics - Making a brighter future in OT/ICS Security - Entrepreneur

5d

Finally some good advise, you hit the nail on the head. I've heard and seen already too much IT SOC providers making bold statements about their OT SOC capabilities. Where in reality they dont have the knowledge and dont know how to react on alerts. "The definition of a Black Hole has changed for me". OT data in, nothing comes out. Its indeed not about having tons of logs, the first important thing is understanding the type of business and type of assets you have in front of you Once you have a mature OT SOC, you can start focusing on proper responding, where we face the next challenge .... 😉

Syed Yusuf Raza, CISSP®

Cyber Security Consultant | Risk Management | TPRM | ISO27001LI | SIEM | SOC |

5d

Thanks Mohammed for sharing. Would request If you can share SIEM use case logic as well for these detection would be great.

Karim Mohamed

OT Cyber Security Lead

5d

Thanks for sharing

Ahmed A.

Senior OT Cybersecurity Engineer | L3 SOC OT Analyst

5d

Finally some good OT Security content on LinkedIN. Thanks for sharing!

Sergio S.

Senior IT\OT Cybersecurity Specialist | Senior Industrial CyberSecurity Specialist | Information Security Specialist | Industrial Network Engineer | Operational Technology Cybersecurity Engineer | Senior IT Engineer

5d

Thanks for sharing Mohamed Atta . Amazing cases!

Pedro Wirya

ICS/OT Cyber Security Consultant, Auditor, and Trainer

5d

Thanks Mohamed Atta 👍🏻

Ian Leroy Arakel

🇮🇳🔒 Passionate InfoSec || 📢🧠 Sharing Knowledge Through Content || 🏭🔗 OT Security & AI 🤖 Journey

5d
N Binh N

WCM, TPM, Kaizen, Automation, OT Cybersecurity, IEC 62443

5d

Good advise !

See more comments

To view or add a comment, sign in

Explore content categories