What Happened to Erasmus+?

A colleague, an expert in European project writing, wrote to me a sentence that sums it up well: "Applying to Erasmus+ today is like playing the lottery." A bitter conclusion, but one that perfectly reflects the widespread frustration of many organisations.

Erasmus+ is the European programme dedicated to skills development and the support of formal, informal and non-formal education. It is probably the best-known programme even outside the circle of professionals in the field: almost everyone knows someone who has experienced the famous Erasmus year abroad, studying, working or gaining new experiences. Over the decades, tens of thousands of organisations, schools, universities, NGOs, local authorities and associations have taken part in Erasmus+ through its various actions and funding streams. This has helped to make Erasmus+ one of the most recognised symbols of the European Union, capable of combining personal growth, social inclusion and transnational cooperation.

With the current Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027, Erasmus+ has presented itself as even more ambitious than its previous versions. While maintaining its essence, the programme has restructured some aspects of its architecture to better respond to the needs of organisations and beneficiaries. One of the main objectives has been to broaden access, involving also smaller or less experienced organisations that cannot always afford to hire consultants for project writing. In this perspective, Small Scale Partnerships were introduced, compact projects with budgets of 30,000 or 60,000 euros, designed to lower the threshold of access to the programme. At the same time, the lump sum system was introduced, intended to simplify financial management and project reporting. In short, the vision of the current programming period was to strengthen the historic goals of Erasmus+, making it more accessible, inclusive and less complex to manage.

Since 2021, Erasmus+ has also begun to resemble other European programmes more closely. A clear example concerns the templates used for centralised calls, such as those for the Centres of Vocational Excellence, which today are almost identical to those used in EU4Health, Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values, the Employment and Social Inclusion strand of ESF+, as well as in Creative Europe and Digital Europe. This evolution reflects the Commission’s intention to bring Erasmus+ closer to other funding instruments, not only in terms of objectives but also in the way proposals are written and submitted.

These changes might suggest a programme that, through the innovations introduced, has actually become better in many respects for those applying. And to some extent this was true, especially in the early years of the new cycle, starting in 2021. The innovations created the impression of a more accessible, more inclusive and better structured Erasmus+.

However, anyone who has applied in recent years has noticed a major change: the drastic fall in success rates.

The likelihood of having a project funded today is no longer comparable to what it was in 2021, and the differences are striking. This means that while in the first two years of the programme the chances of success were still sustainable, by 2025 the picture is completely different, and it remains to be seen what will happen in the coming years.

The success rate has dropped dramatically, making Erasmus+ now as competitive as other European instruments long known for their selectivity, such as some Horizon Europe calls. The question many are asking is inevitable: why has this happened?

This has happened for at least three main reasons.

1. The first is the sharp increase in applications received, both by national agencies and by EACEA for centralised calls. In recent years, the crisis in the NGO sector has pushed more and more organisations to turn to European funds as a key tool to ensure their survival and carry out their activities. This has led to an exponential growth in the number of applications submitted, a trend that had already been seen in previous Multiannual Financial Frameworks but that has now reached unprecedented levels.
2. In addition, large organisations have entered the programme, applying to Erasmus+ systematically and submitting dozens of proposals each year. For many of them, the programme has become a central and almost indispensable source of funding. It is no coincidence that, starting in 2024, the Commission introduced a cap on the number of projects each organisation can submit, in many cases set at ten applications for most key actions. This measure illustrates not only the scale of the increase but also the attempt to contain it.
3. Another factor has had a strong impact on the programme since 2023, and even more so in 2024 and 2025: the use of artificial intelligence. More and more organisations have started using AI tools to draft their applications. This has not necessarily improved the quality of proposals (in most cases, no significant progress has been observed) but it has had the direct effect of multiplying the number of applications submitted. Thanks to AI, it has become much easier and faster to draft a project, drastically reducing the barriers of time and expertise that previously limited access. As a result, this factor too has contributed significantly to the explosion in applications in recent years.

This is, therefore, the first element to keep in mind when asking why Erasmus+ success rates have dropped so drastically: the massive increase in applications submitted.

Several data points from both national agencies and the European Commission confirm this trend.

For example, in Finland, the national agency EDUFI reported a record-breaking demand for Cooperation Partnerships in higher education in 2024, with 45 applications submitted but only 6 projects funded, corresponding to a success rate of just 13.3%. The agency itself described this as an unprecedented volume of proposals compared to earlier years (EDUFI, Finnish National Agency for Education, 2024).

A broader picture emerges from comparative data published in the Netherlands in early 2025, which document the year-on-year growth of applications and simultaneous drop in success rates for several centralised Erasmus+ actions. In the case of Erasmus+ Virtual Exchanges, the number of projects submitted rose from 58 in 2021 to 160 in 2024, while the success rate fell from 31.7% to just 14%. Similarly, in the Capacity Building in Vocational Education and Training (CBVET) strand, applications nearly tripled from 120 in 2022 to 297 in 2024, and the success rate collapsed from 62.4% in 2022 to 25.9% in 2024 (Universities of the Netherlands, 2025).

These are not isolated cases. At the centralised level, the European Commission itself has published alarming figures. In the 2024 call for Capacity Building in Higher Education (CBHE), only 151 projects out of 897 eligible applications were recommended for funding, representing a success rate of 17% (European Commission, CBHE Results, 2024). The same year, the Erasmus+ Sport action received 1,780 project applications, of which only 302 were selected, again corresponding to a success rate of about 17% (EACEA, Erasmus+ Sport Results, 2024).

At the national level, the picture is equally striking. The Italian National Agency for Youth reported that in the March 2024 deadline for Cooperation Partnerships in the Youth field, 294 projects were submitted but only 34 funded, which means an overall success rate of 11.6%. Within this, Small Scale Partnerships (KA210) accounted for 173 applications, of which only 20 were funded, once again around 11.6% (Agenzia Italiana per la Gioventù, 2024).

Comparative analyses highlight how this trend is affecting many countries simultaneously. According to data compiled by the University Foundation, success rates in Cooperation Partnerships have plummeted in several national contexts: in Slovakia from 77% in 2022 to 13.5% in 2024, in Portugal from 30% in 2023 to 11.5% in 2024, and in Greece from 16% in 2023 to just 7.5% in 2024. Even larger countries are experiencing similar drops: in Spain the success rate was 16.8% in 2024, in Italy 19.8%, in France 36.4%, all significantly lower than in previous cycles (University Foundation, 2024).

Finally, at the macro level, the Erasmus+ Annual Report 2023 underlines the extraordinary scale of the programme today: more than 32,000 projects supported and 1.3 million learning opportunities abroad in a single year, with a budget of €4.5 billion. While these numbers demonstrate the breadth of Erasmus+, they also highlight the extraordinary pressure on the programme: never before have so many organisations sought access to this funding (European Commission, Erasmus+ Annual Report, 2023).

Taken together, these figures leave little doubt. Across countries and across different Key Actions, Erasmus+ has become dramatically more competitive. More applications are being submitted every year, and the success rates have fallen accordingly, in some cases to levels comparable with Horizon Europe calls.

The evaluation system, designed in 2020 to handle a certain volume of projects, suddenly found itself having to deal with an exponentially higher number of applications.

But this dynamic has in turn generated a second problem, concerning the national agencies and EACEA. The evaluation system, designed in 2020 to handle a certain volume of projects, suddenly found itself having to deal with an exponentially higher number of applications.

This is where the weaknesses emerged. Such an overload has highlighted the structural shortcomings of the evaluation system, well perceived not only by applicants but also by many external evaluators engaged by the agencies. The result has been a selection process that is perceived as far less consistent, predictable, and reliable than in the past.

Agencies that in 2021 had to evaluate around one hundred applications today may be faced with 200 or even 300, without a corresponding increase in available budget. This has left them with two options: to overload the external evaluators already engaged, or to increase the number of evaluators involved.

a. In the first case, even though there is a maximum cap on the number of projects that each evaluator can assess, the average workload has nevertheless increased. Considering that financial compensation for evaluators remains relatively low, this has inevitably led, in many cases, to faster and less in-depth assessments than in the past.

b. In the second case, by involving a greater number of evaluators, the overall consistency of the selection process has suffered. Profiles with very different backgrounds and experiences have contributed to a greater heterogeneity of judgments, reducing the consistency and reliability of the final evaluations. Moreover, the expansion of the pool of evaluators has made it more difficult for agencies to select only the best profiles available. Inevitably, the quantitative increase has been accompanied by a qualitative decrease: not all new evaluators have the high-level expertise required for this type of work.

At the same time, agencies do not have sufficient resources to provide thorough training to all evaluators involved. This has led, in some cases, to paradoxical situations: evaluators asked to assess Erasmus+ projects without being familiar with fundamental tools such as the Logical Framework, which forms the methodological basis of the programme’s templates. The lack of specific skills and the absence of systematic training have therefore further undermined the quality and reliability of the evaluation process.

The consequences of this scenario are multiple.

The first, and most obvious, is the above-mentioned much higher level of competitiveness: the same budget now has to cover a much larger number of applications, with the result of drastically lower success rates compared to the past.

Another equally significant consequence is the growing inconsistency of evaluations

Another equally significant consequence is the growing inconsistency of evaluations. As a professional working in this field, and in constant dialogue with colleagues and organisations that submit applications, I can say that one of the main frustrations is the unpredictability of the evaluation process, both at the level of national agencies and of the centralised agency.

This inconsistency manifests itself in at least three forms.

a.      The first is temporal inconsistency: a project that one year receives a good score but is not funded may be corrected following the agency’s feedback, resubmitted the following year and then receive a drastically lower score. The most immediate explanation is that different evaluators assessed the project in the two years. But as already mentioned, the limited expertise and the limited time available to evaluators, two factors closely linked to the overload of the system, result in evaluations that are incoherent over time.

A colleague, an expert in European project writing, after experiencing exactly this situation (a project resubmitted with substantial corrections that ended up with a much lower score than the year before) wrote to me a sentence that sums it up well: “Applying to Erasmus+ today is like playing the lottery.” A bitter conclusion, but one that perfectly reflects the widespread frustration of many organisations.

b.      The second form of inconsistency is geographical. The increase in applications has meant that the budgets of some countries are quickly exhausted, while in others the number of applications has remained lower, making access to the programme easier.

In theory, Erasmus+ should be a programme with common European priorities, with some national adjustments but in general with evaluation processes similar across agencies. In practice, this is not the case. Some agencies are extremely competitive, such as those in Spain, Italy and Greece, while others are far less crowded, such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg or Norway, where success rates are significantly higher.

This imbalance has created what many organisations perceive as a real inequity of the programme. Paradoxically, the same project submitted in a wealthier country such as Norway or Luxembourg has far more chances of being funded than if submitted by a Greek organisation, operating in a less prosperous but far more competitive environment.

c.      The third form of inconsistency is technological, once again linked to artificial intelligence. It is now inevitable that evaluation processes will begin to incorporate AI, and some national agencies already seem to be moving in this direction by starting training programmes for their evaluators.

However, since evaluations are largely managed autonomously at national level, differences between countries risk becoming even greater. Smaller agencies, or those with more resources or with national policies already developed on the use of AI, will likely move first, providing their evaluators with the necessary training. Others, with fewer resources or no specific policies in place, will inevitably move more slowly.

The result will be a new technological inconsistency: evaluation processes that differ from country to country depending on the extent to which AI has been integrated and evaluators have been trained.

Note that, though so far I have spoken mainly about national agencies, which manage a significant share of Erasmus+ calls, it is important to remember that Erasmus+ is a mixed-management programme: alongside national calls, there are many actions managed centrally from Brussels through EACEA. These include Capacity Building, Cooperation Partnerships dedicated to European NGOs, Centres of Vocational Excellence and other specific calls.

The dramatic increase in applications, the resulting fall in success rates and the growing competitiveness, are just as valid for centrally managed projects.

Recent data confirms, for example, the sharp drop in success rates in calls for Strategic Partnerships for European NGOs as well as for the Centres of Vocational Excellence.

A striking example of this trend can be seen in the Centres of Vocational Excellence (CoVEs), one of the flagship centralised actions under Erasmus+. In the 2025 call, more than 303 proposals were submitted, competing for a total budget of €60 million. Considering that the average grant per project is around €3.5 million, the potential success rate is expected to be as low as 5.5%. This represents a dramatic decline compared to previous years: in 2024 the success rate was 12%, in 2023 it was 14.5%, and in 2022 it reached 18.5%. These figures illustrate how one of the programme’s most ambitious actions has quickly become highly selective, with success rates approaching those of Horizon Europe. (data taken from the specific calls’ pages on the EU Funding and Tenders Portal)

What could be the solution to these problems?

No one can claim to have definitive answers, but I would like to share some input that has emerged from numerous discussions with NGOs, evaluators, consultants who work professionally on project writing, and trainers in this field. These are observations that come both from the side of applicants and from the side of evaluators and professionals.

It must be acknowledged realistically that no substantial changes are likely to occur before the end of the current Multiannual Financial Framework, so at least until 2027. After that date, however, a deeper rethinking of the structure of Erasmus+ may become possible.

What should be prioritised? In my view, at least three aspects.

1.      The first concerns the skills of evaluators. Too often evaluators are required to handle an excessive number of projects, with low compensation and with guidance from agencies that is not always adequate. This is not about blaming either evaluators or agencies, but about recognising a fact: if we want a more transparent, fair and consistent evaluation system, we need to strengthen evaluators’ skills.

They must be thoroughly trained on the logic of the programme, starting from the Logical Framework, which is the methodological basis of the current templates. They need to understand why Erasmus+ requires certain project structures, what it means to evaluate objectives rather than activities, and how to recognise the internal coherence of a project. One cannot simply tick boxes on a scoring grid: to evaluate correctly one must grasp the overall logic of a project, and this requires specific and ongoing training.

2.      The second aspect concerns the integration of artificial intelligence into evaluation systems. Clear and common policies on the use of AI in evaluation need to be developed, applicable to all national agencies and to centralised calls managed by EACEA.

It is not sustainable for each agency to move independently, as this would inevitably generate new forms of inequity between countries. Instead, standardised rules for the use of AI in project evaluation must be defined, accompanied by specific training for evaluators on how to use these tools properly. Only in this way can a selection process be ensured that remains fair and coherent across Europe, without creating further imbalances.

3.      The third aspect is the need for a more flexible programme, one that can adapt within the same Multiannual Financial Framework based on feedback from applicants: NGOs, schools, training bodies and all those who are, in the end, the real users of Erasmus+.

Erasmus+ has always been characterised by its predictability: deadlines are the same from year to year, and contents remain essentially constant throughout the programming cycle. This stability has its advantages, but it also presents a clear limitation: even though feedback from applicants is constantly collected, it has not been sufficiently incorporated into the current programming.

Complaints about the inconsistency of evaluations have circulated for years and have been shared both with EACEA and with national agencies, but they have not produced substantial changes. To ensure a programme that is truly fair, inclusive and transparent, it will be necessary for the next cycle, starting in 2028, to be more plastic and adaptable, able to react to evidence from the field and to incorporate applicants’ feedback more quickly.

This is my analysis, which I wanted to share in order to throw a stone into the water and spark a debate. The goal is to encourage open and transparent discussion, gathering input not only from agencies but also from applicants, NGOs, consultants and trainers. Only by working together, with mutual trust, will it be possible to further strengthen a programme that remains extraordinary and that represents one of the most emblematic and recognised experiences of the European Union.

This article is not meant as an attack, but as a constructive contribution to protect Erasmus+, to safeguard the quality of projects and to ensure their impact.

It also means ensuring that applicants find a fair system, that evaluators have the time, skills and financial resources to do their work properly, and that agencies have the tools they need to carry out their role effectively.

The hope is that, through collective and transparent dialogue, concrete solutions can be found to make Erasmus+ not only an exceptional programme, but an even better one in the years to come.

Roberto Zanon, director of SOLVERE

www.solvere.works