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I’m excited to share our latest blog “Balancing opportunity and risk: rethinking the China Scholarship Council Programmes (CSC) amid geopolitical tensions” 🥳 🥳 , co-written with Alfredo Yegros and building on our recent paper.
In the post, we explore how CSC international mobility grant programmes both open doors and present challenges, especially in today’s climate of heightened geopolitical tensions. What we found:
✨ • CSC-funded researchers contribute to high-impact research and foster strong international collaborations
✨ • They often help fill funding gaps in under-resourced areas within host countries.
✨ • However, their engagement in security-sensitive research remains limited.
Our analysis draws on analysis about what research is produced, how influential it is, who collaborates with whom, the funding environments involved, and whether research overlaps with sensitive areas.
In the end, we propose policy recommendations calling for a balanced, evidence-based approach for host countries. One that safeguards security without closing the door to collaboration. Trust, transparency and open dialogue might be what keep global science moving forward.
Read the full post on Leiden Madtrics https://lnkd.in/ew534Jqk#ResearchFunding#SciencePolicy#InternationalMobility#ChinaScholarshipCouncil
"Chinese-based scientists filled 45% of leadership roles in US-China joint studies in 2023, up from 30% in 2010. If the trend holds, China will reach parity with the US in 2027 or 2028 — the point at which both sides lead an equal share of joint research."
The US is poised to give up the lead. Cutbacks in federal funding for scientific research won't help -- and will likely accelerate the US decline.
Research Professional News has spotlighted BFPG’s new report on Science and Soft Power, highlighting its calls for the restoration of long-term international funding, stronger coordination and better narratives to harness scientific expertise for global influence.
https://lnkd.in/dn9ju5NU
"In recent months, multiple divisions of the National Natural Science Foundation of China – China’s main provider of basic research funding – have convened seminars related to drafting the 15th five-year plan. Although details of the seminars have not been made public, discussions are believed to have covered issues such as ways to reform the funding system and strengthen support for marginal disciplines."
Alas, funding is less of a matter about fairness or meritocracy than of preserving and strengthening the competitiveness of regional innovation systems in China.
The concentration of research funding in top tier universities, the concentration of top universities in talent-intense and infrastructure-ready regions, and the emergence of competitive innovation clusters in the same regions do not concur as a lucky jackpot----What can a research or innovation breakthrough do in the marginal west if there's no adjacent industry with which it transfers knowledge, shares R&D resources, and provides talents?
Although tweaks may take place, I believe the policymakers will ensure the competitiveness of existing advantageous clusters in Beijing, Shanghai-Suzhou, and GBA not to be threatened.
https://lnkd.in/grqF5UJj
Australia’s research partnership with China is a significant component of its scientific output, particularly in engineering, technology and applied sciences.
By: Elena Collinson, James Laurenceson, Wanning Sun, Marina Zhang and Xunpeng Shi
https://lnkd.in/gUUtg9jP
Thrilled to share our new research published today in PNAS with brilliant colleagues Renli Wu (Northwestern University) and Christopher Esposito (UCLA Anderson)! 🎉
"Shifting power asymmetries in scientific teams reveal China's rising leadership in global science"
We analyzed millions of scientific papers to understand how leadership in international collaborations is shifting by assessing who plays leadership roles in science. Here's what we found:
📊 The Leadership Shift In US-China collaborations: Chinese scientists went from leading 30% of projects (2010) to 45% (2023). Our models project parity by 2027-2028.
🔬 Critical Technologies: China is on track to reach leadership parity with the US in 8 of 11 critical technology areas before 2030—including AI, semiconductors, and advanced communications.
🌍 The Decoupling Paradox: Counterintuitively, our models show that US-China scientific decoupling would actually increase China's global scientific leadership, as Chinese scientists redirect partnerships to countries where they're more likely to lead.
🎓 Belt & Road Investments: China invested $4.6B in training international students (2012-2025), with growing focus on developing countries. This is already translating into scientific leadership in those regions.
💡 What This Means: This isn't a zero-sum game. The real question is whether competition will drive positive investments in global scientific capacity—or whether efforts to restrain progress will harm both nations and slow global advancement.
The dynamics of US-China scientific competition can go in very different directions depending on policy choices made today.
Paper: https://lnkd.in/g_GYzPrt
Grateful to the NSF National Network for Critical Technology Evaluation and UChicago Knowledge Lab#Science#Research#Innovation#GlobalScience#SciencePolicy#China#ChinaPolicy
Pleased that my work with the great Renli Wu and James Evans is now published in PNAS!
James wrote a great synopsis. I wanted to share a bit of the thought process that went into the research.
We were inspired by the idea of the division of labor. When people team up to produce a good or service -- whether in a manufacturing plant or in a scientific lab -- there are leaders (such as bosses and managers), and there are workers who support the leaders. For better or for worse, the leaders hold most of the power: they pick the priorities and capture most of the returns.
In the past 30 years, the production of science globalized, with teams of collaborators spanning international borders. The growth in US-China collaborations is particularly remarkable -- expanding roughly 250-fold since 2000. Often, globalization is thought of as a "great leveler," spreading opportunity and decreasing inequality. But if scientific globalization also extended the division of scientific labor globally, it may have concentrated leadership functions in some countries and supporter functions in others. For example, China could get caught in supporter roles in global collaborations, similar to the "middle income trap" studied in development economics.
We thus asked two main questions: Which country occupies leadership positions in international scientific collaborations? And, how fast is the balance of leadership in US-China collaborations shifting from the US to China?
Our findings surprised us. We found that China is on track to lead the majority of US-China collaborations after 2027-2028, including in Critical Technology Areas as defined by US Congress. Evidently, China rapidly broke away from supportive roles in science and become a global leader.
What explains China's rapid ascent? It appears that advantageous demographics, combined with large investments by the Chinese government to educate its nationals at leading universities in the US, played crucial roles -- as we document in the paper's Supplemental Information. By funding millions of young scientists to study at the world's leading universities, China did not painstakingly climb a development ladder. Instead, it jumped to the top rung.
While the paper is largely empirical, it holds lessons economic development theory. Ultimately, development stems from the ability to organize production. The division of labor in international production provides a window to identify the people and places that organize global production, and the people and places that get organized by others.
Max Palevsky Professor of Sociology & Data Science at the University of Chicago, Santa Fe Institute, & Google
Thrilled to share our new research published today in PNAS with brilliant colleagues Renli Wu (Northwestern University) and Christopher Esposito (UCLA Anderson)! 🎉
"Shifting power asymmetries in scientific teams reveal China's rising leadership in global science"
We analyzed millions of scientific papers to understand how leadership in international collaborations is shifting by assessing who plays leadership roles in science. Here's what we found:
📊 The Leadership Shift In US-China collaborations: Chinese scientists went from leading 30% of projects (2010) to 45% (2023). Our models project parity by 2027-2028.
🔬 Critical Technologies: China is on track to reach leadership parity with the US in 8 of 11 critical technology areas before 2030—including AI, semiconductors, and advanced communications.
🌍 The Decoupling Paradox: Counterintuitively, our models show that US-China scientific decoupling would actually increase China's global scientific leadership, as Chinese scientists redirect partnerships to countries where they're more likely to lead.
🎓 Belt & Road Investments: China invested $4.6B in training international students (2012-2025), with growing focus on developing countries. This is already translating into scientific leadership in those regions.
💡 What This Means: This isn't a zero-sum game. The real question is whether competition will drive positive investments in global scientific capacity—or whether efforts to restrain progress will harm both nations and slow global advancement.
The dynamics of US-China scientific competition can go in very different directions depending on policy choices made today.
Paper: https://lnkd.in/g_GYzPrt
Grateful to the NSF National Network for Critical Technology Evaluation and UChicago Knowledge Lab#Science#Research#Innovation#GlobalScience#SciencePolicy#China#ChinaPolicy
Taiwan’s political polarization is now reaching its universities. The Kuomintang (KMT), which holds a slim majority in parliament, faces accusations of undermining academic independence — particularly that of Academia Sinica, the island’s top research institution. Critics, largely aligned with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), argue that the KMT uses its legislative power to promote “cross-strait normalization” and open the door to Chinese influence in education and research.
Legislator Yeh Yuan-chih’s attacks on Academia Sinica for “blocking” academic exchanges with China symbolize a broader struggle over identity: whether Taiwan should assert a distinct cultural trajectory or embrace shared roots with the mainland. KMT officials deny politicizing academia, insisting that scientific cooperation with China is vital for peace and innovation. Yet, reports from the Global Taiwan Institute and other think tanks warn that such exchanges often serve as channels for Beijing’s United Front operations — recruiting Taiwanese scholars and shaping public narratives favorable to unification.
Cyber operations like “Flax Typhoon” have already targeted Taiwanese universities, stealing intellectual property and research data. Meanwhile, China’s well-funded scholarship programs and joint forums offer soft-power incentives to lure Taiwan’s brightest minds. The KMT’s stance on “peace through engagement” may, intentionally or not, accelerate Beijing’s cultural and technological absorption strategy.
For Taiwan, the issue transcends academia. Its research institutions anchor not only its democratic values but also its global leadership in semiconductors and advanced technology. Weakening them could expose the island’s most strategic assets to foreign control. In the end, the battle for Taiwan’s sovereignty may not begin with an invasion, but with an idea — the quiet erosion of intellectual independence under the guise of cooperation.